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authorArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>2018-10-18 11:13:01 -0300
committerArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>2018-10-18 11:13:01 -0300
commitce6c9da1113ad681bff27a3e376d2017f7f8a59c (patch)
tree922ee99522f8e47e4fa5c735d4ea378dfdb79085 /fs/proc/base.c
parentd4ae552982de39417d17f823df1f06b1cbc3686c (diff)
parent20e8e72d0fa8e26202932c30d592bade73fdc701 (diff)
Merge remote-tracking branch 'tip/perf/urgent' into perf/core
To pick up fixes. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c14
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ccf86f16d9f0..7e9f07bf260d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -407,6 +407,20 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
unsigned long *entries;
int err;
+ /*
+ * The ability to racily run the kernel stack unwinder on a running task
+ * and then observe the unwinder output is scary; while it is useful for
+ * debugging kernel issues, it can also allow an attacker to leak kernel
+ * stack contents.
+ * Doing this in a manner that is at least safe from races would require
+ * some work to ensure that the remote task can not be scheduled; and
+ * even then, this would still expose the unwinder as local attack
+ * surface.
+ * Therefore, this interface is restricted to root.
+ */
+ if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
entries = kmalloc_array(MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH, sizeof(*entries),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entries)