diff options
author | Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> | 2020-09-18 14:08:54 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-09-29 16:08:17 +0100 |
commit | d63d975a71b332df36cc802e6e77a462af6b9fef (patch) | |
tree | 6d9260546f2c21449a646437c281c74001765b15 /arch | |
parent | 7311467702710cc30ac4e3a6c6670a766e7667f9 (diff) |
KVM: arm64: Convert ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()
Convert the KVM WA2 code to using the Spectre infrastructure,
making the code much more readable. It also allows us to
take SSBS into account for the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c | 19 |
3 files changed, 30 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index b1bd2f4cd3e0..9b90a701462c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void) * at EL2. */ if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS) && - arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) { + arm64_get_spectre_v4_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) { kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__kvm_enable_ssbs); } } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c index 69e023dfafce..9824025ccc5c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c @@ -36,13 +36,24 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } break; case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: - switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN: + switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: break; - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED: + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + /* + * SSBS everywhere: Indicate no firmware + * support, as the SSBS support will be + * indicated to the guest and the default is + * safe. + * + * Otherwise, expose a permanent mitigation + * to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the + * guest stays protected. + */ + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + break; + fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED; break; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c index 87e6e3818fb5..db4056ecccfd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c @@ -435,14 +435,19 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid) } return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL; case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: - switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED: - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: + switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) { + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + /* + * As for the hypercall discovery, we pretend we + * don't have any FW mitigation if SSBS is there at + * all times. + */ + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; + fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED; - case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN: - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - default: + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; } } |