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Fix typo which will cause fpe and privilege exception error.
Signed-off-by: Kelly Devilliv <kelly.devilliv@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux
Pull parisc fixes from Helge Deller:
"Some bug and warning fixes:
- Fix "make install" to use debians "installkernel" script which is
now in /usr/sbin
- Fix the bindeb-pkg make target by giving the correct KBUILD_IMAGE
file name
- Fix compiler warnings by annotating parisc agp init functions with
__init
- Fix timekeeping on SMP machines with dual-core CPUs
- Enable some more config options in the 64-bit defconfig"
* tag 'for-5.16/parisc-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
parisc: Mark cr16 CPU clocksource unstable on all SMP machines
parisc: Fix "make install" on newer debian releases
parisc/agp: Annotate parisc agp init functions with __init
parisc: Enable sata sil, audit and usb support on 64-bit defconfig
parisc: Fix KBUILD_IMAGE for self-extracting kernel
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix a couple of SWAPGS fencing issues in the x86 entry code
- Use the proper operand types in __{get,put}_user() to prevent
truncation in SEV-ES string io
- Make sure the kernel mappings are present in trampoline_pgd in order
to prevent any potential accesses to unmapped memory after switching
to it
- Fix a trivial list corruption in objtool's pv_ops validation
- Disable the clocksource watchdog for TSC on platforms which claim
that the TSC is constant, doesn't stop in sleep states, CPU has TSC
adjust and the number of sockets of the platform are max 2, to
prevent erroneous markings of the TSC as unstable.
- Make sure TSC adjust is always checked not only when going idle
- Prevent a stack leak by initializing struct _fpx_sw_bytes properly in
the FPU code
- Fix INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE define naming to adhere to the convention
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.16_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/xen: Add xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()
x86/entry: Use the correct fence macro after swapgs in kernel CR3
x86/entry: Add a fence for kernel entry SWAPGS in paranoid_entry()
x86/sev: Fix SEV-ES INS/OUTS instructions for word, dword, and qword
x86/64/mm: Map all kernel memory into trampoline_pgd
objtool: Fix pv_ops noinstr validation
x86/tsc: Disable clocksource watchdog for TSC on qualified platorms
x86/tsc: Add a timer to make sure TSC_adjust is always checked
x86/fpu/signal: Initialize sw_bytes in save_xstate_epilog()
x86/cpu: Drop spurious underscore from RAPTOR_LAKE #define
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Pull more kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
- Static analysis fix
- New SEV-ES protocol for communicating invalid VMGEXIT requests
- Ensure APICv is considered inactive if there is no APIC
- Fix reserved bits for AMD PerfEvtSeln register
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: SVM: Do not terminate SEV-ES guests on GHCB validation failure
KVM: SEV: Fall back to vmalloc for SEV-ES scratch area if necessary
KVM: SEV: Return appropriate error codes if SEV-ES scratch setup fails
KVM: x86/mmu: Retry page fault if root is invalidated by memslot update
KVM: VMX: Set failure code in prepare_vmcs02()
KVM: ensure APICv is considered inactive if there is no APIC
KVM: x86/pmu: Fix reserved bits for AMD PerfEvtSeln register
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Currently, an SEV-ES guest is terminated if the validation of the VMGEXIT
exit code or exit parameters fails.
The VMGEXIT instruction can be issued from userspace, even though
userspace (likely) can't update the GHCB. To prevent userspace from being
able to kill the guest, return an error through the GHCB when validation
fails rather than terminating the guest. For cases where the GHCB can't be
updated (e.g. the GHCB can't be mapped, etc.), just return back to the
guest.
The new error codes are documented in the lasest update to the GHCB
specification.
Fixes: 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b57280b5562893e2616257ac9c2d4525a9aeeb42.1638471124.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use kvzalloc() to allocate KVM's buffer for SEV-ES's GHCB scratch area so
that KVM falls back to __vmalloc() if physically contiguous memory isn't
available. The buffer is purely a KVM software construct, i.e. there's
no need for it to be physically contiguous.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109222350.2266045-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Return appropriate error codes if setting up the GHCB scratch area for an
SEV-ES guest fails. In particular, returning -EINVAL instead of -ENOMEM
when allocating the kernel buffer could be confusing as userspace would
likely suspect a guest issue.
