From c132fe78ad7b4ce8b5d49a501a15c29d08eeb23a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 08:27:23 +0400 Subject: dmaengine: ti: Fix refcount leak in ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not needed anymore. Add missing of_node_put() in to fix this. Fixes: ec9bfa1e1a79 ("dmaengine: ti-dma-crossbar: dra7: Use bitops instead of idr") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605042723.17668-2-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c index 71d24fc07c00..e34cfb50d241 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c +++ b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, mutex_unlock(&xbar->mutex); dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Run out of free DMA requests\n"); kfree(map); + of_node_put(dma_spec->np); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } set_bit(map->xbar_out, xbar->dma_inuse); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 615a4bfc426e11dba05c2cf343f9ac752fb381d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miaoqian Lin Date: Sun, 5 Jun 2022 08:27:22 +0400 Subject: dmaengine: ti: Add missing put_device in ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate of_find_device_by_node() takes reference, we should use put_device() to release it when not need anymore. Fixes: a074ae38f859 ("dmaengine: Add driver for TI DMA crossbar on DRA7x") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin Acked-by: Peter Ujfalusi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605042723.17668-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c index e34cfb50d241..f744ddbbbad7 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c +++ b/drivers/dma/ti/dma-crossbar.c @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, if (dma_spec->args[0] >= xbar->xbar_requests) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Invalid XBAR request number: %d\n", dma_spec->args[0]); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } @@ -252,12 +253,14 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dma_spec->np = of_parse_phandle(ofdma->of_node, "dma-masters", 0); if (!dma_spec->np) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't get DMA master\n"); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } map = kzalloc(sizeof(*map), GFP_KERNEL); if (!map) { of_node_put(dma_spec->np); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -269,6 +272,7 @@ static void *ti_dra7_xbar_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Run out of free DMA requests\n"); kfree(map); of_node_put(dma_spec->np); + put_device(&pdev->dev); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } set_bit(map->xbar_out, xbar->dma_inuse); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 646728dff254f8070da5d2f82494a065d4287e26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinod Koul Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 23:19:06 +0530 Subject: dmaengine: Revert "dmaengine: add verification of DMA_INTERRUPT capability for dmatest" This reverts commit a8facc7b9885 ("dmaengine: add verification of DMA_INTERRUPT capability for dmatest") as it causes regression due to the fact that DMA_INTERRUPT in linked to dma_prep_interrupt() so checking that is incorrect here Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606174906.3979283-1-vkoul@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/dmatest.c | 13 +++---------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/dmatest.c b/drivers/dma/dmatest.c index 0a2168a4ccb0..f696246f57fd 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/dmatest.c +++ b/drivers/dma/dmatest.c @@ -675,16 +675,10 @@ static int dmatest_func(void *data) /* * src and dst buffers are freed by ourselves below */ - if (params->polled) { + if (params->polled) flags = DMA_CTRL_ACK; - } else { - if (dma_has_cap(DMA_INTERRUPT, dev->cap_mask)) { - flags = DMA_CTRL_ACK | DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT; - } else { - pr_err("Channel does not support interrupt!\n"); - goto err_pq_array; - } - } + else + flags = DMA_CTRL_ACK | DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT; ktime = ktime_get(); while (!(kthread_should_stop() || @@ -912,7 +906,6 @@ error_unmap_continue: runtime = ktime_to_us(ktime); ret = 0; -err_pq_array: kfree(dma_pq); err_srcs_array: kfree(srcs); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a7cd3cf0b2e5aaacfe5e02c472bd28e98e640be7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Robinson Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 17:10:34 +0100 Subject: dmaengine: imx-sdma: Allow imx8m for imx7 FW revs The revision of the imx-sdma IP that is in the i.MX8M series is the same is that as that in the i.MX7 series but the imx7d MODULE_FIRMWARE directive is wrapped in a condiditional which means it's not defined when built for aarch64 SOC_IMX8M platforms and hence you get the following errors when the driver loads on imx8m devices: imx-sdma 302c0000.dma-controller: Direct firmware load for imx/sdma/sdma-imx7d.bin failed with error -2 imx-sdma 302c0000.dma-controller: external firmware not found, using ROM firmware Add the SOC_IMX8M into the check so the firmware can load on i.MX8. Fixes: 1474d48bd639 ("arm64: dts: imx8mq: Add SDMA nodes") Fixes: 941acd566b18 ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: Only check ratio on parts that support 1:1") Signed-off-by: Peter Robinson Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606161034.3544803-1-pbrobinson@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c index 8535018ee7a2..900cafdaf359 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c @@ -2346,7 +2346,7 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("i.MX SDMA driver"); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX6Q) MODULE_FIRMWARE("imx/sdma/sdma-imx6q.bin"); #endif -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX7D) +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX7D) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SOC_IMX8M) MODULE_FIRMWARE("imx/sdma/sdma-imx7d.bin"); #endif MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 90f4b5499cdd94be3c1e856375ecd7d5f9c4cecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ping-Ke Shih Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 10:03:12 +0800 Subject: rtw88: 8821c: fix access const table of channel parameters We would like to make chip_info table const, but 8821c uses one field as a variable, and causes core dump. To fix this, move the field to another struct that can be read and written. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc09f52f4 PGD 5b5215067 P4D 5b5215067 PUD 5b5217067 PMD 111f61067 PTE 8000000111e07161 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 PID: 436 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7-debug-01822-g89d8f53ff6e7 #1 5cac31ca93432e53341863abfb3332fd98b144da Hardware name: HP HP Desktop M01-F1xxx/87D6, BIOS F.12 12/17/2020 RIP: 0010:rtw8821c_phy_set_param+0x262/0x380 [rtw88_8821c] Code: e8 53 f3 c0 d6 48 8b 43 10 4c 8b 63 38 be 24 0a 00 00 48 89 df 48 8b 40 68 e8 3a f3 c0 d6 89 e9 be 28 0a 00 00 48 89 df d3 e8 <41> 89 84 24 54 01 00 00 48 8b 43 10 4c 8b 63 38 48 8b 40 68 e8 15 RSP: 0018:ffffb08c417cb6f0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000064b80c1c RBX: ffff93d15a0120e0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000034028211 RSI: 0000000000000a28 RDI: ffff93d15a0120e0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffffffffc09f51a0 R13: ffff93d15a0156d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f4e9b73d1c0(0000) GS:ffff93d83ab80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffc09f52f4 CR3: 0000000103b9e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: rtw_core_start+0xbd/0x190 [rtw88_core de79d6bdfd083d102030858972032e5706726279] rtw_ops_start+0x26/0x40 [rtw88_core de79d6bdfd083d102030858972032e5706726279] drv_start+0x42/0x100 [mac80211 21e803d0ad10691f64c6c81ecc24c0c6c36e5d58] ieee80211_do_open+0x2fb/0x900 [mac80211 21e803d0ad10691f64c6c81ecc24c0c6c36e5d58] ieee80211_open+0x67/0x80 [mac80211 21e803d0ad10691f64c6c81ecc24c0c6c36e5d58] __dev_open+0xdd/0x180 [...] Fixes: 89d8f53ff6e7 ("wifi: rtw88: Fix Sparse warning for rtw8821c_hw_spec") Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Larry Finger Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220608020312.9663-1-pkshih@realtek.com --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/main.h | 6 +++--- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8821c.c | 14 ++++++++------ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/main.h b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/main.h index c02be4ac159e..7db627fc26be 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/main.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/main.h @@ -1233,9 +1233,6 @@ struct rtw_chip_info { const struct wiphy_wowlan_support *wowlan_stub; const u8 max_sched_scan_ssids; - /* for 8821c set channel */ - u32 ch_param[3]; - /* coex paras */ u32 coex_para_ver; u8 bt_desired_ver; @@ -1937,6 +1934,9 @@ struct rtw_hal { enum rtw_sar_bands sar_band; struct rtw_sar sar; + + /* for 8821c set channel */ + u32 ch_param[3]; }; struct rtw_path_div { diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8821c.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8821c.c index ffee39ea5df6..488a7ddd507c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8821c.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8821c.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static void rtw8821c_phy_bf_init(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev) static void rtw8821c_phy_set_param(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev) { + struct rtw_hal *hal = &rtwdev->hal; u8 crystal_cap, val; /* power on BB/RF domain */ @@ -159,9 +160,9 @@ static void rtw8821c_phy_set_param(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev) /* post init after header files config */ rtw_write32_set(rtwdev, REG_RXPSEL, BIT_RX_PSEL_RST); - rtwdev->chip->ch_param[0] = rtw_read32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXSF2, MASKDWORD); - rtwdev->chip->ch_param[1] = rtw_read32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXSF6, MASKDWORD); - rtwdev->chip->ch_param[2] = rtw_read32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXFILTER, MASKDWORD); + hal->ch_param[0] = rtw_read32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXSF2, MASKDWORD); + hal->ch_param[1] = rtw_read32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXSF6, MASKDWORD); + hal->ch_param[2] = rtw_read32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXFILTER, MASKDWORD); rtw_phy_init(rtwdev); rtwdev->dm_info.cck_pd_default = rtw_read8(rtwdev, REG_CSRATIO) & 0x1f; @@ -351,6 +352,7 @@ static void rtw8821c_set_channel_rxdfir(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 bw) static void rtw8821c_set_channel_bb(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 channel, u8 bw, u8 primary_ch_idx) { + struct rtw_hal *hal = &rtwdev->hal; u32 val32; if (channel <= 14) { @@ -367,11 +369,11 @@ static void rtw8821c_set_channel_bb(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 channel, u8 bw, rtw_write32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXFILTER, MASKDWORD, 0x00003667); } else { rtw_write32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXSF2, MASKDWORD, - rtwdev->chip->ch_param[0]); + hal->ch_param[0]); rtw_write32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXSF6, MASKLWORD, - rtwdev->chip->ch_param[1] & MASKLWORD); + hal->ch_param[1] & MASKLWORD); rtw_write32_mask(rtwdev, REG_TXFILTER, MASKDWORD, - rtwdev->chip->ch_param[2]); + hal->ch_param[2]); } } else if (channel > 35) { rtw_write32_mask(rtwdev, REG_ENTXCCK, BIT(18), 0x1); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f424b1a6e1b460c04018ed5508dd7dbae72e27ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kalle Valo Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 16:36:39 +0300 Subject: dt-bindings: net: wireless: ath9k: Change Toke as maintainer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Toke now maintains ath9k so update DT bindings as well. Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610133640.10810-1-kvalo@kernel.org --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qca,ath9k.yaml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qca,ath9k.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qca,ath9k.yaml index 8cd0adbf7021..7029cb1f38ff 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qca,ath9k.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qca,ath9k.yaml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml# title: Qualcomm Atheros ath9k wireless devices Generic Binding maintainers: - - Kalle Valo + - Toke Høiland-Jørgensen description: | This node provides properties for configuring the ath9k wireless device. -- cgit v1.2.3 From c2b3a0759c76d67186199eb1d076fb55497eac98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kalle Valo Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 16:36:40 +0300 Subject: dt-bindings: net: wireless: ath11k: change Kalle's email My codeaurora.org email doesn't work anymore, so switch to my preferred kernel.org address. Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610133640.10810-2-kvalo@kernel.org --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qcom,ath11k.yaml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qcom,ath11k.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qcom,ath11k.yaml index 8c01fdba134b..a677b056f112 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qcom,ath11k.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/qcom,ath11k.yaml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml# title: Qualcomm Technologies ath11k wireless devices Generic Binding maintainers: - - Kalle Valo + - Kalle Valo description: | These are dt entries for Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. IEEE 802.11ax -- cgit v1.2.3 From 51dd64bb99e4478fc5280171acd8e1b529eadaf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiu Jianfeng Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 19:17:26 +0800 Subject: Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc" This reverts commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37. Commit ccf11dbaa07b ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo], then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc), It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm. And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a UAF issue. Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index a733aff02006..708de9656bbd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) { long rc; const char *algo; - struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm = NULL; + struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm; struct shash_desc *desc; if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { @@ -120,16 +120,13 @@ unlock: alloc: desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!desc) { - crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm); + if (!desc) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } desc->tfm = *tfm; rc = crypto_shash_init(desc); if (rc) { - crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm); kfree(desc); return ERR_PTR(rc); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4deb96e35c5c3ebfeb9cf567f3ba80fa54e2cec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robin Murphy Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 14:46:46 +0100 Subject: irqchip/gicv3: Handle resource request failure consistently Due to a silly oversight on my part, making the simple switch to of_io_request_and_map() in the DT path inadvertently introduced divergent behaviour, whereby failng to request an iomem region now becomes fatal for DT, vs. being silently ignored for ACPI. Refactor a bit harder, so that request errors are non-fatal in both paths as intended, but also consistently reported as well. Reported-by: Matt Ranostay Fixes: 2b2cd74a06c3 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Claim iomem resources") Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5f2b57a0131f3082fae9d3002d360bf784ccb092.1655387206.git.robin.murphy@arm.com --- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c index 5c1cf907ee68..2d25bca63d2a 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c @@ -2042,15 +2042,40 @@ static void __init gic_of_setup_kvm_info(struct device_node *node) vgic_set_kvm_info(&gic_v3_kvm_info); } +static void gic_request_region(resource_size_t base, resource_size_t size, + const char *name) +{ + if (!request_mem_region(base, size, name)) + pr_warn_once(FW_BUG "%s region %pa has overlapping address\n", + name, &base); +} + +static void __iomem *gic_of_iomap(struct device_node *node, int idx, + const char *name, struct resource *res) +{ + void __iomem *base; + int ret; + + ret = of_address_to_resource(node, idx, res); + if (ret) + return IOMEM_ERR_PTR(ret); + + gic_request_region(res->start, resource_size(res), name); + base = of_iomap(node, idx); + + return base ?: IOMEM_ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); +} + static int __init gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *parent) { void __iomem *dist_base; struct redist_region *rdist_regs; + struct resource res; u64 redist_stride; u32 nr_redist_regions; int err, i; - dist_base = of_io_request_and_map(node, 0, "GICD"); + dist_base = gic_of_iomap(node, 0, "GICD", &res); if (IS_ERR(dist_base)) { pr_err("%pOF: unable to map gic dist registers\n", node); return PTR_ERR(dist_base); @@ -2073,12 +2098,8 @@ static int __init gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *pare } for (i = 0; i < nr_redist_regions; i++) { - struct resource res; - int ret; - - ret = of_address_to_resource(node, 1 + i, &res); - rdist_regs[i].redist_base = of_io_request_and_map(node, 1 + i, "GICR"); - if (ret || IS_ERR(rdist_regs[i].redist_base)) { + rdist_regs[i].redist_base = gic_of_iomap(node, 1 + i, "GICR", &res); + if (IS_ERR(rdist_regs[i].redist_base)) { pr_err("%pOF: couldn't map region %d\n", node, i); err = -ENODEV; goto out_unmap_rdist; @@ -2151,7 +2172,7 @@ gic_acpi_parse_madt_redist(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, pr_err("Couldn't map GICR region @%llx\n", redist->base_address); return -ENOMEM; } - request_mem_region(redist->base_address, redist->length, "GICR"); + gic_request_region(redist->base_address, redist->length, "GICR"); gic_acpi_register_redist(redist->base_address, redist_base); return 0; @@ -2174,7 +2195,7 @@ gic_acpi_parse_madt_gicc(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, redist_base = ioremap(gicc->gicr_base_address, size); if (!redist_base) return -ENOMEM; - request_mem_region(gicc->gicr_base_address, size, "GICR"); + gic_request_region(gicc->gicr_base_address, size, "GICR"); gic_acpi_register_redist(gicc->gicr_base_address, redist_base); return 0; @@ -2376,7 +2397,7 @@ gic_acpi_init(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, const unsigned long end) pr_err("Unable to map GICD registers\n"); return -ENOMEM; } - request_mem_region(dist->base_address, ACPI_GICV3_DIST_MEM_SIZE, "GICD"); + gic_request_region(dist->base_address, ACPI_GICV3_DIST_MEM_SIZE, "GICD"); err = gic_validate_dist_version(acpi_data.dist_base); if (err) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07fd5b6cdf3cc30bfde8fe0f644771688be04447 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 12:19:50 -1000 Subject: cgroup: Use separate src/dst nodes when preloading css_sets for migration Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time. Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with the following sequence on cgroup1: #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS & #4> PID=$! #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration, non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader is doing an actual one. After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens: 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader. 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads. 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list. 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy. 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and putting references accordingly. 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on the dst list. This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free. This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too. This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into ->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst preloadings don't interfere with each other. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha Reported-by: shisiyuan Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html Fixes: f817de98513d ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+ --- include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 3 ++- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h index 1bfcfb1af352..d4427d0a0e18 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h @@ -264,7 +264,8 @@ struct css_set { * List of csets participating in the on-going migration either as * source or destination. Protected by cgroup_mutex. */ - struct list_head mg_preload_node; + struct list_head mg_src_preload_node; + struct list_head mg_dst_preload_node; struct list_head mg_node; /* diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index 1779ccddb734..13c8e91d7862 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -765,7 +765,8 @@ struct css_set init_css_set = { .task_iters = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.task_iters), .threaded_csets = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.threaded_csets), .cgrp_links = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.cgrp_links), - .mg_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_preload_node), + .mg_src_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_src_preload_node), + .mg_dst_preload_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_dst_preload_node), .mg_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_css_set.mg_node), /* @@ -1240,7 +1241,8 @@ static struct css_set *find_css_set(struct css_set *old_cset, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->threaded_csets); INIT_HLIST_NODE(&cset->hlist); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->cgrp_links); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_preload_node); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_src_preload_node); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_dst_preload_node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cset->mg_node); /* Copy the set of subsystem state objects generated in @@ -2597,21 +2599,27 @@ int cgroup_migrate_vet_dst(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp) */ void cgroup_migrate_finish(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) { - LIST_HEAD(preloaded); struct css_set *cset, *tmp_cset; lockdep_assert_held(&cgroup_mutex); spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); - list_splice_tail_init(&mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, &preloaded); - list_splice_tail_init(&mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets, &preloaded); + list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, + mg_src_preload_node) { + cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; + cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; + cset->mg_dst_cset = NULL; + list_del_init(&cset->mg_src_preload_node); + put_css_set_locked(cset); + } - list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &preloaded, mg_preload_node) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets, + mg_dst_preload_node) { cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; cset->mg_dst_cset = NULL; - list_del_init(&cset->mg_preload_node); + list_del_init(&cset->mg_dst_preload_node); put_css_set_locked(cset); } @@ -2651,7 +2659,7 @@ void cgroup_migrate_add_src(struct css_set *src_cset, if (src_cset->dead) return; - if (!list_empty(&src_cset->mg_preload_node)) + if (!list_empty(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node)) return; src_cgrp = cset_cgroup_from_root(src_cset, dst_cgrp->root); @@ -2664,7 +2672,7 @@ void cgroup_migrate_add_src(struct css_set *src_cset, src_cset->mg_src_cgrp = src_cgrp; src_cset->mg_dst_cgrp = dst_cgrp; get_css_set(src_cset); - list_add_tail(&src_cset->mg_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets); + list_add_tail(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets); } /** @@ -2689,7 +2697,7 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) /* look up the dst cset for each src cset and link it to src */ list_for_each_entry_safe(src_cset, tmp_cset, &mgctx->preloaded_src_csets, - mg_preload_node) { + mg_src_preload_node) { struct css_set *dst_cset; struct cgroup_subsys *ss; int ssid; @@ -2708,7 +2716,7 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) if (src_cset == dst_cset) { src_cset->mg_src_cgrp = NULL; src_cset->mg_dst_cgrp = NULL; - list_del_init(&src_cset->mg_preload_node); + list_del_init(&src_cset->mg_src_preload_node); put_css_set(src_cset); put_css_set(dst_cset); continue; @@ -2716,8 +2724,8 @@ int cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx) src_cset->mg_dst_cset = dst_cset; - if (list_empty(&dst_cset->mg_preload_node)) - list_add_tail(&dst_cset->mg_preload_node, + if (list_empty(&dst_cset->mg_dst_preload_node)) + list_add_tail(&dst_cset->mg_dst_preload_node, &mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets); else put_css_set(dst_cset); @@ -2963,7 +2971,8 @@ static int cgroup_update_dfl_csses(struct cgroup *cgrp) goto out_finish; spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); - list_for_each_entry(src_cset, &mgctx.preloaded_src_csets, mg_preload_node) { + list_for_each_entry(src_cset, &mgctx.preloaded_src_csets, + mg_src_preload_node) { struct task_struct *task, *ntask; /* all tasks in src_csets need to be migrated */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From f6f0dab5efe4fcabe726f9218a0b3000fee0fa8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Widawsky Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 11:00:59 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Update Ben's email address I'm leaving Intel. Update email address to korg and add .mailmap entries. For now, I will be taking a reduced role in CXL development, but I still plan to spend time working on it, and I can still serve as a good substitute if needed for maintainer responsibilities (that may change in the future). Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky Reviewed-by: Alison Schofield Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520180059.632054-1-bwidawsk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- .mailmap | 3 +++ MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.mailmap b/.mailmap index 825fae8e6b7b..ae8fa1af6b5e 100644 --- a/.mailmap +++ b/.mailmap @@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ Bart Van Assche Bart Van Assche Ben Gardner Ben M Cahill +Ben Widawsky +Ben Widawsky +Ben Widawsky Björn Steinbrink Björn Töpel Björn Töpel diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 3cf9842d9233..54fa6e2059de 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5009,7 +5009,7 @@ COMPUTE EXPRESS LINK (CXL) M: Alison Schofield M: Vishal Verma M: Ira Weiny -M: Ben Widawsky +M: Ben Widawsky M: Dan Williams L: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -- cgit v1.2.3 From db9a3a35d31ea337331f0e6e07e04bcd52642894 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Cameron Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 14:45:19 +0100 Subject: cxl: Fix cleanup of port devices on failure to probe driver. The device is created, and then there is a check if a driver succesfully bound to it. In event of failing the bind (e.g. failure in cxl_port_probe()) the device is left registered. When a bus rescan later occurs, fresh devices are created leading to a multiple device representing the same underlying hardware. Bad things may follow and at very least we have far too many devices. Fix by ensuring autoremove is registered if the device create succeeds, but doesn't depend on sucessful binding to a driver. Bug was observed as side effect of incorrect ownership in [PATCH v9 6/9] cxl/port: Read CDAT table but will result from any failure to in cxl_port_probe(). Fixes: 8dd2bc0f8e02 ("cxl/mem: Add the cxl_mem driver") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609134519.11668-1-Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/cxl/mem.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c index c310f1fd3db0..a979d0b484d5 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static int create_endpoint(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, { struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds; struct cxl_port *endpoint; + int rc; endpoint = devm_cxl_add_port(&parent_port->dev, &cxlmd->dev, cxlds->component_reg_phys, parent_port); @@ -37,13 +38,17 @@ static int create_endpoint(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, dev_dbg(&cxlmd->dev, "add: %s\n", dev_name(&endpoint->dev)); + rc = cxl_endpoint_autoremove(cxlmd, endpoint); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!endpoint->dev.driver) { dev_err(&cxlmd->dev, "%s failed probe\n", dev_name(&endpoint->dev)); return -ENXIO; } - return cxl_endpoint_autoremove(cxlmd, endpoint); + return 0; } static void enable_suspend(void *data) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8ae3cebc1704b9a3ab8398dc7820c37183026bbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Widawsky Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 13:36:45 -0800 Subject: cxl/core: Use is_endpoint_decoder Save some characters and directly check decoder type rather than port type. There's no need to check if the port is an endpoint port since, by this point, cxl_endpoint_decoder_alloc() has a specified type. Reviewed by: Adam Manzanares Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/cxl/core/hdm.c | 2 +- drivers/cxl/core/port.c | 2 +- drivers/cxl/cxl.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/hdm.c b/drivers/cxl/core/hdm.c index 0e89a7a932d4..bfc8ee876278 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/hdm.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/hdm.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int init_hdm_decoder(struct cxl_port *port, struct cxl_decoder *cxld, else cxld->target_type = CXL_DECODER_ACCELERATOR; - if (is_cxl_endpoint(to_cxl_port(cxld->dev.parent))) + if (is_endpoint_decoder(&cxld->dev)) return 0; target_list.value = diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/port.c b/drivers/cxl/core/port.c index ea60abda6500..dbce99bdffab 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/port.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/port.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static const struct device_type cxl_decoder_root_type = { .groups = cxl_decoder_root_attribute_groups, }; -static bool is_endpoint_decoder(struct device *dev) +bool is_endpoint_decoder(struct device *dev) { return dev->type == &cxl_decoder_endpoint_type; } diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxl.h b/drivers/cxl/cxl.h index 140dc3278cde..6799b27c7db2 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/cxl.h +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxl.h @@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ struct cxl_dport *cxl_find_dport_by_dev(struct cxl_port *port, struct cxl_decoder *to_cxl_decoder(struct device *dev); bool is_root_decoder(struct device *dev); +bool is_endpoint_decoder(struct device *dev); bool is_cxl_decoder(struct device *dev); struct cxl_decoder *cxl_root_decoder_alloc(struct cxl_port *port, unsigned int nr_targets); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8a66487506161dbc1d22fd154d2de0244e232040 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alison Schofield Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:14:56 -0800 Subject: cxl/mbox: Use __le32 in get,set_lsa mailbox structures CXL specification defines these as little endian. Fixes: 60b8f17215de ("cxl/pmem: Translate NVDIMM label commands to CXL label commands") Reported-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220225221456.1025635-1-alison.schofield@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 8 ++++---- drivers/cxl/pmem.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h index 60d10ee1e7fc..7df0b053373a 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h @@ -300,13 +300,13 @@ struct cxl_mbox_identify { } __packed; struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa { - u32 offset; - u32 length; + __le32 offset; + __le32 length; } __packed; struct cxl_mbox_set_lsa { - u32 offset; - u32 reserved; + __le32 offset; + __le32 reserved; u8 data[]; } __packed; diff --git a/drivers/cxl/pmem.c b/drivers/cxl/pmem.c index bbeef91e637e..0aaa70b4e0f7 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/pmem.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/pmem.c @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ static int cxl_pmem_get_config_data(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, return -EINVAL; get_lsa = (struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa) { - .offset = cmd->in_offset, - .length = cmd->in_length, + .offset = cpu_to_le32(cmd->in_offset), + .length = cpu_to_le32(cmd->in_length), }; rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_LSA, &get_lsa, @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int cxl_pmem_set_config_data(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, return -ENOMEM; *set_lsa = (struct cxl_mbox_set_lsa) { - .offset = cmd->in_offset, + .offset = cpu_to_le32(cmd->in_offset), }; memcpy(set_lsa->data, cmd->in_buf, cmd->in_length); -- cgit v1.2.3 From db7cfc380900bc4243b09623fd72fabe0a8ff23b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Gladkov Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 22:07:29 +0200 Subject: ipc: Free mq_sysctls if ipc namespace creation failed The problem that Dmitry Vyukov pointed out is that if setup_ipc_sysctls fails, mq_sysctls must be freed before return. executing program BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888112fc9200 (size 512): comm "syz-executor237", pid 3648, jiffies 4294970469 (age 12.270s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): ef d3 60 85 ff ff ff ff 0c 9b d2 12 81 88 ff ff ..`............. 04 00 00 00 a4 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmemdup+0x23/0x50 mm/util.c:129 [] kmemdup include/linux/fortify-string.h:456 [inline] [] setup_mq_sysctls+0x4b/0x1c0 ipc/mq_sysctl.c:89 [] create_ipc_ns ipc/namespace.c:63 [inline] [] copy_ipcs+0x292/0x390 ipc/namespace.c:91 [] create_new_namespaces+0xdc/0x4f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:90 [] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x9b/0x120 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 [] ksys_unshare+0x2fe/0x600 kernel/fork.c:3165 [] __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3236 [inline] [] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3234 [inline] [] __x64_sys_unshare+0x12/0x20 kernel/fork.c:3234 [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888112fd5f00 (size 256): comm "syz-executor237", pid 3648, jiffies 4294970469 (age 12.270s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 92 fc 12 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:605 [inline] [] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:733 [inline] [] __register_sysctl_table+0x7b/0x7f0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1344 [] setup_mq_sysctls+0x12a/0x1c0 ipc/mq_sysctl.c:112 [] create_ipc_ns ipc/namespace.c:63 [inline] [] copy_ipcs+0x292/0x390 ipc/namespace.c:91 [] create_new_namespaces+0xdc/0x4f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:90 [] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x9b/0x120 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 [] ksys_unshare+0x2fe/0x600 kernel/fork.c:3165 [] __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3236 [inline] [] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3234 [inline] [] __x64_sys_unshare+0x12/0x20 kernel/fork.c:3234 [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888112fbba00 (size 256): comm "syz-executor237", pid 3648, jiffies 4294970469 (age 12.270s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 78 ba fb 12 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 x............... 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:605 [inline] [] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:733 [inline] [] new_dir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:978 [inline] [] get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1022 [inline] [] __register_sysctl_table+0x5a9/0x7f0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1373 [] setup_mq_sysctls+0x12a/0x1c0 ipc/mq_sysctl.c:112 [] create_ipc_ns ipc/namespace.c:63 [inline] [] copy_ipcs+0x292/0x390 ipc/namespace.c:91 [] create_new_namespaces+0xdc/0x4f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:90 [] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x9b/0x120 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 [] ksys_unshare+0x2fe/0x600 kernel/fork.c:3165 [] __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3236 [inline] [] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3234 [inline] [] __x64_sys_unshare+0x12/0x20 kernel/fork.c:3234 [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888112fbb900 (size 256): comm "syz-executor237", pid 3648, jiffies 4294970469 (age 12.270s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 78 b9 fb 12 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 x............... 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:605 [inline] [] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:733 [inline] [] new_dir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:978 [inline] [] get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1022 [inline] [] __register_sysctl_table+0x5a9/0x7f0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1373 [] setup_mq_sysctls+0x12a/0x1c0 ipc/mq_sysctl.c:112 [] create_ipc_ns ipc/namespace.c:63 [inline] [] copy_ipcs+0x292/0x390 ipc/namespace.c:91 [] create_new_namespaces+0xdc/0x4f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:90 [] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x9b/0x120 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 [] ksys_unshare+0x2fe/0x600 kernel/fork.c:3165 [] __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3236 [inline] [] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3234 [inline] [] __x64_sys_unshare+0x12/0x20 kernel/fork.c:3234 [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Reported-by: syzbot+b4b0d1b35442afbf6fd2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000f5004705e1db8bad@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220622200729.2639663-1-legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- ipc/namespace.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ipc/namespace.c b/ipc/namespace.c index 754f3237194a..e1fcaedba4fa 100644 --- a/ipc/namespace.c +++ b/ipc/namespace.c @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static struct ipc_namespace *create_ipc_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, goto fail_put; if (!setup_ipc_sysctls(ns)) - goto fail_put; + goto fail_mq; sem_init_ns(ns); msg_init_ns(ns); @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static struct ipc_namespace *create_ipc_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, return ns; +fail_mq: + retire_mq_sysctls(ns); + fail_put: put_user_ns(ns->user_ns); ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f50974eee5c4a5de1e4f1a3d873099f170df25f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:02:31 -0700 Subject: memregion: Fix memregion_free() fallback definition In the CONFIG_MEMREGION=n case, memregion_free() is meant to be a static inline. 0day reports: In file included from drivers/cxl/core/port.c:4: include/linux/memregion.h:19:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'memregion_free' [-Wmissing-prototypes] Mark memregion_free() static. Fixes: 33dd70752cd7 ("lib: Uplevel the pmem "region" ida to a global allocator") Reported-by: kernel test robot Reviewed-by: Alison Schofield Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165601455171.4042645.3350844271068713515.stgit@dwillia2-xfh Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- include/linux/memregion.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/memregion.h b/include/linux/memregion.h index e11595256cac..c04c4fd2e209 100644 --- a/include/linux/memregion.h +++ b/include/linux/memregion.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ static inline int memregion_alloc(gfp_t gfp) { return -ENOMEM; } -void memregion_free(int id) +static inline void memregion_free(int id) { } #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 742ab6df974ae8384a2dd213db1a3a06cf6d8936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:32 +0200 Subject: x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean The recent mmio_stale_data fixes broke the noinstr constraints: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x15b: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x1bf: call to kvm_arch_has_assigned_device() leaves .noinstr.text section make it all happy again. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 3a919e49129b..009bbae9ad66 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -383,9 +383,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) return; - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL); msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr; } @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) return; vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); } static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 1910e1e78b15..26d0cac32f73 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -12631,9 +12631,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment); -bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) +bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) { - return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count); + return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device); diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index c20f2d55840c..83cf7fd842e0 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm) { } -static inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) +static __always_inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a883d624aed463c84c22596006e5a96f5b44db31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:33 +0200 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11 where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE simple. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 03acc823838a..4807302a32d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ @@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+10) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 369ae6ffc41a3c1137cab697635a84d0cc7cdcea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:34 +0200 Subject: x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery On it's own not much of a cleanup but it prepares for more/similar code. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 9 ++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 7 +++---- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 7 +++---- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 36369e76cc63..4061f4907c92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM # define DISABLE_ENQCMD 0 #else @@ -82,7 +89,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK8 (DISABLE_TDX_GUEST) #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK11 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index da251a5645b0..5728539a3e77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -120,17 +120,16 @@ _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; +extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE #define GEN(reg) \ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg; #include #undef GEN -extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index c98b8c0ed3b8..79d26908c143 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -412,16 +412,15 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip) { u8 *prog = *pprog; -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) { EMIT_LFENCE(); EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) { OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(reg); emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip); - } else -#endif - EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); + } else { + EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); + } *pprog = prog; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 00e1533325fd1fb5459229fe37f235462649f668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:35 +0200 Subject: x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Put the actual retpoline thunk as the original code so that it can become more complicated. Specifically, it allows RET to be a JMP, which can't be .altinstr_replacement since that doesn't do relocations (except for the very first instruction). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index b2b2366885a2..2cdd62499d54 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ANNOTATE_NOENDBR - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \ - __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ - __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), \ + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, \ + __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) .endm -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0b53c374b9eff2255a386f1f1cfb9a928e52a5ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:36 +0200 Subject: x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Utilize -mfunction-return=thunk-extern when available to have the compiler replace RET instructions with direct JMPs to the symbol __x86_return_thunk. This does not affect assembler (.S) sources, only C sources. -mfunction-return=thunk-extern has been available since gcc 7.3 and clang 15. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index a74886aed349..6e16057737e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -15,11 +15,13 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix) +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register) endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) endif export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 5728539a3e77..829c9f827a96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; +extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE #define GEN(reg) \ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 2cdd62499d54..4467c21215f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -67,3 +67,16 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) #define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg) #include #undef GEN + +/* + * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. + */ +SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) + UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ret + int3 +SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) + +__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 15e67227c49a57837108acfe1c80570e1bd9f962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:37 +0200 Subject: x86: Undo return-thunk damage Introduce X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK for those afflicted with needing this. [ bp: Do only INT3 padding - simpler. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 8 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++++ 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h index 9b10c8c76087..9542c582d546 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ extern int alternatives_patched; extern void alternative_instructions(void); extern void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end); extern void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end); +extern void apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end); extern void apply_ibt_endbr(s32 *start, s32 *end); struct module; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 4807302a32d9..295e69090fb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ /* FREE! (11*32+11) */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 4061f4907c92..641c479cca17 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index e257f6c80372..76b745921509 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static void __init_or_module add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len) } extern s32 __retpoline_sites[], __retpoline_sites_end[]; +extern s32 __return_sites[], __return_sites_end[]; extern s32 __ibt_endbr_seal[], __ibt_endbr_seal_end[]; extern struct alt_instr __alt_instructions[], __alt_instructions_end[]; extern s32 __smp_locks[], __smp_locks_end[]; @@ -507,9 +508,67 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } +/* + * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls. + * + * For example, convert: + * + * JMP __x86_return_thunk + * + * into: + * + * RET + */ +static int patch_return(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes) +{ + int i = 0; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + return -1; + + bytes[i++] = RET_INSN_OPCODE; + + for (; i < insn->length;) + bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE; + + return i; +} + +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) +{ + s32 *s; + + for (s = start; s < end; s++) { + void *addr = (void *)s + *s; + struct insn insn; + int len, ret; + u8 bytes[16]; + u8 op1; + + ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0)) + continue; + + op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)) + continue; + + DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS", + addr, addr, insn.length, + addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value); + + len = patch_return(addr, &insn, bytes); + if (len == insn.length) { + DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)addr), len, "%px: orig: ", addr); + DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)bytes), len, "%px: repl: ", addr); + text_poke_early(addr, bytes, len); + } + } +} #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ @@ -860,6 +919,7 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void) * those can rewrite the retpoline thunks. */ apply_retpolines(__retpoline_sites, __retpoline_sites_end); + apply_returns(__return_sites, __return_sites_end); /* * Then patch alternatives, such that those paravirt calls that are in diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c index b98ffcf4d250..67828d973389 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, { const Elf_Shdr *s, *text = NULL, *alt = NULL, *locks = NULL, *para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL, - *retpolines = NULL, *ibt_endbr = NULL; + *retpolines = NULL, *returns = NULL, *ibt_endbr = NULL; char *secstrings = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset; for (s = sechdrs; s < sechdrs + hdr->e_shnum; s++) { @@ -271,6 +271,8 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, orc_ip = s; if (!strcmp(".retpoline_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name)) retpolines = s; + if (!strcmp(".return_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name)) + returns = s; if (!strcmp(".ibt_endbr_seal", secstrings + s->sh_name)) ibt_endbr = s; } @@ -287,6 +289,10 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, void *rseg = (void *)retpolines->sh_addr; apply_retpolines(rseg, rseg + retpolines->sh_size); } + if (returns) { + void *rseg = (void *)returns->sh_addr; + apply_returns(rseg, rseg + returns->sh_size); + } if (alt) { /* patch .altinstructions */ void *aseg = (void *)alt->sh_addr; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 81aba718ecd5..ada7eb738113 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ SECTIONS *(.retpoline_sites) __retpoline_sites_end = .; } + + . = ALIGN(8); + .return_sites : AT(ADDR(.return_sites) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __return_sites = .; + *(.return_sites) + __return_sites_end = .; + } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT -- cgit v1.2.3 From d9e9d2300681d68a775c28de6aa6e5290ae17796 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:38 +0200 Subject: x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Find all the return-thunk sites and record them in a .return_sites section such that the kernel can undo this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 5 +++ tools/objtool/check.