diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64')
130 files changed, 3336 insertions, 1878 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 6d232837cbee..893130ce1626 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_STACKWALK select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_DEVICE @@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ config ARM64 select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP select GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP + select GENERIC_IRQ_IPI select GENERIC_IRQ_MULTI_HANDLER select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW @@ -211,12 +213,18 @@ config ARM64_PAGE_SHIFT default 14 if ARM64_16K_PAGES default 12 -config ARM64_CONT_SHIFT +config ARM64_CONT_PTE_SHIFT int default 5 if ARM64_64K_PAGES default 7 if ARM64_16K_PAGES default 4 +config ARM64_CONT_PMD_SHIFT + int + default 5 if ARM64_64K_PAGES + default 5 if ARM64_16K_PAGES + default 4 + config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES @@ -1033,19 +1041,6 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18) -config SECCOMP - bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" - help - This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications - that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their - execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to - the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write - syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in - their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is - enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled - and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls - defined by each seccomp mode. - config PARAVIRT bool "Enable paravirtualization code" help @@ -1165,32 +1160,6 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR - bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on - being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by - executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks - can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch - predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. - - This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the - branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific - instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system - firmware. - - If unsure, say Y. - -config ARM64_SSBD - bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT - default y - help - This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores - by speculative loads. - - If unsure, say Y. - config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases" default y @@ -1630,8 +1599,6 @@ config ARM64_BTI_KERNEL depends on CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94697 depends on !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 100100 - # https://reviews.llvm.org/rGb8ae3fdfa579dbf366b1bb1cbfdbf8c51db7fa55 - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 100001 depends on !(CC_IS_CLANG && GCOV_KERNEL) depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) help @@ -1664,6 +1631,39 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number generator. +config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE + # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with + # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete + # as a late addition to the final architecture spec (LDGM/STGM) + # is only supported in the newer 2.32.x and 2.33 binutils + # versions, hence the extra "stgm" instruction check below. + def_bool $(as-instr,.arch armv8.5-a+memtag\nstgm xzr$(comma)[x0]) + +config ARM64_MTE + bool "Memory Tagging Extension support" + default y + depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + help + Memory Tagging (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides + architectural support for run-time, always-on detection of + various classes of memory error to aid with software debugging + to eliminate vulnerabilities arising from memory-unsafe + languages. + + This option enables the support for the Memory Tagging + Extension at EL0 (i.e. for userspace). + + Selecting this option allows the feature to be detected at + runtime. Any secondary CPU not implementing this feature will + not be allowed a late bring-up. + + Userspace binaries that want to use this feature must + explicitly opt in. The mechanism for the userspace is + described in: + + Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst. + endmenu config ARM64_SVE @@ -1876,6 +1876,10 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION def_bool y depends on HUGETLB_PAGE && MIGRATION +config ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION + def_bool y + depends on TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE + menu "Power management options" source "kernel/power/Kconfig" diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile index 130569f90c54..f4717facf31e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ # Copyright (C) 1995-2001 by Russell King LDFLAGS_vmlinux :=--no-undefined -X -CPPFLAGS_vmlinux.lds = -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) ifeq ($(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE), y) # Pass --no-apply-dynamic-relocs to restore pre-binutils-2.27 behaviour @@ -29,6 +28,10 @@ LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --fix-cortex-a53-843419 endif endif +# We never want expected sections to be placed heuristically by the +# linker. All sections should be explicitly named in the linker script. +LDFLAGS_vmlinux += $(call ld-option, --orphan-handling=warn) + ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_USE_LSE_ATOMICS), y) ifneq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS), y) $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils) @@ -47,13 +50,16 @@ endif KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mgeneral-regs-only \ $(compat_vdso) $(cc_has_k_constraint) -KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, psabi) KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(compat_vdso) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64) KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64) +# Avoid generating .eh_frame* sections. +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables +KBUILD_AFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables + ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK),y) prepare: stack_protector_prepare stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 @@ -132,9 +138,6 @@ endif # Default value head-y := arch/arm64/kernel/head.o -# The byte offset of the kernel image in RAM from the start of RAM. -TEXT_OFFSET := 0x0 - ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS), y) KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT := 4 else @@ -145,8 +148,6 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DKASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT=$(KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DKASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT=$(KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DKASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT=$(KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) -export TEXT_OFFSET - core-y += arch/arm64/ libs-y := arch/arm64/lib/ $(libs-y) libs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi index 2bbc69b4dc99..d5b6c0a1c54a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ }; pcie_reset_pins: pcie-reset-pins { - groups = "pcie1"; + groups = "pcie1"; /* this actually controls "pcie1_reset" */ function = "gpio"; }; diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c index da1034867aaa..8536008e3e35 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u64 dg[2] = {}; - u128 lengths; + be128 lengths; u8 *tag; int err; @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u64 dg[2] = {}; - u128 lengths; + be128 lengths; u8 *tag; int err; diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.c index 565ef604ca04..c63b99211db3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.c @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ struct sha1_ce_state { u32 finalize; }; +extern const u32 sha1_ce_offsetof_count; +extern const u32 sha1_ce_offsetof_finalize; + asmlinkage void sha1_ce_transform(struct sha1_ce_state *sst, u8 const *src, int blocks); diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c index 9450d19b9e6e..5e956d7582a5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ struct sha256_ce_state { u32 finalize; }; +extern const u32 sha256_ce_offsetof_count; +extern const u32 sha256_ce_offsetof_finalize; + asmlinkage void sha2_ce_transform(struct sha256_ce_state *sst, u8 const *src, int blocks); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_gicv3.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_gicv3.h index 6647ae4f0231..880b9054d75c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_gicv3.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_gicv3.h @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static inline bool gic_prio_masking_enabled(void) static inline void gic_pmr_mask_irqs(void) { - BUILD_BUG_ON(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI < (GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF | + BUILD_BUG_ON(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI < (__GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET)); BUILD_BUG_ON(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI >= GIC_PRIO_IRQON); /* @@ -162,6 +162,12 @@ static inline void gic_pmr_mask_irqs(void) * are applied to IRQ priorities */ BUILD_BUG_ON((0x80 | (GICD_INT_DEF_PRI >> 1)) >= GIC_PRIO_IRQON); + /* + * Same situation as above, but now we make sure that we can mask + * regular interrupts. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON((0x80 | (GICD_INT_DEF_PRI >> 1)) < (__GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF_NS | + GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET)); gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h index 44209f6146aa..ffb1a40d5475 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -79,10 +79,5 @@ arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) } #define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early -#else - -static inline bool __arm64_rndr(unsigned long *v) { return false; } -static inline bool __init __early_cpu_has_rndr(void) { return false; } - #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h index fb4c27506ef4..c3009b0e5239 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #define rmb() dsb(ld) #define wmb() dsb(st) +#define dma_mb() dmb(osh) #define dma_rmb() dmb(oshld) #define dma_wmb() dmb(oshst) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/boot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/boot.h index c7f67da13cd9..3e7943fd17a4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/boot.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/boot.h @@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ #define MAX_FDT_SIZE SZ_2M /* - * arm64 requires the kernel image to placed - * TEXT_OFFSET bytes beyond a 2 MB aligned base + * arm64 requires the kernel image to placed at a 2 MB aligned base address */ #define MIN_KIMG_ALIGN SZ_2M diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h index 935d2aa231bf..23a9fb73c04f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h @@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ typedef s32 compat_nlink_t; typedef u16 compat_ipc_pid_t; typedef u32 compat_caddr_t; typedef __kernel_fsid_t compat_fsid_t; -typedef s64 compat_s64; -typedef u64 compat_u64; struct compat_stat { #ifdef __AARCH64EB__ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu_ops.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu_ops.h index d28e8f37d3b4..e95c4df83911 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu_ops.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu_ops.h @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ * mechanism for doing so, tests whether it is possible to boot * the given CPU. * @cpu_boot: Boots a cpu into the kernel. - * @cpu_postboot: Optionally, perform any post-boot cleanup or necesary + * @cpu_postboot: Optionally, perform any post-boot cleanup or necessary * synchronisation. Called from the cpu being booted. * @cpu_can_disable: Determines whether a CPU can be disabled based on * mechanism-specific information. diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h index 07b643a70710..42868dbd29fd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h @@ -31,13 +31,13 @@ #define ARM64_HAS_DCPOP 21 #define ARM64_SVE 22 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 23 -#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR 24 +#define ARM64_SPECTRE_V2 24 #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN 25 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419 26 #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC 27 #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC 28 #define ARM64_HW_DBM 29 -#define ARM64_SSBD 30 +#define ARM64_SPECTRE_V4 30 #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE 31 #define ARM64_HAS_STAGE2_FWB 32 #define ARM64_HAS_CRC32 33 @@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ #define ARM64_BTI 54 #define ARM64_HAS_ARMv8_4_TTL 55 #define ARM64_HAS_TLB_RANGE 56 +#define ARM64_MTE 57 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 57 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 58 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 89b4f0142c28..f7e7144af174 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static inline int cpucap_default_scope(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) } /* - * Generic helper for handling capabilties with multiple (match,enable) pairs + * Generic helper for handling capabilities with multiple (match,enable) pairs * of call backs, sharing the same capability bit. * Iterate over each entry to see if at least one matches. */ @@ -681,6 +681,12 @@ static __always_inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking(void) cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING); } +static inline bool system_supports_mte(void) +{ + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE) && + cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_MTE); +} + static inline bool system_has_prio_mask_debugging(void) { return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_DEBUG_PRIORITY_MASKING) && @@ -698,30 +704,6 @@ static inline bool system_supports_tlb_range(void) cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_TLB_RANGE); } -#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN -1 -#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED 0 -#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED 1 - -int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void); - -#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1 -#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0 -#define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL 1 -#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2 -#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED 3 - -static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD - extern int ssbd_state; - return ssbd_state; -#else - return ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; -#endif -} - -void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state); - extern int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt); static inline u32 id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_phys_shift(int parange) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h index d4ab3f73e7a3..973b14415271 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ efi_status_t __efi_rt_asm_wrapper(void *, const char *, ...); (SEGMENT_ALIGN > THREAD_ALIGN ? SEGMENT_ALIGN : THREAD_ALIGN) /* on arm64, the FDT may be located anywhere in system RAM */ -static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long dram_base) +static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr) { return ULONG_MAX; } @@ -80,8 +80,7 @@ static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long dram_base) * apply to other bootloaders, and are required for some kernel * configurations. */ -static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_initrd_addr(unsigned long dram_base, - unsigned long image_addr) +static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_initrd_addr(unsigned long image_addr) { return (image_addr & ~(SZ_1G - 1UL)) + (1UL << (VA_BITS_MIN - 1)); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h index 035003acfa87..22c81f1edda2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h @@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ #define ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64 (0x18) #define ESR_ELx_EC_SVE (0x19) #define ESR_ELx_EC_ERET (0x1a) /* EL2 only */ -/* Unallocated EC: 0x1b - 0x1E */ +/* Unallocated EC: 0x1B */ +#define ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC (0x1C) /* EL1 and above */ +/* Unallocated EC: 0x1D - 0x1E */ #define ESR_ELx_EC_IMP_DEF (0x1f) /* EL3 only */ #define ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW (0x20) #define ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR (0x21) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h index 7577a754d443..99b9383cd036 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h @@ -47,4 +47,5 @@ void bad_el0_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr); void do_cp15instr(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs); void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs); void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs); +void do_ptrauth_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr); #endif /* __ASM_EXCEPTION_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h index 840a35ed92ec..b15eb4a3e6b2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/extable.h @@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ struct exception_table_entry #define ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE +static inline bool in_bpf_jit(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_JIT)) + return false; + + return regs->pc >= BPF_JIT_REGION_START && + regs->pc < BPF_JIT_REGION_END; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT int arm64_bpf_fixup_exception(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, struct pt_regs *regs); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index 59f10dd13f12..bec5f14b622a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ static inline void *sve_pffr(struct thread_struct *thread) extern void sve_save_state(void *state, u32 *pfpsr); extern void sve_load_state(void const *state, u32 const *pfpsr, unsigned long vq_minus_1); +extern void sve_flush_live(void); +extern void sve_load_from_fpsimd_state(struct user_fpsimd_state const *state, + unsigned long vq_minus_1); extern unsigned int sve_get_vl(void); struct arm64_cpu_capabilities; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index 636e9d9c7929..af43367534c7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -164,25 +164,59 @@ | ((\np) << 5) .endm +/* PFALSE P\np.B */ +.macro _sve_pfalse np + _sve_check_preg \np + .inst 0x2518e400 \ + | (\np) +.endm + .macro __for from:req, to:req .if (\from) == (\to) - _for__body \from + _for__body %\from .else - __for \from, (\from) + ((\to) - (\from)) / 2 - __for (\from) + ((\to) - (\from)) / 2 + 1, \to + __for %\from, %((\from) + ((\to) - (\from)) / 2) + __for %((\from) + ((\to) - (\from)) / 2 + 1), %\to .endif .endm .macro _for var:req, from:req, to:req, insn:vararg .macro _for__body \var:req + .noaltmacro \insn + .altmacro .endm + .altmacro __for \from, \to + .noaltmacro .purgem _for__body .endm +/* Update ZCR_EL1.LEN with the new VQ */ +.macro sve_load_vq xvqminus1, xtmp, xtmp2 + mrs_s \xtmp, SYS_ZCR_EL1 + bic \xtmp2, \xtmp, ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK + orr \xtmp2, \xtmp2, \xvqminus1 + cmp \xtmp2, \xtmp + b.eq 921f + msr_s SYS_ZCR_EL1, \xtmp2 //self-synchronising +921: +.endm + +/* Preserve the first 128-bits of Znz and zero the rest. */ +.macro _sve_flush_z nz + _sve_check_zreg \nz + mov v\nz\().16b, v\nz\().16b +.endm + +.macro sve_flush + _for n, 0, 31, _sve_flush_z \n + _for n, 0, 15, _sve_pfalse \n + _sve_wrffr 0 +.endm + .macro sve_save nxbase, xpfpsr, nxtmp _for n, 0, 31, _sve_str_v \n, \nxbase, \n - 34 _for n, 0, 15, _sve_str_p \n, \nxbase, \n - 16 @@ -197,13 +231,7 @@ .endm .macro sve_load nxbase, xpfpsr, xvqminus1, nxtmp, xtmp2 - mrs_s x\nxtmp, SYS_ZCR_EL1 - bic \xtmp2, x\nxtmp, ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK - orr \xtmp2, \xtmp2, \xvqminus1 - cmp \xtmp2, x\nxtmp - b.eq 921f - msr_s SYS_ZCR_EL1, \xtmp2 // self-synchronising -921: + sve_load_vq \xvqminus1, x\nxtmp, \xtmp2 _for n, 0, 31, _sve_ldr_v \n, \nxbase, \n - 34 _sve_ldr_p 0, \nxbase _sve_wrffr 0 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h index 985493af704b..5ffa4bacdad3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h @@ -13,21 +13,12 @@ #include <asm/kvm_arm.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> -#define NR_IPI 7 - typedef struct { unsigned int __softirq_pending; - unsigned int ipi_irqs[NR_IPI]; } ____cacheline_aligned irq_cpustat_t; #include <linux/irq_cpustat.h> /* Standard mappings for irq_cpustat_t above */ -#define __inc_irq_stat(cpu, member) __IRQ_STAT(cpu, member)++ -#define __get_irq_stat(cpu, member) __IRQ_STAT(cpu, member) - -u64 smp_irq_stat_cpu(unsigned int cpu); -#define arch_irq_stat_cpu smp_irq_stat_cpu - #define __ARCH_IRQ_EXIT_IRQS_DISABLED 1 struct nmi_ctx { diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h index 22f73fe09030..9a5498c2c8ee 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h @@ -8,18 +8,27 @@ #include <uapi/asm/hwcap.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_SWP (1 << 0) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_HALF (1 << 1) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_THUMB (1 << 2) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_26BIT (1 << 3) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_FAST_MULT (1 << 4) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_FPA (1 << 5) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_VFP (1 << 6) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_EDSP (1 << 7) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_JAVA (1 << 8) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_IWMMXT (1 << 9) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_CRUNCH (1 << 10) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_THUMBEE (1 << 11) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv3 (1 << 13) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPV3D16 (1 << 14) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_TLS (1 << 15) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv4 (1 << 16) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVA (1 << 17) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVT (1 << 18) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV (COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVA|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIVT) +#define COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPD32 (1 << 19) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE (1 << 20) #define COMPAT_HWCAP_EVTSTRM (1 << 21) @@ -95,7 +104,7 @@ #define KERNEL_HWCAP_DGH __khwcap2_feature(DGH) #define KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG __khwcap2_feature(RNG) #define KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI __khwcap2_feature(BTI) -/* reserved for KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE __khwcap2_feature(MTE) */ +#define KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE __khwcap2_feature(MTE) /* * This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h index 0bc46149e491..4b39293d0f72 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h @@ -359,9 +359,13 @@ __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(brk, 0xFFE0001F, 0xD4200000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(exception, 0xFF000000, 0xD4000000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(hint, 0xFFFFF01F, 0xD503201F) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(br, 0xFFFFFC1F, 0xD61F0000) +__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(br_auth, 0xFEFFF800, 0xD61F0800) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(blr, 0xFFFFFC1F, 0xD63F0000) +__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(blr_auth, 0xFEFFF800, 0xD63F0800) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(ret, 0xFFFFFC1F, 0xD65F0000) +__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(ret_auth, 0xFFFFFBFF, 0xD65F0BFF) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(eret, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xD69F03E0) +__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(eret_auth, 0xFFFFFBFF, 0xD69F0BFF) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(mrs, 0xFFF00000, 0xD5300000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(msr_imm, 0xFFF8F01F, 0xD500401F) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(msr_reg, 0xFFF00000, 0xD5100000) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h index ff50dd731852..fd172c41df90 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static inline u64 __raw_readq(const volatile void __iomem *addr) #define __io_par(v) __iormb(v) #define __iowmb() dma_wmb() +#define __iomb() dma_mb() /* * Relaxed I/O memory access primitives. These follow the Device memory diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/irq_work.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/irq_work.h index 8a1ef1907760..a1020285ea75 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/irq_work.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/irq_work.h @@ -2,11 +2,9 @@ #ifndef __ASM_IRQ_WORK_H #define __ASM_IRQ_WORK_H -#include <asm/smp.h> - static inline bool arch_irq_work_has_interrupt(void) { - return !!__smp_cross_call; + return true; } #endif /* __ASM_IRQ_WORK_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h index 329fb15f6bac..19ca76ea60d9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ + EARLY_PGDS((vstart), (vend)) /* each PGDIR needs a next level page table */ \ + EARLY_PUDS((vstart), (vend)) /* each PUD needs a next level page table */ \ + EARLY_PMDS((vstart), (vend))) /* each PMD needs a next level page table */ -#define INIT_DIR_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE * EARLY_PAGES(KIMAGE_VADDR + TEXT_OFFSET, _end)) +#define INIT_DIR_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE * EARLY_PAGES(KIMAGE_VADDR, _end)) #define IDMAP_DIR_SIZE (IDMAP_PGTABLE_LEVELS * PAGE_SIZE) #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h index 1da8e3dc4455..64ce29378467 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <asm/types.h> /* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */ +#define HCR_ATA (UL(1) << 56) #define HCR_FWB (UL(1) << 46) #define HCR_API (UL(1) << 41) #define HCR_APK (UL(1) << 40) @@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ * TWI: Trap WFI * TIDCP: Trap L2CTLR/L2ECTLR * BSU_IS: Upgrade barriers to the inner shareable domain - * FB: Force broadcast of all maintainance operations + * FB: Force broadcast of all maintenance operations * AMO: Override CPSR.A and enable signaling with VA * IMO: Override CPSR.I and enable signaling with VI * FMO: Override CPSR.F and enable signaling with VF @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ HCR_AMO | HCR_SWIO | HCR_TIDCP | HCR_RW | HCR_TLOR | \ HCR_FMO | HCR_IMO | HCR_PTW ) #define HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK (HCR_VSE | HCR_VI | HCR_VF) -#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_API | HCR_APK) +#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_API | HCR_APK | HCR_ATA) #define HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_TGE | HCR_E2H) /* TCR_EL2 Registers bits */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h index 6f98fbd0ac81..7f7072f6cb45 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h @@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ #include <asm/virt.h> -#define VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT 0 -#define VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG (_AC(1, UL) << VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT) - #define ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT 31 #define ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(x) ((x) & ~(1U << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT)) #define ARM_EXCEPTION_IS_TRAP(x) (ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE((x)) == ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP) @@ -102,11 +99,9 @@ DECLARE_KVM_HYP_SYM(__kvm_hyp_vector); #define __kvm_hyp_init CHOOSE_NVHE_SYM(__kvm_hyp_init) #define __kvm_hyp_vector CHOOSE_HYP_SYM(__kvm_hyp_vector) -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot; DECLARE_KVM_HYP_SYM(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs); #define __bp_harden_hyp_vecs CHOOSE_HYP_SYM(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs) -#endif extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void); extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t ipa, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h index 1cc5f5f72d0b..5ef2669ccd6c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h @@ -391,20 +391,6 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK; } -static inline bool kvm_arm_get_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - return vcpu->arch.workaround_flags & VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG; -} - -static inline void kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - bool flag) -{ - if (flag) - vcpu->arch.workaround_flags |= VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG; - else - vcpu->arch.workaround_flags &= ~VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG; -} - static inline void kvm_vcpu_set_be(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { if (vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu)) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 905c2b87e05a..bb5e5b88d439 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -631,46 +631,6 @@ static inline void kvm_set_pmu_events(u32 set, struct perf_event_attr *attr) {} static inline void kvm_clr_pmu_events(u32 clr) {} #endif -#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN -1 -#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED 0 -#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED 1 - -static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void) -{ - switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) { - case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED: - return KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED; - case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED: - return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED; - case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN: - default: - return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN; - } -} - -#define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1 -#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0 -#define KVM_SSBD_KERNEL 1 -#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2 -#define KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED 3 - -static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void) -{ - switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE; - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: - return KVM_SSBD_KERNEL; - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE; - case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED: - return KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED; - case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN: - default: - return KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN; - } -} - void kvm_vcpu_load_sysregs_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_vcpu_put_sysregs_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h index 189839c3706a..cff1cebc7590 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/memory.h> +#include <asm/mmu.