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authorTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>2020-07-09 01:19:05 -0500
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2020-07-16 21:53:55 -0400
commiteb624fe214a2e156ddafd9868377cf91499f789d (patch)
tree590ece87004d5d95da553a1f51fe4ea11a09f13b /security/integrity
parentdb2045f5892a9db7354442bf77f9b03b50ff9ee1 (diff)
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported. Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c7
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1c64bd6f1728..81da02071d41 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
return false;
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+ IMA_KEYRINGS))
+ return false;
+
+ if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+ return false;
+
break;
default:
return false;