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h | 1 + tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h | 1 + tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h | 1 + tools/objtool/objtool.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index 8b990a52aada..c260006106be 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -787,3 +787,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) { return !strncmp(sym->name, "__x86_indirect_", 15); } + +bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) +{ + return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk"); +} diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 864bb9dd3584..f6d4ffa82432 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -749,6 +749,52 @@ static int create_retpoline_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } +static int create_return_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + struct section *sec; + int idx; + + sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".return_sites"); + if (sec) { + WARN("file already has .return_sites, skipping"); + return 0; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) + idx++; + + if (!idx) + return 0; + + sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".return_sites", 0, + sizeof(int), idx); + if (!sec) { + WARN("elf_create_section: .return_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) { + + int *site = (int *)sec->data->d_buf + idx; + *site = 0; + + if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(file->elf, sec, + idx * sizeof(int), + R_X86_64_PC32, + insn->sec, insn->offset)) { + WARN("elf_add_reloc_to_insn: .return_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx++; + } + + return 0; +} + static int create_ibt_endbr_seal_sections(struct objtool_file *file) { struct instruction *insn; @@ -1083,6 +1129,11 @@ __weak bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) return false; } +__weak bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) +{ + return false; +} + #define NEGATIVE_RELOC ((void *)-1L) static struct reloc *insn_reloc(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) @@ -1250,6 +1301,18 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *in annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); } +static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + /* + * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise, + * so convert them accordingly. + */ + insn->type = INSN_RETURN; + insn->retpoline_safe = true; + + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); +} + static bool same_function(struct instruction *insn1, struct instruction *insn2) { return insn1->func->pfunc == insn2->func->pfunc; @@ -1302,6 +1365,9 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; + } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) { + add_return_call(file, insn); + continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* * External sibling call or internal sibling call with @@ -2184,6 +2250,9 @@ static int classify_symbols(struct objtool_file *file) if (arch_is_retpoline(func)) func->retpoline_thunk = true; + if (arch_is_rethunk(func)) + func->return_thunk = true; + if (!strcmp(func->name, "__fentry__")) func->fentry = true; @@ -3972,6 +4041,11 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret < 0) goto out; warnings += ret; + + ret = create_return_sites_sections(file); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + warnings += ret; } if (opts.mcount) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h index 9b19cc304195..beb2f3aa94ff 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len); int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base); bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym); +bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym); int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file); diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h index adebfbc2b518..16f4067b82ae 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct symbol { u8 uaccess_safe : 1; u8 static_call_tramp : 1; u8 retpoline_thunk : 1; + u8 return_thunk : 1; u8 fentry : 1; u8 profiling_func : 1; struct list_head pv_target; diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h index a6e72d916807..7f2d1b095333 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct objtool_file { struct list_head insn_list; DECLARE_HASHTABLE(insn_hash, 20); struct list_head retpoline_call_list; + struct list_head return_thunk_list; struct list_head static_call_list; struct list_head mcount_loc_list; struct list_head endbr_list; diff --git a/tools/objtool/objtool.c b/tools/objtool/objtool.c index 512669ce064c..a7ecc32e3512 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/objtool.c +++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.c @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct objtool_file *objtool_open_read(const char *_objname) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.insn_list); hash_init(file.insn_hash); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.retpoline_call_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.return_thunk_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.static_call_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.mcount_loc_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.endbr_list); -- cgit v1.2.3 From ee88d363d15617ff50ac24fab0ffec11113b2aeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:39 +0200 Subject: x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET', there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required. In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence. This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out 'SCT'. This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is, false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern. OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and 'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence: push %rbx rex.XB push %r12 Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get generated by accident. As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes to: ud1 %esp, %ecx Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 12 ++++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h index 2d8dacd02643..70cc9ccb8029 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h @@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ * relative displacement across sections. */ +/* + * The trampoline is 8 bytes and of the general form: + * + * jmp.d32 \func + * ud1 %esp, %ecx + * + * That trailing #UD provides both a speculation stop and serves as a unique + * 3 byte signature identifying static call trampolines. Also see tramp_ud[] + * and __static_call_fixup(). + */ #define __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, insns) \ asm(".pushsection .static_call.text, \"ax\" \n" \ ".align 4 \n" \ @@ -28,7 +38,7 @@ STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) ": \n" \ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR \ insns " \n" \ - ".byte 0x53, 0x43, 0x54 \n" \ + ".byte 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc \n" \ ".type " STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) ", @function \n" \ ".size " STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) ", . - " STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) " \n" \ ".popsection \n") @@ -36,8 +46,13 @@ #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)") +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ + __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk") +#else #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "ret; int3; nop; nop; nop") +#endif #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_RET0_TRAMP(name) \ ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, __static_call_return0) @@ -48,4 +63,6 @@ ".long " STATIC_CALL_KEY_STR(name) " - . \n" \ ".popsection \n") +extern bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest); + #endif /* _ASM_STATIC_CALL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 76b745921509..cf447ee18b3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -539,18 +539,22 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) s32 *s; for (s = start; s < end; s++) { - void *addr = (void *)s + *s; + void *dest = NULL, *addr = (void *)s + *s; struct insn insn; int len, ret; u8 bytes[16]; - u8 op1; + u8 op; ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0)) continue; - op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)) + op = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; + if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE) + dest = addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value; + + if (__static_call_fixup(addr, op, dest) || + WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk)) continue; DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS", diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index aa72cefdd5be..fe21fe778185 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ enum insn_type { RET = 3, /* tramp / site cond-tail-call */ }; +/* + * ud1 %esp, %ecx - a 3 byte #UD that is unique to trampolines, chosen such + * that there is no false-positive trampoline identification while also being a + * speculation stop. + */ +static const u8 tramp_ud[] = { 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc }; + /* * cs cs cs xorl %eax, %eax - a single 5 byte instruction that clears %[er]ax */ @@ -43,7 +50,10 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void break; case RET: - code = &retinsn; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + code = text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, insn, &__x86_return_thunk); + else + code = &retinsn; break; } @@ -60,7 +70,7 @@ static void __static_call_validate(void *insn, bool tail, bool tramp) { u8 opcode = *(u8 *)insn; - if (tramp && memcmp(insn+5, "SCT", 3)) { + if (tramp && memcmp(insn+5, tramp_ud, 3)) { pr_err("trampoline signature fail"); BUG(); } @@ -115,3 +125,29 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform); + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +/* + * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines, + * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as + * having a return trampoline. + * + * The problem is that static_call() is available before determining + * X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK and, by implication, running alternatives. + * + * This means that __static_call_transform() above can have overwritten the + * return trampoline and we now need to fix things up to be consistent. + */ +bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest) +{ + if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) { + /* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */ + return false; + } + + if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk) + __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL); + + return true; +} +#endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f001e9da6bbf482311e45e48f53c2bd2179e59c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:40 +0200 Subject: x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c index 5b4efc927d80..24b9fa89aa27 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union { } __attribute__((packed)); }; -#define RET_SIZE 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS) +#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) static unsigned long create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) @@ -357,7 +357,10 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) goto fail; ip = trampoline + size; - memcpy(ip, retq, RET_SIZE); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + __text_gen_insn(ip, JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, ip, &__x86_return_thunk, JMP32_INSN_SIZE); + else + memcpy(ip, retq, sizeof(retq)); /* No need to test direct calls on created trampolines */ if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From d77cfe594ad50e0bf95d457e02ccd578791b2a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:41 +0200 Subject: x86/bpf: Use alternative RET encoding Use the return thunk in eBPF generated code, if needed. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 79d26908c143..b808c9a80d1b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -425,6 +425,21 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip) *pprog = prog; } +static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip) +{ + u8 *prog = *pprog; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) { + emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_return_thunk, ip); + } else { + EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) + EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */ + } + + *pprog = prog; +} + /* * Generate the following code: * @@ -1685,7 +1700,7 @@ emit_jmp: ctx->cleanup_addr = proglen; pop_callee_regs(&prog, callee_regs_used); EMIT1(0xC9); /* leave */ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + emit_return(&prog, image + addrs[i - 1] + (prog - temp)); break; default: @@ -2188,7 +2203,7 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i if (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME) /* skip our return address and return to parent */ EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 8); /* add rsp, 8 */ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + emit_return(&prog, prog); /* Make sure the trampoline generation logic doesn't overflow */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(prog > (u8 *)image_end - BPF_INSN_SAFETY)) { ret = -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From af2e140f34208a5dfb6b7a8ad2d56bda88f0524d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:42 +0200 Subject: x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Prepare the SETcc fastop stuff for when RET can be larger still. The tricky bit here is that the expressions should not only be constant C expressions, but also absolute GAS expressions. This means no ?: and 'true' is ~0. Also ensure em_setcc() has the same alignment as the actual FOP_SETCC() ops, this ensures there cannot be an alignment hole between em_setcc() and the first op. Additionally, add a .skip directive to the FOP_SETCC() macro to fill any remaining space with INT3 traps; however the primary purpose of this directive is to generate AS warnings when the remaining space goes negative. Which is a very good indication the alignment magic went side-ways. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 89b11e7dca8a..b01437015f99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -325,13 +325,15 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); #define FOP_RET(name) \ __FOP_RET(#name) -#define FOP_START(op) \ +#define __FOP_START(op, align) \ extern void em_##op(struct fastop *fake); \ asm(".pushsection .text, \"ax\" \n\t" \ ".global em_" #op " \n\t" \ - ".align " __stringify(FASTOP_SIZE) " \n\t" \ + ".align " __stringify(align) " \n\t" \ "em_" #op ":\n\t" +#define FOP_START(op) __FOP_START(op, FASTOP_SIZE) + #define FOP_END \ ".popsection") @@ -435,16 +437,15 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); /* * Depending on .config the SETcc functions look like: * - * ENDBR [4 bytes; CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT] - * SETcc %al [3 bytes] - * RET [1 byte] - * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] - * - * Which gives possible sizes 4, 5, 8 or 9. When rounded up to the - * next power-of-two alignment they become 4, 8 or 16 resp. + * ENDBR [4 bytes; CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT] + * SETcc %al [3 bytes] + * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE] + * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] */ -#define SETCC_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 4 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) -#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS) << HAS_KERNEL_IBT) +#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) +#define SETCC_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 3 + RET_LENGTH) +#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1)) static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN); #define FOP_SETCC(op) \ @@ -453,9 +454,10 @@ static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN); #op ": \n\t" \ ASM_ENDBR \ #op " %al \n\t" \ - __FOP_RET(#op) + __FOP_RET(#op) \ + ".skip " __stringify(SETCC_ALIGN) " - (.-" #op "), 0xcc \n\t" -FOP_START(setcc) +__FOP_START(setcc, SETCC_ALIGN) FOP_SETCC(seto) FOP_SETCC(setno) FOP_SETCC(setc) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 15583e514eb16744b80be85dea0774ece153177d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:43 +0200 Subject: x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Don't use RET in vsyscall emulation This is userspace code and doesn't play by the normal kernel rules. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S index 15e35159ebb6..ef2dd1827243 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S @@ -19,17 +19,20 @@ __vsyscall_page: mov $__NR_gettimeofday, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_time, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_getcpu, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 4096, 0xcc -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0ee9073000e8791f8b134a8ded31bcc767f7f232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kim Phillips Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:44 +0200 Subject: x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Specifically, it's because __enc_copy() encrypts the kernel after being relocated outside the kernel in sme_encrypt_execute(), and the RET macro's jmp offset isn't amended prior to execution. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index 3d1dba05fce4..d94dea450fa6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */ pop %rbp - RET + /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ret + int3 SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) @@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r12 pop %r15 - RET + /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ret + int3 .L__enc_copy_end: SYM_FUNC_END(__enc_copy) -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa3d480315ba6c3025a60958e1981072ea37c3df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:45 +0200 Subject: x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Use the return thunk in asm code. If the thunk isn't needed, it will get patched into a RET instruction during boot by apply_returns(). Since alternatives can't handle relocations outside of the first instruction, putting a 'jmp __x86_return_thunk' in one is not valid, therefore carve out the memmove ERMS path into a separate label and jump to it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index c2a8b76ae0bc..76cd790ed0bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ endif endif $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) +$(vobjs): KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DBUILD_VDSO # # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h index 85865f1645bd..e3ae331cabb1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h @@ -19,19 +19,27 @@ #define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN) #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk +#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS #define RET ret; int3 #else #define RET ret #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t" +#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS #define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t" #else #define ASM_RET "ret\n\t" #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S index d83cba364e31..724bbf83eb5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) /* FSRM implies ERMS => no length checks, do the copy directly */ .Lmemmove_begin_forward: ALTERNATIVE "cmp $0x20, %rdx; jb 1f", "", X86_FEATURE_FSRM - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(movq %rdx, %rcx; rep movsb; RET), X86_FEATURE_ERMS + ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lmemmove_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS /* * movsq instruction have many startup latency @@ -205,6 +205,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) movb %r11b, (%rdi) 13: RET + +.Lmemmove_erms: + movq %rdx, %rcx + rep movsb + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__memmove) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memmove) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c81c0c9210c9bfab2bae76aab2999de5bad27db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:46 +0200 Subject: x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Commit ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") manages to introduce a CALL/RET pair that is before SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which means it is before RETBleed can be mitigated. Revert to an earlier version of the commit in Fixes. Down side is that this will bloat .text size somewhat. The alternative is fully reverting it. The purpose of this patch was to allow migrating error_entry() to C, including the whole of kPTI. Much care needs to be taken moving that forward to not re-introduce this problem of early RETs. Fixes: ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 4300ba49b5ee..9f5d6a4f293e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -322,14 +322,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) #endif .endm -/* Save all registers in pt_regs */ -SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(push_and_clear_regs) - UNWIND_HINT_FUNC - PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1 - ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 - RET -SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs) - /** * idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function * @cfunc: C function to be called @@ -337,8 +329,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs) */ .macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req - call push_and_clear_regs - UNWIND_HINT_REGS + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER /* * Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 951ddecf435659553ed15a9214e153a3af43a9a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:47 +0200 Subject: objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Needed because zen_untrain_ret() will be called from noinstr code. Also makes sense since the thunks MUST NOT contain instrumentation nor be poked with dynamic instrumentation. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index f6d4ffa82432..b98fd68013c3 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -376,7 +376,8 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct objtool_file *file) sec->text = true; if (!strcmp(sec->name, ".noinstr.text") || - !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text")) + !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text") || + !strncmp(sec->name, ".text.__x86.", 12)) sec->noinstr = true; for (offset = 0; offset < sec->sh.sh_size; offset += insn->len) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From a149180fbcf336e97ce4eb2cdc13672727feb94d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:48 +0200 Subject: x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps. ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the start (+0x3f). Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one (+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works. [ Alexandre: SVM part. ] [ bp: Build fix, massages. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 17 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 18 +++++++++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 22 +++++++++-- 9 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 9f5d6a4f293e..1f4b18c8909b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -717,6 +718,7 @@ native_irq_return_ldt: pushq %rdi /* Stash user RDI */ swapgs /* to kernel GS */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi /* to kernel CR3 */ + UNTRAIN_RET movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr), %rdi movq %rax, (0*8)(%rdi) /* user RAX */ @@ -911,6 +913,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * be retrieved from a kernel internal table. */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 + UNTRAIN_RET /* * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. @@ -1020,6 +1023,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + UNTRAIN_RET leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */ .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: @@ -1072,6 +1076,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) swapgs FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + UNTRAIN_RET /* * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs @@ -1167,6 +1172,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) movq %rsp, %rdx movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8 + UNTRAIN_RET pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */ pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index d1052742ad0c..03d74c5153fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + UNTRAIN_RET /* * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that @@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -332,6 +335,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) pushq 0*8(%rax) /* regs->orig_ax */ .Lint80_keep_stack: + UNTRAIN_RET PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS UNWIND_HINT_REGS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 295e69090fb8..fa3d0db1470e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ +#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 641c479cca17..db75da511a36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 829c9f827a96..5ca60ae0d14f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -112,6 +112,22 @@ #endif .endm +/* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the + * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD + * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). + * + * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack. + * + * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point + * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. + */ +.macro UNTRAIN_RET +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET +#endif +.endm + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ @@ -124,6 +140,7 @@ typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); +extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index ada7eb738113..c375420036fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ SECTIONS #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE __indirect_thunk_start = .; - *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) + *(.text.__x86.*) __indirect_thunk_end = .; #endif } :text =0xcccc diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index dfaeb47fcf2a..723f8534986c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S @@ -110,6 +110,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif + /* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be + * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the + * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts + * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is + * from the kernel. + */ + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded @@ -190,6 +199,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run) FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE #endif + /* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be + * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the + * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts + * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize RET if the return is + * from the kernel. + */ + UNTRAIN_RET + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 4467c21215f4..fdd16163b996 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -72,11 +72,67 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. */ -SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk + +/* + * Safety details here pertain to the AMD Zen{1,2} microarchitecture: + * 1) The RET at __x86_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for + * alignment within the BTB. + * 2) The instruction at zen_untrain_ret must contain, and not + * end with, the 0xc3 byte of the RET. + * 3) STIBP must be enabled, or SMT disabled, to prevent the sibling thread + * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction. + */ + .align 64 + .skip 63, 0xcc +SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(zen_untrain_ret); + + /* + * As executed from zen_untrain_ret, this is: + * + * TEST $0xcc, %bl + * LFENCE + * JMP __x86_return_thunk + * + * Executing the TEST instruction has a side effect of evicting any BTB + * prediction (potentially attacker controlled) attached to the RET, as + * __x86_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment. + */ + .byte 0xf6 + + /* + * As executed from __x86_return_thunk, this is a plain RET. + * + * As part of the TEST above, RET is the ModRM byte, and INT3 the imm8. + * + * We subsequently jump backwards and architecturally execute the RET. + * This creates a correct BTB prediction (type=ret), but in the + * meantime we suffer Straight Line Speculation (because the type was + * no branch) which is halted by the INT3. + * + * With SMT enabled and STIBP active, a sibling thread cannot poison + * RET's prediction to a type of its choice, but can evict the + * prediction due to competitive sharing. If the prediction is + * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation + * which will be contained safely by the INT3. + */ +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ret int3 SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) -__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk) + /* + * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete. + */ + lfence + + /* + * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction. + * INT3 is for SLS protection. + */ + jmp __x86_return_thunk + int3 +SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) +__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index b98fd68013c3..4252cd05dfc4 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *in annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); } -static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, bool add) { /* * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise, @@ -1311,7 +1311,8 @@ static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) insn->type = INSN_RETURN; insn->retpoline_safe = true; - list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); + if (add) + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); } static bool same_function(struct instruction *insn1, struct instruction *insn2) @@ -1367,7 +1368,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) { - add_return_call(file, insn); + add_return_call(file, insn, true); continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* @@ -1387,6 +1388,21 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) jump_dest = find_insn(file, dest_sec, dest_off); if (!jump_dest) { + struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(dest_sec, dest_off); + + /* + * This is a special case for zen_untrain_ret(). + * It jumps to __x86_return_thunk(), but objtool + * can't find the thunk's starting RET + * instruction, because the RET is also in the + * middle of another instruction. Objtool only + * knows about the outer instruction. + */ + if (sym && sym->return_thunk) { + add_return_call(file, insn, false); + continue; + } + WARN_FUNC("can't find jump dest instruction at %s+0x%lx", insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_sec->name, dest_off); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandre Chartre Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:49 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack. [peterz: add hygon] [kim: invert parity; fam15h] Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index fa3d0db1470e..c16503ca3b75 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -453,5 +453,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ +#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 74c62cc47a5f..74fdd21e416b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1994,6 +1994,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); } +static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -2039,6 +2044,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA: return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: + return retbleed_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2095,4 +2103,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *at { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 4730b0a58f24..4089c173c6ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1205,16 +1205,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; +#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) + #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) +#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + +#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + #define SRBDS BIT(0) /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO BIT(1) /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) +/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ +#define RETBLEED BIT(3) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1247,6 +1258,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + + VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), {} }; @@ -1348,6 +1364,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index a97776ea9d99..4c98849577d4 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -580,6 +586,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -592,6 +599,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, &dev_attr_srbds.attr, &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, + &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 2c7477354744..314802f98b9d 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandre Chartre Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:50 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Add the "retbleed=" boot parameter to select a mitigation for RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret" (JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto". Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on Intel). [peterz: rebase; add hygon] [jpoimboe: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 ++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 2522b11e593f..529613367e7d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5197,6 +5197,21 @@ retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction + retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - unconditionally disable + auto - automatically select a migitation + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} + based systems. + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index be0b95e51df6..e35eecfb74f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -475,6 +475,9 @@ config RETPOLINE config CC_HAS_SLS def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + config SLS bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 74fdd21e416b..bdeb732ff2d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); @@ -120,6 +121,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + retbleed_select_mitigation(); + /* + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is + * forced for UNRET. + */ spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); @@ -752,6 +759,100 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt + +enum retbleed_mitigation { + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, +}; + +enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { + RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, + RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, +}; + +const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", +}; + +static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + +static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + else + pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); + +#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" + +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + switch (retbleed_cmd) { + case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: + default: + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) + break; + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + } + + switch (retbleed_mitigation) { + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { + pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; + break; + } + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt @@ -1996,7 +2097,12 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && + (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, -- cgit v1.2.3 From e8ec1b6e08a2102d8755ccb06fa26d540f26a2fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kim Phillips Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:51 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET For untrained return thunks to be fully effective, STIBP must be enabled or SMT disabled. Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 ++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 529613367e7d..168e164f09eb 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5201,11 +5201,17 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. - off - unconditionally disable - auto - automatically select a migitation - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, - only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} - based systems. + off - no mitigation + auto - automatically select a migitation + auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, + disabling SMT if necessary for + the full mitigation (only on Zen1 + and older without STIBP). + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD f15h-f17h + based systems. + unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bdeb732ff2d9..fb249b2c1eb0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -783,19 +783,34 @@ static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; +static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false; + static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) { if (!str) return -EINVAL; - if (!strcmp(str, "off")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; - else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; - else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; - else - pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + while (str) { + char *next = strchr(str, ','); + if (next) { + *next = 0; + next++; + } + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) { + retbleed_nosmt = true; + } else { + pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str); + } + + str = next; + } return 0; } @@ -841,6 +856,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && + (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) + cpu_smt_disable(false); + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); @@ -1087,6 +1106,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && + mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation'\n"); + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + } + spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode; set_mode: @@ -2097,10 +2123,18 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && - (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", + retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], + !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" : + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ? + "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable"); + } return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:52 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value reflecting the current task's MSR content. [jpoimboe: rename] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 5ca60ae0d14f..bac243da5130 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index fb249b2c1eb0..ce7435593c3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -49,11 +49,29 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void); -/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + +/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); +/* + * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ + * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). + */ +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +{ + if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) + return; + + this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); +} + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. @@ -1279,7 +1297,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } switch (mode) { @@ -1334,7 +1352,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1577,7 +1595,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } } @@ -1828,7 +1846,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 9b2772b7e1f3..05611f66d013 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:53 +0200 Subject: x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware. Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET. Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 17 ++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 29b36e9e4e74..074d04e434de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* @@ -282,6 +284,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with #endif +/* + * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2. + * + * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers + * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET + * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction) + * + * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value, + * which is used on the paranoid paths. + * + * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. + */ +.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + rdmsr + shl $32, %rdx + or %rdx, %rax + mov %rax, \save_reg + test $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax + jz .Ldo_wrmsr_\@ + lfence + jmp .Lend_\@ +.Ldo_wrmsr_\@: +.endif + + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* + * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX) + * regs. Must be called after the last RET. + */ +.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + mov \save_reg, %rdx +.else + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + andl $(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx +.endif + + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + /* * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths. * diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 1f4b18c8909b..f4384a29086f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR - UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -113,6 +112,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) movq %rsp, %rdi /* Sign extend the lower 32bit as syscall numbers are treated as int */ movslq %eax, %rsi + + /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */ + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ /* @@ -192,6 +196,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here. */ syscall_return_via_sysret: + IBRS_EXIT POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 /* @@ -605,6 +610,7 @@ __irqentry_text_end: SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(common_interrupt_return) SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + IBRS_EXIT #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */ testb $3, CS(%rsp) @@ -891,6 +897,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_failsafe_callback) * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * * Y GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit + * + * R14 - old CR3 + * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC @@ -913,7 +922,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * be retrieved from a kernel internal table. */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 - UNTRAIN_RET /* * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. @@ -935,7 +943,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * is needed here. */ SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx - RET + jmp .Lparanoid_gsbase_done .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs: /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */ @@ -954,8 +962,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) xorl %ebx, %ebx swapgs .Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase: - FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY +.Lparanoid_gsbase_done: + + /* + * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like + * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register. + */ + IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15 + UNTRAIN_RET + RET SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) @@ -977,9 +993,19 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * * Y User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally + * + * R14 - old CR3 + * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) UNWIND_HINT_REGS + + /* + * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access + * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable. + */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* * The order of operations is important. RESTORE_CR3 requires * kernel GSBASE. @@ -1023,10 +1049,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */ .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: + /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */ call sync_regs RET @@ -1076,6 +1104,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) swapgs FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET /* @@ -1172,7 +1201,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) movq %rsp, %rdx movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8 - UNTRAIN_RET pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */ pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */ @@ -1183,6 +1211,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx) ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're @@ -1407,6 +1438,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi: movq $-1, %rsi call exc_nmi + /* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 03d74c5153fb..bcb89d23ac0e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs. */ -#include "calling.h" #include #include #include @@ -18,6 +17,8 @@ #include #include +#include "calling.h" + .section .entry.text, "ax" /* @@ -73,7 +74,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) - UNTRAIN_RET /* * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that @@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) cld + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether @@ -192,7 +195,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR - UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -206,6 +208,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rcx=%rbp rax=$-ENOSYS UNWIND_HINT_REGS + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_fast_syscall_32 /* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */ @@ -220,6 +225,8 @@ sysret32_from_system_call: */ STACKLEAK_ERASE + IBRS_EXIT + movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */ @@ -335,12 +342,14 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) pushq 0*8(%rax) /* regs->orig_ax */ .Lint80_keep_stack: - UNTRAIN_RET PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS UNWIND_HINT_REGS cld + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_int80_syscall_32 jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index c16503ca3b75..b5bb35e8588e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ /* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:54 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled. This avoids an MSR write during context switch. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index bac243da5130..b6abf0c6b41d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; -extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val); +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ce7435593c3e..8f7c8dfbdbb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -63,13 +63,19 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). */ -void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) { if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) return; this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); + + /* + * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless + * forced the update can be delayed until that time. + */ + if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); } /* @@ -1297,7 +1303,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } switch (mode) { @@ -1352,7 +1358,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1595,7 +1601,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } } @@ -1846,7 +1852,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 05611f66d013..d456ce21c255 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:55 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS. [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 168e164f09eb..0aeea69e9b7a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5589,6 +5589,7 @@ eibrs - enhanced IBRS eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index b6abf0c6b41d..e14046daa7ba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, }; /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8f7c8dfbdbb4..2d7896493220 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -972,6 +972,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, }; enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { @@ -1044,11 +1045,12 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE); + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } static void __init @@ -1113,12 +1115,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) } /* - * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not - * required. + * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, + * STIBP is not required. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -1150,6 +1152,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", }; static const struct { @@ -1167,6 +1170,7 @@ static const struct { { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false }, { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false }, { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, + { "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -1229,6 +1233,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { + pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option, mitigation_options[i].secure); return cmd; @@ -1268,6 +1290,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && + retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; + break; + } + mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; @@ -1284,6 +1314,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS: mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; break; @@ -1300,7 +1334,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); @@ -1311,6 +1345,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: break; + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS); + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); @@ -1337,17 +1375,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); /* - * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted - * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't - * supported. + * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS + * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around + * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise + * enabled. * * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } @@ -2089,7 +2127,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:56 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on retbleed. Break this cycle. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 2d7896493220..c546a9e4ed17 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); -static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -145,13 +146,19 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + /* + * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about + * spectre_v2=ibrs. + */ retbleed_select_mitigation(); /* - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is * forced for UNRET. */ - spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); @@ -1013,13 +1020,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason); } +static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd; + static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init -spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; int ret, i; - switch (v2_cmd) { + switch (spectre_v2_cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: @@ -1054,7 +1063,7 @@ static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) } static void __init -spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); @@ -1067,7 +1076,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) smt_possible = false; - cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); + cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; @@ -1391,7 +1400,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) } /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ - spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; } static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 13:48:58 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs). [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index d27e0581b777..059c7e500ab4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */ #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */ #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /* * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c546a9e4ed17..05f29db9473b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = + SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt enum retbleed_mitigation { RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, }; enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { @@ -807,6 +812,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = @@ -849,6 +856,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" #define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" +#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -865,12 +873,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) - break; - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + + /* + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + */ + break; } @@ -900,15 +911,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the + * retbleed= cmdline option. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS; + break; + default: + pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG); + } + } + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = - SPECTRE_V2_NONE; - static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init = diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 4089c173c6ae..75a5c720c852 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1237,24 +1237,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), + BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), @@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED)) + if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:58 +0200 Subject: intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency. Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed for them by virtue of their short target residency. Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue. Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't disable IBRS, benchmarking needed. Suggested-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++ drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index e14046daa7ba..ce1acb557162 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); +extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 05f29db9473b..00e9c769ce0b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); } +u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) +{ + return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. diff --git a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c index 424ef470223d..f5c6802aa6c3 100644 --- a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +++ b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c @@ -47,11 +47,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -105,6 +107,12 @@ static unsigned int mwait_substates __initdata; */ #define CPUIDLE_FLAG_ALWAYS_ENABLE BIT(15) +/* + * Disable IBRS across idle (when KERNEL_IBRS), is exclusive vs IRQ_ENABLE + * above. + */ +#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS BIT(16) + /* * MWAIT takes an 8-bit "hint" in EAX "suggesting" * the C-state (top nibble) and sub-state (bottom nibble) @@ -159,6 +167,24 @@ static __cpuidle int intel_idle_irq(struct cpuidle_device *dev, return ret; } +static __cpuidle int intel_idle_ibrs(struct cpuidle_device *dev, + struct cpuidle_driver *drv, int index) +{ + bool smt_active = sched_smt_active(); + u64 spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl_current(); + int ret; + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + + ret = __intel_idle(dev, drv, index); + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl); + + return ret; +} + /** * intel_idle_s2idle - Ask the processor to enter the given idle state. * @dev: cpuidle device of the target CPU. @@ -680,7 +706,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 85, .target_residency = 200, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -688,7 +714,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C7s", .desc = "MWAIT 0x33", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 124, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -696,7 +722,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C8", .desc = "MWAIT 0x40", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 200, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -704,7 +730,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C9", .desc = "MWAIT 0x50", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 480, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -712,7 +738,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C10", .desc = "MWAIT 0x60", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 890, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -741,7 +767,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skx_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 133, .target_residency = 600, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -1819,6 +1845,12 @@ static void __init intel_idle_init_cstates_icpu(struct cpuidle_driver *drv) if (cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE) drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_irq; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) && + cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE); + drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_ibrs; + } + if ((disabled_states_mask & BIT(drv->state_count)) || ((icpu->use_acpi || force_use_acpi) && intel_idle_off_by_default(mwait_hint) && -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:59 +0200 Subject: objtool: Update Retpoline validation Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of not having bare naked RET instructions. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++ arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 1 + tools/objtool/check.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ce1acb557162..455d79c6c2f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ .popsection .endm +/* + * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions + * vs RETBleed validation. + */ +#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + /* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index d94dea450fa6..9de3d900bc92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) pop %rbp /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) @@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r15 /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 .L__enc_copy_end: diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index 3a2cd93bf059..fa884fc73e07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page) .rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret /* * Xen will write the hypercall page, and sort out ENDBR. diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 4252cd05dfc4..7dc378156a63 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2115,8 +2115,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct objtool_file *file) } if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) { - WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call", + insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && + insn->type != INSN_RETURN) { + WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; } @@ -3526,7 +3527,8 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) for_each_insn(file, insn) { if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) + insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && + insn->type != INSN_RETURN) continue; if (insn->retpoline_safe) @@ -3541,9 +3543,14 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !opts.module) continue; - WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", - insn->sec, insn->offset, - insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call"); + if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) { + WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } else { + WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", + insn->sec, insn->offset, + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call"); + } warnings++; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:00 +0200 Subject: x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 20 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c index 81aa46f770c5..cfa99e8f054b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature)) return; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat); if(ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature); } @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) { int ret; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64); if (ret != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret); /* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) { ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32, - xen_syscall32_target); + xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat); if (ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32); } diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index caa9bc2fa100..6bf9d45b9178 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) */ /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR popq %rcx @@ -249,12 +249,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR popq %rcx @@ -269,10 +269,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR /* @@ -291,19 +291,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) #else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax pushq $0 jmp hypercall_iret -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) #endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h index fd0fec6e92f4..9a8bb972193d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ /* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */ extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[]; -void xen_sysenter_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -void xen_syscall_target(void); -void xen_syscall32_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void); #endif extern void *xen_initial_gdt; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d147553b64bad34d2f92cb7d8ba454ae95c3baac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:01 +0200 Subject: x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Ensure the Xen entry also passes through UNTRAIN_RET. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index f4384a29086f..0c88802e1155 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -328,6 +328,12 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) #endif .endm +SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(xen_error_entry) + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + UNTRAIN_RET + RET +SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry) + /** * idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function * @cfunc: C function to be called @@ -347,7 +353,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) * switch the CR3. So it can skip invoking error_entry(). */ ALTERNATIVE "call error_entry; movq %rax, %rsp", \ - "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + "call xen_error_entry", X86_FEATURE_XENPV ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER UNWIND_HINT_REGS -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:02 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead. It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary instruction boundaries. On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates "arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries". But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker predictions. On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP or no-SMT): 1) Nothing System wide open 2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy 3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further 4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe". Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit on Zen1 according to lmbench. [ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 ++ arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 22 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------ 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/entry.S diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 0aeea69e9b7a..f2d26cb7e853 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5207,6 +5207,9 @@ disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). + ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on + basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest + perf impact. unret - force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile index 7fec5dcf6438..eeadbd7d92cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_common.o += -fno-stack-protector -obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o +obj-y := entry.o entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o obj-y += common.o obj-y += vdso/ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bfb7bcb362bc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Common place for both 32- and 64-bit entry routines. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" + +SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) + movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx + movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax + xorl %edx, %edx + wrmsr + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) +/* For KVM */ +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb); + +.popsection diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b5bb35e8588e..09dce77f4848 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ -/* FREE! (11*32+10) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ /* FREE! (11*32+11) */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 455d79c6c2f3..05dd75478d7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). * - * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack. + * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack, + * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX. * * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ + "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm @@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); +extern void entry_ibpb(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 00e9c769ce0b..04077d13b3ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = enum retbleed_mitigation { RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, }; @@ -813,11 +814,13 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, + RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB, }; const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; @@ -847,6 +850,8 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) { retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB; } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) { retbleed_nosmt = true; } else { @@ -861,11 +866,13 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" -#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n" #define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) { + bool mitigate_smt = false; + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) return; @@ -877,11 +884,21 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; break; + case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + break; + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + else + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } /* * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in @@ -897,26 +914,34 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; - break; + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + goto retbleed_force_ibpb; } setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && - (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) - cpu_smt_disable(false); - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); + + mitigate_smt = true; + break; + + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: +retbleed_force_ibpb: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + mitigate_smt = true; break; default: break; } + if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && + (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) + cpu_smt_disable(false); + /* * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the * retbleed= cmdline option. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0fe4aeea9c01baabecc8c3afc7889c809d939bc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 15:07:19 -0700 Subject: x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done twice, but it really only needs to be done once. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++---------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 04077d13b3ae..108bd74289c5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -891,18 +891,13 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; - else - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; - } + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; /* - * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). 'retbleed_mitigation' will + * be set accordingly below. */ break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a09a6e2399ba0595c3042b3164f3ca68a3cff33e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:03 +0200 Subject: objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET instruction. Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0. This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END. If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be reported. There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances: - UNTRAIN_RET itself - exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET - all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 5 + arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 10 +- include/linux/objtool.h | 3 + scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +- tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 3 + tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 6 ++ tools/objtool/check.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 1 + tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 11 +- 13 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 0c88802e1155..65e3b8b7cbe5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR swapgs @@ -1095,6 +1095,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) .Lerror_entry_done_lfence: FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END RET .Lbstep_iret: diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index bcb89d23ac0e..682338e7e2a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * 0(%ebp) arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* Interrupts are off on entry. */ swapgs @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSENTER_compat) * 0(%esp) arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* Interrupts are off on entry. */ swapgs @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat) * ebp arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* * Interrupts are off on entry. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 05dd75478d7b..bba42bd78edf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ */ #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE +/* + * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should + * eventually turn into it's own annotation. + */ +.macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + nop +#endif +.endm + /* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 @@ -131,6 +142,7 @@ */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h index 8b33674288ea..6f70fe4c93f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 .endm +.macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY + UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 +.endm + .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0 .if \base == %rsp .if \indirect diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 92c4afa2b729..d860d437631b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8 ENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + /* Build pt_regs */ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS @@ -448,6 +450,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_array) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16 + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END /* * The stack is the hardware frame, an error code or zero, and the * vector number. @@ -497,6 +500,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8 ENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + /* Build pt_regs */ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index 6bf9d45b9178..6b4fdf6b9542 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct); .macro xen_pv_trap name SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR pop %rcx pop %r11 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h index 15b940ec1eac..b026f1ae39c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o index 3c97a1564947..bc67748044a6 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o +++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)) objtool_args := \ $(if $(delay-objtool),$(objtool_args)) \ - $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr) \ + $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr $(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --unret)) \ $(if $(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL), --no-unreachable) \ --link diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h index 15b940ec1eac..b026f1ae39c6 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c index f4c3a5091737..c063e1ff96b2 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('n', "noinstr", &opts.noinstr, "validate noinstr rules"), OPT_BOOLEAN('o', "orc", &opts.orc, "generate ORC metadata"), OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &opts.retpoline, "validate and annotate retpoline usage"), + OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &opts.unret, "validate entry unret placement"), OPT_BOOLEAN('l', "sls", &opts.sls, "validate straight-line-speculation mitigations"), OPT_BOOLEAN('s', "stackval", &opts.stackval, "validate frame pointer rules"), OPT_BOOLEAN('t', "static-call", &opts.static_call, "annotate static calls"), @@ -163,6 +164,11 @@ static bool link_opts_valid(struct objtool_file *file) return false; } + if (opts.unret) { + ERROR("--unret requires --link"); + return false; + } + return true; } diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 7dc378156a63..822a490e6d87 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2032,16 +2032,24 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) insn->hint = true; - if (opts.ibt && hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset); - if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL && - insn->type != INSN_ENDBR && !insn->noendbr) { - WARN_FUNC("UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS without ENDBR", - insn->sec, insn->offset); + if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL) { + if (opts.ibt && insn->type != INSN_ENDBR && !insn->noendbr) { + WARN_FUNC("UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS without ENDBR", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } + + insn->entry = 1; } } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY) { + hint->type = UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL; + insn->entry = 1; + } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) { insn->cfi = &func_cfi; continue; @@ -2116,8 +2124,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct objtool_file *file) if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_RETURN) { - WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret", + insn->type != INSN_RETURN && + insn->type != INSN_NOP) { + WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret/nop", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; } @@ -3305,8 +3314,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, return 1; } - visited = 1 << state.uaccess; - if (insn->visited) { + visited = VISITED_BRANCH << state.uaccess; + if (insn->visited & VISITED_BRANCH_MASK) { if (!insn->hint && !insn_cfi_match(insn, &state.cfi)) return 1; @@ -3520,6 +3529,145 @@ static int validate_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file, struct section *sec) return warnings; } +/* + * Validate rethunk entry constraint: must untrain RET before the first RET. + * + * Follow every branch (intra-function) and ensure ANNOTATE_UNRET_END comes + * before an actual RET instruction. + */ +static int validate_entry(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + struct instruction *next, *dest; + int ret, warnings = 0; + + for (;;) { + next = next_insn_to_validate(file, insn); + + if (insn->visited & VISITED_ENTRY) + return 0; + + insn->visited |= VISITED_ENTRY; + + if (!insn->ignore_alts && !list_empty(&insn->alts)) { + struct alternative *alt; + bool skip_orig = false; + + list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { + if (alt->skip_orig) + skip_orig = true; + + ret = validate_entry(file, alt->insn); + if (ret) { + if (opts.backtrace) + BT_FUNC("(alt)", insn); + return ret; + } + } + + if (skip_orig) + return 0; + } + + switch (insn->type) { + + case INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC: + case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC: + case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL: + WARN_FUNC("early indirect call", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + + case INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL: + case INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL: + if (!is_sibling_call(insn)) { + if (!insn->jump_dest) { + WARN_FUNC("unresolved jump target after linking?!?", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + return -1; + } + ret = validate_entry(file, insn->jump_dest); + if (ret) { + if (opts.backtrace) { + BT_FUNC("(branch%s)", insn, + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ? "-cond" : ""); + } + return ret; + } + + if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) + return 0; + + break; + } + + /* fallthrough */ + case INSN_CALL: + dest = find_insn(file, insn->call_dest->sec, + insn->call_dest->offset); + if (!dest) { + WARN("Unresolved function after linking!?: %s", + insn->call_dest->name); + return -1; + } + + ret = validate_entry(file, dest); + if (ret) { + if (opts.backtrace) + BT_FUNC("(call)", insn); + return ret; + } + /* + * If a call returns without error, it must have seen UNTRAIN_RET. + * Therefore any non-error return is a success. + */ + return 0; + + case INSN_RETURN: + WARN_FUNC("RET before UNTRAIN", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + + case INSN_NOP: + if (insn->retpoline_safe) + return 0; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + if (!next) { + WARN_FUNC("teh end!", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return -1; + } + insn = next; + } + + return warnings; +} + +/* + * Validate that all branches starting at 'insn->entry' encounter UNRET_END + * before RET. + */ +static int validate_unret(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + int ret, warnings = 0; + + for_each_insn(file, insn) { + if (!insn->entry) + continue; + + ret = validate_entry(file, insn); + if (ret < 0) { + WARN_FUNC("Failed UNRET validation", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return ret; + } + warnings += ret; + } + + return warnings; +} + static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) { struct instruction *insn; @@ -4039,6 +4187,17 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) warnings += ret; } + if (opts.unret) { + /* + * Must be after validate_branch() and friends, it plays + * further games with insn->visited. + */ + ret = validate_unret(file); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + warnings += ret; + } + if (opts.ibt) { ret = validate_ibt(file); if (ret < 0) diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h index 280ea18b7f2b..0c476b0b40a3 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct opts { bool noinstr; bool orc; bool retpoline; + bool unret; bool sls; bool stackval; bool static_call; diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h index f10d7374f388..0eeedeacbefb 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h @@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ struct instruction { ignore_alts : 1, hint : 1, retpoline_safe : 1, - noendbr : 1; - /* 2 bit hole */ + noendbr : 1, + entry : 1; + /* 1 bit hole */ + s8 instr; u8 visited; /* u8 hole */ @@ -69,6 +71,11 @@ struct instruction { struct cfi_state *cfi; }; +#define VISITED_BRANCH 0x01 +#define VISITED_BRANCH_UACCESS 0x02 +#define VISITED_BRANCH_MASK 0x03 +#define VISITED_ENTRY 0x04 + static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn) { return insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL || -- cgit v1.2.3 From d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:04 +0200 Subject: x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting. Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 059c7e500ab4..7b411d9a6efb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -568,6 +568,9 @@ /* Fam 17h MSRs */ #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1) + /* Fam 16h MSRs */ #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230 #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 0c0b09796ced..8cf0659c0521 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -862,6 +862,26 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); } +void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 value; + + /* + * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation. + * + * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it + * suppresses non-branch predictions. + * + * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H + */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) { + if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) { + value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT; + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); + } + } +} + static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); @@ -907,7 +927,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break; - case 0x17: fallthrough; + case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c); + fallthrough; case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 2a8e584fc991..7c9b5893c30a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ static inline void tsx_init(void) { } static inline void tsx_ap_init(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */ +extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index 3fcdda4c1e11..21fd425088fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -302,6 +302,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */ c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id(); + /* + * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT + * + init_spectral_chicken(c); + */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:05 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be silently disabled. There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 -- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 -- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 887420844066..e309e7156038 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -698,7 +698,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(__stack_chk_guard) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -707,7 +706,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */ popfl diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 65e3b8b7cbe5..a4ba162e52c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -255,7 +255,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -264,7 +263,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ popq %r15 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index bba42bd78edf..08b03c12e6c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -122,11 +122,9 @@ * monstrosity above, manually. */ .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP) .Lskip_rsb_\@: -#endif .endm /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From e6aa13622ea8283cc699cac5d018cc40a2ba2010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:06 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling The firmware entry code may accidentally clear STIBP or SSBD. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 08b03c12e6c2..dee9ef77af13 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -285,18 +285,16 @@ extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); */ #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \ - \ preempt_disable(); \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ } while (0) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \ - \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current(), \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ preempt_enable(); \ } while (0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 56aa4d221f1ee2c3a49b45b800778ec6e0ab73c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:07 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change If the SMT state changes, SSBD might get accidentally disabled. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 108bd74289c5..9b80059c4e02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1458,7 +1458,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); + u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP); + write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:08 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit There's no need to recalculate the host value for every entry/exit. Just use the cached value in spec_ctrl_current(). Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9b80059c4e02..f884f9497666 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ @@ -221,15 +221,6 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) - hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - - /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */ - if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) - hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1397,7 +1388,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { - /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 12:12:48 -0700 Subject: x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can just write to SPEC_CTRL directly. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +------------------------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f884f9497666..efff8b9f1bbd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -85,12 +85,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); -/* - * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in - * x86_spec_ctrl_base. - */ -static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - /* * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). @@ -146,10 +140,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); - /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); @@ -208,19 +198,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); + u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); - /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { - /* - * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the - * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the - * modifiable bits from the guest value. - */ - guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1665,16 +1646,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) break; } - /* - * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper - * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the - * case where the host does not enable it. - */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - } - /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8faea26e611189e933ea2281975ff4dc7c1106b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 12:52:40 +0200 Subject: objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Commit c536ed2fffd5 ("objtool: Remove SAVE/RESTORE hints") removed the save/restore unwind hints because they were no longer needed. Now they're going to be needed again so re-add them. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 12 +++++++++-- include/linux/objtool.h | 6 ++++-- tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 6 ++++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 19 +++++++++-------- 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h index 6f70fe4c93f2..f66fbe6537dd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ .macro UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 .endm .macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 .endm .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0 @@ -56,6 +56,14 @@ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=8 type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC .endm +.macro UNWIND_HINT_SAVE + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE +.endm + +.macro UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE +.endm + #else #define UNWIND_HINT_FUNC \ diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h index b026f1ae39c6..10bc88cc3bf6 100644 --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL @@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { * the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any * inconsistencies. */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@: .pushsection .discard.unwind_hints /* struct unwind_hint */ @@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define ASM_REACHABLE #else #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .endm .macro STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD func:req .endm diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h index b026f1ae39c6..10bc88cc3bf6 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL @@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { * the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any * inconsistencies. */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@: .pushsection .discard.unwind_hints /* struct unwind_hint */ @@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define ASM_REACHABLE #else #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .endm .macro STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD func:req .endm diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 822a490e6d87..ddfdd138cc2a 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2032,6 +2032,17 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) insn->hint = true; + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE) { + insn->hint = false; + insn->save = true; + continue; + } + + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE) { + insn->restore = true; + continue; + } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset); @@ -3329,6 +3340,35 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, state.instr += insn->instr; if (insn->hint) { + if (insn->restore) { + struct instruction *save_insn, *i; + + i = insn; + save_insn = NULL; + + sym_for_each_insn_continue_reverse(file, func, i) { + if (i->save) { + save_insn = i; + break; + } + } + + if (!save_insn) { + WARN_FUNC("no corresponding CFI save for CFI restore", + sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + } + + if (!save_insn->visited) { + WARN_FUNC("objtool isn't smart enough to handle this CFI save/restore combo", + sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + } + + insn->cfi = save_insn->cfi; + nr_cfi_reused++; + } + state.cfi = *insn->cfi; } else { /* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */ diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h index 0eeedeacbefb..036129cebeee 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h @@ -46,18 +46,19 @@ struct instruction { enum insn_type type; unsigned long immediate; - u8 dead_end : 1, - ignore : 1, - ignore_alts : 1, - hint : 1, - retpoline_safe : 1, - noendbr : 1, - entry : 1; - /* 1 bit hole */ + u16 dead_end : 1, + ignore : 1, + ignore_alts : 1, + hint : 1, + save : 1, + restore : 1, + retpoline_safe : 1, + noendbr : 1, + entry : 1; + /* 7 bit hole */ s8 instr; u8 visited; - /* u8 hole */ struct alt_group *alt_group; struct symbol *call_dest; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8bd200d23ec42d66ccd517a72dd0b9cc6132d2fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:11 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Move the vmx_vm{enter,exit}() functionality into __vmx_vcpu_run(). This will make it easier to do the spec_ctrl handling before the first RET. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 119 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 435c187927c4..c83163fb2e9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -30,68 +30,6 @@ .section .noinstr.text, "ax" -/** - * vmx_vmenter - VM-Enter the current loaded VMCS - * - * %RFLAGS.ZF: !VMCS.LAUNCHED, i.e. controls VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.CF is set on VM-Fail Invalid - * %RFLAGS.ZF is set on VM-Fail Valid - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * Note that VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH fall-through and return directly if - * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump - * to vmx_vmexit. - */ -SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(vmx_vmenter) - /* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */ - je 2f - -1: vmresume - RET - -2: vmlaunch - RET - -3: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting - je 4f - RET -4: ud2 - - _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) - _ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 3b) - -SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter) - -/** - * vmx_vmexit - Handle a VMX VM-Exit - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * This is vmx_vmenter's partner in crime. On a VM-Exit, control will jump - * here after hardware loads the host's state, i.e. this is the destination - * referred to by VMCS.HOST_RIP. - */ -SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit) -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */ - push %_ASM_AX - - /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RFLAGS.CF and RFLAGS.ZF to preserve VM-Exit, i.e. !VM-Fail. */ - or $1, %_ASM_AX - - pop %_ASM_AX -.Lvmexit_skip_rsb: -#endif - RET -SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit) - /** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) @@ -124,8 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl - /* Adjust RSP to account for the CALL to vmx_vmenter(). */ - lea -WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 + lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp /* Load @regs to RAX. */ @@ -154,11 +91,37 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */ mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX - /* Enter guest mode */ - call vmx_vmenter + /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ + je .Lvmlaunch + + /* + * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" + * resumes below at 'vmx_vmexit' due to the VMCS HOST_RIP setting. + * So this isn't a typical function and objtool needs to be told to + * save the unwind state here and restore it below. + */ + UNWIND_HINT_SAVE + +/* + * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at + * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below. + */ +.Lvmresume: + vmresume + jmp .Lvmfail + +.Lvmlaunch: + vmlaunch + jmp .Lvmfail + + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup) - /* Jump on VM-Fail. */ - jbe 2f +SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + + /* Restore unwind state from before the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH. */ + UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE + ENDBR /* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */ push %_ASM_AX @@ -185,9 +148,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif + /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ xor %eax, %eax +.Lclear_regs: /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded @@ -197,7 +164,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. */ -1: xor %ecx, %ecx + xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx xor %ebx, %ebx xor %ebp, %ebp @@ -216,8 +183,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP - pop %_ASM_BX + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 pop %r13 @@ -230,9 +197,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) pop %_ASM_BP RET - /* VM-Fail. Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */ -2: mov $1, %eax - jmp 1b +.Lfixup: + cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting + jne .Lvmfail + ud2 +.Lvmfail: + /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ + mov $1, %eax + jmp .Lclear_regs + SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:12 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which will need another flag. This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would have to be pushed on the stack. Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr critical section because it will soon start calling potentially traceable functions. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 9 +++++---- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 5 ++++- 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index f5cb18e00e78..3a4e895269d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -3087,7 +3087,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr) vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..57f4c664ea9c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H +#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H + +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index c83163fb2e9c..ddc3bf85db33 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "run_flags.h" #define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @launched: %true if the VMCS has been launched + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) */ push %_ASM_ARG2 - /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ + /* Copy @flags to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - testb %bl, %bl + testb $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %bl /* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */ mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX @@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ - je .Lvmlaunch + jz .Lvmlaunch /* * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 009bbae9ad66..b255c2a5f680 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -839,6 +839,16 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); } +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + unsigned int flags = 0; + + if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) + flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME; + + return flags; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -6826,7 +6836,8 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned long flags) { guest_state_enter_irqoff(); @@ -6845,7 +6856,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2); vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + flags); vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2(); @@ -6953,7 +6964,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ - vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx); + vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); /* * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 8d2342ede0c5..1b1982448aa4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" #include "cpuid.h" +#include "run_flags.h" #define MSR_TYPE_R 1 #define MSR_TYPE_W 2 @@ -404,7 +405,9 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); -bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched); +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); +bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, + unsigned int flags); int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr); void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:13 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index dee9ef77af13..ccde87e6eabb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index efff8b9f1bbd..31ccb7852afd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif } +/* + * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. + * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h index 57f4c664ea9c..edc3f16cc189 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H #define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1) #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index ddc3bf85db33..8641ea74a307 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -33,9 +33,10 @@ /** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode - * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) + * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -54,6 +55,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) #endif push %_ASM_BX + /* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG1 + + /* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG3 + /* * Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and * @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values. @@ -149,25 +156,23 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif - /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ - xor %eax, %eax + /* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ + xor %ebx, %ebx .Lclear_regs: /* - * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent + * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded * via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values. * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during - * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. + * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return + * value. */ + xor %eax, %eax xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx - xor %ebx, %ebx xor %ebp, %ebp xor %esi, %esi xor %edi, %edi @@ -185,6 +190,28 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP + /* + * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before + * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! + * + * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries + * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * + * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't + * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled + * before the first unbalanced RET. + */ + + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + + pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ + pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ + + call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host + + /* Put return value in AX */ + mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 @@ -204,7 +231,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ud2 .Lvmfail: /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ - mov $1, %eax + mov $1, %_ASM_BX jmp .Lclear_regs SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index b255c2a5f680..b81000cc826a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -846,6 +846,14 @@ unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME; + /* + * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free + * to change it directly without causing a vmexit. In that case read + * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl. + */ + if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) + flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL; + return flags; } @@ -6823,6 +6831,26 @@ void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp) } } +void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned int flags) +{ + u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) + return; + + if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL) + vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); + + /* + * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); + + barrier_nospec(); +} + static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) { @@ -6966,26 +6994,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); - /* - * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the - * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and - * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding - * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former - * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. - * - * For non-nested case: - * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - * - * For nested case: - * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - */ - if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) - vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - - x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* All fields are clean at this point */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) { current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |= diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 1b1982448aa4..da654af12ccb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, unsigned int flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:14 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written after vmexit, even if it's already on. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index b81000cc826a..421db354b1ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6844,8 +6844,13 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, /* * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + * + * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after + * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of + * whether the guest/host values differ. */ - if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) || + vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); barrier_nospec(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:15 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 6 ++-- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 09dce77f4848..d143f018eda1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ -/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 31ccb7852afd..fcbd072a5e36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1401,16 +1401,69 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); /* - * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill - * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent - * issues: + * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a + * context switch. In general there are two types of RSB attacks + * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced. * - * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+ - * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB". When the RSB is empty, + * speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor, + * which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry. + * + * AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB, + * regardless of the state of the RSB. + * + * When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack + * scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation + * properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to + * protect against this type of attack. + * + * The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling. + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev', + * 'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB + * entry. + * + * The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and + * eIBRS. + * + * The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires + * RSB clearing. + * + * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context + * switches. + * + * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD? */ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); + /* + * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks + * after vmexit: + * + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing + * the RSB. + * + * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch + * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared + * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike + * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. + * + * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it + * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + /* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 8641ea74a307..4c743fa98a1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -194,15 +194,15 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! * - * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries - * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB + * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow. * * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled * before the first unbalanced RET. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07853adc29a058c5fd143c14e5ac528448a72ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:16 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8 -------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 437308004ef2..cb50589a7102 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "../kvm/vmx/vmx.h" #ifdef CONFIG_XEN #include @@ -107,4 +108,9 @@ static void __used common(void) OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0); OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1); OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) { + BLANK(); + OFFSET(VMX_spec_ctrl, vcpu_vmx, spec_ctrl); + } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index fcbd072a5e36..182f8b2e8a3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) } /* - * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. - * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM. VMX spec_ctrl handling is + * done in vmenter.S. */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h index 3f430e218375..c0e24826a86f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ #include -#include "lapic.h" -#include "x86.h" +#include "../lapic.h" +#include "../x86.h" extern bool __read_mostly enable_vpid; extern bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 4c743fa98a1f..4182c7ffc909 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include #include +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include "run_flags.h" @@ -73,6 +75,33 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL + + /* + * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the + * host's, write the MSR. + * + * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness, + * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code + * and vmentry. + */ + mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI + movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi + movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi + cmp %edi, %esi + je .Lspec_ctrl_done + mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + xor %edx, %edx + mov %edi, %eax + wrmsr + +.Lspec_ctrl_done: + + /* + * Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for + * an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr. + */ + /* Load @regs to RAX. */ mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 421db354b1ab..be7c19374fdd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6988,14 +6988,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu); - /* - * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if - * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there - * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr - * being speculatively taken. - */ - x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index da654af12ccb..1e7f9453894b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ #include #include "capabilities.h" -#include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "posted_intr.h" #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" -#include "cpuid.h" +#include "../cpuid.h" #include "run_flags.h" #define MSR_TYPE_R 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h index 5e7f41225780..5cfc49ddb1b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include "evmcs.h" #include "vmcs.h" -#include "x86.h" +#include "../x86.h" asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault); __attribute__((regparm(0))) void vmread_error_trampoline(unsigned long field, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 14:03:25 +0200 Subject: x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get rid of all that and simply use ANY. If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 75a5c720c852..42d3c7e5f4d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1232,32 +1232,27 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 14:41:21 +0100 Subject: x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion. Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC. Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index d143f018eda1..7e8099fd5ec1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */ #define X86_FEATURE_CPPC (13*32+27) /* Collaborative Processor Performance Control */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ #define X86_FEATURE_BRS (13*32+31) /* Branch Sampling available */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 8cf0659c0521..9cfd11f7ba11 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -890,12 +890,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) node_reclaim_distance = 32; #endif - /* - * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. - * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor. - */ - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); + /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + + /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); + + /* + * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to + * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the + * BTC_NO bit. + */ + if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO); + } } static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 42d3c7e5f4d7..02ba27355b04 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1359,8 +1359,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); - if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + } if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 19e506b317497a8c2b3ec2f12314d355d2f00ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 15:22:26 +0200 Subject: eeprom: at25: Rework buggy read splitting The recent change to split reads into chunks has several problems: 1. If an SPI controller has no transfer size limit, max_chunk is SIZE_MAX, and num_msgs becomes zero, causing no data to be read into the buffer, and exposing the original contents of the buffer to userspace, 2. If the requested read size is not a multiple of the maximum transfer size, the last transfer reads too much data, overflowing the buffer, 3. The loop logic differs from the write case. Fix the above by: 1. Keeping track of the number of bytes that are still to be transferred, instead of precalculating the number of messages and keeping track of the number of bytes tranfered, 2. Calculating the transfer size of each individual message, taking into account the number of bytes left, 3. Switching from a "while"-loop to a "do-while"-loop, and renaming "msg_count" to "segment". While at it, drop the superfluous cast from "unsigned int" to "unsigned int", also from at25_ee_write(), where it was probably copied from. Fixes: 0a35780c755ccec0 ("eeprom: at25: Split reads into chunks and cap write size") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ae260778d2c08986348ea48ce02ef148100e088.1655817534.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c | 26 ++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c index c9c56fd194c1..bdffc6543f6f 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c +++ b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c @@ -80,10 +80,9 @@ static int at25_ee_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset, struct at25_data *at25 = priv; char *buf = val; size_t max_chunk = spi_max_transfer_size(at25->spi); - size_t num_msgs = DIV_ROUND_UP(count, max_chunk); - size_t nr_bytes = 0; - unsigned int msg_offset; - size_t msg_count; + unsigned int msg_offset = offset; + size_t bytes_left = count; + size_t segment; u8 *cp; ssize_t status; struct spi_transfer t[2]; @@ -97,9 +96,8 @@ static int at25_ee_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset, if (unlikely(!count)) return -EINVAL; - msg_offset = (unsigned int)offset; - msg_count = min(count, max_chunk); - while (num_msgs) { + do { + segment = min(bytes_left, max_chunk); cp = at25->command; instr = AT25_READ; @@ -131,8 +129,8 @@ static int at25_ee_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset, t[0].len = at25->addrlen + 1; spi_message_add_tail(&t[0], &m); - t[1].rx_buf = buf + nr_bytes; - t[1].len = msg_count; + t[1].rx_buf = buf; + t[1].len = segment; spi_message_add_tail(&t[1], &m); status = spi_sync(at25->spi, &m); @@ -142,10 +140,10 @@ static int at25_ee_read(void *priv, unsigned int offset, if (status) return status; - --num_msgs; - msg_offset += msg_count; - nr_bytes += msg_count; - } + msg_offset += segment; + buf += segment; + bytes_left -= segment; + } while (bytes_left > 0); dev_dbg(&at25->spi->dev, "read %zu bytes at %d\n", count, offset); @@ -229,7 +227,7 @@ static int at25_ee_write(void *priv, unsigned int off, void *val, size_t count) do { unsigned long timeout, retries; unsigned segment; - unsigned offset = (unsigned) off; + unsigned offset = off; u8 *cp = bounce; int sr; u8 instr; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a4ab14e1d8fe83cc1ed8910b788117ec2ed25179 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Hubbard Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 18:23:53 -0700 Subject: gen_compile_commands: handle multiple lines per .mod file scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py incorrectly assumes that each .mod file only contains one line. That assumption was correct when the script was originally created, but commit 9413e7640564 ("kbuild: split the second line of *.mod into *.usyms") changed the .mod file format so that there is one entry per line, and potentially many lines. The problem can be reproduced by using Kbuild to generate compile_commands.json, like this: make CC=clang compile_commands.json In many cases, the problem might be overlooked because many subsystems only have one line anyway. However, in some subsystems (Nouveau, with 762 entries, is a notable example) it results in skipping most of the subsystem. Fix this by fully processing each .mod file. Fixes: 9413e7640564 ("kbuild: split the second line of *.mod into *.usyms") Signed-off-by: John Hubbard Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada --- scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py b/scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py index 1d1bde1fd45e..47da25b3ba7d 100755 --- a/scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py +++ b/scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py @@ -157,10 +157,10 @@ def cmdfiles_for_modorder(modorder): if ext != '.ko': sys.exit('{}: module path must end with .ko'.format(ko)) mod = base + '.mod' - # The first line of *.mod lists the objects that compose the module. + # Read from *.mod, to get a list of objects that compose the module. with open(mod) as m: - for obj in m.readline().split(): - yield to_cmdfile(obj) + for mod_line in m: + yield to_cmdfile(mod_line.rstrip()) def process_line(root_directory, command_prefix, file_path): -- cgit v1.2.3 From e35f5718903b093be4b1d3833aa8a32f864a3ef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vishal Verma Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:01:09 -0600 Subject: cxl/mbox: Fix missing variable payload checks in cmd size validation The conversion of command sizes to unsigned missed a couple of checks against variable size payloads during command validation, which made all variable payload commands unconditionally fail. Add the checks back using the new CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD scheme. Fixes: 26f89535a5bb ("cxl/mbox: Use type __u32 for mailbox payload sizes") Cc: Cc: Ira Weiny Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Alison Schofield Reported-by: Abhi Cs Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628220109.633564-1-vishal.l.verma@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c index 54f434733b56..cbf23beebebe 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c @@ -355,11 +355,13 @@ static int cxl_to_mem_cmd(struct cxl_mem_command *mem_cmd, return -EBUSY; /* Check the input buffer is the expected size */ - if (info->size_in != send_cmd->in.size) + if ((info->size_in != CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD) && + (info->size_in != send_cmd->in.size)) return -ENOMEM; /* Check the output buffer is at least large enough */ - if (send_cmd->out.size < info->size_out) + if ((info->size_out != CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD) && + (send_cmd->out.size < info->size_out)) return -ENOMEM; *mem_cmd = (struct cxl_mem_command) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f3558c8054f82950b6decf928738306f556edf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 23:04:01 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211_hwsim: set virtio device ready in probe() Just like a similar commit to arch/um/drivers/virt-pci.c, call virtio_device_ready() to make this driver work after commit b4ec69d7e09 ("virtio: harden vring IRQ"), since the driver uses the virtqueues in the probe function. (The virtio core sets the device ready when probe returns.) Fixes: 8b4ec69d7e09 ("virtio: harden vring IRQ") Fixes: 5d44fe7c9808 ("mac80211_hwsim: add frame transmission support over virtio") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Acked-by: Jason Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220613210401.327958-1-johannes@sipsolutions.net Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c index 2f746eb64507..6f83af849f2e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c @@ -4912,6 +4912,8 @@ static int hwsim_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) if (err) return err; + virtio_device_ready(vdev); + err = fill_vq(hwsim_vqs[HWSIM_VQ_RX]); if (err) goto out_remove; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 03895c8414d748747900ede2cb603d0ed3eeae1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Bianconi Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 00:42:12 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: add gfp_t parameter to ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify Introduce the capability to specify gfp_t parameter to ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify routine since it runs in interrupt context in ieee80211_rx_check_bss_color_collision(). Fixes: 6d945a33f2b0a ("mac80211: introduce BSS color collision detection") Co-developed-by: Ryder Lee Signed-off-by: Ryder Lee Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/02c990fb3fbd929c8548a656477d20d6c0427a13.1655419135.git.lorenzo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c | 3 ++- include/net/cfg80211.h | 5 +++-- include/net/mac80211.h | 3 ++- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 4 ++-- net/mac80211/rx.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c index 84d1c7054013..7b1dc19c565e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c @@ -3822,7 +3822,8 @@ ath11k_wmi_obss_color_collision_event(struct ath11k_base *ab, struct sk_buff *sk switch (ev->evt_type) { case WMI_BSS_COLOR_COLLISION_DETECTION: - ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify(arvif->vif, ev->obss_color_bitmap); + ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify(arvif->vif, ev->obss_color_bitmap, + GFP_KERNEL); ath11k_dbg(ab, ATH11K_DBG_WMI, "OBSS color collision detected vdev:%d, event:%d, bitmap:%08llx\n", ev->vdev_id, ev->evt_type, ev->obss_color_bitmap); diff --git a/include/net/cfg80211.h b/include/net/cfg80211.h index 6d02e12e4702..80f41446b1f0 100644 --- a/include/net/cfg80211.h +++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h @@ -8462,11 +8462,12 @@ int cfg80211_bss_color_notify(struct net_device *dev, gfp_t gfp, * cfg80211_obss_color_collision_notify - notify about bss color collision * @dev: network device * @color_bitmap: representations of the colors that the local BSS is aware of + * @gfp: allocation flags */ static inline int cfg80211_obss_color_collision_notify(struct net_device *dev, - u64 color_bitmap) + u64 color_bitmap, gfp_t gfp) { - return cfg80211_bss_color_notify(dev, GFP_KERNEL, + return cfg80211_bss_color_notify(dev, gfp, NL80211_CMD_OBSS_COLOR_COLLISION, 0, color_bitmap); } diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h index ebadb2103968..47642b020706 100644 --- a/include/net/mac80211.h +++ b/include/net/mac80211.h @@ -6960,10 +6960,11 @@ ieee80211_get_unsol_bcast_probe_resp_tmpl(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, * @vif: &struct ieee80211_vif pointer from the add_interface callback. * @color_bitmap: a 64 bit bitmap representing the colors that the local BSS is * aware of. + * @gfp: allocation flags */ void ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, - u64 color_bitmap); + u64 color_bitmap, gfp_t gfp); /** * ieee80211_is_tx_data - check if frame is a data frame diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index f7896f257e1b..4ddf297f40f2 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -4468,14 +4468,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_color_change_finish); void ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, - u64 color_bitmap) + u64 color_bitmap, gfp_t gfp) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); if (sdata->vif.color_change_active || sdata->vif.csa_active) return; - cfg80211_obss_color_collision_notify(sdata->dev, color_bitmap); + cfg80211_obss_color_collision_notify(sdata->dev, color_bitmap, gfp); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify); diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 3c08ae04ddbc..1675f8cb87f1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -3217,7 +3217,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_check_bss_color_collision(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) IEEE80211_HE_OPERATION_BSS_COLOR_MASK); if (color == bss_conf->he_bss_color.color) ieeee80211_obss_color_collision_notify(&rx->sdata->vif, - BIT_ULL(color)); + BIT_ULL(color), + GFP_ATOMIC); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a4926abb787e2ef3ee2997e6ca8844d859478647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryder Lee Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 21:35:32 +0800 Subject: wifi: mac80211: check skb_shared in ieee80211_8023_xmit() Add a missing skb_shared check into 802.3 path to prevent potential use-after-free from happening. This also uses skb_share_check() instead of open-coding in tx path. Signed-off-by: Ryder Lee Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e7a73aaf7742b17e43421c56625646dfc5c4d2cb.1653571902.git.ryder.lee@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 36 +++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 0e4efc08c762..c425f4fb7c2e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -2818,19 +2818,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *ieee80211_build_hdr(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, /* * If the skb is shared we need to obtain our own copy. */ - if (skb_shared(skb)) { - struct sk_buff *tmp_skb = skb; - - /* can't happen -- skb is a clone if info_id != 0 */ - WARN_ON(info_id); - - skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - kfree_skb(tmp_skb); - - if (!skb) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto free; - } + skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(!skb)) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free; } hdr.frame_control = fc; @@ -3539,15 +3530,9 @@ static bool ieee80211_xmit_fast(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, /* after this point (skb is modified) we cannot return false */ - if (skb_shared(skb)) { - struct sk_buff *tmp_skb = skb; - - skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - kfree_skb(tmp_skb); - - if (!skb) - return true; - } + skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(!skb)) + return true; if ((hdr->frame_control & cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_STYPE_QOS_DATA)) && ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate(sdata, sta, fast_tx, skb)) @@ -4437,7 +4422,7 @@ static void ieee80211_8023_xmit(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct net_device *dev, struct sta_info *sta, struct ieee80211_key *key, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); + struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; struct tid_ampdu_tx *tid_tx; u8 tid; @@ -4452,6 +4437,11 @@ static void ieee80211_8023_xmit(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, test_bit(SDATA_STATE_OFFCHANNEL, &sdata->state)) goto out_free; + skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(!skb)) + return; + + info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); ieee80211_aggr_check(sdata, sta, skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f856373e2f31ffd340e47e2b00027bd4070f74b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 21:08:24 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: do not wake queues on a vif that is being stopped MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When a vif is being removed and sdata->bss is cleared, __ieee80211_wake_txqs can still be called on it, which crashes as soon as sdata->bss is being dereferenced. To fix this properly, check for SDATA_STATE_RUNNING before waking queues, and take the fq lock when setting it (to ensure that __ieee80211_wake_txqs observes the change when running on a different CPU) Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531190824.60019-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/iface.c | 2 ++ net/mac80211/util.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c index 41531478437c..15a73b7fdd75 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c @@ -377,7 +377,9 @@ static void ieee80211_do_stop(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, bool going_do bool cancel_scan; struct cfg80211_nan_func *func; + spin_lock_bh(&local->fq.lock); clear_bit(SDATA_STATE_RUNNING, &sdata->state); + spin_unlock_bh(&local->fq.lock); cancel_scan = rcu_access_pointer(local->scan_sdata) == sdata; if (cancel_scan) diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c index 1e26b5235add..dad42d42aa84 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ static void __ieee80211_wake_txqs(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int ac) local_bh_disable(); spin_lock(&fq->lock); + if (!test_bit(SDATA_STATE_RUNNING, &sdata->state)) + goto out; + if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) ps = &sdata->bss->ps; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8d70f33ed7207e82e51d5a4436c8ba2268a83b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinayak Yadawad Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 19:17:39 +0530 Subject: wifi: cfg80211: Allow P2P client interface to indicate port authorization In case of 4way handshake offload, cfg80211_port_authorized enables driver to indicate successful 4way handshake to cfg80211 layer. Currently this path of port authorization is restricted to interface type NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION. This patch extends the use of port authorization API for P2P client as well. Signed-off-by: Vinayak Yadawad Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ef25cb49fcb921df2e5d99e574f65e8a009cc52c.1655905440.git.vinayak.yadawad@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/wireless/sme.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/sme.c b/net/wireless/sme.c index ff4d48fcbfb2..607a68911047 100644 --- a/net/wireless/sme.c +++ b/net/wireless/sme.c @@ -1031,7 +1031,8 @@ void __cfg80211_port_authorized(struct wireless_dev *wdev, const u8 *bssid) { ASSERT_WDEV_LOCK(wdev); - if (WARN_ON(wdev->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION)) + if (WARN_ON(wdev->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && + wdev->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT)) return; if (WARN_ON(!wdev->current_bss) || -- cgit v1.2.3 From f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 22:21:17 +0000 Subject: x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts. NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/Makefile | 8 ++- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 42 +++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 ++ scripts/Makefile.lib | 1 + scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +- security/Kconfig | 11 --- tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 7 ++ tools/objtool/check.c | 9 ++- tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 1 + 19 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index e35eecfb74f2..e58798f636d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -462,32 +462,6 @@ config GOLDFISH def_bool y depends on X86_GOLDFISH -config RETPOLINE - bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL - default y - help - Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against - kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect - branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern - support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. - -config CC_HAS_SLS - def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) - -config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK - def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) - -config SLS - bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" - depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL - default n - help - Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard - against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly - larger. - config X86_CPU_RESCTRL bool "x86 CPU resource control support" depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD) @@ -2456,6 +2430,91 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig" endmenu +config CC_HAS_SLS + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) + +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + +menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities" + default y + help + Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for + speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities. + + If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really + should know what you are doing to say so. + +if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + +config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" + default y + depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) + help + This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by + ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped + into userspace. + + See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. + +config RETPOLINE + bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default y + help + Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against + kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect + branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config RETHUNK + bool "Enable return-thunks" + depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default y + help + Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard + against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation. + Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY + bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation. + +config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. + +config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation. + This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to + performance. + +config SLS + bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" + depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default n + help + Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard + against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly + larger. + +endif + config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES def_bool y depends on ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 6e16057737e5..1f40dad30d50 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -15,14 +15,18 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix) -RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register) endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline -RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) endif + +ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +RETHUNK_CFLAGS := -mfunction-return=thunk-extern +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS) +endif + export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 074d04e434de..f6907627172b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. */ .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx @@ -317,6 +318,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with shr $32, %rdx wrmsr .Lend_\@: +#endif .endm /* @@ -324,6 +326,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * regs. Must be called after the last RET. */ .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx @@ -338,6 +341,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with shr $32, %rdx wrmsr .Lend_\@: +#endif .endm /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index db75da511a36..33d2cd04d254 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -54,9 +54,19 @@ # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +# define DISABLE_UNRET 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM @@ -91,7 +101,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK8 (DISABLE_TDX_GUEST) #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE) +#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h index e3ae331cabb1..73ca20049835 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN) #endif -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) #define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) #define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t" #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ccde87e6eabb..bb05ed4f46bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ .Lskip_rsb_\@: .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "call zen_untrain_ret" +#else +#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "" +#endif + /* * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD @@ -139,10 +145,10 @@ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ - "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h index 70cc9ccb8029..343b722ccaf2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)") -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk") #else diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index cf447ee18b3c..d6858533e6e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK /* * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls. * @@ -569,6 +570,10 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } } +#else +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ + #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 9cfd11f7ba11..35d5288394cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -864,6 +864,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY u64 value; /* @@ -880,6 +881,7 @@ void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); } } +#endif } static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 182f8b2e8a3c..cf08a1b8f3c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -842,7 +842,6 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" -#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n" #define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) @@ -857,18 +856,33 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) return; case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } break; case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } break; +do_cmd_auto: case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } /* * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in @@ -881,14 +895,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) switch (retbleed_mitigation) { case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { - pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; - goto retbleed_force_ibpb; - } - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); @@ -900,7 +906,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: -retbleed_force_ibpb: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); mitigate_smt = true; break; @@ -1271,6 +1276,12 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); @@ -1328,7 +1339,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index fe21fe778185..be7038a0da4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform); -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK /* * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines, * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index b01437015f99..db96bf7d1122 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -439,10 +439,10 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); * * ENDBR [4 bytes; CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT] * SETcc %al [3 bytes] - * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE] + * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK] * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] */ -#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \ +#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) #define SETCC_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 3 + RET_LENGTH) #define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1)) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index fdd16163b996..073289a55f84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk /* @@ -136,3 +138,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) + +#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib index d1425778664b..3fb6a99e78c4 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib +++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ objtool_args = \ $(if $(CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL), --mcount) \ $(if $(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC), --orc) \ $(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --retpoline) \ + $(if $(CONFIG_RETHUNK), --rethunk) \ $(if $(CONFIG_SLS), --sls) \ $(if $(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION), --stackval) \ $(if $(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE), --static-call) \ diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o index bc67748044a6..84019814f33f 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o +++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)) objtool_args := \ $(if $(delay-objtool),$(objtool_args)) \ - $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr $(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --unret)) \ + $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr $(if $(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY), --unret)) \ $(if $(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL), --no-unreachable) \ --link diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index f29e4c656983..e6db09a779b7 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -54,17 +54,6 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK implement socket and networking access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" - default y - depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML - help - This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by - ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped - into userspace. - - See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. - config SECURITY_INFINIBAND bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c index c063e1ff96b2..24fbe803a0d3 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('n', "noinstr", &opts.noinstr, "validate noinstr rules"), OPT_BOOLEAN('o', "orc", &opts.orc, "generate ORC metadata"), OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &opts.retpoline, "validate and annotate retpoline usage"), + OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "rethunk", &opts.rethunk, "validate and annotate rethunk usage"), OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &opts.unret, "validate entry unret placement"), OPT_BOOLEAN('l', "sls", &opts.sls, "validate straight-line-speculation mitigations"), OPT_BOOLEAN('s', "stackval", &opts.stackval, "validate frame pointer rules"), @@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ static bool opts_valid(void) opts.noinstr || opts.orc || opts.retpoline || + opts.rethunk || opts.sls || opts.stackval || opts.static_call || @@ -136,6 +138,11 @@ static bool opts_valid(void) return true; } + if (opts.unret && !opts.rethunk) { + ERROR("--unret requires --rethunk"); + return false; + } + if (opts.dump_orc) return true; diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index ddfdd138cc2a..7bebdb8867cd 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -3732,8 +3732,11 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) continue; if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) { - WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build", - insn->sec, insn->offset); + if (opts.rethunk) { + WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETHUNK build", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } else + continue; } else { WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", insn->sec, insn->offset, @@ -4264,7 +4267,9 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret < 0) goto out; warnings += ret; + } + if (opts.rethunk) { ret = create_return_sites_sections(file); if (ret < 0) goto out; diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h index 0c476b0b40a3..42a52f1a0add 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct opts { bool noinstr; bool orc; bool retpoline; + bool rethunk; bool unret; bool sls; bool stackval; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8ad59b397f86a4d8014966fdc0552095a0c4fb2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Delvare Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 08:37:43 +0200 Subject: i2c: piix4: Fix a memory leak in the EFCH MMIO support The recently added support for EFCH MMIO regions introduced a memory leak in that code path. The leak is caused by the fact that release_resource() merely removes the resource from the tree but does not free its memory. We need to call release_mem_region() instead, which does free the memory. As a nice side effect, this brings back some symmetry between the legacy and MMIO paths. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare Reported-by: Yi Zhang Tested-by: Yi Zhang Reviewed-by: Terry Bowman Tested-by: Terry Bowman Fixes: 7c148722d074 ("i2c: piix4: Add EFCH MMIO support to region request and release") Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c | 16 +++++++--------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c index ac8e7d60672a..39cb1b7bb865 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c @@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ static const char *piix4_aux_port_name_sb800 = " port 1"; struct sb800_mmio_cfg { void __iomem *addr; - struct resource *res; bool use_mmio; }; @@ -179,13 +178,11 @@ static int piix4_sb800_region_request(struct device *dev, struct sb800_mmio_cfg *mmio_cfg) { if (mmio_cfg->use_mmio) { - struct resource *res; void __iomem *addr; - res = request_mem_region_muxed(SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_ADDR, - SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_SIZE, - "sb800_piix4_smb"); - if (!res) { + if (!request_mem_region_muxed(SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_ADDR, + SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_SIZE, + "sb800_piix4_smb")) { dev_err(dev, "SMBus base address memory region 0x%x already in use.\n", SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_ADDR); @@ -195,12 +192,12 @@ static int piix4_sb800_region_request(struct device *dev, addr = ioremap(SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_ADDR, SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_SIZE); if (!addr) { - release_resource(res); + release_mem_region(SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_ADDR, + SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_SIZE); dev_err(dev, "SMBus base address mapping failed.\n"); return -ENOMEM; } - mmio_cfg->res = res; mmio_cfg->addr = addr; return 0; @@ -222,7 +219,8 @@ static void piix4_sb800_region_release(struct device *dev, { if (mmio_cfg->use_mmio) { iounmap(mmio_cfg->addr); - release_resource(mmio_cfg->res); + release_mem_region(SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_ADDR, + SB800_PIIX4_FCH_PM_SIZE); return; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From eb7f8e28420372787933eec079735c35034bda7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 20:32:55 -0600 Subject: misc: rtsx_usb: fix use of dma mapped buffer for usb bulk transfer rtsx_usb driver allocates coherent dma buffer for urb transfers. This buffer is passed to usb_bulk_msg() and usb core tries to map already mapped buffer running into a dma mapping error. xhci_hcd 0000:01:00.0: rejecting DMA map of vmalloc memory WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 279 at include/linux/dma-mapping.h:326 usb_ hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x7d6/0x820 ... xhci_map_urb_for_dma+0x291/0x4e0 usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x199/0x12b0 ... usb_submit_urb+0x3b8/0x9e0 usb_start_wait_urb+0xe3/0x2d0 usb_bulk_msg+0x115/0x240 rtsx_usb_transfer_data+0x185/0x1a8 [rtsx_usb] rtsx_usb_send_cmd+0xbb/0x123 [rtsx_usb] rtsx_usb_write_register+0x12c/0x143 [rtsx_usb] rtsx_usb_probe+0x226/0x4b2 [rtsx_usb] Fix it to use kmalloc() to get DMA-able memory region instead. Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/667d627d502e1ba9ff4f9b94966df3299d2d3c0d.1656642167.git.skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 13 +++++++------ include/linux/rtsx_usb.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index 1ef9b61077c4..e147cc8ab0fd 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -631,8 +631,7 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, ucr->pusb_dev = usb_dev; - ucr->iobuf = usb_alloc_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, - GFP_KERNEL, &ucr->iobuf_dma); + ucr->iobuf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ucr->iobuf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -668,8 +667,9 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, out_init_fail: usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - usb_free_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, ucr->iobuf, - ucr->iobuf_dma); + kfree(ucr->iobuf); + ucr->iobuf = NULL; + ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; return ret; } @@ -682,8 +682,9 @@ static void rtsx_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) mfd_remove_devices(&intf->dev); usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - usb_free_coherent(ucr->pusb_dev, IOBUF_SIZE, ucr->iobuf, - ucr->iobuf_dma); + kfree(ucr->iobuf); + ucr->iobuf = NULL; + ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; } #ifdef CONFIG_PM diff --git a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h index 159729cffd8e..a07f7341ebc2 100644 --- a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h +++ b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct rtsx_ucr { struct usb_interface *pusb_intf; struct usb_sg_request current_sg; unsigned char *iobuf; - dma_addr_t iobuf_dma; struct timer_list sg_timer; struct mutex dev_mutex; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3776c78559853fd151be7c41e369fd076fb679d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 20:32:56 -0600 Subject: misc: rtsx_usb: use separate command and response buffers rtsx_usb uses same buffer for command and response. There could be a potential conflict using the same buffer for both especially if retries and timeouts are involved. Use separate command and response buffers to avoid conflicts. Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/07e3721804ff07aaab9ef5b39a5691d0718b9ade.1656642167.git.skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- include/linux/rtsx_usb.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index e147cc8ab0fd..4e2108052509 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -631,15 +631,18 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, ucr->pusb_dev = usb_dev; - ucr->iobuf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ucr->iobuf) + ucr->cmd_buf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ucr->cmd_buf) return -ENOMEM; + ucr->rsp_buf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ucr->rsp_buf) + goto out_free_cmd_buf; + usb_set_intfdata(intf, ucr); ucr->vendor_id = id->idVendor; ucr->product_id = id->idProduct; - ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = ucr->iobuf; mutex_init(&ucr->dev_mutex); @@ -667,9 +670,11 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, out_init_fail: usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - kfree(ucr->iobuf); - ucr->iobuf = NULL; - ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; + kfree(ucr->rsp_buf); + ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; +out_free_cmd_buf: + kfree(ucr->cmd_buf); + ucr->cmd_buf = NULL; return ret; } @@ -682,9 +687,12 @@ static void rtsx_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) mfd_remove_devices(&intf->dev); usb_set_intfdata(ucr->pusb_intf, NULL); - kfree(ucr->iobuf); - ucr->iobuf = NULL; - ucr->cmd_buf = ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; + + kfree(ucr->cmd_buf); + ucr->cmd_buf = NULL; + + kfree(ucr->rsp_buf); + ucr->rsp_buf = NULL; } #ifdef CONFIG_PM diff --git a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h index a07f7341ebc2..3247ed8e9ff0 100644 --- a/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h +++ b/include/linux/rtsx_usb.h @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ struct rtsx_ucr { struct usb_device *pusb_dev; struct usb_interface *pusb_intf; struct usb_sg_request current_sg; - unsigned char *iobuf; struct timer_list sg_timer; struct mutex dev_mutex; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ee6c6e7342471d468096a16bee9f89b5a6c1e39d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Davidlohr Bueso Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 09:52:25 -0700 Subject: staging/wlan-ng: get the correct struct hfa384x in work callback hfa384x_usbctlx_completion_task() is bogusly using the reaper BH when in fact this is the completion_bh. This was reflected when trying to acquire the hw->ctlxq.lock and getting a failed lockdep class initialized to it. Fixes: 9442e81d7e7c ("staging/wlan-ng, prism2usb: replace completion_bh tasklet with work") Reported-by: syzbot+ce3408364c4a234dd90c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629165225.3436822-1-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c b/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c index 33844526c797..02fdef7a16c8 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c +++ b/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c @@ -2632,7 +2632,7 @@ static void hfa384x_usbctlx_reaper_task(struct work_struct *work) */ static void hfa384x_usbctlx_completion_task(struct work_struct *work) { - struct hfa384x *hw = container_of(work, struct hfa384x, reaper_bh); + struct hfa384x *hw = container_of(work, struct hfa384x, completion_bh); struct hfa384x_usbctlx *ctlx, *temp; unsigned long flags; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 144248515246e52a3706de1ee928af29a63794b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:27:10 +0200 Subject: drm: panel-orientation-quirks: Add quirk for the Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 830 The Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 830F / 830L use a panel which has been mounted 90 degrees rotated. Add a quirk for this. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220623112710.15693-1-hdegoede@redhat.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c index df87ba99a87c..d4e0f2e85548 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c @@ -286,6 +286,21 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id orientation_data[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Lenovo YB1-X9"), }, .driver_data = (void *)&lcd1200x1920_rightside_up, + }, { /* Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 830F / 830L */ + .matches = { + /* + * Note this also matches the Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 1050F/L + * since that uses the same mainboard. The resolution match + * will limit this to only matching on the 830F/L. Neither has + * any external video outputs so those are not a concern. + */ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corp."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "VALLEYVIEW C0 PLATFORM"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "BYT-T FFD8"), + /* Partial match on beginning of BIOS version */ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "BLADE_21"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)&lcd1200x1920_rightside_up, }, { /* OneGX1 Pro */ .matches = { DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SYSTEM_MANUFACTURER"), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 96e8fc5818686d4a1591bb6907e7fdb64ef29884 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:14:39 +0200 Subject: x86/xen: Use clear_bss() for Xen PV guests Instead of clearing the bss area in assembly code, use the clear_bss() function. This requires to pass the start_info address as parameter to xen_start_kernel() in order to avoid the xen_start_info being zeroed again. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-2-jgross@suse.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 8 ++++++-- arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 10 +--------- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h index f8b9ee97a891..f37cbff7354c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h @@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ void *extend_brk(size_t size, size_t align); static char __brk_##name[size] extern void probe_roms(void); + +void clear_bss(void); + #ifdef __i386__ asmlinkage void __init i386_start_kernel(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index bd4a34100ed0..e7e233209a8c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized yet. */ -static void __init clear_bss(void) +void __init clear_bss(void) { memset(__bss_start, 0, (unsigned long) __bss_stop - (unsigned long) __bss_start); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c index e3297b15701c..70fb2ea85e90 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -1183,15 +1183,19 @@ static void __init xen_domu_set_legacy_features(void) extern void early_xen_iret_patch(void); /* First C function to be called on Xen boot */ -asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void) +asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(struct start_info *si) { struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl; unsigned long initrd_start = 0; int rc; - if (!xen_start_info) + if (!si) return; + clear_bss(); + + xen_start_info = si; + __text_gen_insn(&early_xen_iret_patch, JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, &early_xen_iret_patch, &xen_iret, JMP32_INSN_SIZE); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index 3a2cd93bf059..13af6fe453e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -48,15 +48,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_xen) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR cld - /* Clear .bss */ - xor %eax,%eax - mov $__bss_start, %rdi - mov $__bss_stop, %rcx - sub %rdi, %rcx - shr $3, %rcx - rep stosq - - mov %rsi, xen_start_info mov initial_stack(%rip), %rsp /* Set up %gs. @@ -71,6 +62,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_xen) cdq wrmsr + mov %rsi, %rdi call xen_start_kernel SYM_CODE_END(startup_xen) __FINIT -- cgit v1.2.3 From 38fa5479b41376dc9d7f57e71c83514285a25ca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:14:40 +0200 Subject: x86: Clear .brk area at early boot The .brk section has the same properties as .bss: it is an alloc-only section and should be cleared before being used. Not doing so is especially a problem for Xen PV guests, as the hypervisor will validate page tables (check for writable page tables and hypervisor private bits) before accepting them to be used. Make sure .brk is initially zero by letting clear_bss() clear the brk area, too. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-3-jgross@suse.com --- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index e7e233209a8c..6a3cfaf6b72a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ void __init clear_bss(void) { memset(__bss_start, 0, (unsigned long) __bss_stop - (unsigned long) __bss_start); + memset(__brk_base, 0, + (unsigned long) __brk_limit - (unsigned long) __brk_base); } static unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7e09ac27f43b382f5fe9bb7c7f4c465ece1f8a23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:14:41 +0200 Subject: x86: Fix .brk attribute in linker script Commit in Fixes added the "NOLOAD" attribute to the .brk section as a "failsafe" measure. Unfortunately, this leads to the linker no longer covering the .brk section in a program header, resulting in the kernel loader not knowing that the memory for the .brk section must be reserved. This has led to crashes when loading the kernel as PV dom0 under Xen, but other scenarios could be hit by the same problem (e.g. in case an uncompressed kernel is used and the initrd is placed directly behind it). So drop the "NOLOAD" attribute. This has been verified to correctly cover the .brk section by a program header of the resulting ELF file. Fixes: e32683c6f7d2 ("x86/mm: Fix RESERVE_BRK() for older binutils") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-4-jgross@suse.com --- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 81aba718ecd5..9487ce8c13ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ SECTIONS __end_of_kernel_reserve = .; . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); - .brk (NOLOAD) : AT(ADDR(.brk) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + .brk : AT(ADDR(.brk) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __brk_base = .; . += 64 * 1024; /* 64k alignment slop space */ *(.bss..brk) /* areas brk users have reserved */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0ac9c3dd0d6fe293cd5044cfad10bec27d171e4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Caleb Connolly Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 15:06:00 +0100 Subject: dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: fix runtime PM underflow Commit dbad41e7bb5f ("dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: check if the runtime pm enabled") caused unbalanced pm_runtime_get/put() calls when the bam is controlled remotely. This commit reverts it and just enables pm_runtime in all cases, the clk_* functions already just nop when the clock is NULL. Also clean up a bit by removing unnecessary bamclk null checks. Suggested-by: Stephan Gerhold Fixes: dbad41e7bb5f ("dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: check if the runtime pm enabled") Signed-off-by: Caleb Connolly Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629140559.118537-1-caleb.connolly@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/qcom/bam_dma.c | 39 +++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/qcom/bam_dma.c b/drivers/dma/qcom/bam_dma.c index 87f6ca1541cf..2ff787df513e 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/qcom/bam_dma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/qcom/bam_dma.c @@ -558,14 +558,6 @@ static int bam_alloc_chan(struct dma_chan *chan) return 0; } -static int bam_pm_runtime_get_sync(struct device *dev) -{ - if (pm_runtime_enabled(dev)) - return pm_runtime_get_sync(dev); - - return 0; -} - /** * bam_free_chan - Frees dma resources associated with specific channel * @chan: specified channel @@ -581,7 +573,7 @@ static void bam_free_chan(struct dma_chan *chan) unsigned long flags; int ret; - ret = bam_pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return; @@ -784,7 +776,7 @@ static int bam_pause(struct dma_chan *chan) unsigned long flag; int ret; - ret = bam_pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -810,7 +802,7 @@ static int bam_resume(struct dma_chan *chan) unsigned long flag; int ret; - ret = bam_pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -919,7 +911,7 @@ static irqreturn_t bam_dma_irq(int irq, void *data) if (srcs & P_IRQ) tasklet_schedule(&bdev->task); - ret = bam_pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return IRQ_NONE; @@ -1037,7 +1029,7 @@ static void bam_start_dma(struct bam_chan *bchan) if (!vd) return; - ret = bam_pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(bdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return; @@ -1374,11 +1366,6 @@ static int bam_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret) goto err_unregister_dma; - if (!bdev->bamclk) { - pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); - return 0; - } - pm_runtime_irq_safe(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(&pdev->dev, BAM_DMA_AUTOSUSPEND_DELAY); pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev); @@ -1462,10 +1449,8 @@ static int __maybe_unused bam_dma_suspend(struct device *dev) { struct bam_device *bdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (bdev->bamclk) { - pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev); - clk_unprepare(bdev->bamclk); - } + pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev); + clk_unprepare(bdev->bamclk); return 0; } @@ -1475,13 +1460,11 @@ static int __maybe_unused bam_dma_resume(struct device *dev) struct bam_device *bdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev); int ret; - if (bdev->bamclk) { - ret = clk_prepare(bdev->bamclk); - if (ret) - return ret; + ret = clk_prepare(bdev->bamclk); + if (ret) + return ret; - pm_runtime_force_resume(dev); - } + pm_runtime_force_resume(dev); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 44c4237cf3436bda2b185ff728123651ad133f69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Jiang Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:00:56 -0700 Subject: dmaengine: idxd: force wq context cleanup on device disable path Testing shown that when a wq mode is setup to be dedicated and then torn down and reconfigured to shared, the wq configured end up being dedicated anyays. The root cause is when idxd_device_wqs_clear_state() gets called during idxd_driver removal, idxd_wq_disable_cleanup() does not get called vs when the wq driver is removed first. The check of wq state being "enabled" causes the cleanup to be bypassed. However, idxd_driver->remove() releases all wq drivers. So the wqs goes to "disabled" state and will never be "enabled". By that point, the driver has no idea if the wq was previously configured or clean. So force call idxd_wq_disable_cleanup() on all wqs always to make sure everything gets cleaned up. Reported-by: Tony Zhu Tested-by: Tony Zhu Fixes: 0dcfe41e9a4c ("dmanegine: idxd: cleanup all device related bits after disabling device") Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628230056.2527816-1-fenghua.yu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/idxd/device.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/idxd/device.c b/drivers/dma/idxd/device.c index ff0ea60051f0..5a8cc52c1abf 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/idxd/device.c +++ b/drivers/dma/idxd/device.c @@ -716,10 +716,7 @@ static void idxd_device_wqs_clear_state(struct idxd_device *idxd) struct idxd_wq *wq = idxd->wqs[i]; mutex_lock(&wq->wq_lock); - if (wq->state == IDXD_WQ_ENABLED) { - idxd_wq_disable_cleanup(wq); - wq->state = IDXD_WQ_DISABLED; - } + idxd_wq_disable_cleanup(wq); idxd_wq_device_reset_cleanup(wq); mutex_unlock(&wq->wq_lock); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 49db68d45bdcad06e28a420d5d911e4178389666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Emil Renner Berthing Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 11:09:39 +0200 Subject: dmaengine: dw-axi-dmac: Fix RMW on channel suspend register When the DMA is configured for more than 8 channels the bits controlling suspend moves to another register. However when adding support for this the new register would be completely overwritten in one case and overwritten with values from the old register in another case. Found by comparing the parallel implementation of more than 8 channel support for the StarFive JH7100 SoC by Samin. Fixes: 824351668a41 ("dmaengine: dw-axi-dmac: support DMAX_NUM_CHANNELS > 8") Co-developed-by: Samin Guo Signed-off-by: Samin Guo Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627090939.1775717-1-emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c b/drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c index e9c9bcb1f5c2..c741da02b67e 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c +++ b/drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c @@ -1164,8 +1164,9 @@ static int dma_chan_pause(struct dma_chan *dchan) BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP_WE_SHIFT; axi_dma_iowrite32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHEN, val); } else { - val = BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP2_SHIFT | - BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP2_WE_SHIFT; + val = axi_dma_ioread32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHSUSPREG); + val |= BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP2_SHIFT | + BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP2_WE_SHIFT; axi_dma_iowrite32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHSUSPREG, val); } @@ -1190,12 +1191,13 @@ static inline void axi_chan_resume(struct axi_dma_chan *chan) { u32 val; - val = axi_dma_ioread32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHEN); if (chan->chip->dw->hdata->reg_map_8_channels) { + val = axi_dma_ioread32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHEN); val &= ~(BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP_SHIFT); val |= (BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP_WE_SHIFT); axi_dma_iowrite32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHEN, val); } else { + val = axi_dma_ioread32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHSUSPREG); val &= ~(BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP2_SHIFT); val |= (BIT(chan->id) << DMAC_CHAN_SUSP2_WE_SHIFT); axi_dma_iowrite32(chan->chip, DMAC_CHSUSPREG, val); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fd31000d58f41588fa10128278efdab8474f5ce8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamie Iles Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 12:10:08 +0100 Subject: irqchip/xilinx: Add explicit dependency on OF_ADDRESS Commit b84dc7f0e364 ("irqchip/xilinx: Remove microblaze+zynq dependency") relaxed the dependencies on the Xilinx interrupt controller to be OF only, but some OF architectures (s390 for example) do not support OF_ADDRESS and so a build of the driver will result in undefined references to of_iomap/iounmap and friends. Fixes: b84dc7f0e364 ("irqchip/xilinx: Remove microblaze+zynq dependency") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles Acked-by: Michal Simek Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630111008.3838307-1-jamie@jamieiles.com --- drivers/irqchip/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/Kconfig b/drivers/irqchip/Kconfig index 1f23a6be7d88..bbb11cb8b0f7 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/irqchip/Kconfig @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ config XTENSA_MX config XILINX_INTC bool "Xilinx Interrupt Controller IP" - depends on OF + depends on OF_ADDRESS select IRQ_DOMAIN help Support for the Xilinx Interrupt Controller IP core. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1357d2a65601bc0afb221672d5a8f1649063a141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2022 07:28:24 +0000 Subject: irqchip/apple-aic: Make symbol 'use_fast_ipi' static The sparse tool complains as follows: drivers/irqchip/irq-apple-aic.c:231:1: warning: symbol 'use_fast_ipi' was not declared. Should it be static? This symbol is not used outside of irq-apple-aic.c, so marks it static. Fixes: 2cf68211664a ("irqchip/apple-aic: Add Fast IPI support") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Reviewed-by: Hector Martin Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220618072824.562350-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com --- drivers/irqchip/irq-apple-aic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-apple-aic.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-apple-aic.c index 5ac83185ff47..1c2813ad8bbe 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-apple-aic.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-apple-aic.c @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ #define AIC_TMR_EL02_PHYS AIC_TMR_GUEST_PHYS #define AIC_TMR_EL02_VIRT AIC_TMR_GUEST_VIRT -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(use_fast_ipi); +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(use_fast_ipi); struct aic_info { int version; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 09f7b80fac3e588b282ad26aabd7336d7d293efd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sascha Hauer Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 13:50:42 +0200 Subject: dmaengine: imx-sdma: only restart cyclic channel when enabled An interrupt for a channel might be pending even after struct dma_device::device_terminate_all has been called. In that case the recently introduced warning message "restart cyclic channel..." triggers and the channel will be restarted. This is not desired as the channel has just been stopped. Only restart the channel when we still have a descriptor set for it (which will be set to NULL in sdma_terminate_all()). Fixes: 5b215c28b9235 ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: restart cyclic channel if needed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220617115042.4004062-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c index 900cafdaf359..f37a276f519e 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ static void sdma_update_channel_loop(struct sdma_channel *sdmac) * SDMA stops cyclic channel when DMA request triggers a channel and no SDMA * owned buffer is available (i.e. BD_DONE was set too late). */ - if (!is_sdma_channel_enabled(sdmac->sdma, sdmac->channel)) { + if (sdmac->desc && !is_sdma_channel_enabled(sdmac->sdma, sdmac->channel)) { dev_warn(sdmac->sdma->dev, "restart cyclic channel %d\n", sdmac->channel); sdma_enable_channel(sdmac->sdma, sdmac->channel); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07358194badf73e267289b40b761f5dc56928eab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 20:42:18 +0200 Subject: PM: runtime: Redefine pm_runtime_release_supplier() Instead of passing an extra bool argument to pm_runtime_release_supplier(), make its callers take care of triggering a runtime-suspend of the supplier device as needed. No expected functional impact. Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: 5.1+ # 5.1+ --- drivers/base/core.c | 3 ++- drivers/base/power/runtime.c | 20 +++++++++----------- include/linux/pm_runtime.h | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 7cd789c4985d..58aa49527d3a 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static void device_link_release_fn(struct work_struct *work) /* Ensure that all references to the link object have been dropped. */ device_link_synchronize_removal(); - pm_runtime_release_supplier(link, true); + pm_runtime_release_supplier(link); + pm_request_idle(link->supplier); put_device(link->consumer); put_device(link->supplier); diff --git a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c index 676dc72d912d..23cc4c377d77 100644 --- a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c +++ b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c @@ -308,13 +308,10 @@ static int rpm_get_suppliers(struct device *dev) /** * pm_runtime_release_supplier - Drop references to device link's supplier. * @link: Target device link. - * @check_idle: Whether or not to check if the supplier device is idle. * - * Drop all runtime PM references associated with @link to its supplier device - * and if @check_idle is set, check if that device is idle (and so it can be - * suspended). + * Drop all runtime PM references associated with @link to its supplier device. */ -void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link, bool check_idle) +void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link) { struct device *supplier = link->supplier; @@ -327,9 +324,6 @@ void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link, bool check_idle) while (refcount_dec_not_one(&link->rpm_active) && atomic_read(&supplier->power.usage_count) > 0) pm_runtime_put_noidle(supplier); - - if (check_idle) - pm_request_idle(supplier); } static void __rpm_put_suppliers(struct device *dev, bool try_to_suspend) @@ -337,8 +331,11 @@ static void __rpm_put_suppliers(struct device *dev, bool try_to_suspend) struct device_link *link; list_for_each_entry_rcu(link, &dev->links.suppliers, c_node, - device_links_read_lock_held()) - pm_runtime_release_supplier(link, try_to_suspend); + device_links_read_lock_held()) { + pm_runtime_release_supplier(link); + if (try_to_suspend) + pm_request_idle(link->supplier); + } } static void rpm_put_suppliers(struct device *dev) @@ -1838,7 +1835,8 @@ void pm_runtime_drop_link(struct device_link *link) return; pm_runtime_drop_link_count(link->consumer); - pm_runtime_release_supplier(link, true); + pm_runtime_release_supplier(link); + pm_request_idle(link->supplier); } static bool pm_runtime_need_not_resume(struct device *dev) diff --git a/include/linux/pm_runtime.h b/include/linux/pm_runtime.h index 9e4d056967c6..0a41b2dcccad 100644 --- a/include/linux/pm_runtime.h +++ b/include/linux/pm_runtime.h @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ extern void pm_runtime_get_suppliers(struct device *dev); extern void pm_runtime_put_suppliers(struct device *dev); extern void pm_runtime_new_link(struct device *dev); extern void pm_runtime_drop_link(struct device_link *link); -extern void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link, bool check_idle); +extern void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link); extern int devm_pm_runtime_enable(struct device *dev); @@ -314,8 +314,7 @@ static inline void pm_runtime_get_suppliers(struct device *dev) {} static inline void pm_runtime_put_suppliers(struct device *dev) {} static inline void pm_runtime_new_link(struct device *dev) {} static inline void pm_runtime_drop_link(struct device_link *link) {} -static inline void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link, - bool check_idle) {} +static inline void pm_runtime_release_supplier(struct device_link *link) {} #endif /* !CONFIG_PM */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 887371066039011144b4a94af97d9328df6869a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 21:16:41 +0200 Subject: PM: runtime: Fix supplier device management during consumer probe Because pm_runtime_get_suppliers() bumps up the rpm_active counter of each device link to a supplier of the given device in addition to bumping up the supplier's PM-runtime usage counter, a runtime suspend of the consumer device may case the latter to go down to 0 when pm_runtime_put_suppliers() is running on a remote CPU. If that happens after pm_runtime_put_suppliers() has released power.lock for the consumer device, and a runtime resume of that device takes place immediately after it, before pm_runtime_put() is called for the supplier, that pm_runtime_put() call may cause the supplier to be suspended even though the consumer is active. To prevent that from happening, modify pm_runtime_get_suppliers() to call pm_runtime_get_sync() for the given device's suppliers without touching the rpm_active counters of the involved device links Accordingly, modify pm_runtime_put_suppliers() to call pm_runtime_put() for the given device's suppliers without looking at the rpm_active counters of the device links at hand. [This is analogous to what happened before commit 4c06c4e6cf63 ("driver core: Fix possible supplier PM-usage counter imbalance").] Since pm_runtime_get_suppliers() sets supplier_preactivated for each device link where the supplier's PM-runtime usage counter has been incremented and pm_runtime_put_suppliers() calls pm_runtime_put() for the suppliers whose device links have supplier_preactivated set, the PM-runtime usage counter is balanced for each supplier and this is independent of the runtime suspend and resume of the consumer device. However, in case a device link with DL_FLAG_PM_RUNTIME set is dropped during the consumer device probe, so pm_runtime_get_suppliers() bumps up the supplier's PM-runtime usage counter, but it cannot be dropped by pm_runtime_put_suppliers(), make device_link_release_fn() take care of that. Fixes: 4c06c4e6cf63 ("driver core: Fix possible supplier PM-usage counter imbalance") Reported-by: Peter Wang Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Peter Wang Cc: 5.1+ # 5.1+ --- drivers/base/core.c | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/base/power/runtime.c | 14 +------------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 58aa49527d3a..460d6f163e41 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -487,6 +487,16 @@ static void device_link_release_fn(struct work_struct *work) device_link_synchronize_removal(); pm_runtime_release_supplier(link); + /* + * If supplier_preactivated is set, the link has been dropped between + * the pm_runtime_get_suppliers() and pm_runtime_put_suppliers() calls + * in __driver_probe_device(). In that case, drop the supplier's + * PM-runtime usage counter to remove the reference taken by + * pm_runtime_get_suppliers(). + */ + if (link->supplier_preactivated) + pm_runtime_put_noidle(link->supplier); + pm_request_idle(link->supplier); put_device(link->consumer); diff --git a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c index 23cc4c377d77..949907e2e242 100644 --- a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c +++ b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c @@ -1768,7 +1768,6 @@ void pm_runtime_get_suppliers(struct device *dev) if (link->flags & DL_FLAG_PM_RUNTIME) { link->supplier_preactivated = true; pm_runtime_get_sync(link->supplier); - refcount_inc(&link->rpm_active); } device_links_read_unlock(idx); @@ -1788,19 +1787,8 @@ void pm_runtime_put_suppliers(struct device *dev) list_for_each_entry_rcu(link, &dev->links.suppliers, c_node, device_links_read_lock_held()) if (link->supplier_preactivated) { - bool put; - link->supplier_preactivated = false; - - spin_lock_irq(&dev->power.lock); - - put = pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev) && - refcount_dec_not_one(&link->rpm_active); - - spin_unlock_irq(&dev->power.lock); - - if (put) - pm_runtime_put(link->supplier); + pm_runtime_put(link->supplier); } device_links_read_unlock(idx); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 35adf9a4e55e0b0a9d5e313e65ad83681dc32e9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Hunter Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 12:44:03 +0300 Subject: modules: Fix corruption of /proc/kallsyms The commit 91fb02f31505 ("module: Move kallsyms support into a separate file") changed from using strlcpy() to using strscpy() which created a buffer overflow. That happened because: 1) an incorrect value was passed as the buffer length 2) strscpy() (unlike strlcpy()) may copy beyond the length of the input string when copying word-by-word. The assumption was that because it was already known that the strings being copied would fit in the space available, it was not necessary to correctly set the buffer length. strscpy() breaks that assumption because although it will not touch bytes beyond the given buffer length it may write bytes beyond the input string length when writing word-by-word. The result of the buffer overflow is to corrupt the symbol type information that follows. e.g. $ sudo cat -v /proc/kallsyms | grep '\^' | head ffffffffc0615000 ^@ rfcomm_session_get [rfcomm] ffffffffc061c060 ^@ session_list [rfcomm] ffffffffc06150d0 ^@ rfcomm_send_frame [rfcomm] ffffffffc0615130 ^@ rfcomm_make_uih [rfcomm] ffffffffc07ed58d ^@ bnep_exit [bnep] ffffffffc07ec000 ^@ bnep_rx_control [bnep] ffffffffc07ec1a0 ^@ bnep_session [bnep] ffffffffc07e7000 ^@ input_leds_event [input_leds] ffffffffc07e9000 ^@ input_leds_handler [input_leds] ffffffffc07e7010 ^@ input_leds_disconnect [input_leds] Notably, the null bytes (represented above by ^@) can confuse tools. Fix by correcting the buffer length. Fixes: 91fb02f31505 ("module: Move kallsyms support into a separate file") Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain --- kernel/module/kallsyms.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module/kallsyms.c b/kernel/module/kallsyms.c index 3e11523bc6f6..18c23545b984 100644 --- a/kernel/module/kallsyms.c +++ b/kernel/module/kallsyms.c @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ void layout_symtab(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) info->symoffs = ALIGN(mod->data_layout.size, symsect->sh_addralign ?: 1); info->stroffs = mod->data_layout.size = info->symoffs + ndst * sizeof(Elf_Sym); mod->data_layout.size += strtab_size; + /* Note add_kallsyms() computes strtab_size as core_typeoffs - stroffs */ info->core_typeoffs = mod->data_layout.size; mod->data_layout.size += ndst * sizeof(char); mod->data_layout.size = strict_align(mod->data_layout.size); @@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ void add_kallsyms(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) Elf_Sym *dst; char *s; Elf_Shdr *symsec = &info->sechdrs[info->index.sym]; + unsigned long strtab_size; /* Set up to point into init section. */ mod->kallsyms = (void __rcu *)mod->init_layout.base + @@ -190,19 +192,26 @@ void add_kallsyms(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) mod->core_kallsyms.symtab = dst = mod->data_layout.base + info->symoffs; mod->core_kallsyms.strtab = s = mod->data_layout.base + info->stroffs; mod->core_kallsyms.typetab = mod->data_layout.base + info->core_typeoffs; + strtab_size = info->core_typeoffs - info->stroffs; src = rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->symtab; for (ndst = i = 0; i < rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->num_symtab; i++) { rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->typetab[i] = elf_type(src + i, info); if (i == 0 || is_livepatch_module(mod) || is_core_symbol(src + i, info->sechdrs, info->hdr->e_shnum, info->index.pcpu)) { + ssize_t ret; + mod->core_kallsyms.typetab[ndst] = rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->typetab[i]; dst[ndst] = src[i]; dst[ndst++].st_name = s - mod->core_kallsyms.strtab; - s += strscpy(s, - &rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->strtab[src[i].st_name], - KSYM_NAME_LEN) + 1; + ret = strscpy(s, + &rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->strtab[src[i].st_name], + strtab_size); + if (ret < 0) + break; + s += ret + 1; + strtab_size -= ret + 1; } } preempt_enable(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From cfa94c538be621a0ba645adfa9ead005b5fa02f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2022 17:21:56 +0200 Subject: module: Fix selfAssignment cppcheck warning cppcheck reports the following warnings: kernel/module/main.c:1455:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->core_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->core_layout.size = strict_align(mod->core_layout.size); ^ kernel/module/main.c:1489:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->init_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->init_layout.size = strict_align(mod->init_layout.size); ^ kernel/module/main.c:1493:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->init_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->init_layout.size = strict_align(mod->init_layout.size); ^ kernel/module/main.c:1504:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->init_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->init_layout.size = strict_align(mod->init_layout.size); ^ kernel/module/main.c:1459:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->data_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->data_layout.size = strict_align(mod->data_layout.size); ^ kernel/module/main.c:1463:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->data_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->data_layout.size = strict_align(mod->data_layout.size); ^ kernel/module/main.c:1467:26: warning: Redundant assignment of 'mod->data_layout.size' to itself. [selfAssignment] mod->data_layout.size = strict_align(mod->data_layout.size); ^ This is due to strict_align() being a no-op when CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is not selected. Transform strict_align() macro into an inline function. It will allow type checking and avoid the selfAssignment warning. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain --- kernel/module/internal.h | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module/internal.h b/kernel/module/internal.h index bc5507ab8450..ec104c2950c3 100644 --- a/kernel/module/internal.h +++ b/kernel/module/internal.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifndef ARCH_SHF_SMALL #define ARCH_SHF_SMALL 0 @@ -30,11 +31,13 @@ * to ensure complete separation of code and data, but * only when CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y */ -#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX -# define strict_align(X) PAGE_ALIGN(X) -#else -# define strict_align(X) (X) -#endif +static inline unsigned int strict_align(unsigned int size) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX)) + return PAGE_ALIGN(size); + else + return size; +} extern struct mutex module_mutex; extern struct list_head modules; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f963ef123900ac534aeb6141642e5351989ac14c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2022 17:33:20 +0200 Subject: module: Fix "warning: variable 'exit' set but not used" When CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD is not selected, 'exit' is set but never used. It is not possible to replace the #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD by IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD) because mod->exit doesn't exist when CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD is not selected. And because of the rcu_read_lock_sched() section it is not easy to regroup everything in a single #ifdef. Let's regroup partially and add missing #ifdef to completely opt out the use of 'exit' when CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD is not selected. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain --- kernel/module/main.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c index fed58d30725d..0548151dd933 100644 --- a/kernel/module/main.c +++ b/kernel/module/main.c @@ -2939,24 +2939,25 @@ static void cfi_init(struct module *mod) { #ifdef CONFIG_CFI_CLANG initcall_t *init; +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD exitcall_t *exit; +#endif rcu_read_lock_sched(); mod->cfi_check = (cfi_check_fn) find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, "__cfi_check"); init = (initcall_t *) find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, "__cfi_jt_init_module"); - exit = (exitcall_t *) - find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, "__cfi_jt_cleanup_module"); - rcu_read_unlock_sched(); - /* Fix init/exit functions to point to the CFI jump table */ if (init) mod->init = *init; #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD + exit = (exitcall_t *) + find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, "__cfi_jt_cleanup_module"); if (exit) mod->exit = *exit; #endif + rcu_read_unlock_sched(); cfi_module_add(mod, mod_tree.addr_min); #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2cc39179acbbe524127f0427cee92b629db4d64b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 06:33:03 +0900 Subject: doc: module: update file references Adjust documents to the file moves made by commit cfc1d277891e ("module: Move all into module/"). Thanks to Yanteng Si for helping me to update Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kernel-api.rst Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Acked-by: Yanteng Si Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain --- Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst | 2 +- Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst | 4 ++-- Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.rst | 10 +++++----- .../translations/it_IT/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst | 6 +++--- Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kernel-api.rst | 2 +- .../translations/zh_CN/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst | 2 +- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst b/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst index d6b3f94b9f1f..0793c400d4b0 100644 --- a/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst +++ b/Documentation/core-api/kernel-api.rst @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Module Loading Inter Module support -------------------- -Refer to the file kernel/module.c for more information. +Refer to the files in kernel/module/ for more information. Hardware Interfaces =================== diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst b/Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst index 5ad9e0abe42c..12e4aecdae94 100644 --- a/Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst +++ b/Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst @@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ namespace ``USB_STORAGE``, use:: The corresponding ksymtab entry struct ``kernel_symbol`` will have the member ``namespace`` set accordingly. A symbol that is exported without a namespace will refer to ``NULL``. There is no default namespace if none is defined. ``modpost`` -and kernel/module.c make use the namespace at build time or module load time, -respectively. +and kernel/module/main.c make use the namespace at build time or module load +time, respectively. 2.2 Using the DEFAULT_SYMBOL_NAMESPACE define ============================================= diff --git a/Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.rst b/Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.rst index dbe9b400e39f..7347638895a0 100644 --- a/Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.rst +++ b/Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.rst @@ -210,11 +210,11 @@ module->symtab. ===================================== Normally, a stripped down copy of a module's symbol table (containing only "core" symbols) is made available through module->symtab (See layout_symtab() -in kernel/module.c). For livepatch modules, the symbol table copied into memory -on module load must be exactly the same as the symbol table produced when the -patch module was compiled. This is because the relocations in each livepatch -relocation section refer to their respective symbols with their symbol indices, -and the original symbol indices (and thus the symtab ordering) must be +in kernel/module/kallsyms.c). For livepatch modules, the symbol table copied +into memory on module load must be exactly the same as the symbol table produced +when the patch module was compiled. This is because the relocations in each +livepatch relocation section refer to their respective symbols with their symbol +indices, and the original symbol indices (and thus the symtab ordering) must be preserved in order for apply_relocate_add() to find the right symbol. For example, take this particular rela from a livepatch module::: diff --git a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst index 42f5d04e38ec..0f6898860d6d 100644 --- a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst +++ b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst @@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ Di conseguenza, nella tabella dei simboli del kernel ci sarà una voce rappresentata dalla struttura ``kernel_symbol`` che avrà il campo ``namespace`` (spazio dei nomi) impostato. Un simbolo esportato senza uno spazio dei nomi avrà questo campo impostato a ``NULL``. Non esiste uno spazio dei nomi -di base. Il programma ``modpost`` e il codice in kernel/module.c usano lo spazio -dei nomi, rispettivamente, durante la compilazione e durante il caricamento -di un modulo. +di base. Il programma ``modpost`` e il codice in kernel/module/main.c usano lo +spazio dei nomi, rispettivamente, durante la compilazione e durante il +caricamento di un modulo. 2.2 Usare il simbolo di preprocessore DEFAULT_SYMBOL_NAMESPACE ============================================================== diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kernel-api.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kernel-api.rst index e45fe80d1cd8..962d31d019d7 100644 --- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kernel-api.rst +++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kernel-api.rst @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ kernel/kmod.c 模块接口支持 ------------ -更多信息请参考文件kernel/module.c。 +更多信息请参阅kernel/module/目录下的文件。 硬件接口 ======== diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst index 6abf7ed534ca..bb16f0611046 100644 --- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst +++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ 相应的 ksymtab 条目结构体 ``kernel_symbol`` 将有相应的成员 ``命名空间`` 集。 导出时未指明命名空间的符号将指向 ``NULL`` 。如果没有定义命名空间，则默认没有。 -``modpost`` 和kernel/module.c分别在构建时或模块加载时使用名称空间。 +``modpost`` 和kernel/module/main.c分别在构建时或模块加载时使用名称空间。 2.2 使用DEFAULT_SYMBOL_NAMESPACE定义 ==================================== -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2cd37c2e72449a7add6da1183d20a6247d6db111 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuah Khan Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 10:53:52 -0600 Subject: misc: rtsx_usb: set return value in rsp_buf alloc err path Set return value in rsp_buf alloc error path before going to error handling. drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:639:6: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized] if (!ucr->rsp_buf) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:678:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here return ret; ^~~ drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:639:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false if (!ucr->rsp_buf) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c:622:9: note: initialize the variable 'ret' to silence this warning int ret; ^ = 0 Fixes: 3776c7855985 ("misc: rtsx_usb: use separate command and response buffers") Reported-by: kernel test robot Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701165352.15687-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c index 4e2108052509..f150d8769f19 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c +++ b/drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_usb.c @@ -636,8 +636,10 @@ static int rtsx_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return -ENOMEM; ucr->rsp_buf = kmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ucr->rsp_buf) + if (!ucr->rsp_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto out_free_cmd_buf; + } usb_set_intfdata(intf, ucr); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 73f37dbcfe1763ee2294c7717a1f571e27d17fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Axel Rasmussen Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 10:38:12 -0700 Subject: mm: userfaultfd: fix UFFDIO_CONTINUE on fallocated shmem pages When fallocate() is used on a shmem file, the pages we allocate can end up with !PageUptodate. Since UFFDIO_CONTINUE tries to find the existing page the user wants to map with SGP_READ, we would fail to find such a page, since shmem_getpage_gfp returns with a "NULL" pagep for SGP_READ if it discovers !PageUptodate. As a result, UFFDIO_CONTINUE returns -EFAULT, as it would do if the page wasn't found in the page cache at all. This isn't the intended behavior. UFFDIO_CONTINUE is just trying to find if a page exists, and doesn't care whether it still needs to be cleared or not. So, instead of SGP_READ, pass in SGP_NOALLOC. This is the same, except for one critical difference: in the !PageUptodate case, SGP_NOALLOC will clear the page and then return it. With this change, UFFDIO_CONTINUE works properly (succeeds) on a shmem file which has been fallocated, but otherwise not modified. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220610173812.1768919-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Fixes: 153132571f02 ("userfaultfd/shmem: support UFFDIO_CONTINUE for shmem") Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen Acked-by: Peter Xu Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/userfaultfd.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c index 4f4892a5f767..07d3befc80e4 100644 --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -246,7 +246,10 @@ static int mcontinue_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct page *page; int ret; - ret = shmem_getpage(inode, pgoff, &page, SGP_READ); + ret = shmem_getpage(inode, pgoff, &page, SGP_NOALLOC); + /* Our caller expects us to return -EFAULT if we failed to find page. */ + if (ret == -ENOENT) + ret = -EFAULT; if (ret) goto out; if (!page) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From d684e0a52d36f8939eda30a0f31ee235ee4ee741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:01:43 +0200 Subject: sh: convert nommu io{re,un}map() to static inline functions Recently, nommu iounmap() was converted from a static inline function to a macro again, basically reverting commit 4580ba4ad2e6b8dd ("sh: Convert iounmap() macros to inline functions"). With -Werror, this leads to build failures like: drivers/iio/adc/xilinx-ams.c: In function `ams_iounmap_ps': drivers/iio/adc/xilinx-ams.c:1195:14: error: unused variable `ams' [-Werror=unused-variable] 1195 | struct ams *ams = data; | ^~~ Fix this by replacing the macros for ioremap() and iounmap() by static inline functions, based on . Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8d1b1766260961799b04035e7bc39a7f59729f72.1655708312.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Fixes: 13f1fc870dd74713 ("sh: move the ioremap implementation out of line") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Reported-by: kernel test robot Reported-by: Jonathan Cameron Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- arch/sh/include/asm/io.h | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/io.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/io.h index cf9a3ec32406..fba90e670ed4 100644 --- a/arch/sh/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/io.h @@ -271,8 +271,12 @@ static inline void __iomem *ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t offset, unsigned long size, #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT */ #else /* CONFIG_MMU */ -#define iounmap(addr) do { } while (0) -#define ioremap(offset, size) ((void __iomem *)(unsigned long)(offset)) +static inline void __iomem *ioremap(phys_addr_t offset, size_t size) +{ + return (void __iomem *)(unsigned long)offset; +} + +static inline void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr) { } #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ #define ioremap_uc ioremap -- cgit v1.2.3 From ed1523a895ffdabcab6e067af18685ed00f5ce15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baolin Wang Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:34:42 +0800 Subject: mm/damon: use set_huge_pte_at() to make huge pte old The huge_ptep_set_access_flags() can not make the huge pte old according to the discussion [1], that means we will always mornitor the young state of the hugetlb though we stopped accessing the hugetlb, as a result DAMON will get inaccurate accessing statistics. So changing to use set_huge_pte_at() to make the huge pte old to fix this issue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yqy97gXI4Nqb7dYo@arm.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1655692482-28797-1-git-send-email-baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 49f4203aae06 ("mm/damon: add access checking for hugetlb pages") Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park Acked-by: Mike Kravetz Reviewed-by: Muchun Song Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/damon/vaddr.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/damon/vaddr.c b/mm/damon/vaddr.c index 59e1653799f8..3c7b9d6dca95 100644 --- a/mm/damon/vaddr.c +++ b/mm/damon/vaddr.c @@ -336,8 +336,7 @@ static void damon_hugetlb_mkold(pte_t *pte, struct mm_struct *mm, if (pte_young(entry)) { referenced = true; entry = pte_mkold(entry); - huge_ptep_set_access_flags(vma, addr, pte, entry, - vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE); + set_huge_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, entry); } #ifdef CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER -- cgit v1.2.3 From 39d35edee4537487e5178f258e23518272a66413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muchun Song Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:30:19 +0800 Subject: mm: sparsemem: fix missing higher order allocation splitting Higher order allocations for vmemmap pages from buddy allocator must be able to be treated as indepdenent small pages as they can be freed individually by the caller. There is no problem for higher order vmemmap pages allocated at boot time since each individual small page will be initialized at boot time. However, it will be an issue for memory hotplug case since those higher order vmemmap pages are allocated from buddy allocator without initializing each individual small page's refcount. The system will panic in put_page_testzero() when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled if the vmemmap page is freed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220620023019.94257-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com Fixes: d8d55f5616cf ("mm: sparsemem: use page table lock to protect kernel pmd operations") Signed-off-by: Muchun Song Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz Cc: Xiongchun Duan Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/sparse-vmemmap.