Fixes: 8f423a80d299 ("KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109222350.2266045-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In commit c8c3735997a3 ("parisc: Enhance detection of synchronous cr16
clocksources") I assumed that CPUs on the same physical core are syncronous.
While booting up the kernel on two different C8000 machines, one with a
dual-core PA8800 and one with a dual-core PA8900 CPU, this turned out to be
wrong. The symptom was that I saw a jump in the internal clocks printed to the
syslog and strange overall behaviour. On machines which have 4 cores (2
dual-cores) the problem isn't visible, because the current logic already marked
the cr16 clocksource unstable in this case.
This patch now marks the cr16 interval timers unstable if we have more than one
CPU in the system, and it fixes this issue.
Fixes: c8c3735997a3 ("parisc: Enhance detection of synchronous cr16 clocksources")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.15+
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On newer debian releases the debian-provided "installkernel" script is
installed in /usr/sbin. Fix the kernel install.sh script to look for the
script in this directory as well.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux
Pull s390 fixes from Heiko Carstens:
- Fix potential overlap of pseudo-MMIO addresses with MIO addresses
- Fix stack unwinder test case inline assembly compile error that
happens with LLVM's integrated assembler
- Update defconfigs
* tag 's390-5.16-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
s390: update defconfigs
s390/pci: move pseudo-MMIO to prevent MIO overlap
s390/test_unwind: use raw opcode instead of invalid instruction
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
"Three arm64 fixes for -rc4.
One of them is just a trivial documentation fix, whereas the other two
address a warning in the kexec code and a crash in ftrace on systems
implementing BTI.
The latter patch has a couple of ugly ifdefs which Mark plans to clean
up separately, but as-is the patch is straightforward for backporting
to stable kernels.
Summary:
- Add missing BTI landing instructions to the ftrace*_caller
trampolines
- Fix kexec() WARN when DEBUG_VIRTUAL is enabled
- Fix PAC documentation by removing stale references to compiler
flags"
* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
arm64: ftrace: add missing BTIs
arm64: kexec: use __pa_symbol(empty_zero_page)
arm64: update PAC description for kernel
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In the native case, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is the
trampoline stack. But XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, so
PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is also the kernel stack.
In that case, source and destination stacks are identical, which means
that reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() in XEN pv
would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and leave the
IRET frame below %rsp.
This is dangerous as it can be corrupted if #NMI / #MC hit as either of
these events occurring in the middle of the stack pushing would clobber
data on the (original) stack.
And, with XEN pv, swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing
the IRET frame on to the original address is useless and error-prone
when there is any future attempt to modify the code.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 7f2590a110b8 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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The commit
c75890700455 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching")
removed a CR3 write in the faulting path of load_gs_index().
But the path's FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY has no fence operation if PTI is
enabled, see spectre_v1_select_mitigation().
Rather, it depended on the serializing CR3 write of SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
and since it got removed, add a FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY call to make
sure speculation is blocked.
[ bp: Massage commit message and comment. ]
Fixes: c75890700455 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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Commit
18ec54fdd6d18 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")
added FENCE_SWAPGS_{KERNEL|USER}_ENTRY for conditional SWAPGS. In
paranoid_entry(), it uses only FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for both
branches. This is because the fence is required for both cases since the
CR3 write is conditional even when PTI is enabled.
But
96b2371413e8f ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry")
changed the order of SWAPGS and the CR3 write. And it missed the needed
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for the user gsbase case.
Add it back by changing the branches so that FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
can cover both branches.
[ bp: Massage, fix typos, remove obsolete comment while at it. ]
Fixes: 96b2371413e8f ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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Properly type the operands being passed to __put_user()/__get_user().
Otherwise, these routines truncate data for dependent instructions
(e.g., INSW) and only read/write one byte.
This has been tested by sending a string with REP OUTSW to a port and
then reading it back in with REP INSW on the same port.
Previous behavior was to only send and receive the first char of the
size. For example, word operations for "abcd" would only read/write
"ac". With change, the full string is now written and read back.
Fixes: f980f9c31a923 (x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image)
Signed-off-by: Michael Sterritt <sterritt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119232757.176201-1-sterritt@google.com
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The trampoline_pgd only maps the 0xfffffff000000000-0xffffffffffffffff
range of kernel memory (with 4-level paging). This range contains the
kernel's text+data+bss mappings and the module mapping space but not the
direct mapping and the vmalloc area.
