diff options
| author | Cedric Izoard <Cedric.Izoard@ceva-dsp.com> | 2015-03-17 10:47:33 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> | 2015-03-17 12:34:26 +0100 |
| commit | c7ef38e0ccca25050efed56a35df2e1e93c0b469 (patch) | |
| tree | 041949d9e29d3f54936ccbd8de9b5c449ad5036e /net/mac80211 | |
| parent | 8a4988d13734f9340ba8b34467d8ea09347b55d5 (diff) | |
mac80211: Get IV len from key conf and not cipher scheme
When a key is installed using a cipher scheme, set a new
internal key flag (KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) on it, to allow
distinguishing such keys more easily.
In particular, use this flag on the TX path instead of
testing the sta->cipher_scheme pointer, as the station is
NULL for broad-/multicast message, and use the key's iv_len
instead of the cipher scheme information.
Signed-off-by: Cedric Izoard <cedric.izoard@ceva-dsp.com>
[add missing documentation, rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/key.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/key.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/wpa.c | 13 |
3 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index 0825d76edcfc..2291cd730091 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len, for (j = 0; j < len; j++) key->u.gen.rx_pn[i][j] = seq[len - j - 1]; + key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME; } } memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len); diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h index d57a9915494f..c5a31835be0e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.h +++ b/net/mac80211/key.h @@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ struct sta_info; * @KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE: Indicates that this key is present * in the hardware for TX crypto hardware acceleration. * @KEY_FLAG_TAINTED: Key is tainted and packets should be dropped. + * @KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME: This key is for a hardware cipher scheme */ enum ieee80211_internal_key_flags { KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE = BIT(0), KEY_FLAG_TAINTED = BIT(1), + KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME = BIT(2), }; enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state { diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 75de6fac40d1..9d63d93c836e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -780,9 +780,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); - const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme; int hdrlen; - u8 *pos; + u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len; if (info->control.hw_key && !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { @@ -790,14 +789,14 @@ ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, return TX_CONTINUE; } - if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len && - pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))) + if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len && + pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))) return TX_DROP; hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); - pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len); - memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen); + pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len); + memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen); return TX_CONTINUE; } @@ -1217,7 +1216,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) if (!info->control.hw_key) return TX_DROP; - if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) { + if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) { res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb); if (res != TX_CONTINUE) return res; |