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c b/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c index f4fa61dbbee3..dbbd1a7e65f3 100644 --- a/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c +++ b/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c @@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ static int __split_vmemmap_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long start) spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); if (likely(pmd_leaf(*pmd))) { + /* + * Higher order allocations from buddy allocator must be able to + * be treated as indepdenent small pages (as they can be freed + * individually). + */ + if (!PageReserved(page)) + split_page(page, get_order(PMD_SIZE)); + /* Make pte visible before pmd. See comment in pmd_install(). */ smp_wmb(); pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, pgtable); -- cgit v1.2.3 From cffe57bee62b155c08d71218fc0e9e84a0a90bbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bagas Sanjaya Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:45:46 +0700 Subject: Documentation: highmem: use literal block for code example in highmem.h comment When building htmldocs on Linus's tree, there are inline emphasis warnings on include/linux/highmem.h: Documentation/vm/highmem:166: ./include/linux/highmem.h:154: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/vm/highmem:166: ./include/linux/highmem.h:157: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. These warnings above are due to comments in code example at the mentioned lines above are enclosed by double dash (--), which confuses Sphinx as inline markup delimiters instead. Fix these warnings by indenting the code example with literal block indentation and making the comments C comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220622084546.17745-1-bagasdotme@gmail.com Fixes: 85a85e7601263f ("Documentation/vm: move "Using kmap-atomic" to highmem.h") Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny Tested-by: Ira Weiny Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Cc: "Fabio M. De Francesco" Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- include/linux/highmem.h | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h index 3af34de54330..56d6a0196534 100644 --- a/include/linux/highmem.h +++ b/include/linux/highmem.h @@ -149,19 +149,19 @@ static inline void *kmap_local_folio(struct folio *folio, size_t offset); * It is used in atomic context when code wants to access the contents of a * page that might be allocated from high memory (see __GFP_HIGHMEM), for * example a page in the pagecache. The API has two functions, and they - * can be used in a manner similar to the following: + * can be used in a manner similar to the following:: * - * -- Find the page of interest. -- - * struct page *page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); + * // Find the page of interest. + * struct page *page = find_get_page(mapping, offset); * - * -- Gain access to the contents of that page. -- - * void *vaddr = kmap_atomic(page); + * // Gain access to the contents of that page. + * void *vaddr = kmap_atomic(page); * - * -- Do something to the contents of that page. -- - * memset(vaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + * // Do something to the contents of that page. + * memset(vaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); * - * -- Unmap that page. -- - * kunmap_atomic(vaddr); + * // Unmap that page. + * kunmap_atomic(vaddr); * * Note that the kunmap_atomic() call takes the result of the kmap_atomic() * call, not the argument. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 34c0a5b04da8a543bc7335953c635dea1099d757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 16:52:36 +0800 Subject: riscv/mm: fix build error while PAGE_TABLE_CHECK enabled without MMU mm/page_table_check.c: In function `__page_table_check_pte_clear': mm/page_table_check.c:148:6: error: implicit declaration of function `pte_user_accessible_page'; did you mean `user_access_save'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] if (pte_user_accessible_page(pte)) { ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ user_access_save ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK should only enabled with MMU. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220624085236.18544-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Fixes: 3fee229a8eb9 ("riscv/mm: enable ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Albert Ou Cc: Pasha Tatashin Cc: Tong Tiangen Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index 32ffef9f6e5b..fcbb81feb7ad 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC if MMU select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS if MMU - select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK + select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK if MMU select ARCH_USE_MEMTEST select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_RWLOCKS select ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT if MMU -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1118234e4bc22ff50e9eae40ad95b17a6b12cefa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Hildenbrand Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 22:53:32 +0200 Subject: mm/rmap: fix dereferencing invalid subpage pointer in try_to_migrate_one() The subpage we calculate is an invalid pointer for device private pages, because device private pages are mapped via non-present device private entries, not ordinary present PTEs. Let's just not compute broken pointers and fixup later. Move the proper assignment of the correct subpage to the beginning of the function and assert that we really only have a single page in our folio. This currently results in a BUG when tying to compute anon_exclusive, because: [ 528.727237] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea1fffffffc0 [ 528.739585] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 528.745324] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 528.751062] PGD 44eaf2067 P4D 44eaf2067 PUD 0 [ 528.756026] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 528.760890] CPU: 120 PID: 18275 Comm: hmm-tests Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-kfd-alex #257 [ 528.769542] Hardware name: AMD Corporation BardPeak/BardPeak, BIOS RTY1002BDS 09/17/2021 [ 528.778579] RIP: 0010:try_to_migrate_one+0x21a/0x1000 [ 528.784225] Code: f6 48 89 c8 48 2b 05 45 d1 6a 01 48 c1 f8 06 48 29 c3 48 8b 45 a8 48 c1 e3 06 48 01 cb f6 41 18 01 48 89 85 50 ff ff ff 74 0b <4c> 8b 33 49 c1 ee 11 41 83 e6 01 48 8b bd 48 ff ff ff e8 3f 99 02 [ 528.805194] RSP: 0000:ffffc90003cdfaa0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 528.811027] RAX: 00007ffff7ff4000 RBX: ffffea1fffffffc0 RCX: ffffeaffffffffc0 [ 528.818995] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffc90003cdfaf8 [ 528.826962] RBP: ffffc90003cdfb70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 528.834930] R10: ffffc90003cdf910 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888194450540 [ 528.842899] R13: ffff888160d057c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 03ffffffffffffff [ 528.850865] FS: 00007ffff7fdb740(0000) GS:ffff8883b0600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 528.859891] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 528.866308] CR2: ffffea1fffffffc0 CR3: 00000001562b4003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 528.874275] PKRU: 55555554 [ 528.877286] Call Trace: [ 528.880016] [ 528.882356] ? lock_is_held_type+0xdf/0x130 [ 528.887033] rmap_walk_anon+0x167/0x410 [ 528.891316] try_to_migrate+0x90/0xd0 [ 528.895405] ? try_to_unmap_one+0xe10/0xe10 [ 528.900074] ? anon_vma_ctor+0x50/0x50 [ 528.904260] ? put_anon_vma+0x10/0x10 [ 528.908347] ? invalid_mkclean_vma+0x20/0x20 [ 528.913114] migrate_vma_setup+0x5f4/0x750 [ 528.917691] dmirror_devmem_fault+0x8c/0x250 [test_hmm] [ 528.923532] do_swap_page+0xac0/0xe50 [ 528.927623] ? __lock_acquire+0x4b2/0x1ac0 [ 528.932199] __handle_mm_fault+0x949/0x1440 [ 528.936876] handle_mm_fault+0x13f/0x3e0 [ 528.941256] do_user_addr_fault+0x215/0x740 [ 528.945928] exc_page_fault+0x75/0x280 [ 528.950115] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [ 528.954593] RIP: 0033:0x40366b ... Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220623205332.319257-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 6c287605fd56 ("mm: remember exclusively mapped anonymous pages with PG_anon_exclusive") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reported-by: "Sierra Guiza, Alejandro (Alex)" Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple Tested-by: Alistair Popple Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/rmap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c index 5bcb334cd6f2..746c05acad27 100644 --- a/mm/rmap.c +++ b/mm/rmap.c @@ -1899,8 +1899,23 @@ static bool try_to_migrate_one(struct folio *folio, struct vm_area_struct *vma, /* Unexpected PMD-mapped THP? */ VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!pvmw.pte, folio); - subpage = folio_page(folio, - pte_pfn(*pvmw.pte) - folio_pfn(folio)); + if (folio_is_zone_device(folio)) { + /* + * Our PTE is a non-present device exclusive entry and + * calculating the subpage as for the common case would + * result in an invalid pointer. + * + * Since only PAGE_SIZE pages can currently be + * migrated, just set it to page. This will need to be + * changed when hugepage migrations to device private + * memory are supported. + */ + VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_nr_pages(folio) > 1, folio); + subpage = &folio->page; + } else { + subpage = folio_page(folio, + pte_pfn(*pvmw.pte) - folio_pfn(folio)); + } address = pvmw.address; anon_exclusive = folio_test_anon(folio) && PageAnonExclusive(subpage); @@ -1993,15 +2008,7 @@ static bool try_to_migrate_one(struct folio *folio, struct vm_area_struct *vma, /* * No need to invalidate here it will synchronize on * against the special swap migration pte. - * - * The assignment to subpage above was computed from a - * swap PTE which results in an invalid pointer. - * Since only PAGE_SIZE pages can currently be - * migrated, just set it to page. This will need to be - * changed when hugepage migrations to device private - * memory are supported. */ - subpage = &folio->page; } else if (PageHWPoison(subpage)) { pteval = swp_entry_to_pte(make_hwpoison_entry(subpage)); if (folio_test_hugetlb(folio)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5924e6ec1585445f251ea92713eb15beb732622a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryusuke Konishi Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:54:01 +0900 Subject: nilfs2: fix incorrect masking of permission flags for symlinks The permission flags of newly created symlinks are wrongly dropped on nilfs2 with the current umask value even though symlinks should have 777 (rwxrwxrwx) permissions: $ umask 0022 $ touch file && ln -s file symlink; ls -l file symlink -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 0 Jun 23 16:29 file lrwxr-xr-x. 1 root root 4 Jun 23 16:29 symlink -> file This fixes the bug by inserting a missing check that excludes symlinks. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1655974441-5612-1-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi Reported-by: Tommy Pettersson Reported-by: Ciprian Craciun Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h b/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h index 1344f7d475d3..aecda4fc95f5 100644 --- a/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h +++ b/fs/nilfs2/nilfs.h @@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ static inline int nilfs_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode) static inline int nilfs_init_acl(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir) { + if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + inode->i_mode &= ~current_umask(); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 14c99d65941538aa33edd8dc7b1bbbb593c324a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Gowans, James" Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 05:24:03 +0000 Subject: mm: split huge PUD on wp_huge_pud fallback MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Currently the implementation will split the PUD when a fallback is taken inside the create_huge_pud function. This isn't where it should be done: the splitting should be done in wp_huge_pud, just like it's done for PMDs. Reason being that if a callback is taken during create, there is no PUD yet so nothing to split, whereas if a fallback is taken when encountering a write protection fault there is something to split. It looks like this was the original intention with the commit where the splitting was introduced, but somehow it got moved to the wrong place between v1 and v2 of the patch series. Rebase mistake perhaps. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6f48d622eb8bce1ae5dd75327b0b73894a2ec407.camel@amazon.com Fixes: 327e9fd48972 ("mm: Split huge pages on write-notify or COW") Signed-off-by: James Gowans Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström Cc: Christian König Cc: Jan H. Schönherr Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/memory.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 7a089145cad4..4cf7d4b6c950 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -4798,6 +4798,19 @@ static inline vm_fault_t wp_huge_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf) static vm_fault_t create_huge_pud(struct vm_fault *vmf) { +#if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && \ + defined(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD) + /* No support for anonymous transparent PUD pages yet */ + if (vma_is_anonymous(vmf->vma)) + return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK; + if (vmf->vma->vm_ops->huge_fault) + return vmf->vma->vm_ops->huge_fault(vmf, PE_SIZE_PUD); +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK; +} + +static vm_fault_t wp_huge_pud(struct vm_fault *vmf, pud_t orig_pud) +{ #if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && \ defined(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD) /* No support for anonymous transparent PUD pages yet */ @@ -4812,19 +4825,7 @@ static vm_fault_t create_huge_pud(struct vm_fault *vmf) split: /* COW or write-notify not handled on PUD level: split pud.*/ __split_huge_pud(vmf->vma, vmf->pud, vmf->address); -#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ - return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK; -} - -static vm_fault_t wp_huge_pud(struct vm_fault *vmf, pud_t orig_pud) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE - /* No support for anonymous transparent PUD pages yet */ - if (vma_is_anonymous(vmf->vma)) - return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK; - if (vmf->vma->vm_ops->huge_fault) - return vmf->vma->vm_ops->huge_fault(vmf, PE_SIZE_PUD); -#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE && CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD */ return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 887502826549caa7e4215fd9e628f48f14c0825a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 14:16:54 +0200 Subject: powerpc/powernv: delay rng platform device creation until later in boot The platform device for the rng must be created much later in boot. Otherwise it tries to connect to a parent that doesn't yet exist, resulting in this splat: [ 0.000478] kobject: '(null)' ((____ptrval____)): is not initialized, yet kobject_get() is being called. [ 0.002925] [c000000002a0fb30] [c00000000073b0bc] kobject_get+0x8c/0x100 (unreliable) [ 0.003071] [c000000002a0fba0] [c00000000087e464] device_add+0xf4/0xb00 [ 0.003194] [c000000002a0fc80] [c000000000a7f6e4] of_device_add+0x64/0x80 [ 0.003321] [c000000002a0fcb0] [c000000000a800d0] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x1b0 [ 0.003476] [c000000002a0fd00] [c00000000201fa44] pnv_get_random_long_early+0x240/0x2e4 [ 0.003623] [c000000002a0fe20] [c000000002060c38] random_init+0xc0/0x214 This patch fixes the issue by doing the platform device creation inside of machine_subsys_initcall. Fixes: f3eac426657d ("powerpc/powernv: wire up rng during setup_arch") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sachin Sant Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Tested-by: Sachin Sant [mpe: Change "of node" to "platform device" in change log] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630121654.1939181-1-Jason@zx2c4.com --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c index 463c78c52cc5..3805ad13b8f3 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/rng.c @@ -176,12 +176,8 @@ static int __init pnv_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v) NULL) != pnv_get_random_long_early) return 0; - for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") { - if (rng_create(dn)) - continue; - /* Create devices for hwrng driver */ - of_platform_device_create(dn, NULL, NULL); - } + for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") + rng_create(dn); if (!ppc_md.get_random_seed) return 0; @@ -205,10 +201,18 @@ void __init pnv_rng_init(void) static int __init pnv_rng_late_init(void) { + struct device_node *dn; unsigned long v; + /* In case it wasn't called during init for some other reason. */ if (ppc_md.get_random_seed == pnv_get_random_long_early) pnv_get_random_long_early(&v); + + if (ppc_md.get_random_seed == powernv_get_random_long) { + for_each_compatible_node(dn, NULL, "ibm,power-rng") + of_platform_device_create(dn, NULL, NULL); + } + return 0; } machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, pnv_rng_late_init); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bf43e4521ff3223a613f3a496991a22a4d78e04b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Zimmermann Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 14:10:27 +0200 Subject: drm/aperture: Run fbdev removal before internal helpers Always run fbdev removal first to remove simpledrm via sysfb_disable(). This clears the internal state. The later call to drm_aperture_detach_drivers() then does nothing. Otherwise, with drm_aperture_detach_drivers() running first, the call to sysfb_disable() uses inconsistent state. Example backtrace show below: [ 11.663422] ================================================================== [ 11.663426] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663435] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888108185050 by task systemd-udevd/311 [ 11.663440] CPU: 0 PID: 311 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5 .19.0-rc2-1-default+ #1689 [ 11.663445] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL120 G7, BIOS J01 04/21/2011 [ 11.663447] Call Trace: [ 11.663449] [ 11.663451] ? device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663456] dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x73 [ 11.663462] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1b0 [ 11.663468] ? device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663471] ? device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663475] print_report.cold+0x3c/0x21c [ 11.663481] ? lock_acquired+0x87/0x1e0 [ 11.663484] ? lock_acquired+0x87/0x1e0 [ 11.663489] ? device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663492] kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0 [ 11.663498] ? device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663503] device_del+0x79/0x5f0 [ 11.663509] ? device_remove_attrs+0x170/0x170 [ 11.663514] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140 [ 11.663523] platform_device_del.part.0+0x19/0xe0 [ 11.663530] platform_device_unregister+0x1c/0x30 [ 11.663535] sysfb_disable+0x2d/0x70 [ 11.663540] remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x1c/0xf0 [ 11.663546] remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x130/0x1a0 [ 11.663554] drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x86/0xb0 [ 11.663561] ? mgag200_pci_remove+0x30/0x30 [mgag200] [ 11.663578] mgag200_pci_probe+0x2d/0x140 [mgag200] Reported-by: Zack Rusin Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin Fixes: ee7a69aa38d8 ("fbdev: Disable sysfb device registration when removing conflicting FBs") Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Helge Deller Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Cc: Alex Deucher Cc: Zhen Lei Cc: Changcheng Deng Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220617121027.30273-1-tzimmermann@suse.de (cherry picked from commit fb84efa28a48e30b87fa1122e8aab8016c7347cd) Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c index 74bd4a76b253..059fd71424f6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c @@ -329,7 +329,20 @@ int drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct drm_driver *req_driver) { resource_size_t base, size; - int bar, ret = 0; + int bar, ret; + + /* + * WARNING: Apparently we must kick fbdev drivers before vgacon, + * otherwise the vga fbdev driver falls over. + */ +#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_FB) + ret = remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(pdev, req_driver->name); + if (ret) + return ret; +#endif + ret = vga_remove_vgacon(pdev); + if (ret) + return ret; for (bar = 0; bar < PCI_STD_NUM_BARS; ++bar) { if (!(pci_resource_flags(pdev, bar) & IORESOURCE_MEM)) @@ -339,15 +352,6 @@ int drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(struct pci_dev *pdev, drm_aperture_detach_drivers(base, size); } - /* - * WARNING: Apparently we must kick fbdev drivers before vgacon, - * otherwise the vga fbdev driver falls over. - */ -#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_FB) - ret = remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(pdev, req_driver->name); -#endif - if (ret == 0) - ret = vga_remove_vgacon(pdev); - return ret; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 591129d3db266648823bb953ebbc28c92e059bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Ying Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 14:56:32 +0800 Subject: drm/bridge: fsl-ldb: Fix mode clock rate validation With LVDS dual link, up to 160MHz mode clock rate is supported. With LVDS single link, up to 80MHz mode clock rate is supported. Fix mode clock rate validation by swapping the maximum mode clock rates of the two link modes. Fixes: 463db5c2ed4a ("drm: bridge: ldb: Implement simple Freescale i.MX8MP LDB bridge") Cc: Andrzej Hajda Cc: Neil Armstrong Cc: Robert Foss Cc: Laurent Pinchart Cc: Jonas Karlman Cc: Jernej Skrabec Cc: David Airlie Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Marek Vasut Cc: NXP Linux Team Signed-off-by: Liu Ying Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220701065634.4027537-2-victor.liu@nxp.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c index b2675c769a55..3cb3b310e283 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ fsl_ldb_mode_valid(struct drm_bridge *bridge, { struct fsl_ldb *fsl_ldb = to_fsl_ldb(bridge); - if (mode->clock > (fsl_ldb->lvds_dual_link ? 80000 : 160000)) + if (mode->clock > (fsl_ldb->lvds_dual_link ? 160000 : 80000)) return MODE_CLOCK_HIGH; return MODE_OK; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 57ef278ef125e9188474a164f35dcffc69836d01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Ying Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 14:56:33 +0800 Subject: drm/bridge: fsl-ldb: Enable split mode for LVDS dual link When LVDS dual link is used, we have to enable the LDB_CTRL_SPLIT_MODE bit. Fixes: 463db5c2ed4a ("drm: bridge: ldb: Implement simple Freescale i.MX8MP LDB bridge") Cc: Andrzej Hajda Cc: Neil Armstrong Cc: Robert Foss Cc: Laurent Pinchart Cc: Jonas Karlman Cc: Jernej Skrabec Cc: David Airlie Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Marek Vasut Cc: NXP Linux Team Signed-off-by: Liu Ying Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220701065634.4027537-3-victor.liu@nxp.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c index 3cb3b310e283..d4f005eef6f6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void fsl_ldb_atomic_enable(struct drm_bridge *bridge, reg = LDB_CTRL_CH0_ENABLE; if (fsl_ldb->lvds_dual_link) - reg |= LDB_CTRL_CH1_ENABLE; + reg |= LDB_CTRL_CH1_ENABLE | LDB_CTRL_SPLIT_MODE; if (lvds_format_24bpp) { reg |= LDB_CTRL_CH0_DATA_WIDTH; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1dbc790b4d416dacb124a6acd05f88a0bcf3be39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Ying Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 14:56:34 +0800 Subject: drm/bridge: fsl-ldb: Drop DE signal polarity inversion It's unnecessary to invert input data enable signal polarity according to the output one. Let's drop the inversion. Since ->atomic_check() does nothing more than the inversion, it can be dropped entirely as well. Without this patch, 'koe,tx26d202vm0bwa' LVDS panel connected with i.MX8MP EVK board does not show any data on screen. Fixes: 463db5c2ed4a ("drm: bridge: ldb: Implement simple Freescale i.MX8MP LDB bridge") Cc: Andrzej Hajda Cc: Neil Armstrong Cc: Robert Foss Cc: Laurent Pinchart Cc: Jonas Karlman Cc: Jernej Skrabec Cc: David Airlie Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Marek Vasut Cc: NXP Linux Team Signed-off-by: Liu Ying Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220701065634.4027537-4-victor.liu@nxp.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c | 17 ----------------- 1 file changed, 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c index d4f005eef6f6..4b503c544256 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/fsl-ldb.c @@ -74,22 +74,6 @@ static int fsl_ldb_attach(struct drm_bridge *bridge, bridge, flags); } -static int fsl_ldb_atomic_check(struct drm_bridge *bridge, - struct drm_bridge_state *bridge_state, - struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state, - struct drm_connector_state *conn_state) -{ - /* Invert DE signal polarity. */ - bridge_state->input_bus_cfg.flags &= ~(DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_LOW | - DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_HIGH); - if (bridge_state->output_bus_cfg.flags & DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_LOW) - bridge_state->input_bus_cfg.flags |= DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_HIGH; - else if (bridge_state->output_bus_cfg.flags & DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_HIGH) - bridge_state->input_bus_cfg.flags |= DRM_BUS_FLAG_DE_LOW; - - return 0; -} - static void fsl_ldb_atomic_enable(struct drm_bridge *bridge, struct drm_bridge_state *old_bridge_state) { @@ -241,7 +225,6 @@ fsl_ldb_mode_valid(struct drm_bridge *bridge, static const struct drm_bridge_funcs funcs = { .attach = fsl_ldb_attach, - .atomic_check = fsl_ldb_atomic_check, .atomic_enable = fsl_ldb_atomic_enable, .atomic_disable = fsl_ldb_atomic_disable, .atomic_duplicate_state = drm_atomic_helper_bridge_duplicate_state, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8490cad4dc4e2ee265ba9e12cd47bdfd6b9a3d34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Price Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 16:48:30 +0100 Subject: drm/rockchip: Detach from ARM DMA domain in attach_device Since commit 1ea2a07a532b ("iommu: Add DMA ownership management interfaces") the Rockchip display driver on the Firefly RK3288 fails to initialise properly. This is because ARM DMA domain is still attached. Let's follow the lead of exynos and tegra and add code to explicitly remove the ARM domain before attaching a new one. Fixes: 1ea2a07a532b ("iommu: Add DMA ownership management interfaces") Suggested-by: Robin Murphy Signed-off-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220615154830.555422-1-steven.price@arm.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_drv.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_drv.c index 67d38f53d3e5..13ed33e74457 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_drv.c @@ -23,6 +23,14 @@ #include #include +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM_DMA_USE_IOMMU) +#include +#else +#define arm_iommu_detach_device(...) ({ }) +#define arm_iommu_release_mapping(...) ({ }) +#define to_dma_iommu_mapping(dev) NULL +#endif + #include "rockchip_drm_drv.h" #include "rockchip_drm_fb.h" #include "rockchip_drm_gem.h" @@ -49,6 +57,15 @@ int rockchip_drm_dma_attach_device(struct drm_device *drm_dev, if (!private->domain) return 0; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM_DMA_USE_IOMMU)) { + struct dma_iommu_mapping *mapping = to_dma_iommu_mapping(dev); + + if (mapping) { + arm_iommu_detach_device(dev); + arm_iommu_release_mapping(mapping); + } + } + ret = iommu_attach_device(private->domain, dev); if (ret) { DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev, "Failed to attach iommu device\n"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fb6e0637ab7ebd8e61fe24f4d663c4bae99cfa62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 23:06:00 +0300 Subject: drm/panfrost: Put mapping instead of shmem obj on panfrost_mmu_map_fault_addr() error When panfrost_mmu_map_fault_addr() fails, the BO's mapping should be unreferenced and not the shmem object which backs the mapping. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bdefca2d8dc0 ("drm/panfrost: Add the panfrost_gem_mapping concept") Reviewed-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Signed-off-by: Steven Price Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220630200601.1884120-2-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_mmu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_mmu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_mmu.c index d3f82b26a631..b285a8001b1d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_mmu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_mmu.c @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ err_map: err_pages: drm_gem_shmem_put_pages(&bo->base); err_bo: - drm_gem_object_put(&bo->base.base); + panfrost_gem_mapping_put(bomapping); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9fc33eaaa979d112d10fea729edcd2a2e21aa912 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 23:06:01 +0300 Subject: drm/panfrost: Fix shrinker list corruption by madvise IOCTL Calling madvise IOCTL twice on BO causes memory shrinker list corruption and crashes kernel because BO is already on the list and it's added to the list again, while BO should be removed from the list before it's re-added. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 013b65101315 ("drm/panfrost: Add madvise and shrinker support") Acked-by: Alyssa Rosenzweig Reviewed-by: Steven Price Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Signed-off-by: Steven Price Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220630200601.1884120-3-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com --- drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c index 087e69b98d06..b1e6d238674f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c @@ -433,8 +433,8 @@ static int panfrost_ioctl_madvise(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, if (args->retained) { if (args->madv == PANFROST_MADV_DONTNEED) - list_add_tail(&bo->base.madv_list, - &pfdev->shrinker_list); + list_move_tail(&bo->base.madv_list, + &pfdev->shrinker_list); else if (args->madv == PANFROST_MADV_WILLNEED) list_del_init(&bo->base.madv_list); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3770d92bd5237d686e49da7b2fb86f53ee6ed259 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 15:51:11 +0200 Subject: dmaengine: at_xdma: handle errors of at_xdmac_alloc_desc() correctly It seems that it is valid to have less than the requested number of descriptors. But what is not valid and leads to subsequent errors is to have zero descriptors. In that case, abort the probing. Fixes: e1f7c9eee707 ("dmaengine: at_xdmac: creation of the atmel eXtended DMA Controller driver") Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526135111.1470926-1-michael@walle.cc Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c index 3e9d726504e2..7b3e6030f7b4 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c @@ -1900,6 +1900,11 @@ static int at_xdmac_alloc_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *chan) for (i = 0; i < init_nr_desc_per_channel; i++) { desc = at_xdmac_alloc_desc(chan, GFP_KERNEL); if (!desc) { + if (i == 0) { + dev_warn(chan2dev(chan), + "can't allocate any descriptors\n"); + return -EIO; + } dev_warn(chan2dev(chan), "only %d descriptors have been allocated\n", i); break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8ffccd119a5908b240a26182be44c0ff3d1e3d85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Snitselaar Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 22:16:48 -0700 Subject: dmaengine: idxd: Only call idxd_enable_system_pasid() if succeeded in enabling SVA feature On a Sapphire Rapids system if boot without intel_iommu=on, the IDXD driver will crash during probe in iommu_sva_bind_device(). [ 21.423729] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038 [ 21.445108] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 21.450912] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 21.456706] PGD 0 [ 21.459047] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 21.464004] CPU: 0 PID: 1420 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.19.0-0.rc3.27.eln120.x86_64 #1 [ 21.464011] Hardware name: Intel Corporation EAGLESTREAM/EAGLESTREAM, BIOS EGSDCRB1.SYS.0067.D12.2110190954 10/19/2021 [ 21.464015] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 21.464030] RIP: 0010:iommu_sva_bind_device+0x1d/0xe0 [ 21.464046] Code: c3 cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 49 89 d6 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 87 d8 02 00 00 <48> 8b 40 38 48 8b 50 10 48 83 7a 70 00 48 89 14 24 0f 84 91 00 00 [ 21.464050] RSP: 0018:ff7245d9096b7db8 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 21.464054] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1eadeec8a51000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 21.464058] RDX: ff7245d9096b7e24 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff1eadeec8a510d0 [ 21.464060] RBP: ff1eadeec8a51000 R08: ffffffffb1a12300 R09: ff1eadffbfce25b4 [ 21.464062] R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: 0000000000000038 R12: ffffffffc09f8000 [ 21.464065] R13: ff1eadeec8a510d0 R14: ff7245d9096b7e24 R15: ff1eaddf54429000 [ 21.464067] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1eadee7f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 21.464070] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 21.464072] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000008c0e10006 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [ 21.464074] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 21.464076] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 21.464078] PKRU: 55555554 [ 21.464079] Call Trace: [ 21.464083] [ 21.464092] idxd_pci_probe+0x259/0x1070 [idxd] [ 21.464121] local_pci_probe+0x3e/0x80 [ 21.464132] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20 [ 21.464136] process_one_work+0x1c4/0x380 [ 21.464143] worker_thread+0x1ab/0x380 [ 21.464147] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ 21.464158] ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380 [ 21.464161] kthread+0xe6/0x110 [ 21.464168] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 21.464172] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 iommu_sva_bind_device() requires SVA has been enabled successfully on the IDXD device before it's called. Otherwise, iommu_sva_bind_device() will access a NULL pointer. If Intel IOMMU is disabled, SVA cannot be enabled and thus idxd_enable_system_pasid() and iommu_sva_bind_device() should not be called. Fixes: 42a1b73852c4 ("dmaengine: idxd: Separate user and kernel pasid enabling") Cc: Vinod Koul Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Jiang Cc: Fenghua Yu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dmaengine/20220623170232.6whonfjuh3m5vcoy@cantor/ Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar Acked-by: Fenghua Yu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220626051648.14249-1-jsnitsel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/idxd/init.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/idxd/init.c b/drivers/dma/idxd/init.c index 355fb3ef4cbf..aa3478257ddb 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/idxd/init.c +++ b/drivers/dma/idxd/init.c @@ -512,15 +512,16 @@ static int idxd_probe(struct idxd_device *idxd) dev_dbg(dev, "IDXD reset complete\n"); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_IDXD_SVM) && sva) { - if (iommu_dev_enable_feature(dev, IOMMU_DEV_FEAT_SVA)) + if (iommu_dev_enable_feature(dev, IOMMU_DEV_FEAT_SVA)) { dev_warn(dev, "Unable to turn on user SVA feature.\n"); - else + } else { set_bit(IDXD_FLAG_USER_PASID_ENABLED, &idxd->flags); - if (idxd_enable_system_pasid(idxd)) - dev_warn(dev, "No in-kernel DMA with PASID.\n"); - else - set_bit(IDXD_FLAG_PASID_ENABLED, &idxd->flags); + if (idxd_enable_system_pasid(idxd)) + dev_warn(dev, "No in-kernel DMA with PASID.\n"); + else + set_bit(IDXD_FLAG_PASID_ENABLED, &idxd->flags); + } } else if (!sva) { dev_warn(dev, "User forced SVA off via module param.\n"); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8af3a0b23818af59971f538bf258c15e1033ea55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 13:21:14 +0300 Subject: gpio: vf610: fix compilation error MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Fix compilation error by explicitly adding the missing include. drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c: In function ‘vf610_gpio_direction_input’: drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c:120:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘pinctrl_gpio_direction_input’; did you mean ‘vf610_gpio_direction_input’? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] 120 | return pinctrl_gpio_direction_input(chip->base + gpio); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | vf610_gpio_direction_input Fixes: 30a35c07d9e9 ("gpio: vf610: drop the SOC_VF610 dependency for GPIO_VF610") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Peng Fan Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski --- drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c index 23cddb265a0d..9db42f6a2043 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define VF610_GPIO_PER_PORT 32 -- cgit v1.2.3 From bf17455b9cbd4b10bf30d39c047307e1d774fb1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yue Hu Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 10:32:22 +0800 Subject: fscache: Fix if condition in fscache_wait_on_volume_collision() After waiting for the volume to complete the acquisition with timeout, the if condition under which potential volume collision occurs should be acquire the volume is still pending rather than not pending so that we will continue to wait until the pending flag is cleared. Also, use the existing test pending wrapper directly instead of test_bit(). Fixes: 62ab63352350 ("fscache: Implement volume registration") Signed-off-by: Yue Hu Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang Reviewed-by: Jeffle Xu Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Link: https://listman.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2022-May/006918.html --- fs/fscache/volume.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fscache/volume.c b/fs/fscache/volume.c index f2aa7dbad766..a058e0136bfe 100644 --- a/fs/fscache/volume.c +++ b/fs/fscache/volume.c @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static void fscache_wait_on_volume_collision(struct fscache_volume *candidate, { wait_var_event_timeout(&candidate->flags, !fscache_is_acquire_pending(candidate), 20 * HZ); - if (!fscache_is_acquire_pending(candidate)) { + if (fscache_is_acquire_pending(candidate)) { pr_notice("Potential volume collision new=%08x old=%08x", candidate->debug_id, collidee_debug_id); fscache_stat(&fscache_n_volumes_collision); @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static bool fscache_hash_volume(struct fscache_volume *candidate) hlist_bl_add_head(&candidate->hash_link, h); hlist_bl_unlock(h); - if (test_bit(FSCACHE_VOLUME_ACQUIRE_PENDING, &candidate->flags)) + if (fscache_is_acquire_pending(candidate)) fscache_wait_on_volume_collision(candidate, collidee_debug_id); return true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c4588aea6675b69e328d468c5b6be5127e19a79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yue Hu Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 10:51:50 +0800 Subject: fscache: Introduce fscache_cookie_is_dropped() FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_DROPPED will be read more than once, so let's add a helper to avoid code duplication. Signed-off-by: Yue Hu Signed-off-by: David Howells Link: https://listman.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2022-May/006919.html --- fs/fscache/cookie.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fscache/cookie.c b/fs/fscache/cookie.c index 9d3cf0111709..575a5ba07c0d 100644 --- a/fs/fscache/cookie.c +++ b/fs/fscache/cookie.c @@ -372,17 +372,22 @@ nomem: return NULL; } +static inline bool fscache_cookie_is_dropped(struct fscache_cookie *cookie) +{ + return READ_ONCE(cookie->state) == FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_DROPPED; +} + static void fscache_wait_on_collision(struct fscache_cookie *candidate, struct fscache_cookie *wait_for) { enum fscache_cookie_state *statep = &wait_for->state; - wait_var_event_timeout(statep, READ_ONCE(*statep) == FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_DROPPED, + wait_var_event_timeout(statep, fscache_cookie_is_dropped(wait_for), 20 * HZ); - if (READ_ONCE(*statep) != FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_DROPPED) { + if (!fscache_cookie_is_dropped(wait_for)) { pr_notice("Potential collision c=%08x old: c=%08x", candidate->debug_id, wait_for->debug_id); - wait_var_event(statep, READ_ONCE(*statep) == FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_DROPPED); + wait_var_event(statep, fscache_cookie_is_dropped(wait_for)); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 65aa5f6fd8a12e0a343aaf1815949a79a49e3f35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia Zhu Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 16:54:10 +0800 Subject: cachefiles: narrow the scope of flushed requests when releasing fd When an anonymous fd is released, only flush the requests associated with it, rather than all of requests in xarray. Fixes: 9032b6e8589f ("cachefiles: implement on-demand read") Signed-off-by: Jia Zhu Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Jeffle Xu Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang Link: https://listman.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2022-June/006937.html --- fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c b/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c index a41ae6efc545..1fee702d5529 100644 --- a/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c +++ b/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ static int cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release(struct inode *inode, * anon_fd. */ xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX) { - if (req->msg.opcode == CACHEFILES_OP_READ) { + if (req->msg.object_id == object_id && + req->msg.opcode == CACHEFILES_OP_READ) { req->error = -EIO; complete(&req->done); xas_store(&xas, NULL); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 85e4ea1049c70fb99de5c6057e835d151fb647da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 14:27:17 +0100 Subject: fscache: Fix invalidation/lookup race If an NFS file is opened for writing and closed, fscache_invalidate() will be asked to invalidate the file - however, if the cookie is in the LOOKING_UP state (or the CREATING state), then request to invalidate doesn't get recorded for fscache_cookie_state_machine() to do something with. Fix this by making __fscache_invalidate() set a flag if it sees the cookie is in the LOOKING_UP state to indicate that we need to go to invalidation. Note that this requires a count on the n_accesses counter for the state machine, which that will release when it's done. fscache_cookie_state_machine() then shifts to the INVALIDATING state if it sees the flag. Without this, an nfs file can get corrupted if it gets modified locally and then read locally as the cache contents may not get updated. Fixes: d24af13e2e23 ("fscache: Implement cookie invalidation") Reported-by: Max Kellermann Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Max Kellermann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YlWWbpW5Foynjllo@rabbit.intern.cm-ag [1] --- fs/fscache/cookie.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- include/linux/fscache.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fscache/cookie.c b/fs/fscache/cookie.c index 575a5ba07c0d..74920826d8f6 100644 --- a/fs/fscache/cookie.c +++ b/fs/fscache/cookie.c @@ -522,7 +522,14 @@ static void fscache_perform_lookup(struct fscache_cookie *cookie) } fscache_see_cookie(cookie, fscache_cookie_see_active); - fscache_set_cookie_state(cookie, FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE); + spin_lock(&cookie->lock); + if (test_and_clear_bit(FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_INVALIDATE, &cookie->flags)) + __fscache_set_cookie_state(cookie, + FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_INVALIDATING); + else + __fscache_set_cookie_state(cookie, FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE); + spin_unlock(&cookie->lock); + wake_up_cookie_state(cookie); trace = fscache_access_lookup_cookie_end; out: @@ -757,6 +764,9 @@ again_locked: spin_lock(&cookie->lock); } + if (test_and_clear_bit(FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_INVALIDATE, &cookie->flags)) + fscache_end_cookie_access(cookie, fscache_access_invalidate_cookie_end); + switch (state) { case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING: fscache_see_cookie(cookie, fscache_cookie_see_relinquish); @@ -1053,6 +1063,9 @@ void __fscache_invalidate(struct fscache_cookie *cookie, return; case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LOOKING_UP: + __fscache_begin_cookie_access(cookie, fscache_access_invalidate_cookie); + set_bit(FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_INVALIDATE, &cookie->flags); + fallthrough; case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_CREATING: spin_unlock(&cookie->lock); _leave(" [look %x]", cookie->inval_counter); diff --git a/include/linux/fscache.h b/include/linux/fscache.h index 72585c9729a2..b86265664879 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscache.h +++ b/include/linux/fscache.h @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct fscache_cookie { #define FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_PREP_TO_WRITE 12 /* T if cookie needs write preparation */ #define FSCACHE_COOKIE_HAVE_DATA 13 /* T if this cookie has data stored */ #define FSCACHE_COOKIE_IS_HASHED 14 /* T if this cookie is hashed */ +#define FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_INVALIDATE 15 /* T if cookie needs invalidation */ enum fscache_cookie_state state; u8 advice; /* FSCACHE_ADV_* */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7feec7430edddb87c24b0a86b08a03d0b496a755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Limonciello Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 13:29:14 -0500 Subject: ACPI: CPPC: Only probe for _CPC if CPPC v2 is acked Previously the kernel used to ignore whether the firmware masked CPPC or CPPCv2 and would just pretend that it worked. When support for the USB4 bit in _OSC was introduced from commit 9e1f561afb ("ACPI: Execute platform _OSC also with query bit clear") the kernel began to look at the return when the query bit was clear. This caused regressions that were misdiagnosed and attempted to be solved as part of commit 2ca8e6285250 ("Revert "ACPI: Pass the same capabilities to the _OSC regardless of the query flag""). This caused a different regression where non-Intel systems weren't able to negotiate _OSC properly. This was reverted in commit 2ca8e6285250 ("Revert "ACPI: Pass the same capabilities to the _OSC regardless of the query flag"") and attempted to be fixed by commit c42fa24b4475 ("ACPI: bus: Avoid using CPPC if not supported by firmware") but the regression still returned. These systems with the regression only load support for CPPC from an SSDT dynamically when _OSC reports CPPC v2. Avoid the problem by not letting CPPC satisfy the requirement in `acpi_cppc_processor_probe`. Reported-by: CUI Hao Reported-by: maxim.novozhilov@gmail.com Reported-by: lethe.tree@protonmail.com Reported-by: garystephenwright@gmail.com Reported-by: galaxyking0419@gmail.com Fixes: c42fa24b4475 ("ACPI: bus: Avoid using CPPC if not supported by firmware") Fixes: 2ca8e6285250 ("Revert "ACPI Pass the same capabilities to the _OSC regardless of the query flag"") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213023 Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075387 Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg Tested-by: CUI Hao Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- drivers/acpi/bus.c | 11 +++++------ drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c | 4 +++- include/linux/acpi.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bus.c b/drivers/acpi/bus.c index 86fa61a21826..e2db1bdd9dd2 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/bus.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/bus.c @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(osc_cpc_flexible_adr_space_confirmed); bool osc_sb_native_usb4_support_confirmed; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(osc_sb_native_usb4_support_confirmed); -bool osc_sb_cppc_not_supported; +bool osc_sb_cppc2_support_acked; static u8 sb_uuid_str[] = "0811B06E-4A27-44F9-8D60-3CBBC22E7B48"; static void acpi_bus_osc_negotiate_platform_control(void) @@ -358,11 +358,6 @@ static void acpi_bus_osc_negotiate_platform_control(void) return; } -#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB - osc_sb_cppc_not_supported = !