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* @@ -430,19 +431,17 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, return ret; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS /* * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways, * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present: * - * - If the CPU has the ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the - * hardening sequence is placed in one of the vector slots, which is - * executed before jumping to the real vectors. + * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is + * placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping + * to the real vectors. * - * - If the CPU has both the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap and the - * ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the slot containing the - * hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page, and executed - * before jumping to the real vectors. + * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot + * containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page, + * and executed before jumping to the real vectors. * * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an * empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and @@ -452,19 +451,16 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored. */ -#include <asm/mmu.h> - extern void *__kvm_bp_vect_base; extern int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot; -/* This is called on both VHE and !VHE systems */ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void) { struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(); void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector)); int slot = -1; - if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) && data->fn) { + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) { vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)); slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot; } @@ -481,76 +477,6 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void) return vect; } -/* This is only called on a !VHE system */ -static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void) -{ - /* - * HBP = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR - * HEL2 = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS - * - * !HBP + !HEL2 -> use direct vectors - * HBP + !HEL2 -> use hardened vectors in place - * !HBP + HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping - * HBP + HEL2 -> use hardened vertors and use exec mapping - */ - if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) { - __kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs); - __kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base); - } - - if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) { - phys_addr_t vect_pa = __pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs); - unsigned long size = __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ; - - /* - * Always allocate a spare vector slot, as we don't - * know yet which CPUs have a BP hardening slot that - * we can reuse. - */ - __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot); - BUG_ON(__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS); - return create_hyp_exec_mappings(vect_pa, size, - &__kvm_bp_vect_base); - } - - return 0; -} -#else -static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void) -{ - return kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector)); -} - -static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif - -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD -DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); - -static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void) -{ - int cpu, err; - - for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - u64 *ptr; - - ptr = per_cpu_ptr(&arm64_ssbd_callback_required, cpu); - err = create_hyp_mappings(ptr, ptr + 1, PAGE_HYP); - if (err) - return err; - } - return 0; -} -#else -static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif - #define kvm_phys_to_vttbr(addr) phys_to_ttbr(addr) /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h index afa722504bfd..43640d797455 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h @@ -126,13 +126,18 @@ /* * Memory types available. + * + * IMPORTANT: MT_NORMAL must be index 0 since vm_get_page_prot() may 'or' in + * the MT_NORMAL_TAGGED memory type for PROT_MTE mappings. Note + * that protection_map[] only contains MT_NORMAL attributes. */ -#define MT_DEVICE_nGnRnE 0 -#define MT_DEVICE_nGnRE 1 -#define MT_DEVICE_GRE 2 -#define MT_NORMAL_NC 3 -#define MT_NORMAL 4 -#define MT_NORMAL_WT 5 +#define MT_NORMAL 0 +#define MT_NORMAL_TAGGED 1 +#define MT_NORMAL_NC 2 +#define MT_NORMAL_WT 3 +#define MT_DEVICE_nGnRnE 4 +#define MT_DEVICE_nGnRE 5 +#define MT_DEVICE_GRE 6 /* * Memory types for Stage-2 translation @@ -169,7 +174,7 @@ extern s64 memstart_addr; /* PHYS_OFFSET - the physical address of the start of memory. */ #define PHYS_OFFSET ({ VM_BUG_ON(memstart_addr & 1); memstart_addr; }) -/* the virtual base of the kernel image (minus TEXT_OFFSET) */ +/* the virtual base of the kernel image */ extern u64 kimage_vaddr; /* the offset between the kernel virtual and physical mappings */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h index 081ec8de9ea6..e3e28f7daf62 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h @@ -9,16 +9,53 @@ static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, unsigned long pkey __always_unused) { + unsigned long ret = 0; + if (system_supports_bti() && (prot & PROT_BTI)) - return VM_ARM64_BTI; + ret |= VM_ARM64_BTI; - return 0; + if (system_supports_mte() && (prot & PROT_MTE)) + ret |= VM_MTE; + + return ret; } #define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags) +{ + /* + * Only allow MTE on anonymous mappings as these are guaranteed to be + * backed by tags-capable memory. The vm_flags may be overridden by a + * filesystem supporting MTE (RAM-based). + */ + if (system_supports_mte() && (flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) + return VM_MTE_ALLOWED; + + return 0; +} +#define arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) + static inline pgprot_t arch_vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags) { - return (vm_flags & VM_ARM64_BTI) ? __pgprot(PTE_GP) : __pgprot(0); + pteval_t prot = 0; + + if (vm_flags & VM_ARM64_BTI) + prot |= PTE_GP; + + /* + * There are two conditions required for returning a Normal Tagged + * memory type: (1) the user requested it via PROT_MTE passed to + * mmap() or mprotect() and (2) the corresponding vma supports MTE. We + * register (1) as VM_MTE in the vma->vm_flags and (2) as + * VM_MTE_ALLOWED. Note that the latter can only be set during the + * mmap() call since mprotect() does not accept MAP_* flags. + * Checking for VM_MTE only is sufficient since arch_validate_flags() + * does not permit (VM_MTE & !VM_MTE_ALLOWED). + */ + if (vm_flags & VM_MTE) + prot |= PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_TAGGED); + + return __pgprot(prot); } #define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) @@ -30,8 +67,21 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, if (system_supports_bti()) supported |= PROT_BTI; + if (system_supports_mte()) + supported |= PROT_MTE; + return (prot & ~supported) == 0; } #define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return true; + + /* only allow VM_MTE if VM_MTE_ALLOWED has been set previously */ + return !(vm_flags & VM_MTE) || (vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED); +} +#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) + #endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index a7a5ecaa2e83..b2e91c187e2a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -17,11 +17,14 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/refcount.h> + typedef struct { atomic64_t id; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT void *sigpage; #endif + refcount_t pinned; void *vdso; unsigned long flags; } mm_context_t; @@ -45,7 +48,6 @@ struct bp_hardening_data { bp_hardening_cb_t fn; }; -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) @@ -57,21 +59,13 @@ static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { struct bp_hardening_data *d; - if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) + if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2)) return; d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(); if (d->fn) d->fn(); } -#else -static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) -{ - return NULL; -} - -static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { } -#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ extern void arm64_memblock_init(void); extern void paging_init(void); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h index f2d7537d6f83..0672236e1aea 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -177,7 +177,13 @@ static inline void cpu_replace_ttbr1(pgd_t *pgdp) #define destroy_context(mm) do { } while(0) void check_and_switch_context(struct mm_struct *mm); -#define init_new_context(tsk,mm) ({ atomic64_set(&(mm)->context.id, 0); 0; }) +static inline int +init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + atomic64_set(&mm->context.id, 0); + refcount_set(&mm->context.pinned, 0); + return 0; +} #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN static inline void update_saved_ttbr0(struct task_struct *tsk, @@ -248,6 +254,9 @@ switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, void verify_cpu_asid_bits(void); void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void); +unsigned long arm64_mm_context_get(struct mm_struct *mm); +void arm64_mm_context_put(struct mm_struct *mm); + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* !__ASM_MMU_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c99fcadb58c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Ltd. + */ +#ifndef __ASM_MTE_H +#define __ASM_MTE_H + +#define MTE_GRANULE_SIZE UL(16) +#define MTE_GRANULE_MASK (~(MTE_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)) +#define MTE_TAG_SHIFT 56 +#define MTE_TAG_SIZE 4 + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#include <linux/page-flags.h> + +#include <asm/pgtable-types.h> + +void mte_clear_page_tags(void *addr); +unsigned long mte_copy_tags_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, + unsigned long n); +unsigned long mte_copy_tags_to_user(void __user *to, void *from, + unsigned long n); +int mte_save_tags(struct page *page); +void mte_save_page_tags(const void *page_addr, void *tag_storage); +bool mte_restore_tags(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page); +void mte_restore_page_tags(void *page_addr, const void *tag_storage); +void mte_invalidate_tags(int type, pgoff_t offset); +void mte_invalidate_tags_area(int type); +void *mte_allocate_tag_storage(void); +void mte_free_tag_storage(char *storage); + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + +/* track which pages have valid allocation tags */ +#define PG_mte_tagged PG_arch_2 + +void mte_sync_tags(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte); +void mte_copy_page_tags(void *kto, const void *kfrom); +void flush_mte_state(void); +void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next); +void mte_suspend_exit(void); +long set_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg); +long get_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task); +int mte_ptrace_copy_tags(struct task_struct *child, long request, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); + +#else + +/* unused if !CONFIG_ARM64_MTE, silence the compiler */ +#define PG_mte_tagged 0 + +static inline void mte_sync_tags(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) +{ +} +static inline void mte_copy_page_tags(void *kto, const void *kfrom) +{ +} +static inline void flush_mte_state(void) +{ +} +static inline void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ +} +static inline void mte_suspend_exit(void) +{ +} +static inline long set_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline long get_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline int mte_ptrace_copy_tags(struct task_struct *child, + long request, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long data) +{ + return -EIO; +} + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +#endif /* __ASM_MTE_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/numa.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/numa.h index 626ad01e83bf..dd870390d639 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/numa.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/numa.h @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ const struct cpumask *cpumask_of_node(int node); /* Returns a pointer to the cpumask of CPUs on Node 'node'. */ static inline const struct cpumask *cpumask_of_node(int node) { + if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE) + return cpu_all_mask; + return node_to_cpumask_map[node]; } #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/page-def.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/page-def.h index f99d48ecbeef..2403f7b4cdbf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/page-def.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/page-def.h @@ -11,13 +11,8 @@ #include <linux/const.h> /* PAGE_SHIFT determines the page size */ -/* CONT_SHIFT determines the number of pages which can be tracked together */ #define PAGE_SHIFT CONFIG_ARM64_PAGE_SHIFT -#define CONT_SHIFT CONFIG_ARM64_CONT_SHIFT #define PAGE_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << PAGE_SHIFT) #define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE-1)) -#define CONT_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << (CONT_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT)) -#define CONT_MASK (~(CONT_SIZE-1)) - #endif /* __ASM_PAGE_DEF_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/page.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/page.h index c01b52add377..012cffc574e8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/page.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/page.h @@ -15,18 +15,25 @@ #include <linux/personality.h> /* for READ_IMPLIES_EXEC */ #include <asm/pgtable-types.h> -extern void __cpu_clear_user_page(void *p, unsigned long user); -extern void __cpu_copy_user_page(void *to, const void *from, - unsigned long user); +struct page; +struct vm_area_struct; + extern void copy_page(void *to, const void *from); extern void clear_page(void *to); +void copy_user_highpage(struct page *to, struct page *from, + unsigned long vaddr, struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#define __HAVE_ARCH_COPY_USER_HIGHPAGE + +void copy_highpage(struct page *to, struct page *from); +#define __HAVE_ARCH_COPY_HIGHPAGE + #define __alloc_zeroed_user_highpage(movableflags, vma, vaddr) \ alloc_page_vma(GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ZERO | movableflags, vma, vaddr) #define __HAVE_ARCH_ALLOC_ZEROED_USER_HIGHPAGE -#define clear_user_page(addr,vaddr,pg) __cpu_clear_user_page(addr, vaddr) -#define copy_user_page(to,from,vaddr,pg) __cpu_copy_user_page(to, from, vaddr) +#define clear_user_page(page, vaddr, pg) clear_page(page) +#define copy_user_page(to, from, vaddr, pg) copy_page(to, from) typedef struct page *pgtable_t; @@ -36,7 +43,7 @@ extern int pfn_valid(unsigned long); #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ -#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_FLAGS_TSK_EXEC +#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_DATA_FLAGS_TSK_EXEC | VM_MTE_ALLOWED) #include <asm-generic/getorder.h> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pci.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pci.h index 70b323cf8300..b33ca260e3c9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pci.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pci.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #define pcibios_assign_all_busses() \ (pci_has_flag(PCI_REASSIGN_ALL_BUS)) +#define arch_can_pci_mmap_wc() 1 #define ARCH_GENERIC_PCI_MMAP_RESOURCE 1 extern int isa_dma_bridge_buggy; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/perf_event.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/perf_event.h index 2c2d7dbe8a02..60731f602d3e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/perf_event.h @@ -236,6 +236,9 @@ #define ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_CR (1 << 2) /* Cycle counter can be read at EL0 */ #define ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_ER (1 << 3) /* Event counter can be read at EL0 */ +/* PMMIR_EL1.SLOTS mask */ +#define ARMV8_PMU_SLOTS_MASK 0xff + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS struct pt_regs; extern unsigned long perf_instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h index d400a4d9aee2..94b3f2ac2e9d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h @@ -81,25 +81,15 @@ /* * Contiguous page definitions. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES -#define CONT_PTE_SHIFT (5 + PAGE_SHIFT) -#define CONT_PMD_SHIFT (5 + PMD_SHIFT) -#elif defined(CONFIG_ARM64_16K_PAGES) -#define CONT_PTE_SHIFT (7 + PAGE_SHIFT) -#define CONT_PMD_SHIFT (5 + PMD_SHIFT) -#else -#define CONT_PTE_SHIFT (4 + PAGE_SHIFT) -#define CONT_PMD_SHIFT (4 + PMD_SHIFT) -#endif - +#define CONT_PTE_SHIFT (CONFIG_ARM64_CONT_PTE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT) #define CONT_PTES (1 << (CONT_PTE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)) #define CONT_PTE_SIZE (CONT_PTES * PAGE_SIZE) #define CONT_PTE_MASK (~(CONT_PTE_SIZE - 1)) + +#define CONT_PMD_SHIFT (CONFIG_ARM64_CONT_PMD_SHIFT + PMD_SHIFT) #define CONT_PMDS (1 << (CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PMD_SHIFT)) #define CONT_PMD_SIZE (CONT_PMDS * PMD_SIZE) #define CONT_PMD_MASK (~(CONT_PMD_SIZE - 1)) -/* the numerical offset of the PTE within a range of CONT_PTES */ -#define CONT_RANGE_OFFSET(addr) (((addr)>>PAGE_SHIFT)&(CONT_PTES-1)) /* * Hardware page table definitions. diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h index 4d867c6446c4..4cd0d6ca8aa1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h @@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ #define PTE_DEVMAP (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 57) #define PTE_PROT_NONE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 58) /* only when !PTE_VALID */ +/* + * This bit indicates that the entry is present i.e. pmd_page() + * still points to a valid huge page in memory even if the pmd + * has been invalidated. + */ +#define PMD_PRESENT_INVALID (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 59) /* only when !PMD_SECT_VALID */ + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include <asm/cpufeature.h> @@ -50,6 +57,7 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings; #define PROT_NORMAL_NC (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_NC)) #define PROT_NORMAL_WT (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_WT)) #define PROT_NORMAL (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL)) +#define PROT_NORMAL_TAGGED (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_TAGGED)) #define PROT_SECT_DEVICE_nGnRE (PROT_SECT_DEFAULT | PMD_SECT_PXN | PMD_SECT_UXN | PMD_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRE)) #define PROT_SECT_NORMAL (PROT_SECT_DEFAULT | PMD_SECT_PXN | PMD_SECT_UXN | PMD_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL)) @@ -59,6 +67,7 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings; #define _HYP_PAGE_DEFAULT _PAGE_DEFAULT #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(PROT_NORMAL) +#define PAGE_KERNEL_TAGGED __pgprot(PROT_NORMAL_TAGGED) #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot((PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_WRITE) | PTE_RDONLY) #define PAGE_KERNEL_ROX __pgprot((PROT_NORMAL & ~(PTE_WRITE | PTE_PXN)) | PTE_RDONLY) #define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __pgprot(PROT_NORMAL & ~PTE_PXN) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index d5d3fbe73953..a11bf52e0c38 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <asm/proc-fns.h> #include <asm/memory.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h> #include <asm/pgtable-prot.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> @@ -35,11 +36,6 @@ extern struct page *vmemmap; -extern void __pte_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); -extern void __pmd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); -extern void __pud_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); -extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); - #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE #define __HAVE_ARCH_FLUSH_PMD_TLB_RANGE @@ -51,13 +47,22 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ /* + * Outside of a few very special situations (e.g. hibernation), we always + * use broadcast TLB invalidation instructions, therefore a spurious page + * fault on one CPU which has been handled concurrently by another CPU + * does not need to perform additional invalidation. + */ +#define flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address) do { } while (0) + +/* * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used * for zero-mapped memory areas etc.. */ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) phys_to_page(__pa_symbol(empty_zero_page)) -#define pte_ERROR(pte) __pte_error(__FILE__, __LINE__, pte_val(pte)) +#define pte_ERROR(e) \ + pr_err("%s:%d: bad pte %016llx.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, pte_val(e)) /* * Macros to convert between a physical address and its placement in a @@ -90,6 +95,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; #define pte_user_exec(pte) (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN)) #define pte_cont(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_CONT)) #define pte_devmap(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_DEVMAP)) +#define pte_tagged(pte) ((pte_val(pte) & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == \ + PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_TAGGED)) #define pte_cont_addr_end(addr, end) \ ({ unsigned long __boundary = ((addr) + CONT_PTE_SIZE) & CONT_PTE_MASK; \ @@ -145,6 +152,18 @@ static inline pte_t set_pte_bit(pte_t pte, pgprot_t prot) return pte; } +static inline pmd_t clear_pmd_bit(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t prot) +{ + pmd_val(pmd) &= ~pgprot_val(prot); + return pmd; +} + +static inline pmd_t set_pmd_bit(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t prot) +{ + pmd_val(pmd) |= pgprot_val(prot); + return pmd; +} + static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte) { pte = clear_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_WRITE)); @@ -284,6 +303,10 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, if (pte_present(pte) && pte_user_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte)) __sync_icache_dcache(pte); + if (system_supports_mte() && + pte_present(pte) && pte_tagged(pte) && !pte_special(pte)) + mte_sync_tags(ptep, pte); + __check_racy_pte_update(mm, ptep, pte); set_pte(ptep, pte); @@ -363,15 +386,24 @@ static inline int pmd_protnone(pmd_t pmd) } #endif +#define pmd_present_invalid(pmd) (!!(pmd_val(pmd) & PMD_PRESENT_INVALID)) + +static inline int pmd_present(pmd_t pmd) +{ + return pte_present(pmd_pte(pmd)) || pmd_present_invalid(pmd); +} + /* * THP definitions. */ #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE -#define pmd_trans_huge(pmd) (pmd_val(pmd) && !(pmd_val(pmd) & PMD_TABLE_BIT)) +static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd) +{ + return pmd_val(pmd) && pmd_present(pmd) && !(pmd_val(pmd) & PMD_TABLE_BIT); +} #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ -#define pmd_present(pmd) pte_present(pmd_pte(pmd)) #define pmd_dirty(pmd) pte_dirty(pmd_pte(pmd)) #define pmd_young(pmd) pte_young(pmd_pte(pmd)) #define pmd_valid(pmd) pte_valid(pmd_pte(pmd)) @@ -381,7 +413,14 @@ static inline int pmd_protnone(pmd_t pmd) #define pmd_mkclean(pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkclean(pmd_pte(pmd))) #define pmd_mkdirty(pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkdirty(pmd_pte(pmd))) #define pmd_mkyoung(pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkyoung(pmd_pte(pmd))) -#define pmd_mkinvalid(pmd) (__pmd(pmd_val(pmd) & ~PMD_SECT_VALID)) + +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkinvalid(pmd_t pmd) +{ + pmd = set_pmd_bit(pmd, __pgprot(PMD_PRESENT_INVALID)); + pmd = clear_pmd_bit(pmd, __pgprot(PMD_SECT_VALID)); + + return pmd; +} #define pmd_thp_or_huge(pmd) (pmd_huge(pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(pmd)) @@ -541,7 +580,8 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_t pmd) #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 -#define pmd_ERROR(pmd) __pmd_error(__FILE__, __LINE__, pmd_val(pmd)) +#define pmd_ERROR(e) \ + pr_err("%s:%d: bad pmd %016llx.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, pmd_val(e)) #define pud_none(pud) (!pud_val(pud)) #define pud_bad(pud) (!(pud_val(pud) & PUD_TABLE_BIT)) @@ -608,7 +648,8 @@ static inline unsigned long pud_page_vaddr(pud_t pud) #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3 -#define pud_ERROR(pud) __pud_error(__FILE__, __LINE__, pud_val(pud)) +#define pud_ERROR(e) \ + pr_err("%s:%d: bad pud %016llx.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, pud_val(e)) #define p4d_none(p4d) (!p4d_val(p4d)) #define p4d_bad(p4d) (!(p4d_val(p4d) & 2)) @@ -667,15 +708,21 @@ static inline unsigned long p4d_page_vaddr(p4d_t p4d) #endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3 */ -#define pgd_ERROR(pgd) __pgd_error(__FILE__, __LINE__, pgd_val(pgd)) +#define pgd_ERROR(e) \ + pr_err("%s:%d: bad pgd %016llx.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, pgd_val(e)) #define pgd_set_fixmap(addr) ((pgd_t *)set_fixmap_offset(FIX_PGD, addr)) #define pgd_clear_fixmap() clear_fixmap(FIX_PGD) static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot) { + /* + * Normal and Normal-Tagged are two different memory types and indices + * in MAIR_EL1. The mask below has to include PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK. + */ const pteval_t mask = PTE_USER | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_RDONLY | - PTE_PROT_NONE | PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE | PTE_GP; + PTE_PROT_NONE | PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE | PTE_GP | + PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK; /* preserve the hardware dirty information */ if (pte_hw_dirty(pte)) pte = pte_mkdirty(pte); @@ -847,6 +894,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma, #define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) ((swp_entry_t) { pte_val(pte) }) #define __swp_entry_to_pte(swp) ((pte_t) { (swp).val }) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION +#define __pmd_to_swp_entry(pmd) ((swp_entry_t) { pmd_val(pmd) }) +#define __swp_entry_to_pmd(swp) __pmd((swp).val) +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION */ + /* * Ensure that there are not more swap files than can be encoded in the kernel * PTEs. @@ -855,6 +907,38 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma, extern int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + +#define __HAVE_ARCH_PREPARE_TO_SWAP +static inline int arch_prepare_to_swap(struct page *page) +{ + if (system_supports_mte()) + return mte_save_tags(page); + return 0; +} + +#define __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_INVALIDATE +static inline void arch_swap_invalidate_page(int type, pgoff_t offset) +{ + if (system_supports_mte()) + mte_invalidate_tags(type, offset); +} + +static inline void arch_swap_invalidate_area(int type) +{ + if (system_supports_mte()) + mte_invalidate_tags_area(type); +} + +#define __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_RESTORE +static inline void arch_swap_restore(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page) +{ + if (system_supports_mte() && mte_restore_tags(entry, page)) + set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ + /* * On AArch64, the cache coherency is handled via the set_pte_at() function. */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 240fe5e5b720..fce8cbecd6bc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h> #include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h> +#include <asm/spectre.h> #include <asm/types.h> /* @@ -151,6 +152,10 @@ struct thread_struct { struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + u64 sctlr_tcf0; + u64 gcr_user_incl; +#endif }; static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, @@ -197,40 +202,15 @@ static inline void start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc) regs->pmr_save = GIC_PRIO_IRQON; } -static inline void set_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT; -} - -static inline void set_compat_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT; -} - static inline void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc, unsigned long sp) { start_thread_common(regs, pc); regs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL0t; - - if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE) - set_ssbs_bit(regs); - + spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(current); regs->sp = sp; } -static inline bool is_ttbr0_addr(unsigned long addr) -{ - /* entry assembly clears tags for TTBR0 addrs */ - return addr < TASK_SIZE; -} - -static inline bool is_ttbr1_addr(unsigned long addr) -{ - /* TTBR1 addresses may have a tag if KASAN_SW_TAGS is in use */ - return arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr) >= PAGE_OFFSET; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc, unsigned long sp) @@ -244,13 +224,23 @@ static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc, regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_E_BIT; #endif - if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE) - set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs); - + spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(current); regs->compat_sp = sp; } #endif +static inline bool is_ttbr0_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + /* entry assembly clears tags for TTBR0 addrs */ + return addr < TASK_SIZE; +} + +static inline bool is_ttbr1_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + /* TTBR1 addresses may have a tag if KASAN_SW_TAGS is in use */ + return arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr) >= PAGE_OFFSET; +} + /* Forward declaration, a strange C thing */ struct task_struct; @@ -315,10 +305,10 @@ extern void __init minsigstksz_setup(void); #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI /* PR_{SET,GET}_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL prctl */ -long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(unsigned long arg); -long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(void); -#define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg) set_tagged_addr_ctrl(arg) -#define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() get_tagged_addr_ctrl() +long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg); +long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(struct task_struct *task); +#define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg) set_tagged_addr_ctrl(current, arg) +#define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() get_tagged_addr_ctrl(current) #endif /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h index 966ed30ed5f7..997cf8c8cd52 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h @@ -31,9 +31,21 @@ * interrupt disabling temporarily does not rely on IRQ priorities. */ #define GIC_PRIO_IRQON 0xe0 -#define GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF (GIC_PRIO_IRQON & ~0x80) +#define __GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF (GIC_PRIO_IRQON & ~0x80) +#define __GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF_NS 0xa0 #define GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET (1 << 4) +#define GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF \ + ({ \ + extern struct static_key_false gic_nonsecure_priorities;\ + u8 __prio = __GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF; \ + \ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&gic_nonsecure_priorities)) \ + __prio = __GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF_NS; \ + \ + __prio; \ + }) + /* Additional SPSR bits not exposed in the UABI */ #define PSR_MODE_THREAD_BIT (1 << 0) #define PSR_IL_BIT (1 << 20) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h index 0eadbf933e35..2e7f529ec5a6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h @@ -56,27 +56,15 @@ static inline void set_cpu_logical_map(int cpu, u64 hwid) struct seq_file; /* - * generate IPI list text - */ -extern void show_ipi_list(struct seq_file *p, int prec); - -/* - * Called from C code, this handles an IPI. - */ -extern void handle_IPI(int ipinr, struct pt_regs *regs); - -/* * Discover the set of possible CPUs and determine their * SMP operations. */ extern void smp_init_cpus(void); /* - * Provide a function to raise an IPI cross call on CPUs in callmap. + * Register IPI interrupts with the arch SMP code */ -extern void set_smp_cross_call(void (*)(const struct cpumask *, unsigned int)); - -extern void (*__smp_cross_call)(const struct cpumask *, unsigned int); +extern void set_smp_ipi_range(int ipi_base, int nr_ipi); /* * Called from the secondary holding pen, this is the secondary CPU entry point. diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fcdfbce302bd --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Interface for managing mitigations for Spectre vulnerabilities. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC + * Author: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> + */ + +#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H +#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H + +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> + +/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */ +enum mitigation_state { + SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED, + SPECTRE_MITIGATED, + SPECTRE_VULNERABLE, +}; + +struct task_struct; + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(void); +bool has_spectre_v2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); +void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(void); +bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); +void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); +void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk); + +#endif /* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h index fc7613023c19..eb29b1fe8255 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct stackframe { extern int unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame); extern void walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame, - int (*fn)(struct stackframe *, void *), void *data); + bool (*fn)(void *, unsigned long), void *data); extern void dump_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *tsk, const char *loglvl); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 554a7e8ecb07..d52c1b3ce589 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ #define PSTATE_PAN pstate_field(0, 4) #define PSTATE_UAO pstate_field(0, 3) #define PSTATE_SSBS pstate_field(3, 1) +#define PSTATE_TCO pstate_field(3, 4) #define SET_PSTATE_PAN(x) __emit_inst(0xd500401f | PSTATE_PAN | ((!!x) << PSTATE_Imm_shift)) #define SET_PSTATE_UAO(x) __emit_inst(0xd500401f | PSTATE_UAO | ((!!x) << PSTATE_Imm_shift)) #define SET_PSTATE_SSBS(x) __emit_inst(0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS | ((!!x) << PSTATE_Imm_shift)) +#define SET_PSTATE_TCO(x) __emit_inst(0xd500401f | PSTATE_TCO | ((!!x) << PSTATE_Imm_shift)) #define __SYS_BARRIER_INSN(CRm, op2, Rt) \ __emit_inst(0xd5000000 | sys_insn(0, 3, 3, (CRm), (op2)) | ((Rt) & 0x1f)) @@ -181,6 +183,8 @@ #define SYS_SCTLR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 1, 0, 0) #define SYS_ACTLR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 1, 0, 1) #define SYS_CPACR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 1, 0, 2) +#define SYS_RGSR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 1, 0, 5) +#define SYS_GCR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 1, 0, 6) #define SYS_ZCR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 1, 2, 0) @@ -218,6 +222,8 @@ #define SYS_ERXADDR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 5, 4, 3) #define SYS_ERXMISC0_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 5, 5, 0) #define SYS_ERXMISC1_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 5, 5, 1) +#define SYS_TFSR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 5, 6, 0) +#define SYS_TFSRE0_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 5, 6, 1) #define SYS_FAR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 6, 0, 0) #define SYS_PAR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 7, 4, 0) @@ -321,6 +327,8 @@ #define SYS_PMINTENSET_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 9, 14, 1) #define SYS_PMINTENCLR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 9, 14, 2) +#define SYS_PMMIR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 9, 14, 6) + #define SYS_MAIR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 10, 2, 0) #define SYS_AMAIR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 10, 3, 0) @@ -368,6 +376,7 @@ #define SYS_CCSIDR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 1, 0, 0, 0) #define SYS_CLIDR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 1, 0, 0, 1) +#define SYS_GMID_EL1 sys_reg(3, 1, 0, 0, 4) #define SYS_AIDR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 1, 0, 0, 7) #define SYS_CSSELR_EL1 sys_reg(3, 2, 0, 0, 0) @@ -460,6 +469,7 @@ #define SYS_ESR_EL2 sys_reg(3, 4, 5, 2, 0) #define SYS_VSESR_EL2 sys_reg(3, 4, 5, 2, 3) #define SYS_FPEXC32_EL2 sys_reg(3, 4, 5, 3, 0) +#define SYS_TFSR_EL2 sys_reg(3, 4, 5, 6, 0) #define SYS_FAR_EL2 sys_reg(3, 4, 6, 0, 0) #define SYS_VDISR_EL2 sys_reg(3, 4, 12, 1, 1) @@ -516,6 +526,7 @@ #define SYS_AFSR0_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 5, 1, 0) #define SYS_AFSR1_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 5, 1, 1) #define SYS_ESR_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 5, 2, 0) +#define SYS_TFSR_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 5, 6, 0) #define SYS_FAR_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 6, 0, 0) #define SYS_MAIR_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 10, 2, 0) #define SYS_AMAIR_EL12 sys_reg(3, 5, 10, 3, 0) @@ -531,6 +542,15 @@ /* Common SCTLR_ELx flags. */ #define SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS (BIT(44)) +#define SCTLR_ELx_ATA (BIT(43)) + +#define SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SHIFT 40 +#define SCTLR_ELx_TCF_NONE (UL(0x0) << SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SHIFT) +#define SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SYNC (UL(0x1) << SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SHIFT) +#define SCTLR_ELx_TCF_ASYNC (UL(0x2) << SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SHIFT) +#define SCTLR_ELx_TCF_MASK (UL(0x3) << SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SHIFT) + +#define SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB (BIT(37)) #define SCTLR_ELx_ENIA (BIT(31)) #define SCTLR_ELx_ENIB (BIT(30)) #define SCTLR_ELx_ENDA (BIT(27)) @@ -559,6 +579,14 @@ #endif /* SCTLR_EL1 specific flags. */ +#define SCTLR_EL1_ATA0 (BIT(42)) + +#define SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SHIFT 38 +#define SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_NONE (UL(0x0) << SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SHIFT) +#define SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SYNC (UL(0x1) << SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SHIFT) +#define SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_ASYNC (UL(0x2) << SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SHIFT) +#define SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_MASK (UL(0x3) << SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SHIFT) + #define SCTLR_EL1_BT1 (BIT(36)) #define SCTLR_EL1_BT0 (BIT(35)) #define SCTLR_EL1_UCI (BIT(26)) @@ -587,6 +615,7 @@ SCTLR_EL1_SA0 | SCTLR_EL1_SED | SCTLR_ELx_I |\ SCTLR_EL1_DZE | SCTLR_EL1_UCT |\ SCTLR_EL1_NTWE | SCTLR_ELx_IESB | SCTLR_EL1_SPAN |\ + SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB| SCTLR_ELx_ATA | SCTLR_EL1_ATA0 |\ ENDIAN_SET_EL1 | SCTLR_EL1_UCI | SCTLR_EL1_RES1) /* MAIR_ELx memory attributes (used by Linux) */ @@ -595,6 +624,7 @@ #define MAIR_ATTR_DEVICE_GRE UL(0x0c) #define MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_NC UL(0x44) #define MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_WT UL(0xbb) +#define MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_TAGGED UL(0xf0) #define MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL UL(0xff) #define MAIR_ATTR_MASK UL(0xff) @@ -636,14 +666,22 @@ #define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT 4 #define ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT 0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF 0x1 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC 0x2 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2 0x3 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2_FPAC 0x4 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2_FPAC_CMB 0x5 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC 0x2 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2 0x3 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2_FPAC 0x4 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2_FPAC_CMB 0x5 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1 /* id_aa64pfr0 */ #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT 60 @@ -686,6 +724,10 @@ #define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_INSNS 2 #define ID_AA64PFR1_BT_BTI 0x1 +#define ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_EL0 0x1 +#define ID_AA64PFR1_MTE 0x2 + /* id_aa64zfr0 */ #define ID_AA64ZFR0_F64MM_SHIFT 56 #define ID_AA64ZFR0_F32MM_SHIFT 52 @@ -920,6 +962,28 @@ #define CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN (BIT(17)) /* enable EL0 access, if EL1EN set */ #define CPACR_EL1_ZEN (CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN) +/* TCR EL1 Bit Definitions */ +#define SYS_TCR_EL1_TCMA1 (BIT(58)) +#define SYS_TCR_EL1_TCMA0 (BIT(57)) + +/* GCR_EL1 Definitions */ +#define SYS_GCR_EL1_RRND (BIT(16)) +#define SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK 0xffffUL + +/* RGSR_EL1 Definitions */ +#define SYS_RGSR_EL1_TAG_MASK 0xfUL +#define SYS_RGSR_EL1_SEED_SHIFT 8 +#define SYS_RGSR_EL1_SEED_MASK 0xffffUL + +/* GMID_EL1 field definitions */ +#define SYS_GMID_EL1_BS_SHIFT 0 +#define SYS_GMID_EL1_BS_SIZE 4 + +/* TFSR{,E0}_EL1 bit definitions */ +#define SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0_SHIFT 0 +#define SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF1_SHIFT 1 +#define SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0 (UL(1) << SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0_SHIFT) +#define SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF1 (UK(2) << SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF1_SHIFT) /* Safe value for MPIDR_EL1: Bit31:RES1, Bit30:U:0, Bit24:MT:0 */ #define SYS_MPIDR_SAFE_VAL (BIT(31)) @@ -1024,6 +1088,13 @@ write_sysreg(__scs_new, sysreg); \ } while (0) +#define sysreg_clear_set_s(sysreg, clear, set) do { \ + u64 __scs_val = read_sysreg_s(sysreg); \ + u64 __scs_new = (__scs_val & ~(u64)(clear)) | (set); \ + if (__scs_new != __scs_val) \ + write_sysreg_s(__scs_new, sysreg); \ +} while (0) + #endif #endif /* __ASM_SYSREG_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 5e784e16ee89..1fbab854a51b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE 3 /* CPU's FP state is not current's */ #define TIF_UPROBE 4 /* uprobe breakpoint or singlestep */ #define TIF_FSCHECK 5 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */ +#define TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT 6 /* MTE Asynchronous Tag Check Fault */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 8 /* syscall trace active */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 9 /* syscall auditing */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 10 /* syscall tracepoint for ftrace */ @@ -96,10 +97,11 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP) #define _TIF_32BIT (1 << TIF_32BIT) #define _TIF_SVE (1 << TIF_SVE) +#define _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT (1 << TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ - _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_FSCHECK) + _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_FSCHECK | _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) #define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \ _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/topology.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/topology.h index e042f6527981..11a465243f66 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/topology.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/topology.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ void topology_scale_freq_tick(void); #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_AMU_EXTN */ /* Replace task scheduler's default frequency-invariant accounting */ +#define arch_set_freq_scale topology_set_freq_scale #define arch_scale_freq_capacity topology_get_freq_scale +#define arch_scale_freq_invariant topology_scale_freq_invariant /* Replace task scheduler's default cpu-invariant accounting */ #define arch_scale_cpu_capacity topology_get_cpu_scale diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h index cee5928e1b7d..d96dc2c7c09d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct undef_hook { void register_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook); void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook); -void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address); +void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address, unsigned int err); void arm64_notify_segfault(unsigned long addr); void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, const char *str); void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, const char *str); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h index 734860ac7cf9..2a3ad9b9accd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lseek, compat_sys_lseek) #define __NR_getpid 20 __SYSCALL(__NR_getpid, sys_getpid) #define __NR_mount 21 -__SYSCALL(__NR_mount, compat_sys_mount) +__SYSCALL(__NR_mount, sys_mount) /* 22 was sys_umount */ __SYSCALL(22, sys_ni_syscall) #define __NR_setuid 23 @@ -301,9 +301,9 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_flock, sys_flock) #define __NR_msync 144 __SYSCALL(__NR_msync, sys_msync) #define __NR_readv 145 -__SYSCALL(__NR_readv, compat_sys_readv) +__SYSCALL(__NR_readv, sys_readv) #define __NR_writev 146 -__SYSCALL(__NR_writev, compat_sys_writev) +__SYSCALL(__NR_writev, sys_writev) #define __NR_getsid 147 __SYSCALL(__NR_getsid, sys_getsid) #define __NR_fdatasync 148 @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_sync_file_range2, compat_sys_aarch32_sync_file_range2) #define __NR_tee 342 __SYSCALL(__NR_tee, sys_tee) #define __NR_vmsplice 343 -__SYSCALL(__NR_vmsplice, compat_sys_vmsplice) +__SYSCALL(__NR_vmsplice, sys_vmsplice) #define __NR_move_pages 344 __SYSCALL(__NR_move_pages, compat_sys_move_pages) #define __NR_getcpu 345 @@ -763,9 +763,9 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_sendmmsg, compat_sys_sendmmsg) #define __NR_setns 375 __SYSCALL(__NR_setns, sys_setns) #define __NR_process_vm_readv 376 -__SYSCALL(__NR_process_vm_readv, compat_sys_process_vm_readv) +__SYSCALL(__NR_process_vm_readv, sys_process_vm_readv) #define __NR_process_vm_writev 377 -__SYSCALL(__NR_process_vm_writev, compat_sys_process_vm_writev) +__SYSCALL(__NR_process_vm_writev, sys_process_vm_writev) #define __NR_kcmp 378 __SYSCALL(__NR_kcmp, sys_kcmp) #define __NR_finit_module 379 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/page.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/page.h index 31bbc803cecb..dffdc773221b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/page.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/page.h @@ -1 +1,7 @@ #include <xen/arm/page.h> +#include <asm/mmu.h> + +static inline bool xen_kernel_unmapped_at_usr(void) +{ + return arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(); +} diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h index 912162f73529..b8f41aa234ee 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h @@ -74,6 +74,6 @@ #define HWCAP2_DGH (1 << 15) #define HWCAP2_RNG (1 << 16) #define HWCAP2_BTI (1 << 17) -/* reserved for HWCAP2_MTE (1 << 18) */ +#define HWCAP2_MTE (1 << 18) #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index ba85bb23f060..7d804fd0a682 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -242,6 +242,15 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_events { #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL 0 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_AVAIL 1 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_REQUIRED 2 + +/* + * Only two states can be presented by the host kernel: + * - NOT_REQUIRED: the guest doesn't need to do anything + * - NOT_AVAIL: the guest isn't mitigated (it can still use SSBS if available) + * + * All the other values are deprecated. The host still accepts all + * values (they are ABI), but will narrow them to the above two. + */ #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(2) #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL 0 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN 1 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h index 6fdd71eb644f..1e6482a838e1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h @@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ #include <asm-generic/mman.h> #define PROT_BTI 0x10 /* BTI guarded page */ +#define PROT_MTE 0x20 /* Normal Tagged mapping */ #endif /* ! _UAPI__ASM_MMAN_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h index 42cbe34d95ce..758ae984ff97 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #define PSR_PAN_BIT 0x00400000 #define PSR_UAO_BIT 0x00800000 #define PSR_DIT_BIT 0x01000000 +#define PSR_TCO_BIT 0x02000000 #define PSR_V_BIT 0x10000000 #define PSR_C_BIT 0x20000000 #define PSR_Z_BIT 0x40000000 @@ -75,6 +76,9 @@ /* syscall emulation path in ptrace */ #define PTRACE_SYSEMU 31 #define PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP 32 +/* MTE allocation tag access */ +#define PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS 33 +#define PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS 34 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index a561cbb91d4d..bbaf0bc4ad60 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ # Makefile for the linux kernel. # -CPPFLAGS_vmlinux.lds := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) -AFLAGS_head.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) CFLAGS_armv8_deprecated.o := -I$(src) CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) @@ -19,7 +17,7 @@ obj-y := debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o \ return_address.o cpuinfo.o cpu_errata.o \ cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o \ smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o \ - syscall.o + syscall.o proton-pack.o targets += efi-entry.o @@ -59,9 +57,9 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD) += ssbd.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH) += pointer_auth.o obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE) += mte.o obj-y += vdso/ probes/ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO) += vdso32/ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu-reset.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu-reset.S index 4a18055b2ff9..37721eb6f9a1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu-reset.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu-reset.S @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__cpu_soft_restart) mov_q x13, SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS bic x12, x12, x13 pre_disable_mmu_workaround + /* + * either disable EL1&0 translation regime or disable EL2&0 translation + * regime if HCR_EL2.E2H == 1 + */ msr sctlr_el1, x12 isb diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 560ba69e13c1..24d75af344b1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -106,365 +106,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0); } -atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1); - -#include <asm/mmu_context.h> -#include <asm/cacheflush.h> - -DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); - -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS -static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, - const char *hyp_vecs_end) -{ - void *dst = lm_alias(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs + slot * SZ_2K); - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80) - memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start); - - __flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); -} - -static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, - const char *hyp_vecs_start, - const char *hyp_vecs_end) -{ - static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); - int cpu, slot = -1; - - /* - * detect_harden_bp_fw() passes NULL for the hyp_vecs start/end if - * we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work. - */ - if (!hyp_vecs_start) { - __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); - return; - } - - raw_spin_lock(&bp_lock); - for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) { - slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); - break; - } - } - - if (slot == -1) { - slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot); - BUG_ON(slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS); - __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); - } - - __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); - __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); - raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock); -} -#else -static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, - const char *hyp_vecs_start, - const char *hyp_vecs_end) -{ - __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS */ - -#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> - -static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void) -{ - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); -} - -static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void) -{ - arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); -} - -static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void) -{ - u64 tmp; - - asm volatile("mov %0, x30 \n" - ".rept 16 \n" - "bl . + 4 \n" - ".endr \n" - "mov x30, %0 \n" - : "=&r" (tmp)); -} - -static bool __nospectre_v2; -static int __init parse_nospectre_v2(char *str) -{ - __nospectre_v2 = true; - return 0; -} -early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_nospectre_v2); - -/* - * -1: No workaround - * 0: No workaround required - * 1: Workaround installed - */ -static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) -{ - bp_hardening_cb_t cb; - void *smccc_start, *smccc_end; - struct arm_smccc_res res; - u32 midr = read_cpuid_id(); - - arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, - ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); - - switch ((int)res.a0) { - case 1: - /* Firmware says we're just fine */ - return 0; - case 0: - break; - default: - return -1; - } - - switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) { - case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: - cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; - /* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */ - smccc_start = NULL; - smccc_end = NULL; - break; - -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) - case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: - cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; - smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc; - smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc + - __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ; - break; -#endif - - default: - return -1; - } - - if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) || - ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) - cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization; - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) - install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end); - - return 1; -} - -DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); - -int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL; -static bool __ssb_safe = true; - -static const struct ssbd_options { - const char *str; - int state; -} ssbd_options[] = { - { "force-on", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, }, - { "force-off", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, }, - { "kernel", ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL, }, -}; - -static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf) -{ - int i; - - if (!buf || !buf[0]) - return -EINVAL; - - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) { - int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str); - - if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len)) - continue; - - ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state; - return 0; - } - - return -EINVAL; -} -early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg); - -void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, - __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, - int nr_inst) -{ - u32 insn; - - BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); - - switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) { - case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: - insn = aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value(); - break; - case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: - insn = aarch64_insn_get_smc_value(); - break; - default: - return; - } - - *updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn); -} - -void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(struct alt_instr *alt, - __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, - int nr_inst) -{ - BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); - /* - * Only allow mitigation on EL1 entry/exit and guest - * ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling if the SSBD state allows it to - * be flipped. - */ - if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL) - *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop()); -} - -void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) -{ - int conduit; - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)) { - pr_info_once("SSBD disabled by kernel configuration\n"); - return; - } - - if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) { - if (state) - asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(0)); - else - asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(1)); - return; - } - - conduit = arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, - NULL); - - WARN_ON_ONCE(conduit == SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE); -} - -static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, - int scope) -{ - struct arm_smccc_res res; - bool required = true; - s32 val; - bool this_cpu_safe = false; - int conduit; - - WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); - - if (cpu_mitigations_off()) - ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE; - - /* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */ - if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list)) - this_cpu_safe = true; - - if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) { - if (!this_cpu_safe) - __ssb_safe = false; - required = false; - goto out_printmsg; - } - - conduit = arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, - ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); - - if (conduit == SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE) { - ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; - if (!this_cpu_safe) - __ssb_safe = false; - return false; - } - - val = (s32)res.a0; - - switch (val) { - case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED: - ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; - if (!this_cpu_safe) - __ssb_safe = false; - return false; - - /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */ - case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED: - pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc); - ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED; - return false; - - case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: - __ssb_safe = false; - required = true; - break; - - case 1: /* Mitigation not required on this CPU */ - required = false; - break; - - default: - WARN_ON(1); - if (!this_cpu_safe) - __ssb_safe = false; - return false; - } - - switch (ssbd_state) { - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false); - required = false; - break; - - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: - if (required) { - __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); - } - break; - - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); - required = true; - break; - - default: - WARN_ON(1); - break; - } - -out_printmsg: - switch (ssbd_state) { - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc); - break; - - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc); - break; - } - - return required; -} - -/* known invulnerable cores */ -static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = { - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER), - {}, -}; - #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225 DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __in_cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_wa); @@ -519,83 +160,6 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \ CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list) -/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */ -static bool __hardenbp_enab = true; -static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; - -int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void) -{ - if (__spectrev2_safe) - return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED; - - if (!__hardenbp_enab) - return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN; - - return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED; -} - -/* - * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all. - */ -static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = { - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER), - MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER), - { /* sentinel */ } -}; - -/* - * Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine. - * We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe. - */ -static bool __maybe_unused -check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) -{ - int need_wa; - - WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); - - /* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */ - if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1), - ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) - return false; - - /* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */ - if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list)) - return false; - - /* Fallback to firmware detection */ - need_wa = detect_harden_bp_fw(); - if (!need_wa) - return false; - - __spectrev2_safe = false; - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) { - pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n"); - __hardenbp_enab = false; - return false; - } - - /* forced off */ - if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) { - pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); - __hardenbp_enab = false; - return false; - } - - if (need_wa < 0) { - pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n"); - __hardenbp_enab = false; - } - - return (need_wa > 0); -} - static const __maybe_unused struct midr_range tx2_family_cpus[] = { MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN), MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2), @@ -887,9 +451,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { }, #endif { - .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + .desc = "Spectre-v2", + .capability = ARM64_SPECTRE_V2, .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, - .matches = check_branch_predictor, + .matches = has_spectre_v2, + .cpu_enable = spectre_v2_enable_mitigation, }, #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE { @@ -899,11 +465,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { }, #endif { - .desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable", - .capability = ARM64_SSBD, + .desc = "Spectre-v4", + .capability = ARM64_SPECTRE_V4, .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, - .matches = has_ssbd_mitigation, - .midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus, + .matches = has_spectre_v4, + .cpu_enable = spectre_v4_enable_mitigation, }, #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1418040 { @@ -960,40 +526,3 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { { } }; - -ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, - char *buf) -{ - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); -} - -ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, - char *buf) -{ - switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) { - case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED: - return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED: - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); - case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN: - default: - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); - } -} - -ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) -{ - if (__ssb_safe) - return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - - switch (ssbd_state) { - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)) - return sprintf(buf, - "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl\n"); - } - - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); -} diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 6424584be01e..dcc165b3fc04 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu_ops.h> #include <asm/fpsimd.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> #include <asm/traps.h> @@ -197,9 +198,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_END, }; @@ -227,7 +228,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr1[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_MPAMFRAC_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_RASFRAC_SHIFT, 4, 0), - ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_NI), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI), FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_END, @@ -487,7 +490,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr1[] = { }; static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr2[] = { - ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_PFR2_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_PFR2_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_PFR2_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_END, }; @@ -1111,6 +1114,7 @@ u64 read_sanitised_ftr_reg(u32 id) return 0; return regp->sys_val; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(read_sanitised_ftr_reg); #define read_sysreg_case(r) \ case r: return read_sysreg_s(r) @@ -1443,6 +1447,7 @@ static inline void __cpu_enable_hw_dbm(void) write_sysreg(tcr, tcr_el1); isb(); + local_flush_tlb_all(); } static bool cpu_has_broken_dbm(void) @@ -1583,48 +1588,6 @@ static void cpu_has_fwb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) WARN_ON(val & (7 << 27 | 7 << 21)); } -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD -static int ssbs_emulation_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr) -{ - if (user_mode(regs)) - return 1; - - if (instr & BIT(PSTATE_Imm_shift)) - regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT; - else - regs->pstate &= ~PSR_SSBS_BIT; - - arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(regs, 4); - return 0; -} - -static struct undef_hook ssbs_emulation_hook = { - .instr_mask = ~(1U << PSTATE_Imm_shift), - .instr_val = 0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS, - .fn = ssbs_emulation_handler, -}; - -static void cpu_enable_ssbs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) -{ - static bool undef_hook_registered = false; - static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(hook_lock); - - raw_spin_lock(&hook_lock); - if (!undef_hook_registered) { - register_undef_hook(&ssbs_emulation_hook); - undef_hook_registered = true; - } - raw_spin_unlock(&hook_lock); - - if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) { - sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS); - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false); - } else { - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); - } -} -#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */ - #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN static void cpu_enable_pan(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) { @@ -1648,11 +1611,37 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -static bool has_address_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, - int __unused) +static bool has_address_auth_cpucap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { - return __system_matches_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH) || - __system_matches_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF); + int boot_val, sec_val; + + /* We don't expect to be called with SCOPE_SYSTEM */ + WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM); + /* + * The ptr-auth feature levels are not intercompatible with lower + * levels. Hence we must match ptr-auth feature level of the secondary + * CPUs with that of the boot CPU. The level of boot cpu is fetched + * from the sanitised register whereas direct register read is done for + * the secondary CPUs. + * The sanitised feature state is guaranteed to match that of the + * boot CPU as a mismatched secondary CPU is parked before it gets + * a chance to update the state, with the capability. + */ + boot_val = cpuid_feature_extract_field(read_sanitised_ftr_reg(entry->sys_reg), + entry->field_pos, entry->sign); + if (scope & SCOPE_BOOT_CPU) + return boot_val >= entry->min_field_value; + /* Now check for the secondary CPUs with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU scope */ + sec_val = cpuid_feature_extract_field(__read_sysreg_by_encoding(entry->sys_reg), + entry->field_pos, entry->sign); + return sec_val == boot_val; +} + +static bool has_address_auth_metacap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, + int scope) +{ + return has_address_auth_cpucap(cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH], scope) || + has_address_auth_cpucap(cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF], scope); } static bool has_generic_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, @@ -1702,6 +1691,22 @@ static void bti_enable(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) } #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_BTI */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE +static void cpu_enable_mte(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) +{ + static bool cleared_zero_page = false; + + /* + * Clear the tags in the zero page. This needs to be done via the + * linear map which has the Tagged attribute. + */ + if (!cleared_zero_page) { + cleared_zero_page = true; + mte_clear_page_tags(lm_alias(empty_zero_page)); + } +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ + /* Internal helper functions to match cpu capability type */ static bool cpucap_late_cpu_optional(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap) @@ -1976,19 +1981,16 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT, .min_field_value = 1, }, -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD { .desc = "Speculative Store Bypassing Safe (SSBS)", .capability = ARM64_SSBS, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_ONLY, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_ssbs, }, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_CNP { .desc = "Common not Private translations", @@ -2021,7 +2023,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED, - .