This is enough to get the application processors out of real-mode, but
for code that switches back to real-mode the trampoline_pgd is missing
important parts of the address space. For example, consider this code
from arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c, function machine_real_restart() for a
64-bit kernel:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
load_cr3(initial_page_table);
#else
write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
/* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
#endif
/* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
asm volatile("jmpl *%0" : :
"rm" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm),
"a" (type));
#else
asm volatile("ljmpl *%0" : :
"m" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm),
"D" (type));
#endif
The code switches to the trampoline_pgd, which unmaps the direct mapping
and also the kernel stack. The call to cr4_clear_bits() will find no
stack and crash the machine. The real_mode_header pointer below points
into the direct mapping, and dereferencing it also causes a crash.
The reason this does not crash always is only that kernel mappings are
global and the CR3 switch does not flush those mappings. But if theses
mappings are not in the TLB already, the above code will crash before it
can jump to the real-mode stub.
Extend the trampoline_pgd to contain all kernel mappings to prevent
these crashes and to make code which runs on this page-table more
robust.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-5-joro@8bytes.org
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Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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When branch target identifiers are in use, code reachable via an
indirect branch requires a BTI landing pad at the branch target site.
When building FTRACE_WITH_REGS atop patchable-function-entry, we miss
BTIs at the start start of the `ftrace_caller` and `ftrace_regs_caller`
trampolines, and when these are called from a module via a PLT (which
will use a `BR X16`), we will encounter a BTI failure, e.g.
| # insmod lkdtm.ko
| lkdtm: No crash points registered, enable through debugfs
| # echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
| # cat /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x34000001 -- BTI
| CPU: 0 PID: 174 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2-dirty #3
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 60400405 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=jc)
| pc : ftrace_caller+0x0/0x3c
| lr : lkdtm_debugfs_open+0xc/0x20 [lkdtm]
| sp : ffff800012e43b00
| x29: ffff800012e43b00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff800012e43c88
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c171f200
| x23: ffff0000c27b1e00 x22: ffff0000c2265240 x21: ffff0000c23c8c30
| x20: ffff8000090ba380 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80001002bb4c x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000900ff0
| x11: ffff0000c4166310 x10: ffff800012e43b00 x9 : ffff8000104f2384
| x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
| x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff800012e43af0 x3 : 0000000000000001
| x2 : ffff8000090b0000 x1 : ffff0000c171f200 x0 : ffff0000c23c8c30
| Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
| CPU: 0 PID: 174 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2-dirty #3
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a4
| show_stack+0x24/0x30
| dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
| dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
| panic+0x168/0x360
| arm64_exit_nmi.isra.0+0x0/0x80
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xd4
| el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c
| ftrace_caller+0x0/0x3c
| do_dentry_open+0x134/0x3b0
| vfs_open+0x38/0x44
| path_openat+0x89c/0xe40
| do_filp_open+0x8c/0x13c
| do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x174
| __arm64_sys_openat+0x6c/0xbc
| invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100
| do_el0_svc+0x84/0xa0
| el0_svc+0x28/0x80
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0x130
| el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
| SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0,00000f42,da660c5f
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception ]---
Fix this by adding the required `BTI C`, as we only require these to be
reachable via BL for direct calls or BR X16/X17 for PLTs. For now, these
are open-coded in the function prologue, matching the style of the
`__hwasan_tag_mismatch` trampoline.
In future we may wish to consider adding a new SYM_CODE_START_*()
variant which has an implicit BTI.
When ftrace is built atop mcount, the trampolines are marked with
SYM_FUNC_START(), and so get an implicit BTI. We may need to change
these over to SYM_CODE_START() in future for RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, in
case we need to apply special care aroud the return address being
rewritten.
Fixes: 97fed779f2a6 ("arm64: bti: Provide Kconfig for kernel mode BTI")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129135709.2274019-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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In machine_kexec_post_load() we use __pa() on `empty_zero_page`, so that
we can use the physical address during arm64_relocate_new_kernel() to
switch TTBR1 to a new set of tables. While `empty_zero_page` is part of
the old kernel, we won't clobber it until after this switch, so using it
is benign.