(capbuf_ret[OSC_SUPPORT_DWORD] & - (OSC_SB_CPC_SUPPORT | OSC_SB_CPCV2_SUPPORT)); -#endif - /* * Now run _OSC again with query flag clear and with the caps * supported by both the OS and the platform. @@ -376,6 +371,10 @@ static void acpi_bus_osc_negotiate_platform_control(void) capbuf_ret = context.ret.pointer; if (context.ret.length > OSC_SUPPORT_DWORD) { +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB + osc_sb_cppc2_support_acked = capbuf_ret[OSC_SUPPORT_DWORD] & OSC_SB_CPCV2_SUPPORT; +#endif + osc_sb_apei_support_acked = capbuf_ret[OSC_SUPPORT_DWORD] & OSC_SB_APEI_SUPPORT; osc_pc_lpi_support_confirmed = diff --git a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c index 903528f7e187..d64facbda0fb 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c @@ -684,8 +684,10 @@ int acpi_cppc_processor_probe(struct acpi_processor *pr) acpi_status status; int ret = -ENODATA; - if (osc_sb_cppc_not_supported) + if (!osc_sb_cppc2_support_acked) { + pr_debug("CPPC v2 _OSC not acked\n"); return -ENODEV; + } /* Parse the ACPI _CPC table for this CPU. */ status = acpi_evaluate_object_typed(handle, "_CPC", NULL, &output, diff --git a/include/linux/acpi.h b/include/linux/acpi.h index 4f82a5bc6d98..44975c1bbe12 100644 --- a/include/linux/acpi.h +++ b/include/linux/acpi.h @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ acpi_status acpi_run_osc(acpi_handle handle, struct acpi_osc_context *context); extern bool osc_sb_apei_support_acked; extern bool osc_pc_lpi_support_confirmed; extern bool osc_sb_native_usb4_support_confirmed; -extern bool osc_sb_cppc_not_supported; +extern bool osc_sb_cppc2_support_acked; extern bool osc_cpc_flexible_adr_space_confirmed; /* USB4 Capabilities */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8b356e536e69f3a4d6778ae9f0858a1beadabb1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Limonciello Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 13:29:15 -0500 Subject: ACPI: CPPC: Don't require _OSC if X86_FEATURE_CPPC is supported commit 72f2ecb7ece7 ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and when CPPC_LIB is supported") added support for claiming to support CPPC in _OSC on non-Intel platforms. This unfortunately caused a regression on a vartiety of AMD platforms in the field because a number of AMD platforms don't set the `_OSC` bit 5 or 6 to indicate CPPC or CPPC v2 support. As these AMD platforms already claim CPPC support via a dedicated MSR from `X86_FEATURE_CPPC`, use this enable this feature rather than requiring the `_OSC` on platforms with a dedicated MSR. If there is additional breakage on the shared memory designs also missing this _OSC, additional follow up changes may be needed. Fixes: 72f2ecb7ece7 ("Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and when CPPC_LIB is supported") Reported-by: Perry Yuan Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c index 8b8cbf22461a..734b96454896 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c @@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ /* Refer to drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c for the description of functions */ +bool cpc_supported_by_cpu(void) +{ + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) { + case X86_VENDOR_AMD: + case X86_VENDOR_HYGON: + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPPC); + } + return false; +} + bool cpc_ffh_supported(void) { return true; diff --git a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c index d64facbda0fb..6ff1901d7d43 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c @@ -577,6 +577,19 @@ bool __weak cpc_ffh_supported(void) return false; } +/** + * cpc_supported_by_cpu() - check if CPPC is supported by CPU + * + * Check if the architectural support for CPPC is present even + * if the _OSC hasn't prescribed it + * + * Return: true for supported, false for not supported + */ +bool __weak cpc_supported_by_cpu(void) +{ + return false; +} + /** * pcc_data_alloc() - Allocate the pcc_data memory for pcc subspace * @@ -686,7 +699,8 @@ int acpi_cppc_processor_probe(struct acpi_processor *pr) if (!osc_sb_cppc2_support_acked) { pr_debug("CPPC v2 _OSC not acked\n"); - return -ENODEV; + if (!cpc_supported_by_cpu()) + return -ENODEV; } /* Parse the ACPI _CPC table for this CPU. */ diff --git a/include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h b/include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h index c6108581d97d..d389bab54241 100644 --- a/include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h +++ b/include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool cppc_allow_fast_switch(void); extern int acpi_get_psd_map(unsigned int cpu, struct cppc_cpudata *cpu_data); extern unsigned int cppc_get_transition_latency(int cpu); extern bool cpc_ffh_supported(void); +extern bool cpc_supported_by_cpu(void); extern int cpc_read_ffh(int cpunum, struct cpc_reg *reg, u64 *val); extern int cpc_write_ffh(int cpunum, struct cpc_reg *reg, u64 val); #else /* !CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From afe4e376ac5d568367b447ca90c12858d0935b86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Gunthorpe Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2022 22:10:50 -0300 Subject: vfio: Move IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY test to after we know we have a group The test isn't going to work if a group doesn't exist. Normally this isn't a problem since VFIO isn't going to create a device if there is no group, but the special CONFIG_VFIO_NOIOMMU behavior allows bypassing this prevention. The new cap test effectively forces a group and breaks this config option. Move the cap test to vfio_group_find_or_alloc() which is the earliest time we know we have a group available and thus are not running in noiommu mode. Fixes: e8ae0e140c05 ("vfio: Require that devices support DMA cache coherence") Reported-by: Xiang Chen Tested-by: Xiang Chen Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0-v1-e8934b490f36+f4-vfio_cap_fix_jgg@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson --- drivers/vfio/vfio.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio.c index 61e71c1154be..e60b06f2ac22 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio.c @@ -549,6 +549,16 @@ static struct vfio_group *vfio_group_find_or_alloc(struct device *dev) if (!iommu_group) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + /* + * VFIO always sets IOMMU_CACHE because we offer no way for userspace to + * restore cache coherency. It has to be checked here because it is only + * valid for cases where we are using iommu groups. + */ + if (!iommu_capable(dev->bus, IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY)) { + iommu_group_put(iommu_group); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + group = vfio_group_get_from_iommu(iommu_group); if (!group) group = vfio_create_group(iommu_group, VFIO_IOMMU); @@ -601,13 +611,6 @@ static int __vfio_register_dev(struct vfio_device *device, int vfio_register_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device) { - /* - * VFIO always sets IOMMU_CACHE because we offer no way for userspace to - * restore cache coherency. - */ - if (!iommu_capable(device->dev->bus, IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY)) - return -EINVAL; - return __vfio_register_dev(device, vfio_group_find_or_alloc(device->dev)); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b64b3b2f1d81f83519582e1feee87d77f51f5f17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 21:14:32 +0300 Subject: dmaengine: pl330: Fix lockdep warning about non-static key The DEFINE_SPINLOCK() macro shouldn't be used for dynamically allocated spinlocks. The lockdep warns about this and disables locking validator. Fix the warning by making lock static. INFO: trying to register non-static key. The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe you didn't initialize this object before use? turning off the locking correctness validator. Hardware name: Radxa ROCK Pi 4C (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0 show_stack+0x18/0x6c dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 register_lock_class+0x4a8/0x4cc __lock_acquire+0x78/0x20cc lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x230 lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x84/0xc4 add_desc+0x44/0xc0 pl330_get_desc+0x15c/0x1d0 pl330_prep_dma_cyclic+0x100/0x270 snd_dmaengine_pcm_trigger+0xec/0x1c0 dmaengine_pcm_trigger+0x18/0x24 ... Fixes: e588710311ee ("dmaengine: pl330: fix descriptor allocation fail") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520181432.149904-1-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/pl330.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/pl330.c b/drivers/dma/pl330.c index 858400e42ec0..09915a5cba3e 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/pl330.c +++ b/drivers/dma/pl330.c @@ -2589,7 +2589,7 @@ static struct dma_pl330_desc *pl330_get_desc(struct dma_pl330_chan *pch) /* If the DMAC pool is empty, alloc new */ if (!desc) { - DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); LIST_HEAD(pool); if (!add_desc(&pool, &lock, GFP_ATOMIC, 1)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1dbe67b9faea0bc340cce894018076679c16cb71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET Date: Sun, 22 May 2022 19:41:05 +0200 Subject: dmaengine: lgm: Fix an error handling path in intel_ldma_probe() ldma_clk_disable() calls both: clk_disable_unprepare(d->core_clk); reset_control_assert(d->rst); So, should devm_reset_control_get_optional() fail, core_clk should not be prepare_enable'd before it, otherwise it will never be disable_unprepare'd. Reorder the code to handle the error handling path as expected. Fixes: 32d31c79a1a4 ("dmaengine: Add Intel LGM SoC DMA support.") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18504549bc4d2b62a72a02cb22a2e4d8e6a58720.1653241224.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- drivers/dma/lgm/lgm-dma.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/lgm/lgm-dma.c b/drivers/dma/lgm/lgm-dma.c index efe8bd3a0e2a..9b9184f964be 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/lgm/lgm-dma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/lgm/lgm-dma.c @@ -1593,11 +1593,12 @@ static int intel_ldma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) d->core_clk = devm_clk_get_optional(dev, NULL); if (IS_ERR(d->core_clk)) return PTR_ERR(d->core_clk); - clk_prepare_enable(d->core_clk); d->rst = devm_reset_control_get_optional(dev, NULL); if (IS_ERR(d->rst)) return PTR_ERR(d->rst); + + clk_prepare_enable(d->core_clk); reset_control_deassert(d->rst); ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, ldma_clk_disable, d); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b57feed2cc2622ae14b2fa62f19e973e5e0a60cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Roth Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 21:53:15 -0500 Subject: x86/compressed/64: Add identity mappings for setup_data entries The decompressed kernel initially relies on the identity map set up by the boot/compressed kernel for accessing things like boot_params. With the recent introduction of SEV-SNP support, the decompressed kernel also needs to access the setup_data entries pointed to by boot_params->hdr.setup_data. This can lead to a crash in the kexec kernel during early boot due to these entries not currently being included in the initial identity map, see thread at Link below. Include mappings for the setup_data entries in the initial identity map. [ bp: Massage commit message and use a helper var for better readability. ] Fixes: b190a043c49a ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup") Reported-by: Jun'ichi Nomura Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/TYCPR01MB694815CD815E98945F63C99183B49@TYCPR01MB6948.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c index 44c350d627c7..d4a314cc50d6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void kernel_add_identity_map(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode) { unsigned long cmdline; + struct setup_data *sd; /* Exclude the encryption mask from __PHYSICAL_MASK */ physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; @@ -163,6 +164,18 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode) cmdline = get_cmd_line_ptr(); kernel_add_identity_map(cmdline, cmdline + COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); + /* + * Also map the setup_data entries passed via boot_params in case they + * need to be accessed by uncompressed kernel via the identity mapping. + */ + sd = (struct setup_data *)boot_params->hdr.setup_data; + while (sd) { + unsigned long sd_addr = (unsigned long)sd; + + kernel_add_identity_map(sd_addr, sd_addr + sizeof(*sd) + sd->len); + sd = (struct setup_data *)sd->next; + } + sev_prep_identity_maps(top_level_pgt); /* Load the new page-table. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 316f92a705a4c2bf4712135180d56f3cca09243a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yian Chen Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 17:21:15 -0700 Subject: iommu/vt-d: Fix PCI bus rescan device hot add Notifier calling chain uses priority to determine the execution order of the notifiers or listeners registered to the chain. PCI bus device hot add utilizes the notification mechanism. The current code sets low priority (INT_MIN) to Intel dmar_pci_bus_notifier and postpones DMAR decoding after adding new device into IOMMU. The result is that struct device pointer cannot be found in DRHD search for the new device's DMAR/IOMMU. Subsequently, the device is put under the "catch-all" IOMMU instead of the correct one. This could cause system hang when device TLB invalidation is sent to the wrong IOMMU. Invalidation timeout error and hard lockup have been observed and data inconsistency/crush may occur as well. This patch fixes the issue by setting a positive priority(1) for dmar_pci_bus_notifier while the priority of IOMMU bus notifier uses the default value(0), therefore DMAR decoding will be in advance of DRHD search for a new device to find the correct IOMMU. Following is a 2-step example that triggers the bug by simulating PCI device hot add behavior in Intel Sapphire Rapids server. echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/remove echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/rescan Fixes: 59ce0515cdaf ("iommu/vt-d: Update DRHD/RMRR/ATSR device scope") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Reported-by: Zhang, Bernice Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan Signed-off-by: Yian Chen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521002115.1624069-1-yian.chen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c index 592c1e1a5d4b..9699ca101c62 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int dmar_pci_bus_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, static struct notifier_block dmar_pci_bus_nb = { .notifier_call = dmar_pci_bus_notifier, - .priority = INT_MIN, + .priority = 1, }; static struct dmar_drhd_unit * -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4140d77a022101376bbfa3ec3e3da5063455c60e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Baolu Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 21:34:30 +0800 Subject: iommu/vt-d: Fix RID2PASID setup/teardown failure The IOMMU driver shares the pasid table for PCI alias devices. When the RID2PASID entry of the shared pasid table has been filled by the first device, the subsequent device will encounter the "DMAR: Setup RID2PASID failed" failure as the pasid entry has already been marked as present. As the result, the IOMMU probing process will be aborted. On the contrary, when any alias device is hot-removed from the system, for example, by writing to /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../remove, the shared RID2PASID will be cleared without any notifications to other devices. As the result, any DMAs from those rest devices are blocked. Sharing pasid table among PCI alias devices could save two memory pages for devices underneath the PCIe-to-PCI bridges. Anyway, considering that those devices are rare on modern platforms that support VT-d in scalable mode and the saved memory is negligible, it's reasonable to remove this part of immature code to make the driver feasible and stable. Fixes: ef848b7e5a6a0 ("iommu/vt-d: Setup pasid entry for RID2PASID support") Reported-by: Chenyi Qiang Reported-by: Ethan Zhao Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Reviewed-by: Ethan Zhao Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623065720.727849-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220625133430.2200315-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 24 ---------------- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 69 ++------------------------------------------- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 1 - include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 3 -- 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c index 44016594831d..5c0dce78586a 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c @@ -320,30 +320,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_iommu_gfx_mapped); DEFINE_SPINLOCK(device_domain_lock); static LIST_HEAD(device_domain_list); -/* - * Iterate over elements in device_domain_list and call the specified - * callback @fn against each element. - */ -int for_each_device_domain(int (*fn)(struct device_domain_info *info, - void *data), void *data) -{ - int ret = 0; - unsigned long flags; - struct device_domain_info *info; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags); - list_for_each_entry(info, &device_domain_list, global) { - ret = fn(info, data); - if (ret) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags); - return ret; - } - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags); - - return 0; -} - const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops; static bool translation_pre_enabled(struct intel_iommu *iommu) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index cb4c1d0cf25c..17cad7c1f62d 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -86,54 +86,6 @@ void vcmd_free_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, u32 pasid) /* * Per device pasid table management: */ -static inline void -device_attach_pasid_table(struct device_domain_info *info, - struct pasid_table *pasid_table) -{ - info->pasid_table = pasid_table; - list_add(&info->table, &pasid_table->dev); -} - -static inline void -device_detach_pasid_table(struct device_domain_info *info, - struct pasid_table *pasid_table) -{ - info->pasid_table = NULL; - list_del(&info->table); -} - -struct pasid_table_opaque { - struct pasid_table **pasid_table; - int segment; - int bus; - int devfn; -}; - -static int search_pasid_table(struct device_domain_info *info, void *opaque) -{ - struct pasid_table_opaque *data = opaque; - - if (info->iommu->segment == data->segment && - info->bus == data->bus && - info->devfn == data->devfn && - info->pasid_table) { - *data->pasid_table = info->pasid_table; - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int get_alias_pasid_table(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 alias, void *opaque) -{ - struct pasid_table_opaque *data = opaque; - - data->segment = pci_domain_nr(pdev->bus); - data->bus = PCI_BUS_NUM(alias); - data->devfn = alias & 0xff; - - return for_each_device_domain(&search_pasid_table, data); -} /* * Allocate a pasid table for @dev. It should be called in a @@ -143,28 +95,18 @@ int intel_pasid_alloc_table(struct device *dev) { struct device_domain_info *info; struct pasid_table *pasid_table; - struct pasid_table_opaque data; struct page *pages; u32 max_pasid = 0; - int ret, order; - int size; + int order, size; might_sleep(); info = dev_iommu_priv_get(dev); if (WARN_ON(!info || !dev_is_pci(dev) || info->pasid_table)) return -EINVAL; - /* DMA alias device already has a pasid table, use it: */ - data.pasid_table = &pasid_table; - ret = pci_for_each_dma_alias(to_pci_dev(dev), - &get_alias_pasid_table, &data); - if (ret) - goto attach_out; - pasid_table = kzalloc(sizeof(*pasid_table), GFP_KERNEL); if (!pasid_table) return -ENOMEM; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pasid_table->dev); if (info->pasid_supported) max_pasid = min_t(u32, pci_max_pasids(to_pci_dev(dev)), @@ -182,9 +124,7 @@ int intel_pasid_alloc_table(struct device *dev) pasid_table->table = page_address(pages); pasid_table->order = order; pasid_table->max_pasid = 1 << (order + PAGE_SHIFT + 3); - -attach_out: - device_attach_pasid_table(info, pasid_table); + info->pasid_table = pasid_table; return 0; } @@ -202,10 +142,7 @@ void intel_pasid_free_table(struct device *dev) return; pasid_table = info->pasid_table; - device_detach_pasid_table(info, pasid_table); - - if (!list_empty(&pasid_table->dev)) - return; + info->pasid_table = NULL; /* Free scalable mode PASID directory tables: */ dir = pasid_table->table; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h index 583ea67fc783..bf5b937848b4 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h @@ -74,7 +74,6 @@ struct pasid_table { void *table; /* pasid table pointer */ int order; /* page order of pasid table */ u32 max_pasid; /* max pasid */ - struct list_head dev; /* device list */ }; /* Get PRESENT bit of a PASID directory entry. */ diff --git a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h index 4f29139bbfc3..5fcf89faa31a 100644 --- a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h +++ b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h @@ -612,7 +612,6 @@ struct intel_iommu { struct device_domain_info { struct list_head link; /* link to domain siblings */ struct list_head global; /* link to global list */ - struct list_head table; /* link to pasid table */ u32 segment; /* PCI segment number */ u8 bus; /* PCI bus number */ u8 devfn; /* PCI devfn number */ @@ -729,8 +728,6 @@ extern int dmar_ir_support(void); void *alloc_pgtable_page(int node); void free_pgtable_page(void *vaddr); struct intel_iommu *domain_get_iommu(struct dmar_domain *domain); -int for_each_device_domain(int (*fn)(struct device_domain_info *info, - void *data), void *data); void iommu_flush_write_buffer(struct intel_iommu *iommu); int intel_iommu_enable_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev); struct intel_iommu *device_to_iommu(struct device *dev, u8 *bus, u8 *devfn); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1fd6e5675336daf4747940b4285e84b0c114ae32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Almbladh Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 10:23:45 +0200 Subject: xdp: Fix spurious packet loss in generic XDP TX path The byte queue limits (BQL) mechanism is intended to move queuing from the driver to the network stack in order to reduce latency caused by excessive queuing in hardware. However, when transmitting or redirecting a packet using generic XDP, the qdisc layer is bypassed and there are no additional queues. Since netif_xmit_stopped() also takes BQL limits into account, but without having any alternative queuing, packets are silently dropped. This patch modifies the drop condition to only consider cases when the driver itself cannot accept any more packets. This is analogous to the condition in __dev_direct_xmit(). Dropped packets are also counted on the device. Bypassing the qdisc layer in the generic XDP TX path means that XDP packets are able to starve other packets going through a qdisc, and DDOS attacks will be more effective. In-driver-XDP use dedicated TX queues, so they do not have this starvation issue. Signed-off-by: Johan Almbladh Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220705082345.2494312-1-johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com --- net/core/dev.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 8e6f22961206..30a1603a7225 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -4863,7 +4863,10 @@ static u32 netif_receive_generic_xdp(struct sk_buff *skb, } /* When doing generic XDP we have to bypass the qdisc layer and the - * network taps in order to match in-driver-XDP behavior. + * network taps in order to match in-driver-XDP behavior. This also means + * that XDP packets are able to starve other packets going through a qdisc, + * and DDOS attacks will be more effective. In-driver-XDP use dedicated TX + * queues, so they do not have this starvation issue. */ void generic_xdp_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog) { @@ -4875,7 +4878,7 @@ void generic_xdp_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog) txq = netdev_core_pick_tx(dev, skb, NULL); cpu = smp_processor_id(); HARD_TX_LOCK(dev, txq, cpu); - if (!netif_xmit_stopped(txq)) { + if (!netif_xmit_frozen_or_drv_stopped(txq)) { rc = netdev_start_xmit(skb, dev, txq, 0); if (dev_xmit_complete(rc)) free_skb = false; @@ -4883,6 +4886,7 @@ void generic_xdp_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog) HARD_TX_UNLOCK(dev, txq); if (free_skb) { trace_xdp_exception(dev, xdp_prog, XDP_TX); + dev_core_stats_tx_dropped_inc(dev); kfree_skb(skb); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 955f04766d4e6eb94bf3baa539e096808c74ebfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guiling Deng Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 09:36:41 -0700 Subject: fbdev: fbmem: Fix logo center image dx issue Image.dx gets wrong value because of missing '()'. If xres == logo->width and n == 1, image.dx = -16. Signed-off-by: Guiling Deng Fixes: 3d8b1933eb1c ("fbdev: fbmem: add config option to center the bootup logo") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index 8afc4538558c..ee63b5b47290 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int fb_show_logo_line(struct fb_info *info, int rotate, while (n && (n * (logo->width + 8) - 8 > xres)) --n; - image.dx = (xres - n * (logo->width + 8) - 8) / 2; + image.dx = (xres - (n * (logo->width + 8) - 8)) / 2; image.dy = y ?: (yres - logo->height) / 2; } else { image.dx = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3663a2fb325b8782524f3edb0ae32d6faa615109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hsin-Yi Wang Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 01:33:29 +0800 Subject: video: of_display_timing.h: include errno.h If CONFIG_OF is not enabled, default of_get_display_timing() returns an errno, so include the header. Fixes: 422b67e0b31a ("videomode: provide dummy inline functions for !CONFIG_OF") Suggested-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Helge Deller --- include/video/of_display_timing.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/video/of_display_timing.h b/include/video/of_display_timing.h index e1126a74882a..eff166fdd81b 100644 --- a/include/video/of_display_timing.h +++ b/include/video/of_display_timing.h @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ #ifndef __LINUX_OF_DISPLAY_TIMING_H #define __LINUX_OF_DISPLAY_TIMING_H +#include + struct device_node; struct display_timing; struct display_timings; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 73029c9b23cf1213e5f54c2b59efce08665199e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keith Busch Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 10:21:02 -0700 Subject: nvme-pci: phison e16 has bogus namespace ids Add the quirk. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216049 Reported-by: Chris Egolf Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index e7af2234e53b..193b44755662 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -3465,7 +3465,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id nvme_id_table[] = { { PCI_DEVICE(0x1987, 0x5012), /* Phison E12 */ .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, }, { PCI_DEVICE(0x1987, 0x5016), /* Phison E16 */ - .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_IGNORE_DEV_SUBNQN, }, + .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_IGNORE_DEV_SUBNQN | + NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, }, { PCI_DEVICE(0x1b4b, 0x1092), /* Lexar 256 GB SSD */ .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_NO_NS_DESC_LIST | NVME_QUIRK_IGNORE_DEV_SUBNQN, }, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 607a48c78e6b427b0b684d24e61c19e846ad65d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Holland Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 22:19:02 -0500 Subject: dt-bindings: dma: allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma: Fix min/max typo The conditional block for variants with a second clock should have set minItems, not maxItems, which was already 2. Since clock-names requires two items, this typo should not have caused any problems. Fixes: edd14218bd66 ("dt-bindings: dmaengine: Convert Allwinner A31 and A64 DMA to a schema") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland Reviewed-by: Rob Herring Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220702031903.21703-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml index ff0a5c58d78c..e712444abff1 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/allwinner,sun50i-a64-dma.yaml @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ if: then: properties: clocks: - maxItems: 2 + minItems: 2 required: - clock-names -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c629dc9609dc43492a7bc8060cc6120875bf096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keith Busch Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 10:05:05 -0700 Subject: nvme: use struct group for generic command dwords This will allow the trace event to know the full size of the data intended to be copied and silence read overflow checks. Reported-by: John Garry Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- drivers/nvme/host/trace.h | 2 +- include/linux/nvme.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.h b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.h index b5f85259461a..37c7f4c89f92 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.h +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.h @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(nvme_setup_cmd, __entry->metadata = !!blk_integrity_rq(req); __entry->fctype = cmd->fabrics.fctype; __assign_disk_name(__entry->disk, req->q->disk); - memcpy(__entry->cdw10, &cmd->common.cdw10, + memcpy(__entry->cdw10, &cmd->common.cdws, sizeof(__entry->cdw10)); ), TP_printk("nvme%d: %sqid=%d, cmdid=%u, nsid=%u, flags=0x%x, meta=0x%x, cmd=(%s %s)", diff --git a/include/linux/nvme.h b/include/linux/nvme.h index e3934003f239..07cfc922f8e4 100644 --- a/include/linux/nvme.h +++ b/include/linux/nvme.h @@ -906,12 +906,14 @@ struct nvme_common_command { __le32 cdw2[2]; __le64 metadata; union nvme_data_ptr dptr; + struct_group(cdws, __le32 cdw10; __le32 cdw11; __le32 cdw12; __le32 cdw13; __le32 cdw14; __le32 cdw15; + ); }; struct nvme_rw_command { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0609e200246bfd3b7516091c491bec4308349055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 09:53:42 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9209/1: Spectre-BHB: avoid pr_info() every time a CPU comes out of idle Jon reports that the Spectre-BHB init code is filling up the kernel log with spurious notifications about which mitigation has been enabled, every time any CPU comes out of a low power state. Given that Spectre-BHB mitigations are system wide, only a single mitigation can be enabled, and we already print an error if two types of CPUs coexist in a single system that require different Spectre-BHB mitigations. This means that the pr_info() that describes the selected mitigation does not need to be emitted for each CPU anyway, and so we can simply emit it only once. In order to clarify the above in the log message, update it to describe that the selected mitigation will be enabled on all CPUs, including ones that are unaffected. If another CPU comes up later that is affected and requires a different mitigation, we report an error as before. Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround") Tested-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index fb9f3eb6bf48..9edb0c5eb369 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -209,10 +209,10 @@ static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method) return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; spectre_bhb_method = method; - } - pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n", - smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method)); + pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: enabling %s workaround for all CPUs\n", + smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method)); + } return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 598f0a99fa8a35be44b27106b43ddc66417af3b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhen Lei Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 15:05:41 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9210/1: Mark the FDT_FIXED sections as shareable commit 7a1be318f579 ("ARM: 9012/1: move device tree mapping out of linear region") use FDT_FIXED_BASE to map the whole FDT_FIXED_SIZE memory area which contains fdt. But it only reserves the exact physical memory that fdt occupied. Unfortunately, this mapping is non-shareable. An illegal or speculative read access can bring the RAM content from non-fdt zone into cache, PIPT makes it to be hit by subsequently read access through shareable mapping(such as linear mapping), and the cache consistency between cores is lost due to non-shareable property. |<---------FDT_FIXED_SIZE------>| | | ------------------------------- | | | | ------------------------------- 1. CoreA read through MT_ROM mapping, the old data is loaded into the cache. 2. CoreB write to update data through linear mapping. CoreA received the notification to invalid the corresponding cachelines, but the property non-shareable makes it to be ignored. 3. CoreA read through linear mapping, cache hit, the old data is read. To eliminate this risk, add a new memory type MT_MEMORY_RO. Compared to MT_ROM, it is shareable and non-executable. Here's an example: list_del corruption. prev->next should be c0ecbf74, but was c08410dc kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:53! ... ... PC is at __list_del_entry_valid+0x58/0x98 LR is at __list_del_entry_valid+0x58/0x98 psr: 60000093 sp : c0ecbf30 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000001 r10: c08410d0 r9 : 00000001 r8 : c0825e0c r7 : 20000013 r6 : c08410d0 r5 : c0ecbf74 r4 : c0ecbf74 r3 : c0825d08 r2 : 00000000 r1 : df7ce6f4 r0 : 00000044 ... ... Stack: (0xc0ecbf30 to 0xc0ecc000) bf20: c0ecbf74 c0164fd0 c0ecbf70 c0165170 bf40: c0eca000 c0840c00 c0840c00 c0824500 c0825e0c c0189bbc c088f404 60000013 bf60: 60000013 c0e85100 000004ec 00000000 c0ebcdc0 c0ecbf74 c0ecbf74 c0825d08 ... ... < next prev > (__list_del_entry_valid) from (__list_del_entry+0xc/0x20) (__list_del_entry) from (finish_swait+0x60/0x7c) (finish_swait) from (rcu_gp_kthread+0x560/0xa20) (rcu_gp_kthread) from (kthread+0x14c/0x15c) (kthread) from (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) The faulty list node to be deleted is a local variable, its address is c0ecbf74. The dumped stack shows that 'prev' = c0ecbf74, but its value before lib/list_debug.c:53 is c08410dc. A large amount of printing results in swapping out the cacheline containing the old data(MT_ROM mapping is read only, so the cacheline cannot be dirty), and the subsequent dump operation obtains new data from the DDR. Fixes: 7a1be318f579 ("ARM: 9012/1: move device tree mapping out of linear region") Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h | 1 + arch/arm/mm/mmu.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h index 92282558caf7..2b8970d8e5a2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach/map.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum { MT_HIGH_VECTORS, MT_MEMORY_RWX, MT_MEMORY_RW, + MT_MEMORY_RO, MT_ROM, MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED, MT_MEMORY_RW_DTCM, diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c index 5e2be37a198e..cd17e324aa51 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c @@ -296,6 +296,13 @@ static struct mem_type mem_types[] __ro_after_init = { .prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE, .domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL, }, + [MT_MEMORY_RO] = { + .prot_pte = L_PTE_PRESENT | L_PTE_YOUNG | L_PTE_DIRTY | + L_PTE_XN | L_PTE_RDONLY, + .prot_l1 = PMD_TYPE_TABLE, + .prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT, + .domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL, + }, [MT_ROM] = { .prot_sect = PMD_TYPE_SECT, .domain = DOMAIN_KERNEL, @@ -489,6 +496,7 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) /* Also setup NX memory mapping */ mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_XN; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_XN; } if (cpu_arch >= CPU_ARCH_ARMv7 && (cr & CR_TRE)) { /* @@ -568,6 +576,7 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) mem_types[MT_ROM].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; mem_types[MT_MINICLEAN].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; mem_types[MT_CACHECLEAN].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_APX|PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE; #endif /* @@ -587,6 +596,8 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_DMA_READY].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_sect |= PMD_SECT_S; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_pte |= L_PTE_SHARED; @@ -647,6 +658,8 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void) mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_sect |= ecc_mask | cp->pmd; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RW].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_sect |= ecc_mask | cp->pmd; + mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RO].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_DMA_READY].prot_pte |= kern_pgprot; mem_types[MT_MEMORY_RWX_NONCACHED].prot_sect |= ecc_mask; mem_types[MT_ROM].prot_sect |= cp->pmd; @@ -1360,7 +1373,7 @@ static void __init devicemaps_init(const struct machine_desc *mdesc) map.pfn = __phys_to_pfn(__atags_pointer & SECTION_MASK); map.virtual = FDT_FIXED_BASE; map.length = FDT_FIXED_SIZE; - map.type = MT_ROM; + map.type = MT_MEMORY_RO; create_mapping(&map); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc45b836388f0ccc6831288a08f77a33845f10b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Walleij Date: Sun, 19 Jun 2022 20:39:29 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9211/1: domain: drop modify_domain() This function/macro isn't used anywhere in the kernel. The only user was set_fs() and was deleted in the set_fs() removal patch set. Fixes: 8ac6f5d7f84b ("ARM: 9113/1: uaccess: remove set_fs() implementation") Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h | 13 ------------- 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h index f1d0a7807cd0..41536feb4392 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h @@ -112,19 +112,6 @@ static __always_inline void set_domain(unsigned int val) } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS -#define modify_domain(dom,type) \ - do { \ - unsigned int domain = get_domain(); \ - domain &= ~domain_mask(dom); \ - domain = domain | domain_val(dom, type); \ - set_domain(domain); \ - } while (0) - -#else -static inline void modify_domain(unsigned dom, unsigned type) { } -#endif - /* * Generate the T (user) versions of the LDR/STR and related * instructions (inline assembly) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2bf6204240fddb22cc4940b9e3f40c538390212e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Walleij Date: Sun, 19 Jun 2022 20:40:16 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9212/1: domain: Modify Kconfig help text After the removal of set_fs() the reference to set_fs() is stale. Alter the helptext to reflect what the config option really does. Fixes: 8ac6f5d7f84b ("ARM: 9113/1: uaccess: remove set_fs() implementation") Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig index a3a4589ec73b..fc439c2c16f8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig @@ -631,7 +631,11 @@ config CPU_USE_DOMAINS bool help This option enables or disables the use of domain switching - via the set_fs() function. + using the DACR (domain access control register) to protect memory + domains from each other. In Linux we use three domains: kernel, user + and IO. The domains are used to protect userspace from kernelspace + and to handle IO-space as a special type of memory by assigning + manager or client roles to running code (such as a process). config CPU_V7M_NUM_IRQ int "Number of external interrupts connected to the NVIC" -- cgit v1.2.3 From e4ced82deb5fb17222fb82e092c3f8311955b585 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Osipenko Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:55:45 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9213/1: Print message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once Print the message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once. The message is printed each time CPU goes out from idling state on NVIDIA Tegra boards, causing storm in KMSG that makes system unusable. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c index 9edb0c5eb369..8bc7a2d6d6c7 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c @@ -108,8 +108,7 @@ static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) #else static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) { - pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n", - smp_processor_id()); + pr_info_once("Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n"); return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From e5c46fde75e43c15a29b40e5fc5641727f97ae47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 16:46:54 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9214/1: alignment: advance IT state after emulating Thumb instruction After emulating a misaligned load or store issued in Thumb mode, we have to advance the IT state by hand, or it will get out of sync with the actual instruction stream, which means we'll end up applying the wrong condition code to subsequent instructions. This might corrupt the program state rather catastrophically. So borrow the it_advance() helper from the probing code, and use it on CPSR if the emulated instruction is Thumb. Cc: Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/mm/alignment.c | 3 +++ arch/arm/probes/decode.h | 26 +------------------------- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h index 93051e2f402c..1408a6a15d0e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/ptrace.h @@ -163,5 +163,31 @@ static inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs) ((current_stack_pointer | (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) - 7) - 1; \ }) + +/* + * Update ITSTATE after normal execution of an IT block instruction. + * + * The 8 IT state bits are split into two parts in CPSR: + * ITSTATE<1:0> are in CPSR<26:25> + * ITSTATE<7:2> are in CPSR<15:10> + */ +static inline unsigned long it_advance(unsigned long cpsr) +{ + if ((cpsr & 0x06000400) == 0) { + /* ITSTATE<2:0> == 0 means end of IT block, so clear IT state */ + cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK; + } else { + /* We need to shift left ITSTATE<4:0> */ + const unsigned long mask = 0x06001c00; /* Mask ITSTATE<4:0> */ + unsigned long it = cpsr & mask; + it <<= 1; + it |= it >> (27 - 10); /* Carry ITSTATE<2> to correct place */ + it &= mask; + cpsr &= ~mask; + cpsr |= it; + } + return cpsr; +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c b/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c index 6f499559d193..f8dd0b3cc8e0 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/alignment.c @@ -935,6 +935,9 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs) if (type == TYPE_LDST) do_alignment_finish_ldst(addr, instr, regs, offset); + if (thumb_mode(regs)) + regs->ARM_cpsr = it_advance(regs->ARM_cpsr); + return 0; bad_or_fault: diff --git a/arch/arm/probes/decode.h b/arch/arm/probes/decode.h index 973173598992..facc889d05ee 100644 --- a/arch/arm/probes/decode.h +++ b/arch/arm/probes/decode.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include void __init arm_probes_decode_init(void); @@ -35,31 +36,6 @@ void __init find_str_pc_offset(void); #endif -/* - * Update ITSTATE after normal execution of an IT block instruction. - * - * The 8 IT state bits are split into two parts in CPSR: - * ITSTATE<1:0> are in CPSR<26:25> - * ITSTATE<7:2> are in CPSR<15:10> - */ -static inline unsigned long it_advance(unsigned long cpsr) - { - if ((cpsr & 0x06000400) == 0) { - /* ITSTATE<2:0> == 0 means end of IT block, so clear IT state */ - cpsr &= ~PSR_IT_MASK; - } else { - /* We need to shift left ITSTATE<4:0> */ - const unsigned long mask = 0x06001c00; /* Mask ITSTATE<4:0> */ - unsigned long it = cpsr & mask; - it <<= 1; - it |= it >> (27 - 10); /* Carry ITSTATE<2> to correct place */ - it &= mask; - cpsr &= ~mask; - cpsr |= it; - } - return cpsr; -} - static inline void __kprobes bx_write_pc(long pcv, struct pt_regs *regs) { long cpsr = regs->ARM_cpsr; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d6c13d74b5c06bef75febf1f351de3c4c255f149 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eli Cohen Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 17:34:16 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5: TC, allow offload from uplink to other PF's VF Redirecting traffic from uplink to a VF is a legal operation of mulitport eswitch mode. Remove the limitation. Fixes: 94db33177819 ("net/mlx5: Support multiport eswitch mode") Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen Reviewed-by: Maor Dickman Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c index 3a39a50146dd..9ca2c8763237 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c @@ -3793,7 +3793,7 @@ static bool is_lag_dev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, static bool is_multiport_eligible(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct net_device *out_dev) { - if (mlx5e_eswitch_uplink_rep(out_dev) && + if (same_hw_reps(priv, out_dev) && MLX5_CAP_PORT_SELECTION(priv->mdev, port_select_flow_table) && MLX5_CAP_GEN(priv->mdev, create_lag_when_not_master_up)) return true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4892bd9830c363420f00d90186630e7acbed5c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Bloch Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 12:08:10 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5: Lag, decouple FDB selection and shared FDB Multiport eswitch is required to use native FDB selection instead of affinity, This was achieved by passing the shared_fdb flag down the HW lag creation path. While it did accomplish the goal of setting FDB selection mode to native, it had the side effect of also creating a shared FDB configuration. This created a few issues: - TC rules are inserted into a non active FDB, which means traffic isn't offloaded as all traffic will reach only a single FDB. - All wire traffic is treated as if a single physical port received it; while this is true for a bond configuration, this shouldn't be the case for multiport eswitch. Create a new flag MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_FDB_SEL_MODE_NATIVE to indicate what FDB selection mode should be used. Fixes: 94db33177819 ("net/mlx5: Support multiport eswitch mode") Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c | 12 ++++++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c | 12 +++++++++--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/mpesw.c | 5 ++--- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c index 15e41dc84d53..f1ad233ec990 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static int state_show(struct seq_file *file, void *priv) static int flags_show(struct seq_file *file, void *priv) { struct mlx5_core_dev *dev = file->private; + bool fdb_sel_mode_native; struct mlx5_lag *ldev; bool shared_fdb; bool lag_active; @@ -79,14 +80,21 @@ static int flags_show(struct seq_file *file, void *priv) ldev = dev->priv.lag; mutex_lock(&ldev->lock); lag_active = __mlx5_lag_is_active(ldev); - if (lag_active) - shared_fdb = test_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_SHARED_FDB, &ldev->mode_flags); + if (!lag_active) + goto unlock; + + shared_fdb = test_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_SHARED_FDB, &ldev->mode_flags); + fdb_sel_mode_native = test_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_FDB_SEL_MODE_NATIVE, + &ldev->mode_flags); +unlock: mutex_unlock(&ldev->lock); if (!lag_active) return -EINVAL; seq_printf(file, "%s:%s\n", "shared_fdb", shared_fdb ? "on" : "off"); + seq_printf(file, "%s:%s\n", "fdb_selection_mode", + fdb_sel_mode_native ? "native" : "affinity"); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c index 2a8fc547eb37..a9b65dc47a5b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c @@ -68,14 +68,15 @@ static int get_port_sel_mode(enum mlx5_lag_mode mode, unsigned long flags) static int mlx5_cmd_create_lag(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, u8 *ports, int mode, unsigned long flags) { - bool shared_fdb = test_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_SHARED_FDB, &flags); + bool fdb_sel_mode = test_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_FDB_SEL_MODE_NATIVE, + &flags); int port_sel_mode = get_port_sel_mode(mode, flags); u32 in[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(create_lag_in)] = {}; void *lag_ctx; lag_ctx = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_lag_in, in, ctx); MLX5_SET(create_lag_in, in, opcode, MLX5_CMD_OP_CREATE_LAG); - MLX5_SET(lagc, lag_ctx, fdb_selection_mode, shared_fdb); + MLX5_SET(lagc, lag_ctx, fdb_selection_mode, fdb_sel_mode); if (port_sel_mode == MLX5_LAG_PORT_SELECT_MODE_QUEUE_AFFINITY) { MLX5_SET(lagc, lag_ctx, tx_remap_affinity_1, ports[0]); MLX5_SET(lagc, lag_ctx, tx_remap_affinity_2, ports[1]); @@ -471,8 +472,13 @@ static int mlx5_lag_set_flags(struct mlx5_lag *ldev, enum mlx5_lag_mode mode, bool roce_lag = mode == MLX5_LAG_MODE_ROCE; *flags = 0; - if (shared_fdb) + if (shared_fdb) { set_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_SHARED_FDB, flags); + set_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_FDB_SEL_MODE_NATIVE, flags); + } + + if (mode == MLX5_LAG_MODE_MPESW) + set_bit(MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_FDB_SEL_MODE_NATIVE, flags); if (roce_lag) return mlx5_lag_set_port_sel_mode_roce(ldev, flags); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h index c81b173156d2..71d2bb969544 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum { enum { MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_HASH_BASED, MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_SHARED_FDB, + MLX5_LAG_MODE_FLAG_FDB_SEL_MODE_NATIVE, }; enum mlx5_lag_mode { diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/mpesw.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/mpesw.c index ee4b25a50315..f643202b29c6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/mpesw.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/mpesw.c @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ void mlx5_lag_del_mpesw_rule(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev) int mlx5_lag_add_mpesw_rule(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev) { struct mlx5_lag *ldev = dev->priv.lag; - bool shared_fdb; int err = 0; if (!ldev) @@ -55,8 +54,8 @@ int mlx5_lag_add_mpesw_rule(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev) err = -EINVAL; goto out; } - shared_fdb = mlx5_shared_fdb_supported(ldev); - err = mlx5_activate_lag(ldev, NULL, MLX5_LAG_MODE_MPESW, shared_fdb); + + err = mlx5_activate_lag(ldev, NULL, MLX5_LAG_MODE_MPESW, false); if (err) mlx5_core_warn(dev, "Failed to create LAG in MPESW mode (%d)\n", err); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6cc2714e85754a621219693ea8aa3077d6fca0cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tariq Toukan Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 21:20:29 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5e: kTLS, Fix build time constant test in TX Use the correct constant (TLS_DRIVER_STATE_SIZE_TX) in the comparison against the size of the private TX TLS driver context. Fixes: df8d866770f9 ("net/mlx5e: kTLS, Use kernel API to extract private offload context") Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan Reviewed-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_tx.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_tx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_tx.c index 4b6f0d1ea59a..f239fb2e832f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_tx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_tx.c @@ -68,8 +68,7 @@ mlx5e_set_ktls_tx_priv_ctx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct mlx5e_ktls_offload_context_tx **ctx = __tls_driver_ctx(tls_ctx, TLS_OFFLOAD_CTX_DIR_TX); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct mlx5e_ktls_offload_context_tx *) > - TLS_OFFLOAD_CONTEXT_SIZE_TX); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(priv_tx) > TLS_DRIVER_STATE_SIZE_TX); *ctx = priv_tx; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2ec6cf9b742a5c18982861322fa5de6510f8f57e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tariq Toukan Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 21:21:10 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5e: kTLS, Fix build time constant test in RX Use the correct constant (TLS_DRIVER_STATE_SIZE_RX) in the comparison against the size of the private RX TLS driver context. Fixes: 1182f3659357 ("net/mlx5e: kTLS, Add kTLS RX HW offload support") Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan Reviewed-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_rx.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_rx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_rx.c index 0bb0633b7542..27483aa7be8a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ktls_rx.c @@ -231,8 +231,7 @@ mlx5e_set_ktls_rx_priv_ctx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct mlx5e_ktls_offload_context_rx **ctx = __tls_driver_ctx(tls_ctx, TLS_OFFLOAD_CTX_DIR_RX); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct mlx5e_ktls_offload_context_rx *) > - TLS_OFFLOAD_CONTEXT_SIZE_RX); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(priv_rx) > TLS_DRIVER_STATE_SIZE_RX); *ctx = priv_rx; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0c9d876545a56aebed30fa306d0460a4d28d271a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Blakey Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 13:11:18 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5e: Fix enabling sriov while tc nic rules are offloaded There is a total of four 4M entries flow tables. In sriov disabled mode, ct, ct_nat and post_act take three of them. When adding the first tc nic rule in this mode, it will take another 4M table for the tc table. If user then enables sriov, the legacy flow table tries to take another 4M and fails, and so enablement fails. To fix that, have legacy fdb take the next available maximum size from the fs ft pool. Fixes: 4a98544d1827 ("net/mlx5: Move chains ft pool to be used by all firmware steering") Signed-off-by: Paul Blakey Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/legacy.