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + .matches = has_address_auth_cpucap, }, { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)", @@ -2031,12 +2033,12 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF, - .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + .matches = has_address_auth_cpucap, }, { .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, - .matches = has_address_auth, + .matches = has_address_auth_metacap, }, { .desc = "Generic authentication (architected algorithm)", @@ -2121,6 +2123,19 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + { + .desc = "Memory Tagging Extension", + .capability = ARM64_MTE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE, + .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, + .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT, + .min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR1_MTE, + .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, + .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_mte, + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ {}, }; @@ -2237,6 +2252,9 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = { HWCAP_MULTI_CAP(ptr_auth_hwcap_addr_matches, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_PACA), HWCAP_MULTI_CAP(ptr_auth_hwcap_gen_matches, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_PACG), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE), +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ {}, }; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c index d0076c2159e6..6a7bb3729d60 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c @@ -43,94 +43,93 @@ static const char *icache_policy_str[] = { unsigned long __icache_flags; static const char *const hwcap_str[] = { - "fp", - "asimd", - "evtstrm", - "aes", - "pmull", - "sha1", - "sha2", - "crc32", - "atomics", - "fphp", - "asimdhp", - "cpuid", - "asimdrdm", - "jscvt", - "fcma", - "lrcpc", - "dcpop", - "sha3", - "sm3", - "sm4", - "asimddp", - "sha512", - "sve", - "asimdfhm", - "dit", - "uscat", - "ilrcpc", - "flagm", - "ssbs", - "sb", - "paca", - "pacg", - "dcpodp", - "sve2", - "sveaes", - "svepmull", - "svebitperm", - "svesha3", - "svesm4", - "flagm2", - "frint", - "svei8mm", - "svef32mm", - "svef64mm", - "svebf16", - "i8mm", - "bf16", - "dgh", - "rng", - "bti", - /* reserved for "mte" */ - NULL + [KERNEL_HWCAP_FP] = "fp", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ASIMD] = "asimd", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_EVTSTRM] = "evtstrm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_AES] = "aes", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_PMULL] = "pmull", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SHA1] = "sha1", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SHA2] = "sha2", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_CRC32] = "crc32", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ATOMICS] = "atomics", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_FPHP] = "fphp", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ASIMDHP] = "asimdhp", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_CPUID] = "cpuid", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ASIMDRDM] = "asimdrdm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_JSCVT] = "jscvt", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_FCMA] = "fcma", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_LRCPC] = "lrcpc", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_DCPOP] = "dcpop", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SHA3] = "sha3", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SM3] = "sm3", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SM4] = "sm4", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ASIMDDP] = "asimddp", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SHA512] = "sha512", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVE] = "sve", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ASIMDFHM] = "asimdfhm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_DIT] = "dit", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_USCAT] = "uscat", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_ILRCPC] = "ilrcpc", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_FLAGM] = "flagm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SSBS] = "ssbs", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SB] = "sb", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_PACA] = "paca", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_PACG] = "pacg", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_DCPODP] = "dcpodp", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVE2] = "sve2", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEAES] = "sveaes", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEPMULL] = "svepmull", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEBITPERM] = "svebitperm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVESHA3] = "svesha3", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVESM4] = "svesm4", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_FLAGM2] = "flagm2", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_FRINT] = "frint", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEI8MM] = "svei8mm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEF32MM] = "svef32mm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEF64MM] = "svef64mm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEBF16] = "svebf16", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_I8MM] = "i8mm", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_BF16] = "bf16", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_DGH] = "dgh", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG] = "rng", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI] = "bti", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE] = "mte", }; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(x) const_ilog2(COMPAT_HWCAP_ ## x) static const char *const compat_hwcap_str[] = { - "swp", - "half", - "thumb", - "26bit", - "fastmult", - "fpa", - "vfp", - "edsp", - "java", - "iwmmxt", - "crunch", - "thumbee", - "neon", - "vfpv3", - "vfpv3d16", - "tls", - "vfpv4", - "idiva", - "idivt", - "vfpd32", - "lpae", - "evtstrm", - NULL + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(SWP)] = "swp", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(HALF)] = "half", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(THUMB)] = "thumb", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(26BIT)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(FAST_MULT)] = "fastmult", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(FPA)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(VFP)] = "vfp", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(EDSP)] = "edsp", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(JAVA)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(IWMMXT)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(CRUNCH)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(THUMBEE)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(NEON)] = "neon", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(VFPv3)] = "vfpv3", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(VFPV3D16)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(TLS)] = "tls", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(VFPv4)] = "vfpv4", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(IDIVA)] = "idiva", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(IDIVT)] = "idivt", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(VFPD32)] = NULL, /* Not possible on arm64 */ + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(LPAE)] = "lpae", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP(EVTSTRM)] = "evtstrm", }; +#define COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP2(x) const_ilog2(COMPAT_HWCAP2_ ## x) static const char *const compat_hwcap2_str[] = { - "aes", - "pmull", - "sha1", - "sha2", - "crc32", - NULL + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP2(AES)] = "aes", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP2(PMULL)] = "pmull", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP2(SHA1)] = "sha1", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP2(SHA2)] = "sha2", + [COMPAT_KERNEL_HWCAP2(CRC32)] = "crc32", }; #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ @@ -166,16 +165,25 @@ static int c_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, "Features\t:"); if (compat) { #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - for (j = 0; compat_hwcap_str[j]; j++) - if (compat_elf_hwcap & (1 << j)) + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(compat_hwcap_str); j++) { + if (compat_elf_hwcap & (1 << j)) { + /* + * Warn once if any feature should not + * have been present on arm64 platform. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!compat_hwcap_str[j])) + continue; + seq_printf(m, " %s", compat_hwcap_str[j]); + } + } - for (j = 0; compat_hwcap2_str[j]; j++) + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(compat_hwcap2_str); j++) if (compat_elf_hwcap2 & (1 << j)) seq_printf(m, " %s", compat_hwcap2_str[j]); #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ } else { - for (j = 0; hwcap_str[j]; j++) + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(hwcap_str); j++) if (cpu_have_feature(j)) seq_printf(m, " %s", hwcap_str[j]); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c index 7310a4f7f993..fa76151de6ff 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ void __init debug_traps_init(void) hook_debug_fault_code(DBG_ESR_EVT_HWSS, single_step_handler, SIGTRAP, TRAP_TRACE, "single-step handler"); hook_debug_fault_code(DBG_ESR_EVT_BRK, brk_handler, SIGTRAP, - TRAP_BRKPT, "ptrace BRK handler"); + TRAP_BRKPT, "BRK handler"); } /* Re-enable single step for syscall restarting. */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c index d3be9dbf5490..43d4c329775f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c @@ -66,6 +66,13 @@ static void notrace el1_dbg(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_dbg); +static void notrace el1_fpac(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) +{ + local_daif_inherit(regs); + do_ptrauth_fault(regs, esr); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_fpac); + asmlinkage void notrace el1_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long esr = read_sysreg(esr_el1); @@ -92,6 +99,9 @@ asmlinkage void notrace el1_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) case ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64: el1_dbg(regs, esr); break; + case ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC: + el1_fpac(regs, esr); + break; default: el1_inv(regs, esr); } @@ -227,6 +237,14 @@ static void notrace el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs) } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_svc); +static void notrace el0_fpac(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) +{ + user_exit_irqoff(); + local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX); + do_ptrauth_fault(regs, esr); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_fpac); + asmlinkage void notrace el0_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long esr = read_sysreg(esr_el1); @@ -272,6 +290,9 @@ asmlinkage void notrace el0_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) case ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64: el0_dbg(regs, esr); break; + case ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC: + el0_fpac(regs, esr); + break; default: el0_inv(regs, esr); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index f880dd63ddc3..2ca395c25448 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state) SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state) #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SVE + SYM_FUNC_START(sve_save_state) sve_save 0, x1, 2 ret @@ -46,4 +47,28 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sve_get_vl) _sve_rdvl 0, 1 ret SYM_FUNC_END(sve_get_vl) + +/* + * Load SVE state from FPSIMD state. + * + * x0 = pointer to struct fpsimd_state + * x1 = VQ - 1 + * + * Each SVE vector will be loaded with the first 128-bits taken from FPSIMD + * and the rest zeroed. All the other SVE registers will be zeroed. + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(sve_load_from_fpsimd_state) + sve_load_vq x1, x2, x3 + fpsimd_restore x0, 8 + _for n, 0, 15, _sve_pfalse \n + _sve_wrffr 0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(sve_load_from_fpsimd_state) + +/* Zero all SVE registers but the first 128-bits of each vector */ +SYM_FUNC_START(sve_flush_live) + sve_flush + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(sve_flush_live) + #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 55af8b504b65..f30007dff35f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -132,9 +132,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif * them if required. */ .macro apply_ssbd, state, tmp1, tmp2 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD -alternative_cb arm64_enable_wa2_handling - b .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@ +alternative_cb spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable + b .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@ // Patched to NOP alternative_cb_end ldr_this_cpu \tmp2, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, \tmp1 cbz \tmp2, .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@ @@ -142,10 +141,35 @@ alternative_cb_end tbnz \tmp2, #TIF_SSBD, .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@ mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 mov w1, #\state -alternative_cb arm64_update_smccc_conduit +alternative_cb spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0 alternative_cb_end .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@: + .endm + + /* Check for MTE asynchronous tag check faults */ + .macro check_mte_async_tcf, flgs, tmp +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE +alternative_if_not ARM64_MTE + b 1f +alternative_else_nop_endif + mrs_s \tmp, SYS_TFSRE0_EL1 + tbz \tmp, #SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0_SHIFT, 1f + /* Asynchronous TCF occurred for TTBR0 access, set the TI flag */ + orr \flgs, \flgs, #_TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT + str \flgs, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] + msr_s SYS_TFSRE0_EL1, xzr +1: +#endif + .endm + + /* Clear the MTE asynchronous tag check faults */ + .macro clear_mte_async_tcf +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE +alternative_if ARM64_MTE + dsb ish + msr_s SYS_TFSRE0_EL1, xzr +alternative_else_nop_endif #endif .endm @@ -182,6 +206,8 @@ alternative_cb_end ldr x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] disable_step_tsk x19, x20 + /* Check for asynchronous tag check faults in user space */ + check_mte_async_tcf x19, x22 apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 @@ -233,6 +259,13 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING str x20, [sp, #S_PMR_SAVE] alternative_else_nop_endif + /* Re-enable tag checking (TCO set on exception entry) */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE +alternative_if ARM64_MTE + SET_PSTATE_TCO(0) +alternative_else_nop_endif +#endif + /* * Registers that may be useful after this macro is invoked: * @@ -697,11 +730,9 @@ el0_irq_naked: bl trace_hardirqs_off #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR tbz x22, #55, 1f bl do_el0_irq_bp_hardening 1: -#endif irq_handler #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS @@ -744,6 +775,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(ret_to_user) and x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK cbnz x2, work_pending finish_ret_to_user: + /* Ignore asynchronous tag check faults in the uaccess routines */ + clear_mte_async_tcf enable_step_tsk x1, x2 #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK bl stackleak_erase diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index 55c8f3ec6705..a6d688c10745 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -32,9 +32,11 @@ #include <linux/swab.h> #include <asm/esr.h> +#include <asm/exception.h> #include <asm/fpsimd.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/cputype.h> +#include <asm/neon.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/simd.h> #include <asm/sigcontext.h> @@ -312,7 +314,7 @@ static void fpsimd_save(void) * re-enter user with corrupt state. * There's no way to recover, so kill it: */ - force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0); + force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0); return; } @@ -928,7 +930,7 @@ void fpsimd_release_task(struct task_struct *dead_task) * the SVE access trap will be disabled the next time this task * reaches ret_to_user. * - * TIF_SVE should be clear on entry: otherwise, task_fpsimd_load() + * TIF_SVE should be clear on entry: otherwise, fpsimd_restore_current_state() * would have disabled the SVE access trap for userspace during * ret_to_user, making an SVE access trap impossible in that case. */ @@ -936,7 +938,7 @@ void do_sve_acc(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) { /* Even if we chose not to use SVE, the hardware could still trap: */ if (unlikely(!system_supports_sve()) || WARN_ON(is_compat_task())) { - force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc); + force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc, 0); return; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S index 037421c66b14..d8d9caf02834 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S @@ -36,14 +36,10 @@ #include "efi-header.S" -#define __PHYS_OFFSET (KERNEL_START - TEXT_OFFSET) +#define __PHYS_OFFSET KERNEL_START -#if (TEXT_OFFSET & 0xfff) != 0 -#error TEXT_OFFSET must be at least 4KB aligned -#elif (PAGE_OFFSET & 0x1fffff) != 0 +#if (PAGE_OFFSET & 0x1fffff) != 0 #error PAGE_OFFSET must be at least 2MB aligned -#elif TEXT_OFFSET > 0x1fffff -#error TEXT_OFFSET must be less than 2MB #endif /* @@ -55,7 +51,7 @@ * x0 = physical address to the FDT blob. * * This code is mostly position independent so you call this at - * __pa(PAGE_OFFSET + TEXT_OFFSET). + * __pa(PAGE_OFFSET). * * Note that the callee-saved registers are used for storing variables * that are useful before the MMU is enabled. The allocations are described @@ -77,7 +73,7 @@ _head: b primary_entry // branch to kernel start, magic .long 0 // reserved #endif - le64sym _kernel_offset_le // Image load offset from start of RAM, little-endian + .quad 0 // Image load offset from start of RAM, little-endian le64sym _kernel_size_le // Effective size of kernel image, little-endian le64sym _kernel_flags_le // Informative flags, little-endian .quad 0 // reserved @@ -382,7 +378,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__create_page_tables) * Map the kernel image (starting with PHYS_OFFSET). */ adrp x0, init_pg_dir - mov_q x5, KIMAGE_VADDR + TEXT_OFFSET // compile time __va(_text) + mov_q x5, KIMAGE_VADDR // compile time __va(_text) add x5, x5, x23 // add KASLR displacement mov x4, PTRS_PER_PGD adrp x6, _end // runtime __pa(_end) @@ -474,7 +470,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__primary_switched) .pushsection ".rodata", "a" SYM_DATA_START(kimage_vaddr) - .quad _text - TEXT_OFFSET + .quad _text SYM_DATA_END(kimage_vaddr) EXPORT_SYMBOL(kimage_vaddr) .popsection diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c index 68e14152d6e9..42003774d261 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> -#include <linux/version.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> @@ -31,6 +30,7 @@ #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h> #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -285,6 +285,117 @@ static int create_safe_exec_page(void *src_start, size_t length, #define dcache_clean_range(start, end) __flush_dcache_area(start, (end - start)) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + +static DEFINE_XARRAY(mte_pages); + +static int save_tags(struct page *page, unsigned long pfn) +{ + void *tag_storage, *ret; + + tag_storage = mte_allocate_tag_storage(); + if (!tag_storage) + return -ENOMEM; + + mte_save_page_tags(page_address(page), tag_storage); + + ret = xa_store(&mte_pages, pfn, tag_storage, GFP_KERNEL); + if (WARN(xa_is_err(ret), "Failed to store MTE tags")) { + mte_free_tag_storage(tag_storage); + return xa_err(ret); + } else if (WARN(ret, "swsusp: %s: Duplicate entry", __func__)) { + mte_free_tag_storage(ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void swsusp_mte_free_storage(void) +{ + XA_STATE(xa_state, &mte_pages, 0); + void *tags; + + xa_lock(&mte_pages); + xas_for_each(&xa_state, tags, ULONG_MAX) { + mte_free_tag_storage(tags); + } + xa_unlock(&mte_pages); + + xa_destroy(&mte_pages); +} + +static int swsusp_mte_save_tags(void) +{ + struct zone *zone; + unsigned long pfn, max_zone_pfn; + int ret = 0; + int n = 0; + + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return 0; + + for_each_populated_zone(zone) { + max_zone_pfn = zone_end_pfn(zone); + for (pfn = zone->zone_start_pfn; pfn < max_zone_pfn; pfn++) { + struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn); + + if (!page) + continue; + + if (!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) + continue; + + ret = save_tags(page, pfn); + if (ret) { + swsusp_mte_free_storage(); + goto out; + } + + n++; + } + } + pr_info("Saved %d MTE pages\n", n); + +out: + return ret; +} + +static void swsusp_mte_restore_tags(void) +{ + XA_STATE(xa_state, &mte_pages, 0); + int n = 0; + void *tags; + + xa_lock(&mte_pages); + xas_for_each(&xa_state, tags, ULONG_MAX) { + unsigned long pfn = xa_state.xa_index; + struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn); + + mte_restore_page_tags(page_address(page), tags); + + mte_free_tag_storage(tags); + n++; + } + xa_unlock(&mte_pages); + + pr_info("Restored %d MTE pages\n", n); + + xa_destroy(&mte_pages); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ + +static int swsusp_mte_save_tags(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void swsusp_mte_restore_tags(void) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ + int swsusp_arch_suspend(void) { int ret = 0; @@ -302,6 +413,10 @@ int swsusp_arch_suspend(void) /* make the crash dump kernel image visible/saveable */ crash_prepare_suspend(); + ret = swsusp_mte_save_tags(); + if (ret) + return ret; + sleep_cpu = smp_processor_id(); ret = swsusp_save(); } else { @@ -315,6 +430,8 @@ int swsusp_arch_suspend(void) dcache_clean_range(__hyp_text_start, __hyp_text_end); } + swsusp_mte_restore_tags(); + /* make the crash dump kernel image protected again */ crash_post_resume(); @@ -332,11 +449,7 @@ int swsusp_arch_suspend(void) * mitigation off behind our back, let's set the state * to what we expect it to be. */ - switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); - } + spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(NULL); } local_daif_restore(flags); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h b/arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h index 8982b68289b7..843ecfb16a69 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h @@ -64,12 +64,10 @@ __efistub__ctype = _ctype; #define KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(sym) __kvm_nvhe_##sym = sym; /* Alternative callbacks for init-time patching of nVHE hyp code. */ -KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(arm64_enable_wa2_handling); KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_patch_vector_branch); KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_update_va_mask); /* Global kernel state accessed by nVHE hyp code. */ -KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(arm64_ssbd_callback_required); KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_host_data); KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_vgic_global_state); @@ -101,6 +99,8 @@ KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(vgic_v3_cpuif_trap); /* Static key checked in pmr_sync(). */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(gic_pmr_sync); +/* Static key checked in GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF. */ +KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(gic_nonsecure_priorities); #endif /* EL2 exception handling */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/image.h b/arch/arm64/kernel/image.h index c7d38c660372..7bc3ba897901 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/image.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/image.h @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ */ #define HEAD_SYMBOLS \ DEFINE_IMAGE_LE64(_kernel_size_le, _end - _text); \ - DEFINE_IMAGE_LE64(_kernel_offset_le, TEXT_OFFSET); \ DEFINE_IMAGE_LE64(_kernel_flags_le, __HEAD_FLAGS); #endif /* __ARM64_KERNEL_IMAGE_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c index a107375005bc..6c0de2f60ea9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c @@ -60,16 +60,10 @@ bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable_hint(u32 insn) case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_XPACLRI: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PACIA_1716: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PACIB_1716: - case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIA_1716: - case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIB_1716: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PACIAZ: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PACIASP: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PACIBZ: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PACIBSP: - case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIAZ: - case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIASP: - case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIBZ: - case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIBSP: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTI: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTIC: case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTIJ: @@ -176,7 +170,7 @@ bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_uses_literal(u32 insn) bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_branch(u32 insn) { - /* b, bl, cb*, tb*, b.cond, br, blr */ + /* b, bl, cb*, tb*, ret*, b.cond, br*, blr* */ return aarch64_insn_is_b(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_bl(insn) || @@ -185,8 +179,11 @@ bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_branch(u32 insn) aarch64_insn_is_tbz(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_tbnz(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_ret(insn) || + aarch64_insn_is_ret_auth(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_br(insn) || + aarch64_insn_is_br_auth(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_blr(insn) || + aarch64_insn_is_blr_auth(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_bcond(insn); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c index 04a327ccf84d..9cf2fb87584a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd. */ -#include <linux/kernel_stat.h> #include <linux/irq.h> #include <linux/memory.h> #include <linux/smp.h> +#include <linux/hardirq.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/irqchip.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h> @@ -22,20 +22,11 @@ #include <asm/daifflags.h> #include <asm/vmap_stack.h> -unsigned long irq_err_count; - /* Only access this in an NMI enter/exit */ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct nmi_ctx, nmi_contexts); DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, irq_stack_ptr); -int arch_show_interrupts(struct seq_file *p, int prec) -{ - show_ipi_list(p, prec); - seq_printf(p, "%*s: %10lu\n", prec, "Err", irq_err_count); - return 0; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK static void init_irq_stacks(void) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index 361a1143e09e..5b0e67b93cdc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static int prepare_elf_headers(void **addr, unsigned long *sz) phys_addr_t start, end; nr_ranges = 1; /* for exclusion of crashkernel region */ - for_each_mem_range(i, &memblock.memory, NULL, NUMA_NO_NODE, - MEMBLOCK_NONE, &start, &end, NULL) + for_each_mem_range(i, &start, &end) nr_ranges++; cmem = kmalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, nr_ranges), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -225,8 +224,7 @@ static int prepare_elf_headers(void **addr, unsigned long *sz) cmem->max_nr_ranges = nr_ranges; cmem->nr_ranges = 0; - for_each_mem_range(i, &memblock.memory, NULL, NUMA_NO_NODE, - MEMBLOCK_NONE, &start, &end, NULL) { + for_each_mem_range(i, &start, &end) { cmem->ranges[cmem->nr_ranges].start = start; cmem->ranges[cmem->nr_ranges].end = end - 1; cmem->nr_ranges++; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..52a0638ed967 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Ltd. + */ + +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/swap.h> +#include <linux/swapops.h> +#include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <linux/uio.h> + +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> +#include <asm/ptrace.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + +static void mte_sync_page_tags(struct page *page, pte_t *ptep, bool check_swap) +{ + pte_t old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep); + + if (check_swap && is_swap_pte(old_pte)) { + swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(old_pte); + + if (!non_swap_entry(entry) && mte_restore_tags(entry, page)) + return; + } + + mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page)); +} + +void mte_sync_tags(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) +{ + struct page *page = pte_page(pte); + long i, nr_pages = compound_nr(page); + bool check_swap = nr_pages == 1; + + /* if PG_mte_tagged is set, tags have already been initialised */ + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++) { + if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) + mte_sync_page_tags(page, ptep, check_swap); + } +} + +int memcmp_pages(struct page *page1, struct page *page2) +{ + char *addr1, *addr2; + int ret; + + addr1 = page_address(page1); + addr2 = page_address(page2); + ret = memcmp(addr1, addr2, PAGE_SIZE); + + if (!system_supports_mte() || ret) + return ret; + + /* + * If the page content is identical but at least one of the pages is + * tagged, return non-zero to avoid KSM merging. If only one of the + * pages is tagged, set_pte_at() may zero or change the tags of the + * other page via mte_sync_tags(). + */ + if (test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page1->flags) || + test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page2->flags)) + return addr1 != addr2; + + return ret; +} + +static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0) +{ + /* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */ + sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_MASK, tcf0); + isb(); +} + +static void set_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0) +{ + /* + * mte_thread_switch() checks current->thread.sctlr_tcf0 as an + * optimisation. Disable preemption so that it does not see + * the variable update before the SCTLR_EL1.TCF0 one. + */ + preempt_disable(); + current->thread.sctlr_tcf0 = tcf0; + update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(tcf0); + preempt_enable(); +} + +static void update_gcr_el1_excl(u64 incl) +{ + u64 excl = ~incl & SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK; + + /* + * Note that 'incl' is an include mask (controlled by the user via + * prctl()) while GCR_EL1 accepts an exclude mask. + * No need for ISB since this only affects EL0 currently, implicit + * with ERET. + */ + sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_GCR_EL1, SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK, excl); +} + +static void set_gcr_el1_excl(u64 incl) +{ + current->thread.gcr_user_incl = incl; + update_gcr_el1_excl(incl); +} + +void flush_mte_state(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return; + + /* clear any pending asynchronous tag fault */ + dsb(ish); + write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_TFSRE0_EL1); + clear_thread_flag(TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT); + /* disable tag checking */ + set_sctlr_el1_tcf0(SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_NONE); + /* reset tag generation mask */ + set_gcr_el1_excl(0); +} + +void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return; + + /* avoid expensive SCTLR_EL1 accesses if no change */ + if (current->thread.sctlr_tcf0 != next->thread.sctlr_tcf0) + update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(next->thread.sctlr_tcf0); + update_gcr_el1_excl(next->thread.gcr_user_incl); +} + +void mte_suspend_exit(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return; + + update_gcr_el1_excl(current->thread.gcr_user_incl); +} + +long set_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg) +{ + u64 tcf0; + u64 gcr_incl = (arg & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK) >> PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT; + + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return 0; + + switch (arg & PR_MTE_TCF_MASK) { + case PR_MTE_TCF_NONE: + tcf0 = SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_NONE; + break; + case PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC: + tcf0 = SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SYNC; + break; + case PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC: + tcf0 = SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_ASYNC; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (task != current) { + task->thread.sctlr_tcf0 = tcf0; + task->thread.gcr_user_incl = gcr_incl; + } else { + set_sctlr_el1_tcf0(tcf0); + set_gcr_el1_excl(gcr_incl); + } + + return 0; +} + +long get_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task) +{ + unsigned long ret; + + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return 0; + + ret = task->thread.gcr_user_incl << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT; + + switch (task->thread.sctlr_tcf0) { + case SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_NONE: + return PR_MTE_TCF_NONE; + case SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SYNC: + ret |= PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC; + break; + case SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_ASYNC: + ret |= PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC; + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Access MTE tags in another process' address space as given in mm. Update + * the number of tags copied. Return 0 if any tags copied, error otherwise. + * Inspired by __access_remote_vm(). + */ +static int __access_remote_tags(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, + struct iovec *kiov, unsigned int gup_flags) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + void __user *buf = kiov->iov_base; + size_t len = kiov->iov_len; + int ret; + int write = gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE; + + if (!access_ok(buf, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) + return -EIO; + + while (len) { + unsigned long tags, offset; + void *maddr; + struct page *page = NULL; + + ret = get_user_pages_remote(mm, addr, 1, gup_flags, &page, + &vma, NULL); + if (ret <= 0) + break; + + /* + * Only copy tags if the page has been mapped as PROT_MTE + * (PG_mte_tagged set). Otherwise the tags are not valid and + * not accessible to user. Moreover, an mprotect(PROT_MTE) + * would cause the existing tags to be cleared if the page + * was never mapped with PROT_MTE. + */ + if (!