However, `empty_zero_page` is part of the kernel image rather than a
linear map address, so it is not correct to use __pa(x), and we should
instead use __pa_symbol(x) or __pa(lm_alias(x)). Otherwise, when the
kernel is built with DEBUG_VIRTUAL, we'll encounter splats as below, as
I've seen when fuzzing v5.16-rc3 with Syzkaller:
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| virt_to_phys used for non-linear address: 000000008492561a (empty_zero_page+0x0/0x1000)
| WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 11492 at arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:15 __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12
| CPU: 3 PID: 11492 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-00001-g48bd452a045c #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12
| lr : __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12
| sp : ffff80001af17bb0
| x29: ffff80001af17bb0 x28: ffff1cc65207b400 x27: ffffb7828730b120
| x26: 0000000000000e11 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001
| x23: ffffb7828963e000 x22: ffffb78289644000 x21: 0000600000000000
| x20: 000000000000002d x19: 0000b78289644000 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 74706d6528206131 x16: 3635323934383030 x15: 303030303030203a
| x14: 1ffff000035e2eb8 x13: ffff6398d53f4f0f x12: 1fffe398d53f4f0e
| x11: 1fffe398d53f4f0e x10: ffff6398d53f4f0e x9 : ffffb7827c6f76dc
| x8 : ffff1cc6a9fa7877 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff6398d53f4f0f
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff1cc66f2a99c0
| x2 : 0000000000040000 x1 : d7ce7775b09b5d00 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12
| machine_kexec_post_load+0x284/0x670 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c:150
| do_kexec_load+0x570/0x670 kernel/kexec.c:155
| __do_sys_kexec_load kernel/kexec.c:250 [inline]
| __se_sys_kexec_load kernel/kexec.c:231 [inline]
| __arm64_sys_kexec_load+0x1d8/0x268 kernel/kexec.c:231
| __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
| invoke_syscall+0x90/0x2e0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
| el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x1e4/0x2f8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
| do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:181
| el0_svc+0x60/0x248 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:603
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:621
| el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x184 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:572
| irq event stamp: 2428
| hardirqs last enabled at (2427): [<ffffb7827c6f2308>] __up_console_sem+0xf0/0x118 kernel/printk/printk.c:255
| hardirqs last disabled at (2428): [<ffffb7828223df98>] el1_dbg+0x28/0x80 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:375
| softirqs last enabled at (2424): [<ffffb7827c411c00>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:401 [inline]
| softirqs last enabled at (2424): [<ffffb7827c411c00>] __do_softirq+0xa28/0x11e4 kernel/softirq.c:587
| softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] do_softirq_own_stack include/asm-generic/softirq_stack.h:10 [inline]
| softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:439 [inline]
| softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:636 [inline]
| softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] irq_exit_rcu+0x53c/0x688 kernel/softirq.c:648
| ---[ end trace 0ca578534e7ca938 ]---
With or without DEBUG_VIRTUAL __pa() will fall back to __kimg_to_phys()
for non-linear addresses, and will happen to do the right thing in this
case, even with the warning. But we should not depend upon this, and to
keep the warning useful we should fix this case.
Fix this issue by using __pa_symbol(), which handles kernel image
addresses (and checks its input is a kernel image address). This matches
what we do elsewhere, e.g. in arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h:
| #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) phys_to_page(__pa_symbol(empty_zero_page))
Fixes: 3744b5280e67 ("arm64: kexec: install a copy of the linear-map")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121849.3319010-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Bail from the page fault handler if the root shadow page was obsoleted by
a memslot update. Do the check _after_ acuiring mmu_lock, as the TDP MMU
doesn't rely on the memslot/MMU generation, and instead relies on the
root being explicit marked invalid by kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(), which takes
mmu_lock for write.
For the TDP MMU, inserting a SPTE into an obsolete root can leak a SP if
kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots() has already zapped the SP, i.e. has
moved past the gfn associated with the SP.
For other MMUs, the resulting behavior is far more convoluted, though
unlikely to be truly problematic. Installing SPs/SPTEs into the obsolete
root isn't directly problematic, as the obsolete root will be unloaded
and dropped before the vCPU re-enters the guest. But because the legacy
MMU tracks shadow pages by their role, any SP created by the fault can
can be reused in the new post-reload root. Again, that _shouldn't_ be
problematic as any leaf child SPTEs will be created for the current/valid
memslot generation, and kvm_mmu_get_page() will not reuse child SPs from
the old generation as they will be flagged as obsolete. But, given that
continuing with the fault is pointess (the root will be unloaded), apply
the check to all MMUs.
