From 86812bb0de1a3758dc6c7aa01a763158a7c0638a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 18:55:46 -0700 Subject: Smack: move label list initialization A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support. Move the initialization of predefined Smack label list entries to the LSM initialization from the smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs acquired xattr support, but was never correct. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- security/smack/smackfs.c | 14 -------------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 10056f2f6df..45c32f07416 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3640,8 +3640,38 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { }; -static __init void init_smack_know_list(void) +static __init void init_smack_known_list(void) { + /* + * Initialize CIPSO locks + */ + spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock); + spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock); + spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock); + spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock); + spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock); + spin_lock_init(&smack_known_web.smk_cipsolock); + /* + * Initialize rule list locks + */ + mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock); + mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock); + /* + * Initialize rule lists + */ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules); + /* + * Create the known labels list + */ list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list); list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list); list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list); @@ -3676,16 +3706,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) cred = (struct cred *) current->cred; cred->security = tsp; - /* initialize the smack_know_list */ - init_smack_know_list(); - /* - * Initialize locks - */ - spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock); - spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock); - spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock); - spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock); - spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock); + /* initialize the smack_known_list */ + init_smack_known_list(); /* * Register with LSM diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 5c32f36ff70..038811cb7e6 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -1614,20 +1614,6 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) smk_cipso_doi(); smk_unlbl_ambient(NULL); - mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock); - mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock); - mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock); - mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock); - mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock); - mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock); - - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules); - return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 16:26:54 -0400 Subject: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/commoncap.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 0cf4b53480a..0ecf4ba321c 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -505,6 +505,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } skip: + /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + + /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 51b79bee627d526199b2f6a6bef8ee0c0739b6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonghwan Choi Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2012 17:23:04 -0400 Subject: security: fix compile error in commoncap.c Add missing "personality.h" security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds': security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function) security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.) Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/commoncap.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 0ecf4ba321c..71a166a0597 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in -- cgit v1.2.3