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + put_page(page); + break; + } + + /* limit access to the end of the page */ + offset = offset_in_page(addr); + tags = min(len, (PAGE_SIZE - offset) / MTE_GRANULE_SIZE); + + maddr = page_address(page); + if (write) { + tags = mte_copy_tags_from_user(maddr + offset, buf, tags); + set_page_dirty_lock(page); + } else { + tags = mte_copy_tags_to_user(buf, maddr + offset, tags); + } + put_page(page); + + /* error accessing the tracer's buffer */ + if (!tags) + break; + + len -= tags; + buf += tags; + addr += tags * MTE_GRANULE_SIZE; + } + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + + /* return an error if no tags copied */ + kiov->iov_len = buf - kiov->iov_base; + if (!kiov->iov_len) { + /* check for error accessing the tracee's address space */ + if (ret <= 0) + return -EIO; + else + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Copy MTE tags in another process' address space at 'addr' to/from tracer's + * iovec buffer. Return 0 on success. Inspired by ptrace_access_vm(). + */ +static int access_remote_tags(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, + struct iovec *kiov, unsigned int gup_flags) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm; + int ret; + + mm = get_task_mm(tsk); + if (!mm) + return -EPERM; + + if (!tsk->ptrace || (current != tsk->parent) || + ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && + !ptracer_capable(tsk, mm->user_ns))) { + mmput(mm); + return -EPERM; + } + + ret = __access_remote_tags(mm, addr, kiov, gup_flags); + mmput(mm); + + return ret; +} + +int mte_ptrace_copy_tags(struct task_struct *child, long request, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long data) +{ + int ret; + struct iovec kiov; + struct iovec __user *uiov = (void __user *)data; + unsigned int gup_flags = FOLL_FORCE; + + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return -EIO; + + if (get_user(kiov.iov_base, &uiov->iov_base) || + get_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (request == PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS) + gup_flags |= FOLL_WRITE; + + /* align addr to the MTE tag granule */ + addr &= MTE_GRANULE_MASK; + + ret = access_remote_tags(child, addr, &kiov, gup_flags); + if (!ret) + ret = put_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c index b0e03e052dd1..88ff471b0bce 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c @@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ void perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, * whist unwinding the stackframe and is like a subroutine return so we use * the PC. */ -static int callchain_trace(struct stackframe *frame, void *data) +static bool callchain_trace(void *data, unsigned long pc) { struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry = data; - perf_callchain_store(entry, frame->pc); - return 0; + perf_callchain_store(entry, pc); + return true; } void perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c index 462f9a9cc44b..3605f77ad4df 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ static const unsigned armv8_pmuv3_perf_cache_map[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX] [C(ITLB)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_MISS)] = ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_L1I_TLB_REFILL, [C(ITLB)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_ACCESS)] = ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_L1I_TLB, + [C(LL)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_MISS)] = ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_LL_CACHE_MISS_RD, + [C(LL)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_ACCESS)] = ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_LL_CACHE_RD, + [C(BPU)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_ACCESS)] = ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_BR_PRED, [C(BPU)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_MISS)] = ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_BR_MIS_PRED, }; @@ -302,13 +305,33 @@ static struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_format_attr_group = { .attrs = armv8_pmuv3_format_attrs, }; +static ssize_t slots_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *page) +{ + struct pmu *pmu = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = container_of(pmu, struct arm_pmu, pmu); + u32 slots = cpu_pmu->reg_pmmir & ARMV8_PMU_SLOTS_MASK; + + return snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%08x\n", slots); +} + +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(slots); + +static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_caps_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_slots.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = { + .name = "caps", + .attrs = armv8_pmuv3_caps_attrs, +}; + /* * Perf Events' indices */ #define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER 0 #define ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER0 1 -#define ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER_LAST(cpu_pmu) \ - (ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER + cpu_pmu->num_events - 1) /* @@ -348,6 +371,73 @@ static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_chained(struct perf_event *event) #define ARMV8_IDX_TO_COUNTER(x) \ (((x) - ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER0) & ARMV8_PMU_COUNTER_MASK) +/* + * This code is really good + */ + +#define PMEVN_CASE(n, case_macro) \ + case n: case_macro(n); break + +#define PMEVN_SWITCH(x, case_macro) \ + do { \ + switch (x) { \ + PMEVN_CASE(0, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(1, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(2, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(3, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(4, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(5, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(6, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(7, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(8, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(9, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(10, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(11, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(12, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(13, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(14, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(15, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(16, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(17, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(18, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(19, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(20, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(21, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(22, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(23, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(24, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(25, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(26, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(27, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(28, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(29, case_macro); \ + PMEVN_CASE(30, case_macro); \ + default: WARN(1, "Invalid PMEV* index\n"); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define RETURN_READ_PMEVCNTRN(n) \ + return read_sysreg(pmevcntr##n##_el0) +static unsigned long read_pmevcntrn(int n) +{ + PMEVN_SWITCH(n, RETURN_READ_PMEVCNTRN); + return 0; +} + +#define WRITE_PMEVCNTRN(n) \ + write_sysreg(val, pmevcntr##n##_el0) +static void write_pmevcntrn(int n, unsigned long val) +{ + PMEVN_SWITCH(n, WRITE_PMEVCNTRN); +} + +#define WRITE_PMEVTYPERN(n) \ + write_sysreg(val, pmevtyper##n##_el0) +static void write_pmevtypern(int n, unsigned long val) +{ + PMEVN_SWITCH(n, WRITE_PMEVTYPERN); +} + static inline u32 armv8pmu_pmcr_read(void) { return read_sysreg(pmcr_el0); @@ -365,28 +455,16 @@ static inline int armv8pmu_has_overflowed(u32 pmovsr) return pmovsr & ARMV8_PMU_OVERFLOWED_MASK; } -static inline int armv8pmu_counter_valid(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, int idx) -{ - return idx >= ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER && - idx <= ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER_LAST(cpu_pmu); -} - static inline int armv8pmu_counter_has_overflowed(u32 pmnc, int idx) { return pmnc & BIT(ARMV8_IDX_TO_COUNTER(idx)); } -static inline void armv8pmu_select_counter(int idx) +static inline u32 armv8pmu_read_evcntr(int idx) { u32 counter = ARMV8_IDX_TO_COUNTER(idx); - write_sysreg(counter, pmselr_el0); - isb(); -} -static inline u64 armv8pmu_read_evcntr(int idx) -{ - armv8pmu_select_counter(idx); - return read_sysreg(pmxevcntr_el0); + return read_pmevcntrn(counter); } static inline u64 armv8pmu_read_hw_counter(struct perf_event *event) @@ -440,15 +518,11 @@ static u64 armv8pmu_unbias_long_counter(struct perf_event *event, u64 value) static u64 armv8pmu_read_counter(struct perf_event *event) { - struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; int idx = hwc->idx; u64 value = 0; - if (!armv8pmu_counter_valid(cpu_pmu, idx)) - pr_err("CPU%u reading wrong counter %d\n", - smp_processor_id(), idx); - else if (idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) + if (idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) value = read_sysreg(pmccntr_el0); else value = armv8pmu_read_hw_counter(event); @@ -458,8 +532,9 @@ static u64 armv8pmu_read_counter(struct perf_event *event) static inline void armv8pmu_write_evcntr(int idx, u64 value) { - armv8pmu_select_counter(idx); - write_sysreg(value, pmxevcntr_el0); + u32 counter = ARMV8_IDX_TO_COUNTER(idx); + + write_pmevcntrn(counter, value); } static inline void armv8pmu_write_hw_counter(struct perf_event *event, @@ -477,16 +552,12 @@ static inline void armv8pmu_write_hw_counter(struct perf_event *event, static void armv8pmu_write_counter(struct perf_event *event, u64 value) { - struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; int idx = hwc->idx; value = armv8pmu_bias_long_counter(event, value); - if (!armv8pmu_counter_valid(cpu_pmu, idx)) - pr_err("CPU%u writing wrong counter %d\n", - smp_processor_id(), idx); - else if (idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) + if (idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) write_sysreg(value, pmccntr_el0); else armv8pmu_write_hw_counter(event, value); @@ -494,9 +565,10 @@ static void armv8pmu_write_counter(struct perf_event *event, u64 value) static inline void armv8pmu_write_evtype(int idx, u32 val) { - armv8pmu_select_counter(idx); + u32 counter = ARMV8_IDX_TO_COUNTER(idx); + val &= ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_MASK; - write_sysreg(val, pmxevtyper_el0); + write_pmevtypern(counter, val); } static inline void armv8pmu_write_event_type(struct perf_event *event) @@ -516,7 +588,10 @@ static inline void armv8pmu_write_event_type(struct perf_event *event) armv8pmu_write_evtype(idx - 1, hwc->config_base); armv8pmu_write_evtype(idx, chain_evt); } else { - armv8pmu_write_evtype(idx, hwc->config_base); + if (idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) + write_sysreg(hwc->config_base, pmccfiltr_el0); + else + armv8pmu_write_evtype(idx, hwc->config_base); } } @@ -532,6 +607,11 @@ static u32 armv8pmu_event_cnten_mask(struct perf_event *event) static inline void armv8pmu_enable_counter(u32 mask) { + /* + * Make sure event configuration register writes are visible before we + * enable the counter. + * */ + isb(); write_sysreg(mask, pmcntenset_el0); } @@ -550,6 +630,11 @@ static inline void armv8pmu_enable_event_counter(struct perf_event *event) static inline void armv8pmu_disable_counter(u32 mask) { write_sysreg(mask, pmcntenclr_el0); + /* + * Make sure the effects of disabling the counter are visible before we + * start configuring the event. + */ + isb(); } static inline void armv8pmu_disable_event_counter(struct perf_event *event) @@ -606,15 +691,10 @@ static inline u32 armv8pmu_getreset_flags(void) static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) { - unsigned long flags; - struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); - struct pmu_hw_events *events = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); - /* * Enable counter and interrupt, and set the counter to count * the event that we're interested in. */ - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&events->pmu_lock, flags); /* * Disable counter @@ -622,7 +702,7 @@ static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) armv8pmu_disable_event_counter(event); /* - * Set event (if destined for PMNx counters). + * Set event. */ armv8pmu_write_event_type(event); @@ -635,21 +715,10 @@ static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) * Enable counter */ armv8pmu_enable_event_counter(event); - - raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&events->pmu_lock, flags); } static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event) { - unsigned long flags; - struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); - struct pmu_hw_events *events = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); - - /* - * Disable counter and interrupt - */ - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&events->pmu_lock, flags); - /* * Disable counter */ @@ -659,30 +728,18 @@ static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event) * Disable interrupt for this counter */ armv8pmu_disable_event_irq(event); - - raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&events->pmu_lock, flags); } static void armv8pmu_start(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - unsigned long flags; - struct pmu_hw_events *events = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); - - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&events->pmu_lock, flags); /* Enable all counters */ armv8pmu_pmcr_write(armv8pmu_pmcr_read() | ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_E); - raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&events->pmu_lock, flags); } static void armv8pmu_stop(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - unsigned long flags; - struct pmu_hw_events *events = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); - - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&events->pmu_lock, flags); /* Disable all counters */ armv8pmu_pmcr_write(armv8pmu_pmcr_read() & ~ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_E); - raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&events->pmu_lock, flags); } static irqreturn_t armv8pmu_handle_irq(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) @@ -735,20 +792,16 @@ static irqreturn_t armv8pmu_handle_irq(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event)) continue; + /* + * Perf event overflow will queue the processing of the event as + * an irq_work which will be taken care of in the handling of + * IPI_IRQ_WORK. + */ if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs)) cpu_pmu->disable(event); } armv8pmu_start(cpu_pmu); - /* - * Handle the pending perf events. - * - * Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For - * platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this - * will not work. - */ - irq_work_run(); - return IRQ_HANDLED; } @@ -997,6 +1050,12 @@ static void __armv8pmu_probe_pmu(void *info) bitmap_from_arr32(cpu_pmu->pmceid_ext_bitmap, pmceid, ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS); + + /* store PMMIR_EL1 register for sysfs */ + if (pmuver >= ID_AA64DFR0_PMUVER_8_4 && (pmceid_raw[1] & BIT(31))) + cpu_pmu->reg_pmmir = read_cpuid(PMMIR_EL1); + else + cpu_pmu->reg_pmmir = 0; } static int armv8pmu_probe_pmu(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) @@ -1019,7 +1078,8 @@ static int armv8pmu_probe_pmu(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) static int armv8_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, int (*map_event)(struct perf_event *event), const struct attribute_group *events, - const struct attribute_group *format) + const struct attribute_group *format, + const struct attribute_group *caps) { int ret = armv8pmu_probe_pmu(cpu_pmu); if (ret) @@ -1044,104 +1104,112 @@ static int armv8_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, events : &armv8_pmuv3_events_attr_group; cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_FORMATS] = format ? format : &armv8_pmuv3_format_attr_group; + cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_CAPS] = caps ? + caps : &armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group; return 0; } +static int armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, + int (*map_event)(struct perf_event *event)) +{ + return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, name, map_event, NULL, NULL, NULL); +} + static int armv8_pmuv3_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_pmuv3", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_pmuv3", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_a34_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a34", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a34", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_a35_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a35", - armv8_a53_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a35", + armv8_a53_map_event); } static int armv8_a53_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a53", - armv8_a53_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a53", + armv8_a53_map_event); } static int armv8_a55_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a55", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a55", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_a57_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a57", - armv8_a57_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a57", + armv8_a57_map_event); } static int armv8_a65_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a65", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a65", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_a72_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a72", - armv8_a57_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a72", + armv8_a57_map_event); } static int armv8_a73_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a73", - armv8_a73_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a73", + armv8_a73_map_event); } static int armv8_a75_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a75", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a75", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_a76_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a76", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a76", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_a77_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a77", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cortex_a77", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_e1_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_neoverse_e1", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_neoverse_e1", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_n1_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_neoverse_n1", - armv8_pmuv3_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_neoverse_n1", + armv8_pmuv3_map_event); } static int armv8_thunder_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cavium_thunder", - armv8_thunder_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_cavium_thunder", + armv8_thunder_map_event); } static int armv8_vulcan_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { - return armv8_pmu_init(cpu_pmu, "armv8_brcm_vulcan", - armv8_vulcan_map_event, NULL, NULL); + return armv8_pmu_init_nogroups(cpu_pmu, "armv8_brcm_vulcan", + armv8_vulcan_map_event); } static const struct of_device_id armv8_pmu_of_device_ids[] = { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_regs.c index 666b225aeb3a..94e8718e7229 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_regs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_regs.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ u64 perf_reg_value(struct pt_regs *regs, int idx) /* * Our handling of compat tasks (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_32) is weird, but - * we're stuck with it for ABI compatability reasons. + * we're stuck with it for ABI compatibility reasons. * * For a 32-bit consumer inspecting a 32-bit task, then it will look at * the first 16 registers (see arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/perf_regs.h). diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c index 263d5fba4c8a..104101f633b1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ static bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable(u32 insn) aarch64_insn_is_msr_imm(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_msr_reg(insn) || aarch64_insn_is_exception(insn) || - aarch64_insn_is_eret(insn)) + aarch64_insn_is_eret(insn) || + aarch64_insn_is_eret_auth(insn)) return false; /* @@ -42,8 +43,10 @@ static bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable(u32 insn) != AARCH64_INSN_SPCLREG_DAIF; /* - * The HINT instruction is is problematic when single-stepping, - * except for the NOP case. + * The HINT instruction is steppable only if it is in whitelist + * and the rest of other such instructions are blocked for + * single stepping as they may cause exception or other + * unintended behaviour. */ if (aarch64_insn_is_hint(insn)) return aarch64_insn_is_steppable_hint(insn); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c index 5290f17a4d80..deba738142ed 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c @@ -464,87 +464,15 @@ int __init arch_populate_kprobe_blacklist(void) void __kprobes __used *trampoline_probe_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) { - struct kretprobe_instance *ri = NULL; - struct hlist_head *head, empty_rp; - struct hlist_node *tmp; - unsigned long flags, orig_ret_address = 0; - unsigned long trampoline_address = - (unsigned long)&kretprobe_trampoline; - kprobe_opcode_t *correct_ret_addr = NULL; - - INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&empty_rp); - kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags); - - /* - * It is possible to have multiple instances associated with a given - * task either because multiple functions in the call path have - * return probes installed on them, and/or more than one - * return probe was registered for a target function. - * - * We can handle this because: - * - instances are always pushed into the head of the list - * - when multiple return probes are registered for the same - * function, the (chronologically) first instance's ret_addr - * will be the real return address, and all the rest will - * point to kretprobe_trampoline. - */ - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ri, tmp, head, hlist) { - if (ri->task != current) - /* another task is sharing our hash bucket */ - continue; - - orig_ret_address = (unsigned long)ri->ret_addr; - - if (orig_ret_address != trampoline_address) - /* - * This is the real return address. Any other - * instances associated with this task are for - * other calls deeper on the call stack - */ - break; - } - - kretprobe_assert(ri, orig_ret_address, trampoline_address); - - correct_ret_addr = ri->ret_addr; - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ri, tmp, head, hlist) { - if (ri->task != current) - /* another task is sharing our hash bucket */ - continue; - - orig_ret_address = (unsigned long)ri->ret_addr; - if (ri->rp && ri->rp->handler) { - __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, &ri->rp->kp); - get_kprobe_ctlblk()->kprobe_status = KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE; - ri->ret_addr = correct_ret_addr; - ri->rp->handler(ri, regs); - __this_cpu_write(current_kprobe, NULL); - } - - recycle_rp_inst(ri, &empty_rp); - - if (orig_ret_address != trampoline_address) - /* - * This is the real return address. Any other - * instances associated with this task are for - * other calls deeper on the call stack - */ - break; - } - - kretprobe_hash_unlock(current, &flags); - - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ri, tmp, &empty_rp, hlist) { - hlist_del(&ri->hlist); - kfree(ri); - } - return (void *)orig_ret_address; + return (void *)kretprobe_trampoline_handler(regs, &kretprobe_trampoline, + (void *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs)); } void __kprobes arch_prepare_kretprobe(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) { ri->ret_addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *)regs->regs[30]; + ri->fp = (void *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs); /* replace return addr (x30) with trampoline */ regs->regs[30] = (long)&kretprobe_trampoline; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index f1804496b935..4784011cecac 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/lockdep.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/stddef.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ #include <asm/exec.h> #include <asm/fpsimd.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> @@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ static void print_pstate(struct pt_regs *regs) const char *btype_str = btypes[(pstate & PSR_BTYPE_MASK) >> PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT]; - printk("pstate: %08llx (%c%c%c%c %c%c%c%c %cPAN %cUAO BTYPE=%s)\n", + printk("pstate: %08llx (%c%c%c%c %c%c%c%c %cPAN %cUAO %cTCO BTYPE=%s)\n", pstate, pstate & PSR_N_BIT ? 'N' : 'n', pstate & PSR_Z_BIT ? 'Z' : 'z', @@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ static void print_pstate(struct pt_regs *regs) pstate & PSR_F_BIT ? 'F' : 'f', pstate & PSR_PAN_BIT ? '+' : '-', pstate & PSR_UAO_BIT ? '+' : '-', + pstate & PSR_TCO_BIT ? '+' : '-', btype_str); } } @@ -336,6 +339,7 @@ void flush_thread(void) tls_thread_flush(); flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(current); flush_tagged_addr_state(); + flush_mte_state(); } void release_thread(struct task_struct *dead_task) @@ -368,6 +372,9 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src) dst->thread.sve_state = NULL; clear_tsk_thread_flag(dst, TIF_SVE); + /* clear any pending asynchronous tag fault raised by the parent */ + clear_tsk_thread_flag(dst, TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT); + return 0; } @@ -421,8 +428,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start, cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO)) childregs->pstate |= PSR_UAO_BIT; - if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) - set_ssbs_bit(childregs); + spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(p); if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) childregs->pmr_save = GIC_PRIO_IRQON; @@ -472,8 +478,6 @@ void uao_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) */ static void ssbs_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { - struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(next); - /* * Nothing to do for kernel threads, but 'regs' may be junk * (e.g. idle task) so check the flags and bail early. @@ -485,18 +489,10 @@ static void ssbs_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) * If all CPUs implement the SSBS extension, then we just need to * context-switch the PSTATE field. */ - if (cpu_have_feature(cpu_feature(SSBS))) + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) return; - /* If the mitigation is enabled, then we leave SSBS clear. */ - if ((arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE) || - test_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_SSBD)) - return; - - if (compat_user_mode(regs)) - set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs); - else if (user_mode(regs)) - set_ssbs_bit(regs); + spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(next); } /* @@ -571,6 +567,13 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, */ dsb(ish); + /* + * MTE thread switching must happen after the DSB above to ensure that + * any asynchronous tag check faults have been logged in the TFSR*_EL1 + * registers. + */ + mte_thread_switch(next); + /* the actual thread switch */ last = cpu_switch_to(prev, next); @@ -620,6 +623,11 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0; ptrauth_thread_init_user(current); + + if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(current)) { + arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(current, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, + PR_SPEC_ENABLE); + } } #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI @@ -628,11 +636,18 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) */ static unsigned int tagged_addr_disabled; -long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(unsigned long arg) +long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg) { - if (is_compat_task()) + unsigned long valid_mask = PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE; + struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(task); + + if (is_compat_thread(ti)) return -EINVAL; - if (arg & ~PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE) + + if (system_supports_mte()) + valid_mask |= PR_MTE_TCF_MASK | PR_MTE_TAG_MASK; + + if (arg & ~valid_mask) return -EINVAL; /* @@ -642,20 +657,28 @@ long set_tagged_addr_ctrl(unsigned long arg) if (arg & PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE && tagged_addr_disabled) return -EINVAL; - update_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR, arg & PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE); + if (set_mte_ctrl(task, arg) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + update_ti_thread_flag(ti, TIF_TAGGED_ADDR, arg & PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE); return 0; } -long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(void) +long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(struct task_struct *task) { - if (is_compat_task()) + long ret = 0; + struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(task); + + if (is_compat_thread(ti)) return -EINVAL; - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)) - return PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE; + if (test_ti_thread_flag(ti, TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)) + ret = PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE; - return 0; + ret |= get_mte_ctrl(task); + + return ret; } /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..68b710f1b43f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c @@ -0,0 +1,792 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Handle detection, reporting and mitigation of Spectre v1, v2 and v4, as + * detailed at: + * + * https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability + * + * This code was originally written hastily under an awful lot of stress and so + * aspects of it are somewhat hacky. Unfortunately, changing anything in here + * instantly makes me feel ill. Thanks, Jann. Thann. + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC + * + * "If there's something strange in your neighbourhood, who you gonna call?" + * + * Authors: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> and Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> + */ + +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> + +#include <asm/spectre.