Fixes: b7cccd397f31 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Fast invalidation for TDP MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211120045046.3940942-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The error paths in the prepare_vmcs02() function are supposed to set
*entry_failure_code but this path does not. It leads to using an
uninitialized variable in the caller.
Fixes: 71f7347025bf ("KVM: nVMX: Load GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR on VM-Entry")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20211130125337.GB24578@kili>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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kvm_vcpu_apicv_active() returns false if a virtual machine has no in-kernel
local APIC, however kvm_apicv_activated might still be true if there are
no reasons to disable APICv; in fact it is quite likely that there is none
because APICv is inhibited by specific configurations of the local APIC
and those configurations cannot be programmed. This triggers a WARN:
WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu));
To avoid this, introduce another cause for APICv inhibition, namely the
absence of an in-kernel local APIC. This cause is enabled by default,
and is dropped by either KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP or the enabling of
KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP_SPLIT.
Reported-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Fixes: ee49a8932971 ("KVM: x86: Move SVM's APICv sanity check to common x86", 2021-10-22)
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Message-Id: <20211130123746.293379-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If we run the following perf command in an AMD Milan guest:
perf stat \
-e cpu/event=0x1d0/ \
-e cpu/event=0x1c7/ \
-e cpu/umask=0x1f,event=0x18e/ \
-e cpu/umask=0x7,event=0x18e/ \
-e cpu/umask=0x18,event=0x18e/ \
./workload
dmesg will report a #GP warning from an unchecked MSR access
error on MSR_F15H_PERF_CTLx.
This is because according to APM (Revision: 4.03) Figure 13-7,
the bits [35:32] of AMD PerfEvtSeln register is a part of the
event select encoding, which extends the EVENT_SELECT field
from 8 bits to 12 bits.
Opportunistically update pmu->reserved_bits for reserved bit 19.
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Fixes: ca724305a2b0 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Implement AMD vPMU code for KVM")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20211118130320.95997-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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There are cases that the TSC clocksource is wrongly judged as unstable by
the clocksource watchdog mechanism which tries to validate the TSC against
HPET, PM_TIMER or jiffies. While there is hardly a general reliable way to
check the validity of a watchdog, Thomas Gleixner proposed [1]:
"I'm inclined to lift that requirement when the CPU has:
1) X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC
2) X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC
3) X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3
4) X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST
5) At max. 4 sockets
After two decades of horrors we're finally at a point where TSC seems
to be halfway reliable and less abused by BIOS tinkerers. TSC_ADJUST
was really key as we can now detect even small modifications reliably
and the important point is that we can cure them as well (not pretty
but better than all other options)."
As feature #3 X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 only exists on several generations
of Atom processorz, and is always coupled with X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC
and X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC, skip checking it, and also be more defensive
to use maximal 2 sockets.
The check is done inside tsc_init() before registering 'tsc-early' and
'tsc' clocksources, as there were cases that both of them had been
wrongly judged as unreliable.
For more background of tsc/watchdog, there is a good summary in [2]
[tglx} Update vs. jiffies:
On systems where the only remaining clocksource aside of TSC is jiffies
there is no way to make this work because that creates a circular
dependency. Jiffies accuracy depends on not missing a periodic timer
interrupt, which is not guaranteed. That could be detected by TSC, but as
TSC is not trusted this cannot be compensated. The consequence is a
circulus vitiosus which results in shutting down TSC and falling back to
the jiffies clocksource which is even more unreliable.
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87eekfk8bd.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/
[2]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87a6pimt1f.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/
[ tglx: Refine comment and amend changelog ]
Fixes: 6e3cd95234dc ("x86/hpet: Use another crystalball to evaluate HPET usability")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117023751.24190-2-feng.tang@intel.com
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The TSC_ADJUST register is checked every time a CPU enters idle state, but
Thomas Gleixner mentioned there is still a caveat that a system won't enter
idle [1], either because it's too busy or configured purposely to not enter
idle.
Setup a periodic timer (every 10 minutes) to make sure the check is
happening on a regular base.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/875z286xtk.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/
Fixes: 6e3cd95234dc ("x86/hpet: Use another crystalball to evaluate HPET usability")
Requested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117023751.24190-1-feng.tang@intel.com
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save_sw_bytes() did not fully initialize sw_bytes, which caused KMSAN
to report an infoleak (see below).
