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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-05-31 16:52:59 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-05-31 16:52:59 -0700 |
| commit | 1501f707d2b24316b41d45bdc95a73bc8cc8dd49 (patch) | |
| tree | 432a2c255fd269f4910d6c36cfe9eb58cdc92f5d /fs/f2fs/hash.c | |
| parent | 2a5699b0de4ee623d77f183c8e8e62691bd60a70 (diff) | |
| parent | 2d1fe8a86bf5e0663866fd0da83c2af1e1b0e362 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'f2fs-for-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
"In this round, we've refactored the existing atomic write support
implemented by in-memory operations to have storing data in disk
temporarily, which can give us a benefit to accept more atomic writes.
At the same time, we removed the existing volatile write support.
We've also revisited the file pinning and GC flows and found some
corner cases which contributeed abnormal system behaviours.
As usual, there're several minor code refactoring for readability,
sanity check, and clean ups.
Enhancements:
- allow compression for mmap files in compress_mode=user
- kill volatile write support
- change the current atomic write way
- give priority to select unpinned section for foreground GC
- introduce data read/write showing path info
- remove unnecessary f2fs_lock_op in f2fs_new_inode
Bug fixes:
- fix the file pinning flow during checkpoint=disable and GCs
- fix foreground and background GCs to select the right victims and
get free sections on time
- fix GC flags on defragmenting pages
- avoid an infinite loop to flush node pages
- fix fallocate to use file_modified to update permissions
consistently"
* tag 'f2fs-for-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (40 commits)
f2fs: fix to tag gcing flag on page during file defragment
f2fs: replace F2FS_I(inode) and sbi by the local variable
f2fs: add f2fs_init_write_merge_io function
f2fs: avoid unneeded error handling for revoke_entry_slab allocation
f2fs: allow compression for mmap files in compress_mode=user
f2fs: fix typo in comment
f2fs: make f2fs_read_inline_data() more readable
f2fs: fix to do sanity check for inline inode
f2fs: fix fallocate to use file_modified to update permissions consistently
f2fs: don't use casefolded comparison for "." and ".."
f2fs: do not stop GC when requiring a free section
f2fs: keep wait_ms if EAGAIN happens
f2fs: introduce f2fs_gc_control to consolidate f2fs_gc parameters
f2fs: reject test_dummy_encryption when !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
f2fs: kill volatile write support
f2fs: change the current atomic write way
f2fs: don't need inode lock for system hidden quota
f2fs: stop allocating pinned sections if EAGAIN happens
f2fs: skip GC if possible when checkpoint disabling
f2fs: give priority to select unpinned section for foreground GC
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/f2fs/hash.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/f2fs/hash.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/hash.c b/fs/f2fs/hash.c index 3cb1e7a24740..049ce50cec9b 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/hash.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/hash.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static u32 TEA_hash_name(const u8 *p, size_t len) /* * Compute @fname->hash. For all directories, @fname->disk_name must be set. * For casefolded directories, @fname->usr_fname must be set, and also - * @fname->cf_name if the filename is valid Unicode. + * @fname->cf_name if the filename is valid Unicode and is not "." or "..". */ void f2fs_hash_filename(const struct inode *dir, struct f2fs_filename *fname) { @@ -110,10 +110,11 @@ void f2fs_hash_filename(const struct inode *dir, struct f2fs_filename *fname) /* * If the casefolded name is provided, hash it instead of the * on-disk name. If the casefolded name is *not* provided, that - * should only be because the name wasn't valid Unicode, so fall - * back to treating the name as an opaque byte sequence. Note - * that to handle encrypted directories, the fallback must use - * usr_fname (plaintext) rather than disk_name (ciphertext). + * should only be because the name wasn't valid Unicode or was + * "." or "..", so fall back to treating the name as an opaque + * byte sequence. Note that to handle encrypted directories, + * the fallback must use usr_fname (plaintext) rather than + * disk_name (ciphertext). */ WARN_ON_ONCE(!fname->usr_fname->name); if (fname->cf_name.name) { |