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> + +/* + * We try to ensure that the mitigation state can never change as the result of + * onlining a late CPU. + */ +static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp, + enum mitigation_state new) +{ + enum mitigation_state state; + + do { + state = READ_ONCE(*oldp); + if (new <= state) + break; + + /* Userspace almost certainly can't deal with this. */ + if (WARN_ON(system_capabilities_finalized())) + break; + } while (cmpxchg_relaxed(oldp, state, new) != state); +} + +/* + * Spectre v1. + * + * The kernel can't protect userspace for this one: it's each person for + * themselves. Advertise what we're doing and be done with it. + */ +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); +} + +/* + * Spectre v2. + * + * This one sucks. A CPU is either: + * + * - Mitigated in hardware and advertised by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2. + * - Mitigated in hardware and listed in our "safe list". + * - Mitigated in software by firmware. + * - Mitigated in software by a CPU-specific dance in the kernel. + * - Vulnerable. + * + * It's not unlikely for different CPUs in a big.LITTLE system to fall into + * different camps. + */ +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_state; + +static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_v2; +static int __init parse_spectre_v2_param(char *str) +{ + __nospectre_v2 = true; + return 0; +} +early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_spectre_v2_param); + +static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(void) +{ + bool ret = __nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off(); + + if (ret) + pr_info_once("spectre-v2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); + + return ret; +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + switch (spectre_v2_state) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + fallthrough; + default: + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + } +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + u64 pfr0; + static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER), + { /* sentinel */ } + }; + + /* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */ + pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + + /* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */ + if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list)) + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; +} + +#define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED (1) + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + int ret; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); + + ret = res.a0; + switch (ret) { + case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED: + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + default: + fallthrough; + case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } +} + +bool has_spectre_v2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) +{ + WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); + + if (spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + return false; + + if (spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + return false; + + return true; +} + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_state; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/kvm_asm.h> + +atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1); + +static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + void *dst = lm_alias(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs + slot * SZ_2K); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80) + memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start); + + __flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); +} + +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn) +{ + static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + int cpu, slot = -1; + const char *hyp_vecs_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc; + const char *hyp_vecs_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc + + __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ; + + /* + * detect_harden_bp_fw() passes NULL for the hyp_vecs start/end if + * we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work. + */ + if (!is_hyp_mode_available()) { + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); + return; + } + + raw_spin_lock(&bp_lock); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) { + slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); + break; + } + } + + if (slot == -1) { + slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot); + BUG_ON(slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS); + __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); + } + + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); + raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock); +} +#else +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn) +{ + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ + +static void call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void) +{ + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); +} + +static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void) +{ + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); +} + +static void qcom_link_stack_sanitisation(void) +{ + u64 tmp; + + asm volatile("mov %0, x30 \n" + ".rept 16 \n" + "bl . + 4 \n" + ".endr \n" + "mov x30, %0 \n" + : "=&r" (tmp)); +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(void) +{ + bp_hardening_cb_t cb; + enum mitigation_state state; + + state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); + if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) + return state; + + if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off()) + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + + switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) { + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: + cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; + break; + + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: + cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; + break; + + default: + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + install_bp_hardening_cb(cb); + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_sw_mitigation(void) +{ + u32 midr; + + if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off()) + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + + midr = read_cpuid_id(); + if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) && + ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + + install_bp_hardening_cb(qcom_link_stack_sanitisation); + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} + +void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) +{ + enum mitigation_state state; + + WARN_ON(preemptible()); + + state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(); + if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) + state = spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(); + if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) + state = spectre_v2_enable_sw_mitigation(); + + update_mitigation_state(&spectre_v2_state, state); +} + +/* + * Spectre v4. + * + * If you thought Spectre v2 was nasty, wait until you see this mess. A CPU is + * either: + * + * - Mitigated in hardware and listed in our "safe list". + * - Mitigated in hardware via PSTATE.SSBS. + * - Mitigated in software by firmware (sometimes referred to as SSBD). + * + * Wait, that doesn't sound so bad, does it? Keep reading... + * + * A major source of headaches is that the software mitigation is enabled both + * on a per-task basis, but can also be forced on for the kernel, necessitating + * both context-switch *and* entry/exit hooks. To make it even worse, some CPUs + * allow EL0 to toggle SSBS directly, which can end up with the prctl() state + * being stale when re-entering the kernel. The usual big.LITTLE caveats apply, + * so you can have systems that have both firmware and SSBS mitigations. This + * means we actually have to reject late onlining of CPUs with mitigations if + * all of the currently onlined CPUs are safelisted, as the mitigation tends to + * be opt-in for userspace. Yes, really, the cure is worse than the disease. + * + * The only good part is that if the firmware mitigation is present, then it is + * present for all CPUs, meaning we don't have to worry about late onlining of a + * vulnerable CPU if one of the boot CPUs is using the firmware mitigation. + * + * Give me a VAX-11/780 any day of the week... + */ +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_state; + +/* This is the per-cpu state tracking whether we need to talk to firmware */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); + +enum spectre_v4_policy { + SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DYNAMIC, + SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_ENABLED, + SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED, +}; + +static enum spectre_v4_policy __read_mostly __spectre_v4_policy; + +static const struct spectre_v4_param { + const char *str; + enum spectre_v4_policy policy; +} spectre_v4_params[] = { + { "force-on", SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_ENABLED, }, + { "force-off", SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED, }, + { "kernel", SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DYNAMIC, }, +}; +static int __init parse_spectre_v4_param(char *str) +{ + int i; + + if (!str || !str[0]) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_v4_params); i++) { + const struct spectre_v4_param *param = &spectre_v4_params[i]; + + if (strncmp(str, param->str, strlen(param->str))) + continue; + + __spectre_v4_policy = param->policy; + return 0; + } + + return -EINVAL; +} +early_param("ssbd", parse_spectre_v4_param); + +/* + * Because this was all written in a rush by people working in different silos, + * we've ended up with multiple command line options to control the same thing. + * Wrap these up in some helpers, which prefer disabling the mitigation if faced + * with contradictory parameters. The mitigation is always either "off", + * "dynamic" or "on". + */ +static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_off(void) +{ + bool ret = cpu_mitigations_off() || + __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED; + + if (ret) + pr_info_once("spectre-v4 mitigation disabled by command-line option\n"); + + return ret; +} + +/* Do we need to toggle the mitigation state on entry to/exit from the kernel? */ +static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic(void) +{ + return !spectre_v4_mitigations_off() && + __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DYNAMIC; +} + +static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_on(void) +{ + return !spectre_v4_mitigations_off() && + __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_ENABLED; +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + switch (spectre_v4_state) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl\n"); + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + fallthrough; + default: + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + } +} + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(void) +{ + return spectre_v4_state; +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + static const struct midr_range spectre_v4_safe_list[] = { + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER), + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER), + { /* sentinel */ }, + }; + + if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v4_safe_list)) + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + + /* CPU features are detected first */ + if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) +{ + int ret; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); + + ret = res.a0; + switch (ret) { + case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED: + fallthrough; + case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED: + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + default: + fallthrough; + case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } +} + +bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope) +{ + enum mitigation_state state; + + WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); + + state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(); + if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) + state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); + + return state != SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; +} + +static int ssbs_emulation_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr) +{ + if (user_mode(regs)) + return 1; + + if (instr & BIT(PSTATE_Imm_shift)) + regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT; + else + regs->pstate &= ~PSR_SSBS_BIT; + + arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(regs, 4); + return 0; +} + +static struct undef_hook ssbs_emulation_hook = { + .instr_mask = ~(1U << PSTATE_Imm_shift), + .instr_val = 0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS, + .fn = ssbs_emulation_handler, +}; + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void) +{ + static bool undef_hook_registered = false; + static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(hook_lock); + enum mitigation_state state; + + /* + * If the system is mitigated but this CPU doesn't have SSBS, then + * we must be on the safelist and there's nothing more to do. + */ + state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(); + if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED || !this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + return state; + + raw_spin_lock(&hook_lock); + if (!undef_hook_registered) { + register_undef_hook(&ssbs_emulation_hook); + undef_hook_registered = true; + } + raw_spin_unlock(&hook_lock); + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) { + sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS); + asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(1)); + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + /* SCTLR_EL1.DSSBS was initialised to 0 during boot */ + asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(0)); + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} + +/* + * Patch a branch over the Spectre-v4 mitigation code with a NOP so that + * we fallthrough and check whether firmware needs to be called on this CPU. + */ +void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, + __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) +{ + BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* Branch -> NOP */ + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) + return; + + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + return; + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic()) + *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop()); +} + +/* + * Patch a NOP in the Spectre-v4 mitigation code with an SMC/HVC instruction + * to call into firmware to adjust the mitigation state. + */ +void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, + __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) +{ + u32 insn; + + BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* NOP -> HVC/SMC */ + + switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) { + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: + insn = aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value(); + break; + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: + insn = aarch64_insn_get_smc_value(); + break; + default: + return; + } + + *updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn); +} + +static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_fw_mitigation(void) +{ + enum mitigation_state state; + + state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); + if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) + return state; + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) { + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, false, NULL); + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, true, NULL); + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic()) + __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); + + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; +} + +void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) +{ + enum mitigation_state state; + + WARN_ON(preemptible()); + + state = spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(); + if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) + state = spectre_v4_enable_fw_mitigation(); + + update_mitigation_state(&spectre_v4_state, state); +} + +static void __update_pstate_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool state) +{ + u64 bit = compat_user_mode(regs) ? PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT; + + if (state) + regs->pstate |= bit; + else + regs->pstate &= ~bit; +} + +void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(tsk); + bool ssbs = false, kthread = tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD; + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) + ssbs = true; + else if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic() && !kthread) + ssbs = !test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD); + + __update_pstate_ssbs(regs, ssbs); +} + +/* + * The Spectre-v4 mitigation can be controlled via a prctl() from userspace. + * This is interesting because the "speculation disabled" behaviour can be + * configured so that it is preserved across exec(), which means that the + * prctl() may be necessary even when PSTATE.SSBS can be toggled directly + * from userspace. + */ +static void ssbd_prctl_enable_mitigation(struct task_struct *task) +{ + task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task); + task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); + set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); +} + +static void ssbd_prctl_disable_mitigation(struct task_struct *task) +{ + task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task); + task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task); + clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); +} + +static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) +{ + switch (ctrl) { + case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + /* Enable speculation: disable mitigation */ + /* + * Force disabled speculation prevents it from being + * re-enabled. + */ + if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) + return -EPERM; + + /* + * If the mitigation is forced on, then speculation is forced + * off and we again prevent it from being re-enabled. + */ + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_on()) + return -EPERM; + + ssbd_prctl_disable_mitigation(task); + break; + case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: + /* Force disable speculation: force enable mitigation */ + /* + * If the mitigation is forced off, then speculation is forced + * on and we prevent it from being disabled. + */ + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) + return -EPERM; + + task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task); + fallthrough; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + /* Disable speculation: enable mitigation */ + /* Same as PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE */ + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) + return -EPERM; + + ssbd_prctl_enable_mitigation(task); + break; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC: + /* Disable speculation until execve(): enable mitigation */ + /* + * If the mitigation state is forced one way or the other, then + * we must fail now before we try to toggle it on execve(). + */ + if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task) || + spectre_v4_mitigations_off() || + spectre_v4_mitigations_on()) { + return -EPERM; + } + + ssbd_prctl_enable_mitigation(task); + task_set_spec_ssb_noexec(task); + break; + default: + return -ERANGE; + } + + spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(task); + return 0; +} + +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which, + unsigned long ctrl) +{ + switch (which) { + case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: + return ssbd_prctl_set(task, ctrl); + default: + return -ENODEV; + } +} + +static int ssbd_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) +{ + switch (spectre_v4_state) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_on()) + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + + if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic()) + break; + + /* Mitigations are disabled, so we're vulnerable. */ + fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + fallthrough; + default: + return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + } + + /* Check the mitigation state for this task */ + if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; + + if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC; + + if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; +} + +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) +{ + switch (which) { + case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: + return ssbd_prctl_get(task); + default: + return -ENODEV; + } +} diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index d8ebfd813e28..f49b349e16a3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/debug-monitors.h> #include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> #include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> @@ -1032,6 +1033,35 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI +static int tagged_addr_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *target, + const struct user_regset *regset, + struct membuf to) +{ + long ctrl = get_tagged_addr_ctrl(target); + + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(ctrl)) + return ctrl; + + return membuf_write(&to, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl)); +} + +static int tagged_addr_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct + user_regset *regset, unsigned int pos, + unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const + void __user *ubuf) +{ + int ret; + long ctrl; + + ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &ctrl, 0, -1); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return set_tagged_addr_ctrl(target, ctrl); +} +#endif + enum aarch64_regset { REGSET_GPR, REGSET_FPR, @@ -1051,6 +1081,9 @@ enum aarch64_regset { REGSET_PACG_KEYS, #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + REGSET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, +#endif }; static const struct user_regset aarch64_regsets[] = { @@ -1148,6 +1181,16 @@ static const struct user_regset aarch64_regsets[] = { }, #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + [REGSET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL] = { + .core_note_type = NT_ARM_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, + .n = 1, + .size = sizeof(long), + .align = sizeof(long), + .regset_get = tagged_addr_ctrl_get, + .set = tagged_addr_ctrl_set, + }, +#endif }; static const struct user_regset_view user_aarch64_view = { @@ -1691,6 +1734,12 @@ const struct user_regset_view *task_user_regset_view(struct task_struct *task) long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data) { + switch (request) { + case PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS: + case PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS: + return mte_ptrace_copy_tags(child, request, addr, data); + } + return ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data); } @@ -1793,7 +1842,7 @@ void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs) * We also reserve IL for the kernel; SS is handled dynamically. */ #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH64_RES0_BITS \ - (GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 25) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 26) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | \ GENMASK_ULL(20, 13) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 5)) #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH32_RES0_BITS \ (GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(22, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20, 20)) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S index 542d6edc6806..84eec95ec06c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S @@ -36,18 +36,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(arm64_relocate_new_kernel) mov x14, xzr /* x14 = entry ptr */ mov x13, xzr /* x13 = copy dest */ - /* Clear the sctlr_el2 flags. */ - mrs x0, CurrentEL - cmp x0, #CurrentEL_EL2 - b.ne 1f - mrs x0, sctlr_el2 - mov_q x1, SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS - bic x0, x0, x1 - pre_disable_mmu_workaround - msr sctlr_el2, x0 - isb -1: - /* Check if the new image needs relocation. */ tbnz x16, IND_DONE_BIT, .Ldone diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/return_address.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/return_address.c index a5e8b3b9d798..a6d18755652f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/return_address.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/return_address.c @@ -18,16 +18,16 @@ struct return_address_data { void *addr; }; -static int save_return_addr(struct stackframe *frame, void *d) +static bool save_return_addr(void *d, unsigned long pc) { struct return_address_data *data = d; if (!data->level) { - data->addr = (void *)frame->pc; - return 1; + data->addr = (void *)pc; + return false; } else { --data->level; - return 0; + return true; } } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(save_return_addr); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c index 53acbeca4f57..133257ffd859 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static void __init request_standard_resources(void) if (!standard_resources) panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, res_size); - for_each_memblock(memory, region) { + for_each_mem_region(region) { res = &standard_resources[i++]; if (memblock_is_nomap(region)) { res->name = "reserved"; @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static int __init reserve_memblock_reserved_regions(void) if (!memblock_is_region_reserved(mem->start, mem_size)) continue; - for_each_reserved_mem_region(j, &r_start, &r_end) { + for_each_reserved_mem_range(j, &r_start, &r_end) { resource_size_t start, end; start = max(PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(r_start)), mem->start); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c index 3b4f31f35e45..bdcaaf091e1e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c @@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ static int preserve_sve_context(struct sve_context __user *ctx) if (vq) { /* * This assumes that the SVE state has already been saved to - * the task struct by calling preserve_fpsimd_context(). + * the task struct by calling the function + * fpsimd_signal_preserve_current_state(). */ err |= __copy_to_user((char __user *)ctx + SVE_SIG_REGS_OFFSET, current->thread.sve_state, @@ -748,6 +749,9 @@ static void setup_return(struct pt_regs *regs, struct k_sigaction *ka, regs->pstate |= PSR_BTYPE_C; } + /* TCO (Tag Check Override) always cleared for signal handlers */ + regs->pstate &= ~PSR_TCO_BIT; + if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) sigtramp = ka->sa.sa_restorer; else @@ -932,6 +936,12 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, if (thread_flags & _TIF_UPROBE) uprobe_notify_resume(regs); + if (thread_flags & _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) { + clear_thread_flag(TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT); + send_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_MTEAERR, + (void __user *)NULL, current); + } + if (thread_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING) do_signal(regs); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smccc-call.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/smccc-call.S index 1f93809528a4..d62447964ed9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smccc-call.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smccc-call.S @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> .macro SMCCC instr - .cfi_startproc \instr #0 ldr x4, [sp] stp x0, x1, [x4, #ARM_SMCCC_RES_X0_OFFS] @@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ b.ne 1f str x6, [x4, ARM_SMCCC_QUIRK_STATE_OFFS] 1: ret - .cfi_endproc .endm /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c index 355ee9eed4dd..82e75fc2c903 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/irq_work.h> +#include <linux/kernel_stat.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/kvm_host.h> @@ -72,10 +73,18 @@ enum ipi_msg_type { IPI_CPU_CRASH_STOP, IPI_TIMER, IPI_IRQ_WORK, - IPI_WAKEUP + IPI_WAKEUP, + NR_IPI }; +static int ipi_irq_base __read_mostly; +static int nr_ipi __read_mostly = NR_IPI; +static struct irq_desc *ipi_desc[NR_IPI] __read_mostly; + +static void ipi_setup(int cpu); + #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU +static void ipi_teardown(int cpu); static int op_cpu_kill(unsigned int cpu); #else static inline int op_cpu_kill(unsigned int cpu) @@ -237,6 +246,8 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void) */ notify_cpu_starting(cpu); + ipi_setup(cpu); + store_cpu_topology(cpu); numa_add_cpu(cpu); @@ -302,6 +313,7 @@ int __cpu_disable(void) * and we must not schedule until we're ready to give up the cpu. */ set_cpu_online(cpu, false); + ipi_teardown(cpu); /* * OK - migrate IRQs away from this CPU @@ -772,13 +784,6 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus) } } -void (*__smp_cross_call)(const struct cpumask *, unsigned int); - -void __init set_smp_cross_call(void (*fn)(const struct cpumask *, unsigned int)) -{ - __smp_cross_call = fn; -} - static const char *ipi_types[NR_IPI] __tracepoint_string = { #define S(x,s) [x] = s S(IPI_RESCHEDULE, "Rescheduling interrupts"), @@ -790,35 +795,25 @@ static const char *ipi_types[NR_IPI] __tracepoint_string = { S(IPI_WAKEUP, "CPU wake-up interrupts"), }; -static void smp_cross_call(const struct cpumask *target, unsigned int ipinr) -{ - trace_ipi_raise(target, ipi_types[ipinr]); - __smp_cross_call(target, ipinr); -} +static void smp_cross_call(const struct cpumask *target, unsigned int ipinr); -void show_ipi_list(struct seq_file *p, int prec) +unsigned long irq_err_count; + +int arch_show_interrupts(struct seq_file *p, int prec) { unsigned int cpu, i; for (i = 0; i < NR_IPI; i++) { + unsigned int irq = irq_desc_get_irq(ipi_desc[i]); seq_printf(p, "%*s%u:%s", prec - 1, "IPI", i, prec >= 4 ? " " : ""); for_each_online_cpu(cpu) - seq_printf(p, "%10u ", - __get_irq_stat(cpu, ipi_irqs[i])); + seq_printf(p, "%10u ", kstat_irqs_cpu(irq, cpu)); seq_printf(p, " %s\n", ipi_types[i]); } -} - -u64 smp_irq_stat_cpu(unsigned int cpu) -{ - u64 sum = 0; - int i; - for (i = 0; i < NR_IPI; i++) - sum += __get_irq_stat(cpu, ipi_irqs[i]); - - return sum; + seq_printf(p, "%*s: %10lu\n", prec, "Err", irq_err_count); + return 0; } void arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask) @@ -841,8 +836,7 @@ void arch_send_wakeup_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask) #ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_WORK void arch_irq_work_raise(void) { - if (__smp_cross_call) - smp_cross_call(cpumask_of(smp_processor_id()), IPI_IRQ_WORK); + smp_cross_call(cpumask_of(smp_processor_id()), IPI_IRQ_WORK); } #endif @@ -890,15 +884,12 @@ static void ipi_cpu_crash_stop(unsigned int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) /* * Main handler for inter-processor interrupts */ -void handle_IPI(int ipinr, struct pt_regs *regs) +static void do_handle_IPI(int ipinr) { unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - struct pt_regs *old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs); - if ((unsigned)ipinr < NR_IPI) { + if ((unsigned)ipinr < NR_IPI) trace_ipi_entry_rcuidle(ipi_types[ipinr]); - __inc_irq_stat(cpu, ipi_irqs[ipinr]); - } switch (ipinr) { case IPI_RESCHEDULE: @@ -906,21 +897,16 @@ void handle_IPI(int ipinr, struct pt_regs *regs) break; case IPI_CALL_FUNC: - irq_enter(); generic_smp_call_function_interrupt(); - irq_exit(); break; case IPI_CPU_STOP: - irq_enter(); local_cpu_stop(); - irq_exit(); break; case IPI_CPU_CRASH_STOP: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE)) { - irq_enter(); - ipi_cpu_crash_stop(cpu, regs); + ipi_cpu_crash_stop(cpu, get_irq_regs()); unreachable(); } @@ -928,17 +914,13 @@ void handle_IPI(int ipinr, struct pt_regs *regs) #ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST case IPI_TIMER: - irq_enter(); tick_receive_broadcast(); - irq_exit(); break; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_WORK case IPI_IRQ_WORK: - irq_enter(); irq_work_run(); - irq_exit(); break; #endif @@ -957,7 +939,66 @@ void handle_IPI(int ipinr, struct pt_regs *regs) if ((unsigned)ipinr < NR_IPI) trace_ipi_exit_rcuidle(ipi_types[ipinr]); - set_irq_regs(old_regs); +} + +static irqreturn_t ipi_handler(int irq, void *data) +{ + do_handle_IPI(irq - ipi_irq_base); + return IRQ_HANDLED; +} + +static void smp_cross_call(const struct cpumask *target, unsigned int ipinr) +{ + trace_ipi_raise(target, ipi_types[ipinr]); + __ipi_send_mask(ipi_desc[ipinr], target); +} + +static void ipi_setup(int cpu) +{ + int i; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ipi_irq_base)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < nr_ipi; i++) + enable_percpu_irq(ipi_irq_base + i, 0); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU +static void ipi_teardown(int cpu) +{ + int i; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ipi_irq_base)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < nr_ipi; i++) + disable_percpu_irq(ipi_irq_base + i); +} +#endif + +void __init set_smp_ipi_range(int ipi_base, int n) +{ + int i; + + WARN_ON(n < NR_IPI); + nr_ipi = min(n, NR_IPI); + + for (i = 0; i < nr_ipi; i++) { + int err; + + err = request_percpu_irq(ipi_base + i, ipi_handler, + "IPI", &cpu_number); + WARN_ON(err); + + ipi_desc[i] = irq_to_desc(ipi_base + i); + irq_set_status_flags(ipi_base + i, IRQ_HIDDEN); + } + + ipi_irq_base = ipi_base; + + /* Setup the boot CPU immediately */ + ipi_setup(smp_processor_id()); } void smp_send_reschedule(int cpu) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp_spin_table.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp_spin_table.c index c8a3fee00c11..5892e79fa429 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp_spin_table.