Initialize sw_bytes explicitly to avoid this.
KMSAN report follows:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user ./include/linux/instrumented.h:121
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in __copy_to_user ./include/linux/uaccess.h:154
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in save_xstate_epilog+0x2df/0x510 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:127
instrument_copy_to_user ./include/linux/instrumented.h:121
__copy_to_user ./include/linux/uaccess.h:154
save_xstate_epilog+0x2df/0x510 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:127
copy_fpstate_to_sigframe+0x861/0xb60 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:245
get_sigframe+0x656/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:296
__setup_rt_frame+0x14d/0x2a60 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:471
setup_rt_frame arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:781
handle_signal arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:825
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x417/0xdd0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:870
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:149
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1f6/0x490 kernel/entry/common.c:173
exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:208
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:290
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:302
do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae ??:?
Local variable sw_bytes created at:
save_xstate_epilog+0x80/0x510 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:121
copy_fpstate_to_sigframe+0x861/0xb60 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:245
Bytes 20-47 of 48 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 48 starts at ffff8880801d3a18
Data copied to user address 00007ffd90e2ef50
=====================================================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG_fn=V9T6OKPonSjsi9PmWB0hMHFC=yawozdft8i1-MSxrv=w@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 53599b4d54b9b8dd ("x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126124746.761278-1-glider@google.com
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Convention for all the other "lake" CPUs is all one word.
So s/RAPTOR_LAKE/RAPTORLAKE/
Fixes: fbdb5e8f2926 ("x86/cpu: Add Raptor Lake to Intel family")
Reported-by: Rui Zhang <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119170832.1034220-1-tony.luck@intel.com
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Add some more config options which reflect what's needed to boot our
64-bit debian buildds out of the box.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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Default KBUILD_IMAGE to $(boot)/bzImage if a self-extracting
(CONFIG_PARISC_SELF_EXTRACT=y) kernel is to be built.
This fixes the bindeb-pkg make target.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM64:
- Fix constant sign extension affecting TCR_EL2 and preventing
running on ARMv8.7 models due to spurious bits being set
- Fix use of helpers using PSTATE early on exit by always sampling it
as soon as the exit takes place
- Move pkvm's 32bit handling into a common helper
RISC-V:
- Fix incorrect KVM_MAX_VCPUS value
- Unmap stage2 mapping when deleting/moving a memslot
x86:
- Fix and downgrade BUG_ON due to uninitialized cache
- Many APICv and MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM fixes
- Correctly emulate TLB flushes around nested vmentry/vmexit and when
the nested hypervisor uses VPID
- Prevent modifications to CPUID after the VM has run
- Other smaller bugfixes
Generic:
- Memslot handling bugfixes"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (44 commits)
KVM: fix avic_set_running for preemptable kernels
KVM: VMX: clear vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr if APICv is disabled
KVM: SEV: accept signals in sev_lock_two_vms
KVM: SEV: do not take kvm->lock when destroying
KVM: SEV: Prohibit migration of a VM that has mirrors
KVM: SEV: Do COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM with both VMs locked
selftests: sev_migrate_tests: add tests for KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
KVM: SEV: move mirror status to destination of KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
KVM: SEV: initialize regions_list of a mirror VM
KVM: SEV: cleanup locking for KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
KVM: SEV: do not use list_replace_init on an empty list
KVM: x86: Use a stable condition around all VT-d PI paths
KVM: x86: check PIR even for vCPUs with disabled APICv
KVM: VMX: prepare sync_pir_to_irr for running with APICv disabled
KVM: selftests: page_table_test: fix calculation of guest_test_phys_mem
KVM: x86/mmu: Handle "default" period when selectively waking kthread
KVM: MMU: shadow nested paging does not have PKU
KVM: x86/mmu: Remove spurious TLB flushes in TDP MMU zap collapsible path
KVM: x86/mmu: Use yield-safe TDP MMU root iter in MMU notifier unmapping
KVM: X86: Use vcpu->arch.walk_mmu for kvm_mmu_invlpg()
...
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avic_set_running() passes the current CPU to avic_vcpu_load(), albeit
via vcpu->cpu rather than smp_processor_id(). If the thread is migrated
while avic_set_running runs, the call to avic_vcpu_load() can use a stale
value for the processor id. Avoid this by blocking preemption over the
entire execution of avic_set_running().
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: 8221c1370056 ("svm: Manage vcpu load/unload when enable AVIC")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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There is nothing to synchronize if APICv is disabled, since neither
other vCPUs nor assigned devices can set PIR.ON.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Generally, kvm->lock is not taken for a long time, but
sev_lock_two_vms is different: it takes vCPU locks
inside, so userspace can hold it back just by calling
a vCPU ioctl. Play it safe and use mutex_lock_killable.
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-13-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Taking the lock is useless since there are no other references,
and there are already accesses (e.g. to sev->enc_context_owner)
that do not take it. So get rid of it.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-12-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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VMs that mirror an encryption context rely on the owner to keep the
ASID allocated. Performing a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
would cause a dangling ASID:
1. copy context from A to B (gets ref to A)
2. move context from A to L (moves ASID from A to L)
3. close L (releases ASID from L, B still references it)
The right way to do the handoff instead is to create a fresh mirror VM
on the destination first:
1. copy context from A to B (gets ref to A)
[later] 2. close B (releases ref to A)
3. move context from A to L (moves ASID from A to L)
4. copy context from L to M
So, catch the situation by adding a count of how many VMs are
mirroring this one's encryption context.
Fixes: 0b020f5af092 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-11-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that we have a facility to lock two VMs with deadlock
protection, use it for the creation of mirror VMs as well. One of
COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM(dst, src) and COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM(src, dst)
would always fail, so the combination is nonsensical and it is okay to
return -EBUSY if it is attempted.
This sidesteps the question of what happens if a VM is
MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM'd at the same time as it is
COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM'd: the locking prevents that from
happening.
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-10-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow intra-host migration of a mirror VM; the destination VM will be
a mirror of the same ASID as the source.
Fixes: b56639318bb2 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-8-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This was broken before the introduction of KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM,
but technically harmless because the region list was unused for a mirror
VM. However, it is untidy and it now causes a NULL pointer access when
attempting to move the encryption context of a mirror VM.
Fixes: 54526d1fd593 ("KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context")
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Encapsulate the handling of the migration_in_progress flag for both VMs in
two functions sev_lock_two_vms and sev_unlock_two_vms. It does not matter
if KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM locks the destination struct kvm a bit
later, and this change 1) keeps the cleanup chain of labels smaller 2)
makes it possible for KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM to reuse the logic.
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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list_replace_init cannot be used if the source is an empty list,
because "new->next->prev = new" will overwrite "old->next":
new old
prev = new, next = new prev = old, next = old
new->next = old->next prev = new, next = old prev = old, next = old
new->next->prev = new prev = new, next = old prev = old, next = new
new->prev = old->prev prev = old, next = old prev = old, next = old
new->next->prev = new prev = old, next = old prev = new, next = new
The desired outcome instead would be to leave both old and new the same
as they were (two empty circular lists). Use list_cut_before, which
already has the necessary check and is documented to discard the
previous contents of the list that will hold the result.
Fixes: b56639318bb2 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-5-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Currently, checks for whether VT-d PI can be used refer to the current
status of the feature in the current vCPU; or they more or less pick
vCPU 0 in case a specific vCPU is not available.
However, these checks do not attempt to synchronize with changes to
the IRTE. In particular, there is no path that updates the IRTE when
APICv is re-activated on vCPU 0; and there is no path to wakeup a CPU
that has APICv disabled, if the wakeup occurs because of an IRTE
that points to a posted interrupt.
To fix this, always go through the VT-d PI path as long as there are
assigned devices and APICv is available on both the host and the VM side.
Since the relevant condition was copied over three times, take the hint
and factor it into a separate function.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123004311.2954158-5-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The IRTE for an assigned device can trigger a POSTED_INTR_VECTOR even
if APICv is disabled on the vCPU that receives it. In that case, the
interrupt will just cause a vmexit and leave the ON bit set together
with the PIR bit corresponding to the interrupt.
Right now, the interrupt would not be delivered until APICv is re-enabled.
However, fixing this is just a matter of always doing the PIR->IRR
synchronization, even if the vCPU has temporarily disabled APICv.