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp_spin_table.c @@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ static int smp_spin_table_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu) /* * We write the release address as LE regardless of the native - * endianess of the kernel. Therefore, any boot-loaders that + * endianness of the kernel. Therefore, any boot-loaders that * read this address need to convert this address to the - * boot-loader's endianess before jumping. This is mandated by + * boot-loader's endianness before jumping. This is mandated by * the boot protocol. */ writeq_relaxed(__pa_symbol(secondary_holding_pen), release_addr); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c deleted file mode 100644 index b26955f56750..000000000000 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved. - */ - -#include <linux/compat.h> -#include <linux/errno.h> -#include <linux/prctl.h> -#include <linux/sched.h> -#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> -#include <linux/thread_info.h> - -#include <asm/cpufeature.h> - -static void ssbd_ssbs_enable(struct task_struct *task) -{ - u64 val = is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)) ? - PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT; - - task_pt_regs(task)->pstate |= val; -} - -static void ssbd_ssbs_disable(struct task_struct *task) -{ - u64 val = is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)) ? - PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT; - - task_pt_regs(task)->pstate &= ~val; -} - -/* - * prctl interface for SSBD - */ -static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) -{ - int state = arm64_get_ssbd_state(); - - /* Unsupported */ - if (state == ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN) - return -ENODEV; - - /* Treat the unaffected/mitigated state separately */ - if (state == ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED) { - switch (ctrl) { - case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: - return -EPERM; - case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: - case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: - return 0; - } - } - - /* - * Things are a bit backward here: the arm64 internal API - * *enables the mitigation* when the userspace API *disables - * speculation*. So much fun. - */ - switch (ctrl) { - case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: - /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */ - if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE || - task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) - return -EPERM; - task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task); - clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); - ssbd_ssbs_enable(task); - break; - case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: - if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) - return -EPERM; - task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); - set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); - ssbd_ssbs_disable(task); - break; - case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: - if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) - return -EPERM; - task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); - task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task); - set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); - ssbd_ssbs_disable(task); - break; - default: - return -ERANGE; - } - - return 0; -} - -int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which, - unsigned long ctrl) -{ - switch (which) { - case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: - return ssbd_prctl_set(task, ctrl); - default: - return -ENODEV; - } -} - -static int ssbd_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) -{ - switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { - case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN: - return -ENODEV; - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; - case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: - if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) - return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; - if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task)) - return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; - return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - default: - return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; - } -} - -int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) -{ - switch (which) { - case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: - return ssbd_prctl_get(task); - default: - return -ENODEV; - } -} diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c index 2dd8e3b8b94b..fa56af1a59c3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c @@ -118,12 +118,12 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame) NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unwind_frame); void notrace walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame, - int (*fn)(struct stackframe *, void *), void *data) + bool (*fn)(void *, unsigned long), void *data) { while (1) { int ret; - if (fn(frame, data)) + if (!fn(data, frame->pc)) break; ret = unwind_frame(tsk, frame); if (ret < 0) @@ -132,84 +132,89 @@ void notrace walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame, } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(walk_stackframe); -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE -struct stack_trace_data { - struct stack_trace *trace; - unsigned int no_sched_functions; - unsigned int skip; -}; - -static int save_trace(struct stackframe *frame, void *d) +static void dump_backtrace_entry(unsigned long where, const char *loglvl) { - struct stack_trace_data *data = d; - struct stack_trace *trace = data->trace; - unsigned long addr = frame->pc; - - if (data->no_sched_functions && in_sched_functions(addr)) - return 0; - if (data->skip) { - data->skip--; - return 0; - } - - trace->entries[trace->nr_entries++] = addr; - - return trace->nr_entries >= trace->max_entries; + printk("%s %pS\n", loglvl, (void *)where); } -void save_stack_trace_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct stack_trace *trace) +void dump_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *tsk, + const char *loglvl) { - struct stack_trace_data data; struct stackframe frame; + int skip = 0; - data.trace = trace; - data.skip = trace->skip; - data.no_sched_functions = 0; + pr_debug("%s(regs = %p tsk = %p)\n", __func__, regs, tsk); - start_backtrace(&frame, regs->regs[29], regs->pc); - walk_stackframe(current, &frame, save_trace, &data); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(save_stack_trace_regs); + if (regs) { + if (user_mode(regs)) + return; + skip = 1; + } -static noinline void __save_stack_trace(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct stack_trace *trace, unsigned int nosched) -{ - struct stack_trace_data data; - struct stackframe frame; + if (!tsk) + tsk = current; if (!try_get_task_stack(tsk)) return; - data.trace = trace; - data.skip = trace->skip; - data.no_sched_functions = nosched; - - if (tsk != current) { - start_backtrace(&frame, thread_saved_fp(tsk), - thread_saved_pc(tsk)); - } else { - /* We don't want this function nor the caller */ - data.skip += 2; + if (tsk == current) { start_backtrace(&frame, (unsigned long)__builtin_frame_address(0), - (unsigned long)__save_stack_trace); + (unsigned long)dump_backtrace); + } else { + /* + * task blocked in __switch_to + */ + start_backtrace(&frame, + thread_saved_fp(tsk), + thread_saved_pc(tsk)); } - walk_stackframe(tsk, &frame, save_trace, &data); + printk("%sCall trace:\n", loglvl); + do { + /* skip until specified stack frame */ + if (!skip) { + dump_backtrace_entry(frame.pc, loglvl); + } else if (frame.fp == regs->regs[29]) { + skip = 0; + /* + * Mostly, this is the case where this function is + * called in panic/abort. As exception handler's + * stack frame does not contain the corresponding pc + * at which an exception has taken place, use regs->pc + * instead. + */ + dump_backtrace_entry(regs->pc, loglvl); + } + } while (!unwind_frame(tsk, &frame)); put_task_stack(tsk); } -void save_stack_trace_tsk(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stack_trace *trace) +void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *sp, const char *loglvl) { - __save_stack_trace(tsk, trace, 1); + dump_backtrace(NULL, tsk, loglvl); + barrier(); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(save_stack_trace_tsk); -void save_stack_trace(struct stack_trace *trace) +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE + +void arch_stack_walk(stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie, + struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs) { - __save_stack_trace(current, trace, 0); + struct stackframe frame; + + if (regs) + start_backtrace(&frame, regs->regs[29], regs->pc); + else if (task == current) + start_backtrace(&frame, + (unsigned long)__builtin_frame_address(0), + (unsigned long)arch_stack_walk); + else + start_backtrace(&frame, thread_saved_fp(task), + thread_saved_pc(task)); + + walk_stackframe(task, &frame, consume_entry, cookie); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(save_stack_trace); #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c index c1dee9066ff9..96cd347c7a46 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <asm/daifflags.h> #include <asm/debug-monitors.h> #include <asm/exec.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/smp_plat.h> @@ -72,8 +73,10 @@ void notrace __cpu_suspend_exit(void) * have turned the mitigation on. If the user has forcefully * disabled it, make sure their wishes are obeyed. */ - if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) - arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false); + spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(NULL); + + /* Restore additional MTE-specific configuration */ + mte_suspend_exit(); } /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c index 5f0c04863d2c..e4c0dadf0d92 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c @@ -123,6 +123,16 @@ static void el0_svc_common(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno, int sc_nr, local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX); user_exit(); + if (system_supports_mte() && (flags & _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT)) { + /* + * Process the asynchronous tag check fault before the actual + * syscall. do_notify_resume() will send a signal to userspace + * before the syscall is restarted. + */ + regs->regs[0] = -ERESTARTNOINTR; + return; + } + if (has_syscall_work(flags)) { /* * The de-facto standard way to skip a system call using ptrace diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/topology.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/topology.c index 0801a0f3c156..543c67cae02f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/topology.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/topology.c @@ -36,21 +36,23 @@ void store_cpu_topology(unsigned int cpuid) if (mpidr & MPIDR_UP_BITMASK) return; - /* Create cpu topology mapping based on MPIDR. */ - if (mpidr & MPIDR_MT_BITMASK) { - /* Multiprocessor system : Multi-threads per core */ - cpuid_topo->thread_id = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 0); - cpuid_topo->core_id = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 1); - cpuid_topo->package_id = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 2) | - MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 3) << 8; - } else { - /* Multiprocessor system : Single-thread per core */ - cpuid_topo->thread_id = -1; - cpuid_topo->core_id = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 0); - cpuid_topo->package_id = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 1) | - MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 2) << 8 | - MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 3) << 16; - } + /* + * This would be the place to create cpu topology based on MPIDR. + * + * However, it cannot be trusted to depict the actual topology; some + * pieces of the architecture enforce an artificial cap on Aff0 values + * (e.g. GICv3's ICC_SGI1R_EL1 limits it to 15), leading to an + * artificial cycling of Aff1, Aff2 and Aff3 values. IOW, these end up + * having absolutely no relationship to the actual underlying system + * topology, and cannot be reasonably used as core / package ID. + * + * If the MT bit is set, Aff0 *could* be used to define a thread ID, but + * we still wouldn't be able to obtain a sane core ID. This means we + * need to entirely ignore MPIDR for any topology deduction. + */ + cpuid_topo->thread_id = -1; + cpuid_topo->core_id = cpuid; + cpuid_topo->package_id = cpu_to_node(cpuid); pr_debug("CPU%u: cluster %d core %d thread %d mpidr %#016llx\n", cpuid, cpuid_topo->package_id, cpuid_topo->core_id, @@ -246,6 +248,13 @@ static int __init init_amu_fie(void) static_branch_enable(&amu_fie_key); } + /* + * If the system is not fully invariant after AMU init, disable + * partial use of counters for frequency invariance. + */ + if (!topology_scale_freq_invariant()) + static_branch_disable(&amu_fie_key); + free_valid_mask: free_cpumask_var(valid_cpus); @@ -253,7 +262,7 @@ free_valid_mask: } late_initcall_sync(init_amu_fie); -bool arch_freq_counters_available(struct cpumask *cpus) +bool arch_freq_counters_available(const struct cpumask *cpus) { return amu_freq_invariant() && cpumask_subset(cpus, amu_fie_cpus); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c index 13ebd5ca2070..8af4e0e85736 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <asm/daifflags.h> #include <asm/debug-monitors.h> #include <asm/esr.h> +#include <asm/extable.h> #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/kprobes.h> #include <asm/traps.h> @@ -53,11 +54,6 @@ static const char *handler[]= { int show_unhandled_signals = 0; -static void dump_backtrace_entry(unsigned long where, const char *loglvl) -{ - printk("%s %pS\n", loglvl, (void *)where); -} - static void dump_kernel_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long addr = instruction_pointer(regs); @@ -83,66 +79,6 @@ static void dump_kernel_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs) printk("%sCode: %s\n", lvl, str); } -void dump_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *tsk, - const char *loglvl) -{ - struct stackframe frame; - int skip = 0; - - pr_debug("%s(regs = %p tsk = %p)\n", __func__, regs, tsk); - - if (regs) { - if (user_mode(regs)) - return; - skip = 1; - } - - if (!tsk) - tsk = current; - - if (!try_get_task_stack(tsk)) - return; - - if (tsk == current) { - start_backtrace(&frame, - (unsigned long)__builtin_frame_address(0), - (unsigned long)dump_backtrace); - } else { - /* - * task blocked in __switch_to - */ - start_backtrace(&frame, - thread_saved_fp(tsk), - thread_saved_pc(tsk)); - } - - printk("%sCall trace:\n", loglvl); - do { - /* skip until specified stack frame */ - if (!skip) { - dump_backtrace_entry(frame.pc, loglvl); - } else if (frame.fp == regs->regs[29]) { - skip = 0; - /* - * Mostly, this is the case where this function is - * called in panic/abort. As exception handler's - * stack frame does not contain the corresponding pc - * at which an exception has taken place, use regs->pc - * instead. - */ - dump_backtrace_entry(regs->pc, loglvl); - } - } while (!unwind_frame(tsk, &frame)); - - put_task_stack(tsk); -} - -void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *sp, const char *loglvl) -{ - dump_backtrace(NULL, tsk, loglvl); - barrier(); -} - #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT #define S_PREEMPT " PREEMPT" #elif defined(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) @@ -200,9 +136,9 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err) oops_exit(); if (in_interrupt()) - panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"); + panic("%s: Fatal exception in interrupt", str); if (panic_on_oops) - panic("Fatal exception"); + panic("%s: Fatal exception", str); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&die_lock, flags); @@ -412,7 +348,7 @@ exit: return fn ? fn(regs, instr) : 1; } -void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address) +void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address, unsigned int err) { const char *desc; struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs(); @@ -438,7 +374,7 @@ void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address) signal = SIGKILL; } - arm64_notify_die(desc, regs, signal, code, (void __user *)address, 0); + arm64_notify_die(desc, regs, signal, code, (void __user *)address, err); } /* @@ -455,7 +391,7 @@ void arm64_notify_segfault(unsigned long addr) code = SEGV_ACCERR; mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); - force_signal_inject(SIGSEGV, code, addr); + force_signal_inject(SIGSEGV, code, addr, 0); } void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) @@ -468,17 +404,28 @@ void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) return; BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)); - force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc); + force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc, 0); } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_undefinstr); void do_bti(struct pt_regs *regs) { BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)); - force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc); + force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc, 0); } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_bti); +void do_ptrauth_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) +{ + /* + * Unexpected FPAC exception or pointer authentication failure in + * the kernel: kill the task before it does any more harm. + */ + BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)); + force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPN, regs->pc, esr); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_ptrauth_fault); + #define __user_cache_maint(insn, address, res) \ if (address >= user_addr_max()) { \ res = -EFAULT; \ @@ -528,7 +475,7 @@ static void user_cache_maint_handler(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) __user_cache_maint("ic ivau", address, ret); break; default: - force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc); + force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc, 0); return; } @@ -581,7 +528,7 @@ static void mrs_handler(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) sysreg = esr_sys64_to_sysreg(esr); if (do_emulate_mrs(regs, sysreg, rt) != 0) - force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc); + force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->pc, 0); } static void wfi_handler(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) @@ -775,6 +722,7 @@ static const char *esr_class_str[] = { [ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = "MSR/MRS (AArch64)", [ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = "SVE", [ESR_ELx_EC_ERET] = "ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB", + [ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC] = "FPAC", [ESR_ELx_EC_IMP_DEF] = "EL3 IMP DEF", [ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = "IABT (lower EL)", [ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR] = "IABT (current EL)", @@ -935,26 +883,6 @@ asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void) } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(enter_from_user_mode); -void __pte_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val) -{ - pr_err("%s:%d: bad pte %016lx.\n", file, line, val); -} - -void __pmd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val) -{ - pr_err("%s:%d: bad pmd %016lx.\n", file, line, val); -} - -void __pud_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val) -{ - pr_err("%s:%d: bad pud %016lx.\n", file, line, val); -} - -void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val) -{ - pr_err("%s:%d: bad pgd %016lx.\n", file, line, val); -} - /* GENERIC_BUG traps */ int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long addr) @@ -994,6 +922,21 @@ static struct break_hook bug_break_hook = { .imm = BUG_BRK_IMM, }; +static int reserved_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) +{ + pr_err("%s generated an invalid instruction at %pS!\n", + in_bpf_jit(regs) ? "BPF JIT" : "Kernel text patching", + (void *)instruction_pointer(regs)); + + /* We cannot handle this */ + return DBG_HOOK_ERROR; +} + +static struct break_hook fault_break_hook = { + .fn = reserved_fault_handler, + .imm = FAULT_BRK_IMM, +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS #define KASAN_ESR_RECOVER 0x20 @@ -1059,6 +1002,7 @@ int __init early_brk64(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, void __init trap_init(void) { register_kernel_break_hook(&bug_break_hook); + register_kernel_break_hook(&fault_break_hook); #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS register_kernel_break_hook(&kasan_break_hook); #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c index d4202a32abc9..debb8995d57f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c @@ -30,15 +30,11 @@ #include <asm/vdso.h> extern char vdso_start[], vdso_end[]; -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO extern char vdso32_start[], vdso32_end[]; -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO */ enum vdso_abi { VDSO_ABI_AA64, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO VDSO_ABI_AA32, -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO */ }; enum vvar_pages { @@ -284,21 +280,17 @@ up_fail: /* * Create and map the vectors page for AArch32 tasks. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO static int aarch32_vdso_mremap(const struct vm_special_mapping *sm, struct vm_area_struct *new_vma) { return __vdso_remap(VDSO_ABI_AA32, sm, new_vma); } -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO */ enum aarch32_map { AA32_MAP_VECTORS, /* kuser helpers */ -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO + AA32_MAP_SIGPAGE, AA32_MAP_VVAR, AA32_MAP_VDSO, -#endif - AA32_MAP_SIGPAGE }; static struct page *aarch32_vectors_page __ro_after_init; @@ -309,7 +301,10 @@ static struct vm_special_mapping aarch32_vdso_maps[] = { .name = "[vectors]", /* ABI */ .pages = &aarch32_vectors_page, }, -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO + [AA32_MAP_SIGPAGE] = { + .name = "[sigpage]", /* ABI */ + .pages = &aarch32_sig_page, + }, [AA32_MAP_VVAR] = { .name = "[vvar]", .fault = vvar_fault, @@ -319,11 +314,6 @@ static struct vm_special_mapping aarch32_vdso_maps[] = { .name = "[vdso]", .mremap = aarch32_vdso_mremap, }, -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO */ - [AA32_MAP_SIGPAGE] = { - .name = "[sigpage]", /* ABI */ - .pages = &aarch32_sig_page, - }, }; static int aarch32_alloc_kuser_vdso_page(void) @@ -362,25 +352,25 @@ static int aarch32_alloc_sigpage(void) return 0; } -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO static int __aarch32_alloc_vdso_pages(void) { + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO)) + return 0; + vdso_info[VDSO_ABI_AA32].dm = &aarch32_vdso_maps[AA32_MAP_VVAR]; vdso_info[VDSO_ABI_AA32].cm = &aarch32_vdso_maps[AA32_MAP_VDSO]; return __vdso_init(VDSO_ABI_AA32); } -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO */ static int __init aarch32_alloc_vdso_pages(void) { int ret; -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO ret = __aarch32_alloc_vdso_pages(); if (ret) return ret; -#endif ret = aarch32_alloc_sigpage(); if (ret) @@ -449,14 +439,12 @@ int aarch32_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp) if (ret) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO - ret = __setup_additional_pages(VDSO_ABI_AA32, - mm, - bprm, - uses_interp); - if (ret) - goto out; -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO)) { + ret = __setup_additional_pages(VDSO_ABI_AA32, mm, bprm, + uses_interp); + if (ret) + goto out; + } ret = aarch32_sigreturn_setup(mm); out: @@ -497,8 +485,7 @@ static int __init vdso_init(void) } arch_initcall(vdso_init); -int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, - int uses_interp) +int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int ret; @@ -506,11 +493,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) return -EINTR; - ret = __setup_additional_pages(VDSO_ABI_AA64, - mm, - bprm, - uses_interp); - + ret = __setup_additional_pages(VDSO_ABI_AA64, mm, bprm, uses_interp); mmap_write_unlock(mm); return ret; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile index 45d5cfe46429..04021a93171c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile @@ -43,13 +43,6 @@ ifneq ($(c-gettimeofday-y),) CFLAGS_vgettimeofday.o += -include $(c-gettimeofday-y) endif -# Clang versions less than 8 do not support -mcmodel=tiny -ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG), y) - ifeq ($(shell test $(CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION) -lt 80000; echo $$?),0) - CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o += -mcmodel=tiny - endif -endif - # Disable gcov profiling for VDSO code GCOV_PROFILE := n diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 7cba7623fcec..5ca957e656ab 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ */ #define RO_EXCEPTION_TABLE_ALIGN 8 +#define RUNTIME_DISCARD_EXIT #include <asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h> #include <asm/cache.h> @@ -96,16 +97,13 @@ SECTIONS * matching the same input section name. There is no documented * order of matching. */ + DISCARDS /DISCARD/ : { - EXIT_CALL - *(.discard) - *(.discard.*) *(.interp .dynamic) *(.dynsym .dynstr .hash .gnu.hash) - *(.eh_frame) } - . = KIMAGE_VADDR + TEXT_OFFSET; + . = KIMAGE_VADDR; .head.text : { _text = .; @@ -131,6 +129,14 @@ SECTIONS *(.got) /* Global offset table */ } + /* + * Make sure that the .got.plt is either completely empty or it + * contains only the lazy dispatch entries. + */ + .got.plt : { *(.got.plt) } + ASSERT(SIZEOF(.got.plt) == 0 || SIZEOF(.got.plt) == 0x18, + "Unexpected GOT/PLT entries detected!") + . = ALIGN(SEGMENT_ALIGN); _etext = .; /* End of text section */ @@ -249,8 +255,22 @@ SECTIONS _end = .; STABS_DEBUG + DWARF_DEBUG + ELF_DETAILS HEAD_SYMBOLS + + /* + * Sections that should stay zero sized, which is safer to + * explicitly check instead of blindly discarding. + */ + .plt : { + *(.plt) *(.plt.*) *(.iplt) *(.igot) + } + ASSERT(SIZEOF(.plt) == 0, "Unexpected run-time procedure linkages detected!") + + .data.rel.ro : { *(.data.rel.ro) } + ASSERT(SIZEOF(.data.rel.ro) == 0, "Unexpected RELRO detected!") } #include "image-vars.h" @@ -274,4 +294,4 @@ ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) == PAGE_SIZE, /* * If padding is applied before .head.text, virt<->phys conversions will fail. */ -ASSERT(_text == (KIMAGE_VADDR + TEXT_OFFSET), "HEAD is misaligned") +ASSERT(_text == KIMAGE_VADDR, "HEAD is misaligned") diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig index 318c8f2df245..043756db8f6e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig @@ -57,9 +57,6 @@ config KVM_ARM_PMU Adds support for a virtual Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) in virtual machines. -config KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS - def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || RANDOMIZE_BASE - endif # KVM endif # VIRTUALIZATION diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index b588c3b5c2f0..acf9a993dfb6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -1259,6 +1259,40 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, } } +static int kvm_map_vectors(void) +{ + /* + * SV2 = ARM64_SPECTRE_V2 + * HEL2 = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS + * + * !SV2 + !HEL2 -> use direct vectors + * SV2 + !HEL2 -> use hardened vectors in place + * !SV2 + HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping + * SV2 + HEL2 -> use hardened vectors and use exec mapping + */ + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2)) { + __kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs); + __kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base); + } + + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) { + phys_addr_t vect_pa = __pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs); + unsigned long size = __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ; + + /* + * Always allocate a spare vector slot, as we don't + * know yet which CPUs have a BP hardening slot that + * we can reuse. + */ + __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot); + BUG_ON(__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS); + return create_hyp_exec_mappings(vect_pa, size, + &__kvm_bp_vect_base); + } + + return 0; +} + static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void) { phys_addr_t pgd_ptr; @@ -1295,7 +1329,7 @@ static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void) * at EL2. */ if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS) && - arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) { + arm64_get_spectre_v4_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) { kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__kvm_enable_ssbs); } } @@ -1552,10 +1586,6 @@ static int init_hyp_mode(void) } } - err = hyp_map_aux_data(); - if (err) - kvm_err("Cannot map host auxiliary data: %d\n", err); - return 0; out_err: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile index f54f0e89a71c..d898f0da5802 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile @@ -10,5 +10,4 @@ subdir-ccflags-y := -I$(incdir) \ -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += vhe/ nvhe/ -obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS) += smccc_wa.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += vhe/ nvhe/ smccc_wa.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index 46b4dab933d0..7ea277b82967 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -116,35 +116,6 @@ el1_hvc_guest: ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2) cbnz w1, el1_trap -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD -alternative_cb arm64_enable_wa2_handling - b wa2_end -alternative_cb_end - get_vcpu_ptr x2, x0 - ldr x0, [x2, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS] - - // Sanitize the argument and update the guest flags - ldr x1, [sp, #8] // Guest's x1 - clz w1, w1 // Murphy's device: - lsr w1, w1, #5 // w1 = !!w1 without using - eor w1, w1, #1 // the flags... - bfi x0, x1, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT, #1 - str x0, [x2, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS] - - /* Check that we actually need to perform the call */ - hyp_ldr_this_cpu x0, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, x2 - cbz x0, wa2_end - - mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 - smc #0 - - /* Don't leak data from the SMC call */ - mov x3, xzr -wa2_end: - mov x2, xzr - mov x1, xzr -#endif - wa_epilogue: mov x0, xzr add sp, sp, #16 @@ -288,7 +259,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__kvm_hyp_vector) valid_vect el1_error // Error 32-bit EL1 SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_hyp_vector) -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS .macro hyp_ventry .align 7 1: esb @@ -338,4 +308,3 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs) 1: .org __bp_harden_hyp_vecs + __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ .org 1b SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs) -#endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h index 0261308bf944..d0f07e8cc3ff 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h @@ -479,39 +479,6 @@ exit: return false; } -static inline bool __needs_ssbd_off(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBD)) - return false; - - return !(vcpu->arch.workaround_flags & VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG); -} - -static inline void __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD - /* - * The host runs with the workaround always present. If the - * guest wants it disabled, so be it... - */ - if (__needs_ssbd_off(vcpu) && - __hyp_this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required)) - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, 0, NULL); -#endif -} - -static inline void __set_host_arch_workaround_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD - /* - * If the guest has disabled the workaround, bring it back on. - */ - if (__needs_ssbd_off(vcpu) && - __hyp_this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required)) - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, 1, NULL); -#endif -} - static inline void __kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void) { unsigned long addr, fixup; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c index 0970442d2dbc..8d3dd4f47924 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c @@ -202,8 +202,6 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) __debug_switch_to_guest(vcpu); - __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(vcpu); - do { /* Jump in the fire! */ exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu, host_ctxt); @@ -211,8 +209,6 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* And we're baaack! */ } while (fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, &exit_code)); - __set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu); - __sysreg_save_state_nvhe(guest_ctxt); __sysreg32_save_state(vcpu); __timer_disable_traps(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c index c1da4f86ccac..ecf67e678203 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c @@ -131,8 +131,6 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) sysreg_restore_guest_state_vhe(guest_ctxt); __debug_switch_to_guest(vcpu); - __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(vcpu); - do { /* Jump in the fire! */ exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu, host_ctxt); @@ -140,8 +138,6 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* And we're baaack! */ } while (fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, &exit_code)); - __set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu); - sysreg_save_guest_state_vhe(guest_ctxt); __deactivate_traps(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c index 550dfa3e53cd..9824025ccc5c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c @@ -24,27 +24,36 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu); switch (feature) { case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: - switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) { - case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN: + switch (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state()) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: break; - case KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED: + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; break; - case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED: + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED; break; } break; case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: - switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) { - case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN: + switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: break; - case KVM_SSBD_KERNEL: - val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; - break; - case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - case KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED: + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + /* + * SSBS everywhere: Indicate no firmware + * support, as the SSBS support will be + * indicated to the guest and the default is + * safe. + * + * Otherwise, expose a permanent mitigation + * to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the + * guest stays protected. + */ + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + break; + fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED; break; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c index f0d0312c0a55..81916e360b1e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ void kvm_pmu_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) for (i = 0; i < ARMV8_PMU_MAX_COUNTERS; i++) kvm_pmu_release_perf_event(&pmu->pmc[i]); + irq_work_sync(&vcpu->arch.pmu.overflow_work); } u64 kvm_pmu_valid_counter_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -434,6 +435,22 @@ void kvm_pmu_sync_hwstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } /** + * When perf interrupt is an NMI, we cannot safely notify the vcpu corresponding + * to the event. + * This is why we need a callback to do it once outside of the NMI context. + */ +static void kvm_pmu_perf_overflow_notify_vcpu(struct irq_work *work) +{ + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + struct kvm_pmu *pmu; + + pmu = container_of(work, struct kvm_pmu, overflow_work); + vcpu = kvm_pmc_to_vcpu(pmu->pmc); + + kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu); +} + +/** * When the perf event overflows, set the overflow status and inform the vcpu. */ static void kvm_pmu_perf_overflow(struct perf_event *perf_event, @@ -465,7 +482,11 @@ static void kvm_pmu_perf_overflow(struct perf_event *perf_event, if (kvm_pmu_overflow_status(vcpu)) { kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_IRQ_PENDING, vcpu); - kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu); + + if (!in_nmi()) + kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu); + else + irq_work_queue(&vcpu->arch.pmu.overflow_work); } cpu_pmu->pmu.start(perf_event, PERF_EF_RELOAD); @@ -764,6 +785,9 @@ static int kvm_arm_pmu_v3_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return ret; } + init_irq_work(&vcpu->arch.pmu.overflow_work, + kvm_pmu_perf_overflow_notify_vcpu); + vcpu->arch.pmu.created = true; return 0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c index 83415e96b589..db4056ecccfd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c @@ -425,27 +425,30 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid) { switch (regid) { case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: - switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) { - case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN: + switch (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state()) { + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL; - case KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED: + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_AVAIL; - case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED: + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_REQUIRED; } return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL; case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: - switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) { - case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: - return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; - case KVM_SSBD_KERNEL: - return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL; - case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: - case KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED: + switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) { + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + /* + * As for the hypercall discovery, we pretend we + * don't have any FW mitigation if SSBS is there at + * all times. + */ + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; + fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED; - case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN: - default: - return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN; + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; } } @@ -462,14 +465,8 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) val = kvm_psci_version(vcpu, vcpu->kvm); break; case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: - val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK; - break; case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK; - - if (val == KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL && - kvm_arm_get_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(vcpu)) - val |= KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED; break; default: return -ENOENT; @@ -527,34 +524,35 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED)) return -EINVAL; - wa_level = val & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK; - - if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < wa_level) - return -EINVAL; - /* The enabled bit must not be set unless the level is AVAIL. */ - if (wa_level != KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL && - wa_level != val) + if ((val & KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED) && + (val & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK) != KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL) return -EINVAL; - /* Are we finished or do we need to check the enable bit ? */ - if (kvm_arm_have_ssbd() != KVM_SSBD_KERNEL) - return 0; - /* - * If this kernel supports the workaround to be switched on - * or off, make sure it matches the requested setting. + * Map all the possible incoming states to the only two we + * really want to deal with. */ - switch (wa_level) { - case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL: - kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(vcpu, - val & KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED); + switch (val & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK) { + case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL: + case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN: + wa_level = KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; break; + case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL: case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED: - kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(vcpu, true); + wa_level = KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED; break; + default: + return -EINVAL; } + /* + * We can deal with NOT_AVAIL on NOT_REQUIRED, but not the + * other way around. + */ + if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < wa_level) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; default: return -ENOENT; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c index ee33875c5c2a..f6e8b4a75cbb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c @@ -319,10 +319,6 @@ int kvm_reset_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.reset_state.reset = false; } - /* Default workaround setup is enabled (if supported) */ - if (kvm_arm_have_ssbd() == KVM_SSBD_KERNEL) - vcpu->arch.workaround_flags |= VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG; - /* Reset timer */ ret = kvm_timer_vcpu_reset(vcpu); out: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c index 077293b5115f..9ca270603980 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c @@ -1131,6 +1131,11 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT); val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT); + if (!(val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) && + arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + val |= (1UL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1) { + val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT); } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 && !vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) { val &= ~((0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) | (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) | @@ -1382,6 +1387,13 @@ static bool access_ccsidr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p, return true; } +static bool access_mte_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p, + const struct sys_reg_desc *r) +{ + kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu); + return false; +} + /* sys_reg_desc initialiser for known cpufeature ID registers */ #define ID_SANITISED(name) { \ SYS_DESC(SYS_##name), \ @@ -1547,6 +1559,10 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = { { SYS_DESC(SYS_SCTLR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, SCTLR_EL1, 0x00C50078 }, { SYS_DESC(SYS_ACTLR_EL1), access_actlr, reset_actlr, ACTLR_EL1 }, { SYS_DESC(SYS_CPACR_EL1), NULL, reset_val, CPACR_EL1, 0 }, + + { SYS_DESC(SYS_RGSR_EL1), access_mte_regs }, + { SYS_DESC(SYS_GCR_EL1), access_mte_regs }, + { SYS_DESC(SYS_ZCR_EL1), NULL, reset_val, ZCR_EL1, 0, .visibility = sve_visibility }, { SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR0_EL1 }, { SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR1_EL1 }, @@ -1571,6 +1587,9 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = { { SYS_DESC(SYS_ERXMISC0_EL1), trap_raz_wi }, { SYS_DESC(SYS_ERXMISC1_EL1), trap_raz_wi }, + { SYS_DESC(SYS_TFSR_EL1), access_mte_regs }, + { SYS_DESC(SYS_TFSRE0_EL1), access_mte_regs }, + { SYS_DESC(SYS_FAR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, FAR_EL1 }, { SYS_DESC(SYS_PAR_EL1), NULL, reset_unknown, PAR_EL1 }, diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v3.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v3.c index 5c786b915cd3..52d6f24f65dc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v3.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v3.c @@ -1001,8 +1001,8 @@ void vgic_v3_dispatch_sgi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 reg, bool allow_group1) raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&irq->irq_lock, flags); /* - * An access targetting Group0 SGIs can only generate - * those, while an access targetting Group1 SGIs can + * An access targeting Group0 SGIs can only generate + * those, while an access targeting Group1 SGIs can * generate interrupts of either group. */ if (!irq->group || allow_group1) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile b/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile index 2fc253466dbf..d31e1169d9b8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile @@ -16,3 +16,5 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE) += uaccess_flushcache.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRC32) += crc32.o obj-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION) += error-inject.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE) += mte.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S b/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..03ca6d8b8670 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Ltd. + */ +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +#include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> +#include <asm/page.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + + .arch armv8.5-a+memtag + +/* + * multitag_transfer_size - set \reg to the block size that is accessed by the + * LDGM/STGM instructions. + */ + .macro multitag_transfer_size, reg, tmp + mrs_s \reg, SYS_GMID_EL1 + ubfx \reg, \reg, #SYS_GMID_EL1_BS_SHIFT, #SYS_GMID_EL1_BS_SIZE + mov \tmp, #4 + lsl \reg, \tmp, \reg + .endm + +/* + * Clear the tags in a page + * x0 - address of the page to be cleared + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_clear_page_tags) + multitag_transfer_size x1, x2 +1: stgm xzr, [x0] + add x0, x0, x1 + tst x0, #(PAGE_SIZE - 1) + b.ne 1b + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_clear_page_tags) + +/* + * Copy the tags from the source page to the destination one + * x0 - address of the destination page + * x1 - address of the source page + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_copy_page_tags) + mov x2, x0 + mov x3, x1 + multitag_transfer_size x5, x6 +1: ldgm x4, [x3] + stgm x4, [x2] + add x2, x2, x5 + add x3, x3, x5 + tst x2, #(PAGE_SIZE - 1) + b.ne 1b + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_copy_page_tags) + +/* + * Read tags from a user buffer (one tag per byte) and set the corresponding + * tags at the given kernel address. Used by PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS. + * x0 - kernel address (to) + * x1 - user buffer (from) + * x2 - number of tags/bytes (n) + * Returns: + * x0 - number of tags read/set + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_copy_tags_from_user) + mov x3, x1 + cbz x2, 2f +1: + uao_user_alternative 2f, ldrb, ldtrb, w4, x1, 0 + lsl x4, x4, #MTE_TAG_SHIFT + stg x4, [x0], #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE + add x1, x1, #1 + subs x2, x2, #1 + b.ne 1b + + // exception handling and function return +2: sub x0, x1, x3 // update the number of tags set + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_copy_tags_from_user) + +/* + * Get the tags from a kernel address range and write the tag values to the + * given user buffer (one tag per byte). Used by PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS. + * x0 - user buffer (to) + * x1 - kernel address (from) + * x2 - number of tags/bytes (n) + * Returns: + * x0 - number of tags read/set + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_copy_tags_to_user) + mov x3, x0 + cbz x2, 2f +1: + ldg x4, [x1] + ubfx x4, x4, #MTE_TAG_SHIFT, #MTE_TAG_SIZE + uao_user_alternative 2f, strb, sttrb, w4, x0, 0 + add x0, x0, #1 + add x1, x1, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE + subs x2, x2, #1 + b.ne 1b + + // exception handling and function return +2: sub x0, x0, x3 // update the number of tags copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_copy_tags_to_user) + +/* + * Save the tags in a page + * x0 - page address + * x1 - tag storage + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_save_page_tags) + multitag_transfer_size x7, x5 +1: + mov x2, #0 +2: + ldgm x5, [x0] + orr x2, x2, x5 + add x0, x0, x7 + tst x0, #0xFF // 16 tag values fit in a register, + b.ne 2b // which is 16*16=256 bytes + + str x2, [x1], #8 + + tst x0, #(PAGE_SIZE - 1) + b.ne 1b + + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_save_page_tags) + +/* + * Restore the tags in a page + * x0 - page address + * x1 - tag storage + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_restore_page_tags) + multitag_transfer_size x7, x5 +1: + ldr x2, [x1], #8 +2: + stgm x2, [x0] + add x0, x0, x7 + tst x0, #0xFF + b.ne 2b + + tst x0, #(PAGE_SIZE - 1) + b.ne 1b + + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_restore_page_tags) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile b/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile index d91030f0ffee..5ead3c3de3b6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/Makefile @@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ obj-y := dma-mapping.o extable.o fault.o init.o \ ioremap.o mmap.o pgd.o mmu.o \ context.o proc.o pageattr.o obj-$(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE) += hugetlbpage.o -obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += dump.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS) += ptdump_debugfs.o obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += numa.o obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL) += physaddr.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE) += mteswap.o KASAN_SANITIZE_physaddr.o += n obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += kasan_init.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c index 9b11c096a042..001737a8f309 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(atomic64_t, active_asids); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, reserved_asids); static cpumask_t tlb_flush_pending; +static unsigned long max_pinned_asids; +static unsigned long nr_pinned_asids; +static unsigned long *pinned_asid_map; + #define ASID_MASK (~GENMASK(asid_bits - 1, 0)) #define ASID_FIRST_VERSION (1UL << asid_bits) @@ -72,7 +76,7 @@ void verify_cpu_asid_bits(void) } } -static void set_kpti_asid_bits(void) +static void set_kpti_asid_bits(unsigned long *map) { unsigned int len = BITS_TO_LONGS(NUM_USER_ASIDS) * sizeof(unsigned long); /* @@ -81,13 +85,15 @@ static void set_kpti_asid_bits(void) * is set, then the ASID will map only userspace. Thus * mark even as reserved for kernel. */ - memset(asid_map, 0xaa, len); + memset(map, 0xaa, len); } static void set_reserved_asid_bits(void) { - if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) - set_kpti_asid_bits(); + if (pinned_asid_map) + bitmap_copy(asid_map, pinned_asid_map, NUM_USER_ASIDS); + else if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + set_kpti_asid_bits(asid_map); else bitmap_clear(asid_map, 0, NUM_USER_ASIDS); } @@ -166,6 +172,14 @@ static u64 new_context(struct mm_struct *mm) return newasid; /* + * If it is pinned, we can keep using it. Note that reserved + * takes priority, because even if it is also pinned, we need to + * update the generation into the reserved_asids. + */ + if (refcount_read(&mm->context.pinned)) + return newasid; + + /* * We had a valid ASID in a previous life, so try to re-use * it if possible. */ @@ -256,6 +270,71 @@ switch_mm_fastpath: cpu_switch_mm(mm->pgd, mm); } +unsigned long arm64_mm_context_get(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u64 asid; + + if (!pinned_asid_map) + return 0; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_asid_lock, flags); + + asid = atomic64_read(&mm->context.id); + + if (refcount_inc_not_zero(&mm->context.pinned)) + goto out_unlock; + + if (nr_pinned_asids >= max_pinned_asids) { + asid = 0; + goto out_unlock; + } + + if (!asid_gen_match(asid)) { + /* + * We went through one or more rollover since that ASID was + * used. Ensure that it is still valid, or generate a new one. + */ + asid = new_context(mm); + atomic64_set(&mm->context.id, asid); + } + + nr_pinned_asids++; + __set_bit(asid2idx(asid), pinned_asid_map); + refcount_set(&mm->context.pinned, 1); + +out_unlock: + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_asid_lock, flags); + + asid &= ~ASID_MASK; + + /* Set the equivalent of USER_ASID_BIT */ + if (asid && arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + asid |= 1; + + return asid; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arm64_mm_context_get); + +void arm64_mm_context_put(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + unsigned long flags; + u64 asid = atomic64_read(&mm->context.id); + + if (!pinned_asid_map) + return; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_asid_lock, flags); + + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&mm->context.pinned)) { + __clear_bit(asid2idx(asid), pinned_asid_map); + nr_pinned_asids--; + } + + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_asid_lock, flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arm64_mm_context_put); + /* Errata workaround post TTBRx_EL1 update. */ asmlinkage void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void) { @@ -296,8 +375,11 @@ static int asids_update_limit(void) { unsigned long num_available_asids = NUM_USER_ASIDS; - if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) { num_available_asids /= 2; + if (pinned_asid_map) + set_kpti_asid_bits(pinned_asid_map); + } /* * Expect allocation after rollover to fail if we don't have at least * one more ASID than CPUs. ASID #0 is reserved for init_mm. @@ -305,6 +387,13 @@ static int asids_update_limit(void) WARN_ON(num_available_asids - 1 <= num_possible_cpus()); pr_info("ASID allocator initialised with %lu entries\n", num_available_asids); + + /* + * There must always be an ASID available after rollover. Ensure that, + * even if all CPUs have a reserved ASID and the maximum number of ASIDs + * are pinned, there still is at least one empty slot in the ASID map. + */ + max_pinned_asids = num_available_asids - num_possible_cpus() - 2; return 0; } arch_initcall(asids_update_limit); @@ -319,13 +408,17 @@ static int asids_init(void) panic("Failed to allocate bitmap for %lu ASIDs\n", NUM_USER_ASIDS); + pinned_asid_map = kcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(NUM_USER_ASIDS), + sizeof(*pinned_asid_map), GFP_KERNEL); + nr_pinned_asids = 0; + /* * We cannot call set_reserved_asid_bits() here because CPU * caps are not finalized yet, so it is safer to assume KPTI * and reserve kernel ASID's from beginning. */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) - set_kpti_asid_bits(); + set_kpti_asid_bits(asid_map); return 0; } early_initcall(asids_init); diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c b/arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c index 2ee7b73433a5..70a71f38b6a9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c @@ -6,21 +6,32 @@ * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd. */ +#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> -void __cpu_copy_user_page(void *kto, const void *kfrom, unsigned long vaddr) +void copy_highpage(struct page *to, struct page *from) { - struct page *page = virt_to_page(kto); + struct page *kto = page_address(to); + struct page *kfrom = page_address(from); + copy_page(kto, kfrom); - flush_dcache_page(page); + + if (system_supports_mte() && test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &from->flags)) { + set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &to->flags); + mte_copy_page_tags(kto, kfrom); + } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cpu_copy_user_page); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_highpage); -void __cpu_clear_user_page(void *kaddr, unsigned long vaddr) +void copy_user_highpage(struct page *to, struct page *from, + unsigned long vaddr, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - clear_page(kaddr); + copy_highpage(to, from); + flush_dcache_page(to); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cpu_clear_user_page); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_user_highpage); diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c b/arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c index 6c45350e33aa..93e87b287556 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/cache.h> -#include <linux/dma-noncoherent.h> +#include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> #include <linux/dma-iommu.h> #include <xen/xen.h> #include <xen/swiotlb-xen.h> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c index eee1732ab6cd..aa0060178343 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/extable.c @@ -14,9 +14,7 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs) if (!fixup) return 0; - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_JIT) && - regs->pc >= BPF_JIT_REGION_START && - regs->pc < BPF_JIT_REGION_END) + if (in_bpf_jit(regs)) return arm64_bpf_fixup_exception(fixup, regs); regs->pc = (unsigned long)&fixup->fixup + fixup->fixup; diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index f07333e86c2f..94c99c1c19e3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -218,7 +218,9 @@ int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval, pteval); } while (pteval != old_pteval); - flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address); + /* Invalidate a stale read-only entry */ + if (dirty) + flush_tlb_page(vma, address); return 1; } @@ -641,6 +643,13 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) return 0; } +static int do_tag_check_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs); + return 0; +} + static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = { { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "ttbr address size fault" }, { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 address size fault" }, @@ -659,7 +668,7 @@ static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = { { do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 permission fault" }, { do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 permission fault" }, { do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "synchronous external abort" }, - { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 17" }, + { do_tag_check_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MTESERR, "synchronous tag check fault" }, { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 18" }, { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 19" }, { do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 0 (translation table walk)" }, diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c index 481d22c32a2e..a53c1e0fb017 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c @@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/dma-direct.h> -#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> -#include <linux/dma-contiguous.h> +#include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/swiotlb.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> @@ -429,6 +428,8 @@ void __init bootmem_init(void) arm64_hugetlb_cma_reserve(); #endif + dma_pernuma_cma_reserve(); + /* * sparse_init() tries to allocate memory from memblock, so must be * done after the fixed reservations @@ -471,12 +472,10 @@ static inline void free_memmap(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn) */ static void __init free_unused_memmap(void) { - unsigned long start, prev_end = 0; - struct memblock_region *reg; - - for_each_memblock(memory, reg) { - start = __phys_to_pfn(reg->base); + unsigned long start, end, prev_end = 0; + int i; + for_each_mem_pfn_range(i, MAX_NUMNODES, &start, &end, NULL) { #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM /* * Take care not to free memmap entries that don't exist due @@ -496,8 +495,7 @@ static void __init free_unused_memmap(void) * memmap entries are valid from the bank end aligned to * MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES. */ - prev_end = ALIGN(__phys_to_pfn(reg->base + reg->size), - MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES); + prev_end = ALIGN(end, MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES); } #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c b/arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c index 7291b26ce788..b24e43d20667 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c @@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) { u64 kimg_shadow_start, kimg_shadow_end; u64 mod_shadow_start, mod_shadow_end; - struct memblock_region *reg; - int i; + phys_addr_t pa_start, pa_end; + u64 i; kimg_shadow_start = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_text) & PAGE_MASK; kimg_shadow_end = PAGE_ALIGN((u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_end)); @@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) kasan_populate_early_shadow((void *)mod_shadow_end, (void *)kimg_shadow_start); - for_each_memblock(memory, reg) { - void *start = (void *)__phys_to_virt(reg->base); - void *end = (void *)__phys_to_virt(reg->base + reg->size); + for_each_mem_range(i, &pa_start, &pa_end) { + void *start = (void *)__phys_to_virt(pa_start); + void *end = (void *)__phys_to_virt(pa_end); if (start >= end) break; diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index 75df62fea1b6..beff3ad8c7f8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ u64 idmap_t0sz = TCR_T0SZ(VA_BITS); u64 idmap_ptrs_per_pgd = PTRS_PER_PGD; -u64 __section(".mmuoff.data.write") vabits_actual; +u64 __section(.mmuoff.data.write) vabits_actual; EXPORT_SYMBOL(vabits_actual); u64 kimage_voffset __ro_after_init; @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new) * The following mapping attributes may be updated in live * kernel mappings without the need for break-before-make. */ - static const pteval_t mask = PTE_PXN | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_NG; + pteval_t mask = PTE_PXN | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_NG; /* creating or taking down mappings is always safe */ if (old == 0 || new == 0) @@ -136,6 +136,17 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new) if (old & ~new & PTE_NG) return false; + /* + * Changing the memory type between Normal and Normal-Tagged is safe + * since Tagged is considered a permission attribute from the + * mismatched attribute aliases perspective. + */ + if (((old & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL) || + (old & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_TAGGED)) && + ((new & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL) || + (new & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_TAGGED))) + mask |= PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK; + return ((old ^ new) & ~mask) == 0; } @@ -462,8 +473,9 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp) { phys_addr_t kernel_start = __pa_symbol(_text); phys_addr_t kernel_end = __pa_symbol(__init_begin); - struct memblock_region *reg; + phys_addr_t start, end; int flags = 0; + u64 i; if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled()) flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; @@ -482,16 +494,15 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp) #endif /* map all the memory banks */ - for_each_memblock(memory, reg) { - phys_addr_t start = reg->base; - phys_addr_t end = start + reg->size; - + for_each_mem_range(i, &start, &end) { if (start >= end) break; - if (memblock_is_nomap(reg)) - continue; - - __map_memblock(pgdp, start, end, PAGE_KERNEL, flags); + /* + * The linear map must allow allocation tags reading/writing + * if MTE is present. Otherwise, it has the same attributes as + * PAGE_KERNEL. + */ + __map_memblock(pgdp, start, end, PAGE_KERNEL_TAGGED, flags); } /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c52c1847079c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/xarray.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/swap.h> +#include <linux/swapops.h> +#include <asm/mte.h> + +static DEFINE_XARRAY(mte_pages); + +void *mte_allocate_tag_storage(void) +{ + /* tags granule is 16 bytes, 2 tags stored per byte */ + return kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE / 16 / 2, GFP_KERNEL); +} + +void mte_free_tag_storage(char *storage) +{ + kfree(storage); +} + +int mte_save_tags(struct page *page) +{ + void *tag_storage, *ret; + + if (!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) + return 0; + + tag_storage = mte_allocate_tag_storage(); + if (!tag_storage) + return -ENOMEM; + + mte_save_page_tags(page_address(page), tag_storage); + + /* page_private contains the swap entry.val set in do_swap_page */ + ret = xa_store(&mte_pages, page_private(page), tag_storage, GFP_KERNEL); + if (WARN(xa_is_err(ret), "Failed to store MTE tags")) { + mte_free_tag_storage(tag_storage); + return xa_err(ret); + } else if (ret) { + /* Entry is being replaced, free the old entry */ + mte_free_tag_storage(ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +bool mte_restore_tags(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page) +{ + void *tags = xa_load(&mte_pages, entry.val); + + if (!tags) + return false; + + mte_restore_page_tags(page_address(page), tags); + + return true; +} + +void mte_invalidate_tags(int type, pgoff_t offset) +{ + swp_entry_t entry = swp_entry(type, offset); + void *tags = xa_erase(&mte_pages, entry.val); + + mte_free_tag_storage(tags); +} + +void mte_invalidate_tags_area(int type) +{ + swp_entry_t entry = swp_entry(type, 0); + swp_entry_t last_entry = swp_entry(type + 1, 0); + void *tags; + + XA_STATE(xa_state, &mte_pages, entry.val); + + xa_lock(&mte_pages); + xas_for_each(&xa_state, tags, last_entry.val - 1) { + __xa_erase(&mte_pages, xa_state.xa_index); + mte_free_tag_storage(tags); + } + xa_unlock(&mte_pages); +} diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c b/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c index 73f8b49d485c..a8303bc6b62a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c @@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(node_to_cpumask_map); */ const struct cpumask *cpumask_of_node(int node) { - if (WARN_ON(node >= nr_node_ids)) + + if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE) + return cpu_all_mask; + + if (WARN_ON(node < 0 || node >= nr_node_ids)) return cpu_none_mask; if (WARN_ON(node_to_cpumask_map[node] == NULL)) @@ -350,7 +354,7 @@ static int __init numa_register_nodes(void) struct memblock_region *mblk; /* Check that valid nid is set to memblks */ - for_each_memblock(memory, mblk) { + for_each_mem_region(mblk) { int mblk_nid = memblock_get_region_node(mblk); if (mblk_nid == NUMA_NO_NODE || mblk_nid >= MAX_NUMNODES) { @@ -423,19 +427,16 @@ out_free_distance: */ static int __init dummy_numa_init(void) { + phys_addr_t start = memblock_start_of_DRAM(); + phys_addr_t end = memblock_end_of_DRAM(); int ret; - struct memblock_region *mblk; if (numa_off) pr_info("NUMA disabled\n"); /* Forced off on command line. */ - pr_info("Faking a node at [mem %#018Lx-%#018Lx]\n", - memblock_start_of_DRAM(), memblock_end_of_DRAM() - 1); - - for_each_memblock(memory, mblk) { - ret = numa_add_memblk(0, mblk->base, mblk->base + mblk->size); - if (!ret) - continue; + pr_info("Faking a node at [mem %#018Lx-%#018Lx]\n", start, end - 1); + ret = numa_add_memblk(0, start, end); + if (ret) { pr_err("NUMA init failed\n"); return ret; } @@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ static int __init dummy_numa_init(void) * arm64_numa_init() - Initialize NUMA * * Try each configured NUMA initialization method until one succeeds. The - * last fallback is dummy single node config encomapssing whole memory. + * last fallback is dummy single node config encompassing whole memory. */ void __init arm64_numa_init(void) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 23f648c2a199..1b94f5b82654 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S index 796e47a571e6..23c326a06b2d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/smp.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES #define TCR_TG_FLAGS TCR_TG0_64K | TCR_TG1_64K @@ -44,14 +45,18 @@ #define TCR_KASAN_FLAGS 0 #endif -/* Default MAIR_EL1 */ +/* + * Default MAIR_EL1. MT_NORMAL_TAGGED is initially mapped as Normal memory and + * changed during __cpu_setup to Normal Tagged if the system supports MTE. + */ #define MAIR_EL1_SET \ (MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_DEVICE_nGnRnE, MT_DEVICE_nGnRnE) | \ MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_DEVICE_nGnRE, MT_DEVICE_nGnRE) | \ MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_DEVICE_GRE, MT_DEVICE_GRE) | \ MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_NC, MT_NORMAL_NC) | \ MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL, MT_NORMAL) | \ - MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_WT, MT_NORMAL_WT)) + MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_WT, MT_NORMAL_WT) | \ + MAIR_ATTRIDX(MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL, MT_NORMAL_TAGGED)) #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM /** @@ -421,6 +426,29 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) * Memory region attributes */ mov_q x5, MAIR_EL1_SET +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + /* + * Update MAIR_EL1, GCR_EL1 and TFSR*_EL1 if MTE is supported + * (ID_AA64PFR1_EL1[11:8] > 1). + */ + mrs x10, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 + ubfx x10, x10, #ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT, #4 + cmp x10, #ID_AA64PFR1_MTE + b.lt 1f + + /* Normal Tagged memory type at the corresponding MAIR index */ + mov x10, #MAIR_ATTR_NORMAL_TAGGED + bfi x5, x10, #(8 * MT_NORMAL_TAGGED), #8 + + /* initialize GCR_EL1: all non-zero tags excluded by default */ + mov x10, #(SYS_GCR_EL1_RRND | SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK) + msr_s SYS_GCR_EL1, x10 + + /* clear any pending tag check faults in TFSR*_EL1 */ + msr_s SYS_TFSR_EL1, xzr + msr_s SYS_TFSRE0_EL1, xzr +1: +#endif msr mair_el1, x5 /* * Set/prepare TCR and TTBR. We use 512GB (39-bit) address range for diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c b/arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c index 0b8da1cc1c07..807dc634bbd2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ static struct addr_marker address_markers[] = { { 0 /* KASAN_SHADOW_START */, "Kasan shadow start" }, { KASAN_SHADOW_END, "Kasan shadow end" }, #endif + { BPF_JIT_REGION_START, "BPF start" }, + { BPF_JIT_REGION_END, "BPF end" }, { MODULES_VADDR, "Modules start" }, { MODULES_END, "Modules end" }, { VMALLOC_START, "vmalloc() area" }, @@ -169,6 +171,10 @@ static const struct prot_bits pte_bits[] = { .mask = PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK, .val = PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL), .set = "MEM/NORMAL", + }, { + .mask = PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK, + .val = PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_TAGGED), + .set = "MEM/NORMAL-TAGGED", } }; |