This is not a problem for performance, or if anything it is an
improvement. First, in the common case where vcpu->arch.apicv_active is
true, one fewer check has to be performed. Second, static_call_cond will
elide the function call if APICv is not present or disabled. Finally,
in the case for AMD hardware we can remove the sync_pir_to_irr callback:
it is only needed for apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr, and that function
already has a fallback for !APICv.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123004311.2954158-4-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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|
If APICv is disabled for this vCPU, assigned devices may still attempt to
post interrupts. In that case, we need to cancel the vmentry and deliver
the interrupt with KVM_REQ_EVENT. Extend the existing code that handles
injection of L1 interrupts into L2 to cover this case as well.
vmx_hwapic_irr_update is only called when APICv is active so it would be
confusing to add a check for vcpu->arch.apicv_active in there. Instead,
just use vmx_set_rvi directly in vmx_sync_pir_to_irr.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123004311.2954158-3-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Account for the '0' being a default, "let KVM choose" period, when
determining whether or not the recovery worker needs to be awakened in
response to userspace reducing the period. Failure to do so results in
the worker not being awakened properly, e.g. when changing the period
from '0' to any small-ish value.
Fixes: 4dfe4f40d845 ("kvm: x86: mmu: Make NX huge page recovery period configurable")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211120015706.3830341-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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|
Initialize the mask for PKU permissions as if CR4.PKE=0, avoiding
incorrect interpretations of the nested hypervisor's page tables.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Drop the "flush" param and return values to/from the TDP MMU's helper for
zapping collapsible SPTEs. Because the helper runs with mmu_lock held
for read, not write, it uses tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(), and the atomic
zap handles the necessary remote TLB flush.
Similarly, because mmu_lock is dropped and re-acquired between zapping
legacy MMUs and zapping TDP MMUs, kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes() must
handle remote TLB flushes from the legacy MMU before calling into the TDP
MMU.
Fixes: e2209710ccc5d ("KVM: x86/mmu: Skip rmap operations if rmaps not allocated")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211120045046.3940942-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use the yield-safe variant of the TDP MMU iterator when handling an
unmapping event from the MMU notifier, as most occurences of the event
allow yielding.
Fixes: e1eed5847b09 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Allow yielding during MMU notifier unmap/zap, if possible")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211120015008.3780032-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When running without MIO support, with pci=nomio or for devices which
are not MIO-capable the zPCI subsystem generates pseudo-MMIO addresses
to allow access to PCI BARs via MMIO based Linux APIs even though the
platform uses function handles and BAR numbers.
This is done by stashing an index into our global IOMAP array which
contains the function handle in the 16 most significant bits of the
addresses returned by ioremap() always setting the most significant bit.
On the other hand the MIO addresses assigned by the platform for use,
while requiring special instructions, allow PCI access with virtually
mapped physical addresses. Now the problem is that these MIO addresses
and our own pseudo-MMIO addresses may overlap, while functionally this
would not be a problem by itself this overlap is detected by common code
as both address types are added as resources in the iomem_resource tree.
This leads to the overlapping resource claim of either the MIO capable
or non-MIO capable devices with being rejected.
Since PCI is tightly coupled to the use of the iomem_resource tree, see
for example the code for request_mem_region(), we can't reasonably get
rid of the overlap being detected by keeping our pseudo-MMIO addresses
out of the iomem_resource tree.
Instead let's move the range used by our own pseudo-MMIO addresses by
starting at (1UL << 62) and only using addresses below (1UL << 63) thus
avoiding the range currently used for MIO addresses.
Fixes: c7ff0e918a7c ("s390/pci: deal with devices that have no support for MIO instructions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3+
Reviewed-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 build fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix for a missing __init annotation of prepare_command_line()"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2021-11-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot: Mark prepare_command_line() __init
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu
Pull iommu fixes from Joerg Roedel:
- Intel VT-d fixes:
- Remove unused PASID_DISABLED
- Fix RCU locking
- Fix for the unmap_pages call-back
- Rockchip RK3568 address mask fix
- AMD IOMMUv2 log message clarification
* tag 'iommu-fixes-v5.16-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu:
iommu/vt-d: Fix unmap_pages support
iommu/vt-d: Fix an unbalanced rcu_read_lock/rcu_read_unlock()
iommu/rockchip: Fix PAGE_DESC_HI_MASKs for RK3568
iommu/amd: Clarify AMD IOMMUv2 initialization messages
iommu/vt-d: Remove unused PASID_DISABLED
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