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/legacy.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/legacy.c index 9d17206d1625..fabe49a35a5c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/legacy.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/legacy.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "mlx5_core.h" #include "eswitch.h" #include "fs_core.h" +#include "fs_ft_pool.h" #include "esw/qos.h" enum { @@ -95,8 +96,7 @@ static int esw_create_legacy_fdb_table(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw) if (!flow_group_in) return -ENOMEM; - table_size = BIT(MLX5_CAP_ESW_FLOWTABLE_FDB(dev, log_max_ft_size)); - ft_attr.max_fte = table_size; + ft_attr.max_fte = POOL_NEXT_SIZE; ft_attr.prio = LEGACY_FDB_PRIO; fdb = mlx5_create_flow_table(root_ns, &ft_attr); if (IS_ERR(fdb)) { @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ static int esw_create_legacy_fdb_table(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw) goto out; } esw->fdb_table.legacy.fdb = fdb; + table_size = fdb->max_fte; /* Addresses group : Full match unicast/multicast addresses */ MLX5_SET(create_flow_group_in, flow_group_in, match_criteria_enable, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1afbd1e283d6a5449d8c24ce8ccae8ccb15ee943 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Liu, Changcheng" Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 16:49:14 +0800 Subject: net/mlx5: Lag, correct get the port select mode str mode & mode_flags is updated at the end of mlx5_activate_lag which may not reflect the actual mode as shown in below logic: mlx5_activate_lag(struct mlx5_lag *ldev, |-- unsigned long flags = 0; |-- err = mlx5_lag_set_flags(ldev, mode, tracker, shared_fdb, &flags); |-- err = mlx5_create_lag(ldev, tracker, mode, flags); |-- mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(ldev); |-- ldev->mode = mode; |-- ldev->mode_flags = flags; Use mode & flag as parameters to get port select mode info. Fixes: 94db33177819 ("net/mlx5: Support multiport eswitch mode") Signed-off-by: Liu, Changcheng Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c | 6 +++--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c index f1ad233ec990..b8feaf0f5c4c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/debugfs.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int port_sel_mode_show(struct seq_file *file, void *priv) ldev = dev->priv.lag; mutex_lock(&ldev->lock); if (__mlx5_lag_is_active(ldev)) - mode = mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(ldev); + mode = mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(ldev->mode, ldev->mode_flags); else ret = -EINVAL; mutex_unlock(&ldev->lock); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c index a9b65dc47a5b..5d41e19378e0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.c @@ -487,9 +487,9 @@ static int mlx5_lag_set_flags(struct mlx5_lag *ldev, enum mlx5_lag_mode mode, return 0; } -char *mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(struct mlx5_lag *ldev) +char *mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(enum mlx5_lag_mode mode, unsigned long flags) { - int port_sel_mode = get_port_sel_mode(ldev->mode, ldev->mode_flags); + int port_sel_mode = get_port_sel_mode(mode, flags); switch (port_sel_mode) { case MLX5_LAG_PORT_SELECT_MODE_QUEUE_AFFINITY: return "queue_affinity"; @@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ static int mlx5_create_lag(struct mlx5_lag *ldev, if (tracker) mlx5_lag_print_mapping(dev0, ldev, tracker, flags); mlx5_core_info(dev0, "shared_fdb:%d mode:%s\n", - shared_fdb, mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(ldev)); + shared_fdb, mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(mode, flags)); err = mlx5_cmd_create_lag(dev0, ldev->v2p_map, mode, flags); if (err) { diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h index 71d2bb969544..ce2ce8ccbd70 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lag/lag.h @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ bool mlx5_shared_fdb_supported(struct mlx5_lag *ldev); void mlx5_lag_del_mpesw_rule(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev); int mlx5_lag_add_mpesw_rule(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev); -char *mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(struct mlx5_lag *ldev); +char *mlx5_get_str_port_sel_mode(enum mlx5_lag_mode mode, unsigned long flags); void mlx5_infer_tx_enabled(struct lag_tracker *tracker, u8 num_ports, u8 *ports, int *num_enabled); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6c4e8fa03fde7e5b304594294e397a9ba92feaf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roi Dayan Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 10:43:55 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5e: CT: Use own workqueue instead of mlx5e priv Allocate a ct priv workqueue instead of using mlx5e priv one so flushing will only be of related CT entries. Also move flushing of the workqueue before rhashtable destroy otherwise entries won't be valid. Fixes: b069e14fff46 ("net/mlx5e: CT: Fix queued up restore put() executing after relevant ft release") Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan Reviewed-by: Oz Shlomo Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_ct.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_ct.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_ct.c index 25f51f80a9b4..ba171c7f0a67 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_ct.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_ct.c @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct mlx5_tc_ct_priv { struct mlx5_ct_fs *fs; struct mlx5_ct_fs_ops *fs_ops; spinlock_t ht_lock; /* protects ft entries */ + struct workqueue_struct *wq; struct mlx5_tc_ct_debugfs debugfs; }; @@ -941,14 +942,11 @@ static void mlx5_tc_ct_entry_del_work(struct work_struct *work) static void __mlx5_tc_ct_entry_put(struct mlx5_ct_entry *entry) { - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; - if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&entry->refcnt)) return; - priv = netdev_priv(entry->ct_priv->netdev); INIT_WORK(&entry->work, mlx5_tc_ct_entry_del_work); - queue_work(priv->wq, &entry->work); + queue_work(entry->ct_priv->wq, &entry->work); } static struct mlx5_ct_counter * @@ -1759,19 +1757,16 @@ mlx5_tc_ct_flush_ft_entry(void *ptr, void *arg) static void mlx5_tc_ct_del_ft_cb(struct mlx5_tc_ct_priv *ct_priv, struct mlx5_ct_ft *ft) { - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; - if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&ft->refcount)) return; + flush_workqueue(ct_priv->wq); nf_flow_table_offload_del_cb(ft->nf_ft, mlx5_tc_ct_block_flow_offload, ft); rhashtable_remove_fast(&ct_priv->zone_ht, &ft->node, zone_params); rhashtable_free_and_destroy(&ft->ct_entries_ht, mlx5_tc_ct_flush_ft_entry, ct_priv); - priv = netdev_priv(ct_priv->netdev); - flush_workqueue(priv->wq); mlx5_tc_ct_free_pre_ct_tables(ft); mapping_remove(ct_priv->zone_mapping, ft->zone_restore_id); kfree(ft); @@ -2176,6 +2171,12 @@ mlx5_tc_ct_init(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5_fs_chains *chains, if (rhashtable_init(&ct_priv->ct_tuples_nat_ht, &tuples_nat_ht_params)) goto err_ct_tuples_nat_ht; + ct_priv->wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("mlx5e_ct_priv_wq", 0); + if (!ct_priv->wq) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err_wq; + } + err = mlx5_tc_ct_fs_init(ct_priv); if (err) goto err_init_fs; @@ -2184,6 +2185,8 @@ mlx5_tc_ct_init(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5_fs_chains *chains, return ct_priv; err_init_fs: + destroy_workqueue(ct_priv->wq); +err_wq: rhashtable_destroy(&ct_priv->ct_tuples_nat_ht); err_ct_tuples_nat_ht: rhashtable_destroy(&ct_priv->ct_tuples_ht); @@ -2213,6 +2216,7 @@ mlx5_tc_ct_clean(struct mlx5_tc_ct_priv *ct_priv) if (!ct_priv) return; + destroy_workqueue(ct_priv->wq); mlx5_ct_tc_remove_dbgfs(ct_priv); chains = ct_priv->chains; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 452133dd580811f184e76b1402983182ee425298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gal Pressman Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 15:05:53 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5e: Fix capability check for updating vnic env counters The existing capability check for vnic env counters only checks for receive steering discards, although we need the counters update for the exposed internal queue oob counter as well. This could result in the latter counter not being updated correctly when the receive steering discards counter is not supported. Fix that by checking whether any counter is supported instead of only the steering counter capability. Fixes: 0cfafd4b4ddf ("net/mlx5e: Add device out of buffer counter") Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_stats.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_stats.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_stats.c index 57fa0489eeb8..1e87bb2b7541 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_stats.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_stats.c @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static MLX5E_DECLARE_STATS_GRP_OP_UPDATE_STATS(vnic_env) u32 in[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(query_vnic_env_in)] = {}; struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev; - if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(priv->mdev, nic_receive_steering_discard)) + if (!mlx5e_stats_grp_vnic_env_num_stats(priv)) return; MLX5_SET(query_vnic_env_in, in, opcode, MLX5_CMD_OP_QUERY_VNIC_ENV); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5b759bf2f9d73db05369aef2344502095c4e5e73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Mikityanskiy Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 14:01:37 +0300 Subject: net/mlx5e: Ring the TX doorbell on DMA errors TX doorbells may be postponed, because sometimes the driver knows that another packet follows (for example, when xmit_more is true, or when a MPWQE session is closed before transmitting a packet). However, the DMA mapping may fail for the next packet, in which case a new WQE is not posted, the doorbell isn't updated either, and the transmission of the previous packet will be delayed indefinitely. This commit fixes the described rare error flow by posting a NOP and ringing the doorbell on errors to flush all the previous packets. The MPWQE session is closed before that. DMA mapping in the MPWQE flow is moved to the beginning of mlx5e_sq_xmit_mpwqe, because empty sessions are not allowed. Stop room always has enough space for a NOP, because the actual TX WQE is not posted. Fixes: e586b3b0baee ("net/mlx5: Ethernet Datapath files") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c index 50d14cec4894..9a7250be229f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c @@ -341,6 +341,26 @@ static void mlx5e_tx_check_stop(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq) } } +static void mlx5e_tx_flush(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq) +{ + struct mlx5e_tx_wqe_info *wi; + struct mlx5e_tx_wqe *wqe; + u16 pi; + + /* Must not be called when a MPWQE session is active but empty. */ + mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_ensure_complete(sq); + + pi = mlx5_wq_cyc_ctr2ix(&sq->wq, sq->pc); + wi = &sq->db.wqe_info[pi]; + + *wi = (struct mlx5e_tx_wqe_info) { + .num_wqebbs = 1, + }; + + wqe = mlx5e_post_nop(&sq->wq, sq->sqn, &sq->pc); + mlx5e_notify_hw(&sq->wq, sq->pc, sq->uar_map, &wqe->ctrl); +} + static inline void mlx5e_txwqe_complete(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mlx5e_tx_attr *attr, @@ -459,6 +479,7 @@ mlx5e_sq_xmit_wqe(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, err_drop: stats->dropped++; dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + mlx5e_tx_flush(sq); } static bool mlx5e_tx_skb_supports_mpwqe(struct sk_buff *skb, struct mlx5e_tx_attr *attr) @@ -560,6 +581,13 @@ mlx5e_sq_xmit_mpwqe(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg *cseg; struct mlx5e_xmit_data txd; + txd.data = skb->data; + txd.len = skb->len; + + txd.dma_addr = dma_map_single(sq->pdev, txd.data, txd.len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(sq->pdev, txd.dma_addr))) + goto err_unmap; + if (!mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_session_is_active(sq)) { mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_session_start(sq, eseg); } else if (!mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_same_eseg(sq, eseg)) { @@ -569,18 +597,9 @@ mlx5e_sq_xmit_mpwqe(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, sq->stats->xmit_more += xmit_more; - txd.data = skb->data; - txd.len = skb->len; - - txd.dma_addr = dma_map_single(sq->pdev, txd.data, txd.len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); - if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(sq->pdev, txd.dma_addr))) - goto err_unmap; mlx5e_dma_push(sq, txd.dma_addr, txd.len, MLX5E_DMA_MAP_SINGLE); - mlx5e_skb_fifo_push(&sq->db.skb_fifo, skb); - mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_add_dseg(sq, &txd); - mlx5e_tx_skb_update_hwts_flags(skb); if (unlikely(mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_is_full(&sq->mpwqe, sq->max_sq_mpw_wqebbs))) { @@ -602,6 +621,7 @@ err_unmap: mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, 1); sq->stats->dropped++; dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + mlx5e_tx_flush(sq); } void mlx5e_tx_mpwqe_ensure_complete(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq) @@ -1006,5 +1026,6 @@ void mlx5i_sq_xmit(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, err_drop: stats->dropped++; dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + mlx5e_tx_flush(sq); } #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From f9a89117fbdc63c0d4ab63a8f3596a72c245bcfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Deucher Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 10:04:55 -0400 Subject: drm/amdgpu: keep fbdev buffers pinned during suspend Was dropped when we converted to the generic helpers. Fixes: 087451f372bf ("drm/amdgpu: use generic fb helpers instead of setting up AMD own's.") Acked-by: Evan Quan Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c index 17c9bbe0cbc5..4dfd6724b3ca 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c @@ -1528,6 +1528,21 @@ bool amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position(struct drm_crtc *crtc, stime, etime, mode); } +static bool +amdgpu_display_robj_is_fb(struct amdgpu_device *adev, struct amdgpu_bo *robj) +{ + struct drm_device *dev = adev_to_drm(adev); + struct drm_fb_helper *fb_helper = dev->fb_helper; + + if (!fb_helper || !fb_helper->buffer) + return false; + + if (gem_to_amdgpu_bo(fb_helper->buffer->gem) != robj) + return false; + + return true; +} + int amdgpu_display_suspend_helper(struct amdgpu_device *adev) { struct drm_device *dev = adev_to_drm(adev); @@ -1563,10 +1578,12 @@ int amdgpu_display_suspend_helper(struct amdgpu_device *adev) continue; } robj = gem_to_amdgpu_bo(fb->obj[0]); - r = amdgpu_bo_reserve(robj, true); - if (r == 0) { - amdgpu_bo_unpin(robj); - amdgpu_bo_unreserve(robj); + if (!amdgpu_display_robj_is_fb(adev, robj)) { + r = amdgpu_bo_reserve(robj, true); + if (r == 0) { + amdgpu_bo_unpin(robj); + amdgpu_bo_unreserve(robj); + } } } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3a4b1cc28fbdc2325b3e3ed7d8024995a75f9216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Deucher Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 10:10:37 -0400 Subject: drm/amdgpu/display: disable prefer_shadow for generic fb helpers Seems to break hibernation. Disable for now until we can root cause it. Fixes: 087451f372bf ("drm/amdgpu: use generic fb helpers instead of setting up AMD own's.") Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216119 Acked-by: Evan Quan Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vkms.c | 3 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v10_0.c | 3 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v11_0.c | 3 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v6_0.c | 3 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v8_0.c | 3 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 3 ++- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vkms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vkms.c index 576849e95296..108e8e8a1a36 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vkms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vkms.c @@ -496,7 +496,8 @@ static int amdgpu_vkms_sw_init(void *handle) adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_height = YRES_MAX; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; - adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 1; + /* disable prefer shadow for now due to hibernation issues */ + adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.fb_base = adev->gmc.aper_base; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v10_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v10_0.c index 288fce7dc0ed..9c964cd3b5d4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v10_0.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v10_0.c @@ -2796,7 +2796,8 @@ static int dce_v10_0_sw_init(void *handle) adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_height = 16384; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; - adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 1; + /* disable prefer shadow for now due to hibernation issues */ + adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.fb_modifiers_not_supported = true; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v11_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v11_0.c index cbe5250b31cb..e0ad9f27dc3f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v11_0.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v11_0.c @@ -2914,7 +2914,8 @@ static int dce_v11_0_sw_init(void *handle) adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_height = 16384; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; - adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 1; + /* disable prefer shadow for now due to hibernation issues */ + adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.fb_modifiers_not_supported = true; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v6_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v6_0.c index 982855e6cf52..3caf6f386042 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v6_0.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v6_0.c @@ -2673,7 +2673,8 @@ static int dce_v6_0_sw_init(void *handle) adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_width = 16384; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_height = 16384; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; - adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 1; + /* disable prefer shadow for now due to hibernation issues */ + adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.fb_modifiers_not_supported = true; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.fb_base = adev->gmc.aper_base; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v8_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v8_0.c index 84440741c60b..7c75df5bffed 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v8_0.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/dce_v8_0.c @@ -2693,7 +2693,8 @@ static int dce_v8_0_sw_init(void *handle) adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_height = 16384; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; - adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 1; + /* disable prefer shadow for now due to hibernation issues */ + adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.fb_modifiers_not_supported = true; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c index 9dd2e0601ea8..1c2984bbda51 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c @@ -3822,7 +3822,8 @@ static int amdgpu_dm_mode_config_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev) adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.max_height = 16384; adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.preferred_depth = 24; - adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 1; + /* disable prefer shadow for now due to hibernation issues */ + adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.prefer_shadow = 0; /* indicates support for immediate flip */ adev_to_drm(adev)->mode_config.async_page_flip = true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9fab303a2cb3d323ca3a32a8b4ab60b451141901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 11:23:38 -0400 Subject: ima: fix violation measurement list record Although the violation digest in the IMA measurement list is always zeroes, the size of the digest should be based on the hash algorithm. Until recently the hash algorithm was hard coded to sha1. Fix the violation digest size included in the IMA measurement list. This is just a cosmetic change which should not affect attestation. Reported-by: Stefan Berger Fixes: 09091c44cb73 ("ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations") Tested-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index c877f01a5471..7bf9b1507220 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -323,10 +323,10 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, else /* * If digest is NULL, the event being recorded is a violation. - * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset of - * IMA_DIGEST_SIZE. + * Make room for the digest by increasing the offset by the + * hash algorithm digest size. */ - offset += IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; + offset += hash_digest_size[hash_algo]; return ima_write_template_field_data(buffer, offset + digestsize, fmt, field_data); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 85144df9ff4652816448369de76897c57cbb1b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 06:04:06 -0700 Subject: drm/i915: fix a possible refcount leak in intel_dp_add_mst_connector() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If drm_connector_init fails, intel_connector_free will be called to take care of proper free. So it is necessary to drop the refcount of port before intel_connector_free. Fixes: 091a4f91942a ("drm/i915: Handle drm-layer errors in intel_dp_add_mst_connector") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220624130406.17996-1-jose.souza@intel.com Signed-off-by: José Roberto de Souza (cherry picked from commit cea9ed611e85d36a05db52b6457bf584b7d969e2) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c index 061b277e5ce7..14d2a64193b2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp_mst.c @@ -839,6 +839,7 @@ static struct drm_connector *intel_dp_add_mst_connector(struct drm_dp_mst_topolo ret = drm_connector_init(dev, connector, &intel_dp_mst_connector_funcs, DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DisplayPort); if (ret) { + drm_dp_mst_put_port_malloc(port); intel_connector_free(intel_connector); return NULL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 25c95bf494067f7bd1dfa8064ef964abe88cafc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 16:30:05 -0700 Subject: drm/i915/guc: ADL-N should use the same GuC FW as ADL-S The only difference between the ADL S and P GuC FWs is the HWConfig support. ADL-N does not support HWConfig, so we should use the same binary as ADL-S, otherwise the GuC might attempt to fetch a config table that does not exist. ADL-N is internally identified as an ADL-P, so we need to special-case it in the FW selection code. Fixes: 7e28d0b26759 ("drm/i915/adl-n: Enable ADL-N platform") Cc: John Harrison Cc: Tejas Upadhyay Cc: Anusha Srivatsa Cc: Jani Nikula Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio Reviewed-by: Matt Roper Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220621233005.3952293-1-daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 971e4a9781742aaad1587e25fd5582b2dd595ef8) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_uc_fw.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_uc_fw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_uc_fw.c index f0d7b57b741e..2ff55b9994bc 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_uc_fw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_uc_fw.c @@ -162,6 +162,15 @@ __uc_fw_auto_select(struct drm_i915_private *i915, struct intel_uc_fw *uc_fw) u8 rev = INTEL_REVID(i915); int i; + /* + * The only difference between the ADL GuC FWs is the HWConfig support. + * ADL-N does not support HWConfig, so we should use the same binary as + * ADL-S, otherwise the GuC might attempt to fetch a config table that + * does not exist. + */ + if (IS_ADLP_N(i915)) + p = INTEL_ALDERLAKE_S; + GEM_BUG_ON(uc_fw->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(blobs_all)); fw_blobs = blobs_all[uc_fw->type].blobs; fw_count = blobs_all[uc_fw->type].count; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 12058077b2e963d16d2d673d46233a7f46add7c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Hellström Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:36:59 +0200 Subject: drm/i915: Fix vm use-after-free in vma destruction MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In vma destruction, the following race may occur: Thread 1: Thread 2: i915_vma_destroy(); ... list_del_init(vma->vm_link); ... mutex_unlock(vma->vm->mutex); __i915_vm_release(); release_references(); And in release_reference() we dereference vma->vm to get to the vm gt pointer, leading to a use-after free. However, __i915_vm_release() grabs the vm->mutex so the vm won't be destroyed before vma->vm->mutex is released, so extract the gt pointer under the vm->mutex to avoid the vma->vm dereference in release_references(). v2: Fix a typo in the commit message (Andi Shyti) Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/5944 Fixes: e1a7ab4fca0c ("drm/i915: Remove the vm open count") Cc: Niranjana Vishwanathapura Cc: Matthew Auld Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström Acked-by: Nirmoy Das Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220620123659.381772-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 1926a6b75954fc1a8b44d10bd0c67db957b78cf7) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c index 0bffb70b3c5f..04d12f278f57 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c @@ -1637,10 +1637,10 @@ static void force_unbind(struct i915_vma *vma) GEM_BUG_ON(drm_mm_node_allocated(&vma->node)); } -static void release_references(struct i915_vma *vma, bool vm_ddestroy) +static void release_references(struct i915_vma *vma, struct intel_gt *gt, + bool vm_ddestroy) { struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj = vma->obj; - struct intel_gt *gt = vma->vm->gt; GEM_BUG_ON(i915_vma_is_active(vma)); @@ -1695,11 +1695,12 @@ void i915_vma_destroy_locked(struct i915_vma *vma) force_unbind(vma); list_del_init(&vma->vm_link); - release_references(vma, false); + release_references(vma, vma->vm->gt, false); } void i915_vma_destroy(struct i915_vma *vma) { + struct intel_gt *gt; bool vm_ddestroy; mutex_lock(&vma->vm->mutex); @@ -1707,8 +1708,11 @@ void i915_vma_destroy(struct i915_vma *vma) list_del_init(&vma->vm_link); vm_ddestroy = vma->vm_ddestroy; vma->vm_ddestroy = false; + + /* vma->vm may be freed when releasing vma->vm->mutex. */ + gt = vma->vm->gt; mutex_unlock(&vma->vm->mutex); - release_references(vma, vm_ddestroy); + release_references(vma, gt, vm_ddestroy); } void i915_vma_parked(struct intel_gt *gt) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c1aeba7bb977fe327fbc9682e9ccb36134cbf77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: xinhui pan Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 16:02:41 +0800 Subject: dma-buf: Fix one use-after-free of fence MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Need get the new fence when we replace the old one. Fixes: 047a1b877ed48 ("dma-buf & drm/amdgpu: remove dma_resv workaround") Signed-off-by: xinhui pan Reviewed-by: Christian König Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220707080241.20060-1-xinhui.pan@amd.com Signed-off-by: Christian König --- drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c index 0cce6e4ec946..205acb2c744d 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ void dma_resv_replace_fences(struct dma_resv *obj, uint64_t context, if (old->context != context) continue; - dma_resv_list_set(list, i, replacement, usage); + dma_resv_list_set(list, i, dma_fence_get(replacement), usage); dma_fence_put(old); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 65a01e601dbba8b7a51a2677811f70f783766682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 12:56:49 +0200 Subject: fbcon: Disallow setting font bigger than screen size Prevent that users set a font size which is bigger than the physical screen. It's unlikely this may happen (because screens are usually much larger than the fonts and each font char is limited to 32x32 pixels), but it may happen on smaller screens/LCD displays. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index c4e91715ef00..a33532564393 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2469,6 +2469,11 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font *font, if (charcount != 256 && charcount != 512) return -EINVAL; + /* font bigger than screen resolution ? */ + if (w > FBCON_SWAP(info->var.rotate, info->var.xres, info->var.yres) || + h > FBCON_SWAP(info->var.rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres)) + return -EINVAL; + /* Make sure drawing engine can handle the font */ if (!(info->pixmap.blit_x & (1 << (font->width - 1))) || !(info->pixmap.blit_y & (1 << (font->height - 1)))) -- cgit v1.2.3 From e64242caef18b4a5840b0e7a9bff37abd4f4f933 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 13:00:34 +0200 Subject: fbcon: Prevent that screen size is smaller than font size We need to prevent that users configure a screen size which is smaller than the currently selected font size. Otherwise rendering chars on the screen will access memory outside the graphics memory region. This patch adds a new function fbcon_modechange_possible() which implements this check and which later may be extended with other checks if necessary. The new function is called from the FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl handler in fbmem.c, which will return -EINVAL if userspace asked for a too small screen size. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 4 +++- include/linux/fbcon.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index a33532564393..5632870a9aeb 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2736,6 +2736,34 @@ void fbcon_update_vcs(struct fb_info *info, bool all) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fbcon_update_vcs); +/* let fbcon check if it supports a new screen resolution */ +int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) +{ + struct fbcon_ops *ops = info->fbcon_par; + struct vc_data *vc; + unsigned int i; + + WARN_CONSOLE_UNLOCKED(); + + if (!ops) + return 0; + + /* prevent setting a screen size which is smaller than font size */ + for (i = first_fb_vc; i <= last_fb_vc; i++) { + vc = vc_cons[i].d; + if (!vc || vc->vc_mode != KD_TEXT || + registered_fb[con2fb_map[i]] != info) + continue; + + if (vc->vc_font.width > FBCON_SWAP(var->rotate, var->xres, var->yres) || + vc->vc_font.height > FBCON_SWAP(var->rotate, var->yres, var->xres)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fbcon_modechange_possible); + int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_videomode *mode) { diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index ee63b5b47290..7dc6848a96bb 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1107,7 +1107,9 @@ static long do_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned int cmd, return -EFAULT; console_lock(); lock_fb_info(info); - ret = fb_set_var(info, &var); + ret = fbcon_modechange_possible(info, &var); + if (!ret) + ret = fb_set_var(info, &var); if (!ret) fbcon_update_vcs(info, var.activate & FB_ACTIVATE_ALL); unlock_fb_info(info); diff --git a/include/linux/fbcon.h b/include/linux/fbcon.h index ff5596dd30f8..2382dec6d6ab 100644 --- a/include/linux/fbcon.h +++ b/include/linux/fbcon.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info); void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps); void fbcon_fb_blanked(struct fb_info *info, int blank); +int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, + struct fb_var_screeninfo *var); void fbcon_update_vcs(struct fb_info *info, bool all); void fbcon_remap_all(struct fb_info *info); int fbcon_set_con2fb_map_ioctl(void __user *argp); @@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ static inline void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps) {} static inline void fbcon_fb_blanked(struct fb_info *info, int blank) {} +static inline int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, + struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) { return 0; } static inline void fbcon_update_vcs(struct fb_info *info, bool all) {} static inline void fbcon_remap_all(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline int fbcon_set_con2fb_map_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b68277f19e31a25312c4acccadb5cf1502e52e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ezequiel Garcia Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 15:41:33 -0300 Subject: drm/ssd130x: Fix pre-charge period setting Fix small typo which causes the mask for the 'precharge1' setting to be used with the 'precharge2' value. Signed-off-by: Ezequiel Garcia Acked-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220706184133.210888-1-ezequiel@vanguardiasur.com.ar --- drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c index 08394444dd6e..f4886e66ff34 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static int ssd130x_init(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x) /* Set precharge period in number of ticks from the internal clock */ precharge = (SSD130X_SET_PRECHARGE_PERIOD1_SET(ssd130x->prechargep1) | - SSD130X_SET_PRECHARGE_PERIOD1_SET(ssd130x->prechargep2)); + SSD130X_SET_PRECHARGE_PERIOD2_SET(ssd130x->prechargep2)); ret = ssd130x_write_cmd(ssd130x, 2, SSD130X_SET_PRECHARGE_PERIOD, precharge); if (ret < 0) return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6c11df58fd1ac0aefcb3b227f72769272b939e56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 15:53:55 +0200 Subject: fbmem: Check virtual screen sizes in fb_set_var() Verify that the fbdev or drm driver correctly adjusted the virtual screen sizes. On failure report the failing driver and reject the screen size change. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index 7dc6848a96bb..7ee6eb2fa715 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1017,6 +1017,16 @@ fb_set_var(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) if (ret) return ret; + /* verify that virtual resolution >= physical resolution */ + if (var->xres_virtual < var->xres || + var->yres_virtual < var->yres) { + pr_warn("WARNING: fbcon: Driver '%s' missed to adjust virtual screen size (%ux%u vs. %ux%u)\n", + info->fix.id, + var->xres_virtual, var->yres_virtual, + var->xres, var->yres); + return -EINVAL; + } + if ((var->activate & FB_ACTIVATE_MASK) != FB_ACTIVATE_NOW) return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 53a6e66b1b4fea4b52f8bc62e5f9530af9061027 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 13:00:34 +0200 Subject: fbcon: Use fbcon_info_from_console() in fbcon_modechange_possible() Use the fbcon_info_from_console() wrapper which was added to kernel v5.19 with commit 409d6c95f9c6 ("fbcon: Introduce wrapper for console->fb_info lookup"). Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 5632870a9aeb..1a9aa12cf886 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2752,7 +2752,7 @@ int fbcon_modechange_possible(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *va for (i = first_fb_vc; i <= last_fb_vc; i++) { vc = vc_cons[i].d; if (!vc || vc->vc_mode != KD_TEXT || - registered_fb[con2fb_map[i]] != info) + fbcon_info_from_console(i) != info) continue; if (vc->vc_font.width > FBCON_SWAP(var->rotate, var->xres, var->yres) || -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7fd6ef61a5d610b4f74c0ac59450237b40130319 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 09:34:05 +0200 Subject: LoongArch: Drop these obsolete selects in Kconfig Commit fa96b57c1490 ("LoongArch: Add build infrastructure") adds the new file arch/loongarch/Kconfig. As the work on LoongArch was probably quite some time under development, various config symbols have changed and disappeared from the time of initial writing of the Kconfig file and its inclusion in the repository. The following four commits: commit c126a53c2760 ("arch: remove GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT entirely") commit 140c8180eb7c ("arch: remove HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS") commit aca52c398389 ("mm: remove CONFIG_HAVE_MEMBLOCK") commit 3f08a302f533 ("mm: remove CONFIG_HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP option") remove the mentioned config symbol, and enable the intended setup by default without configuration. Drop these obsolete selects in loongarch's Kconfig. Reviewed-by: WANG Xuerui Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig index 1920d52653b4..53a912befb62 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ config LOONGARCH select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE select GENERIC_ENTRY - select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT select GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY select GENERIC_IRQ_MULTI_HANDLER select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE @@ -77,7 +76,6 @@ config LOONGARCH select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING - select HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD @@ -86,8 +84,6 @@ config LOONGARCH select HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK select HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING - select HAVE_MEMBLOCK - select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC select HAVE_NMI select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS -- cgit v1.2.3 From 112380996ac22e428264cd7186722e784db887e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qi Hu Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 19:29:37 +0800 Subject: LoongArch: Remove obsolete mentions of vcsr The `vcsr` only exists in the old hardware design, it isn't used in any shipped hardware from Loongson-3A5000 on. Both scalar FP and LSX/LASX instructions use the `fcsr` as their control and status registers now. For example, the RM control bit in fcsr0 is shared by FP, LSX and LASX instructions. Particularly, fcsr16 to fcsr31 are reserved for LSX/LASX now, access to these registers has no visible effect if LSX/LASX is enabled, and will cause SXD/ASXD exceptions if LSX/LASX is not enabled. So, mentions of vcsr are obsolete in the first place (it was just used for debugging), let's remove them. Reviewed-by: WANG Xuerui Signed-off-by: Qi Hu Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/fpregdef.h | 1 - arch/loongarch/include/asm/processor.h | 2 -- arch/loongarch/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 - arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S | 10 ---------- 4 files changed, 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/fpregdef.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/fpregdef.h index adb16e4b43b0..b6be527831dd 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/fpregdef.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/fpregdef.h @@ -48,6 +48,5 @@ #define fcsr1 $r1 #define fcsr2 $r2 #define fcsr3 $r3 -#define vcsr16 $r16 #endif /* _ASM_FPREGDEF_H */ diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/processor.h index 1d63c934b289..57ec45aa078e 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/processor.h @@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ BUILD_FPR_ACCESS(64) struct loongarch_fpu { unsigned int fcsr; - unsigned int vcsr; uint64_t fcc; /* 8x8 */ union fpureg fpr[NUM_FPU_REGS]; }; @@ -161,7 +160,6 @@ struct thread_struct { */ \ .fpu = { \ .fcsr = 0, \ - .vcsr = 0, \ .fcc = 0, \ .fpr = {{{0,},},}, \ }, \ diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/asm-offsets.c index bfb65eb2844f..20cd9e16a95a 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ void output_thread_fpu_defines(void) OFFSET(THREAD_FCSR, loongarch_fpu, fcsr); OFFSET(THREAD_FCC, loongarch_fpu, fcc); - OFFSET(THREAD_VCSR, loongarch_fpu, vcsr); BLANK(); } diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S b/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S index 75c6ce0682a2..a631a7137667 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S @@ -146,16 +146,6 @@ movgr2fcsr fcsr0, \tmp0 .endm - .macro sc_save_vcsr base, tmp0 - movfcsr2gr \tmp0, vcsr16 - EX st.w \tmp0, \base, 0 - .endm - - .macro sc_restore_vcsr base, tmp0 - EX ld.w \tmp0, \base, 0 - movgr2fcsr vcsr16, \tmp0 - .endm - /* * Save a thread's fp context. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From e6ee90233eb155991e469d2047855fc466b831b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huacai Chen Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 11:03:09 +0800 Subject: LoongArch: Fix build errors for tinyconfig Building loongarch:tinyconfig fails with the following error. ./arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h: In function 'pfn_valid': ./arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h:42:32: error: 'PHYS_OFFSET' undeclared Add the missing include file and fix succeeding vdso errors. Fixes: 09cfefb7fa70 ("LoongArch: Add memory management") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h | 1 + arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h index 3dba4986f6c9..dc47fc724fa1 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/page.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #define _ASM_PAGE_H #include +#include /* * PAGE_SHIFT determines the page size diff --git a/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile b/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile index 6b6e16732c60..92e404032257 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ ccflags-vdso += $(filter --target=%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) endif cflags-vdso := $(ccflags-vdso) \ + -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include) \ $(filter -W%,$(filter-out -Wa$(comma)%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))) \ -O2 -g -fno-strict-aliasing -fno-common -fno-builtin -G0 \ -fno-stack-protector -fno-jump-tables -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ -- cgit v1.2.3 From f0fbe652e8529a180630617a17cd5922298c4f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiezhu Yang Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 14:57:35 +0800 Subject: LoongArch: Fix section mismatch warning init_numa_memory() is annotated __init and not used by any module, thus don't export it. Remove not needed EXPORT_SYMBOL for init_numa_memory() to fix the following section mismatch warning: MODPOST vmlinux.symvers WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab+init_numa_memory+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_init_numa_memory to the function .init.text:init_numa_memory() The symbol init_numa_memory is exported and annotated __init Fix this by removing the __init annotation of init_numa_memory or drop the export. This is build on Linux 5.19-rc4. Fixes: d4b6f1562a3c ("LoongArch: Add Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) support") Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/kernel/numa.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/numa.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/numa.c index a76f547a5aa3..a13f92593cfd 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/numa.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/numa.c @@ -429,7 +429,6 @@ int __init init_numa_memory(void) return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_numa_memory); #endif void __init paging_init(void) -- cgit v1.2.3 From c8e27a4a5136e7230f9e4ffcf132705bf56864cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kent Gibson Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:45:07 +0800 Subject: gpiolib: cdev: fix null pointer dereference in linereq_free() Fix a kernel NULL pointer dereference reported by gpio kselftests. linereq_free() can be called as part of the cleanup of a failed request, at which time the desc for a line may not have been determined, so it is unsafe to dereference without a check. Add a check prior to dereferencing the line desc. Fixes: 2068339a6c35 ("gpiolib: cdev: Add hardware timestamp clock type") Signed-off-by: Kent Gibson Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c index f5aa5f93342a..0c9a63becfef 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c @@ -1460,11 +1460,12 @@ static ssize_t linereq_read(struct file *file, static void linereq_free(struct linereq *lr) { unsigned int i; - bool hte; + bool hte = false; for (i = 0; i < lr->num_lines; i++) { - hte = !!test_bit(FLAG_EVENT_CLOCK_HTE, - &lr->lines[i].desc->flags); + if (lr->lines[i].desc) + hte = !!test_bit(FLAG_EVENT_CLOCK_HTE, + &lr->lines[i].desc->flags); edge_detector_stop(&lr->lines[i], hte); if (lr->lines[i].desc) gpiod_free(lr->lines[i].desc); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f54d45372c6ac9c993451de5e51312485f7d10bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 15:01:15 -0700 Subject: x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list. Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 02ba27355b04..736262a76a12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 38e0e4d04d4187c63d6b511396faae7db6a3cd9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:57:42 +0200 Subject: x86/ibt, objtool: Don't discard text references from tracepoint section On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 04:28:58PM +0800, Pengfei Xu wrote: > # ./ftracetest > === Ftrace unit tests === > [1] Basic trace file check [PASS] > [2] Basic test for tracers [PASS] > [3] Basic trace clock test [PASS] > [4] Basic event tracing check [PASS] > [5] Change the ringbuffer size [PASS] > [6] Snapshot and tracing setting [PASS] > [7] trace_pipe and trace_marker [PASS] > [8] Test ftrace direct functions against tracers [UNRESOLVED] > [9] Test ftrace direct functions against kprobes [UNRESOLVED] > [10] Generic dynamic event - add/remove eprobe events [FAIL] > [11] Generic dynamic event - add/remove kprobe events > > It 100% reproduced in step 11 and then missing ENDBR BUG generated: > " > [ 9332.752836] mmiotrace: enabled CPU7. > [ 9332.788612] mmiotrace: disabled. > [ 9337.103426] traps: Missing ENDBR: syscall_regfunc+0x0/0xb0 It turns out that while syscall_regfunc() does have an ENDBR when generated, it gets sealed by objtool's .ibt_endbr_seal list. Since the only text references to this function: $ git grep syscall_regfunc include/linux/tracepoint.h:extern int syscall_regfunc(void); include/trace/events/syscalls.h: syscall_regfunc, syscall_unregfunc include/trace/events/syscalls.h: syscall_regfunc, syscall_unregfunc kernel/tracepoint.c:int syscall_regfunc(void) appear in the __tracepoint section which is excluded by objtool. Fixes: 3c6f9f77e618 ("objtool: Rework ibt and extricate from stack validation") Reported-by: Pengfei Xu Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yrrepdaow4F5kqG0@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 864bb9dd3584..57153e00349c 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -3826,8 +3826,7 @@ static int validate_ibt(struct objtool_file *file) !strcmp(sec->name, "__bug_table") || !strcmp(sec->name, "__ex_table") || !strcmp(sec->name, "__jump_table") || - !strcmp(sec->name, "__mcount_loc") || - !strcmp(sec->name, "__tracepoints")) + !strcmp(sec->name, "__mcount_loc")) continue; list_for_each_entry(reloc, &sec->reloc->reloc_list, list) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2c08b9b38f5b0f4a6c2d29be22b695e4ec4a556b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 15:33:30 +0200 Subject: x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Commit ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") moved PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry, into its own function, in part to avoid calling error_entry() for XenPV. However, commit 7c81c0c9210c ("x86/entry: Avoid very early RET") had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every exception vector. However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit d147553b64bad ("x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET") it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back into *error_entry(). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index a4ba162e52c3..285e043a3e40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -328,6 +328,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(xen_error_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1 + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 UNTRAIN_RET RET SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry) @@ -339,9 +341,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry) */ .macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req - PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS - ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER - /* * Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace. * @@ -1042,6 +1041,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_exit) */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1 + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 + testb $3, CS+8(%rsp) jz .Lerror_kernelspace -- cgit v1.2.3 From d2ee2cfc4aa85ff6a2a3b198a3a524ec54e3d999 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huaxin Lu Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 13:14:17 +0800 Subject: ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem. Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures") Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index cdb84dccd24e..bde74fcecee3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -514,7 +514,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, goto out; } - status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, + rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint); switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 040e3360af3736348112d29425bf5d0be5b93115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Francesco Dolcini Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 12:13:01 +0200 Subject: ASoC: sgtl5000: Fix noise on shutdown/remove Put the SGTL5000 in a silent/safe state on shutdown/remove, this is required since the SGTL5000 produces a constant noise on its output after it is configured and its clock is removed. Without this change this is happening every time the module is unbound/removed or from reboot till the clock is enabled again. The issue was experienced on both a Toradex Colibri/Apalis iMX6, but can be easily reproduced everywhere just playing something on the codec and after that removing/unbinding the driver. Fixes: 9b34e6cc3bc2 ("ASoC: Add Freescale SGTL5000 codec support") Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220624101301.441314-1-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c | 9 +++++++++ sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c index 2aa48aef6a97..3363d1696ad7 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.c @@ -1795,6 +1795,9 @@ static int sgtl5000_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) { struct sgtl5000_priv *sgtl5000 = i2c_get_clientdata(client); + regmap_write(sgtl5000->regmap, SGTL5000_CHIP_DIG_POWER, SGTL5000_DIG_POWER_DEFAULT); + regmap_write(sgtl5000->regmap, SGTL5000_CHIP_ANA_POWER, SGTL5000_ANA_POWER_DEFAULT); + clk_disable_unprepare(sgtl5000->mclk); regulator_bulk_disable(sgtl5000->num_supplies, sgtl5000->supplies); regulator_bulk_free(sgtl5000->num_supplies, sgtl5000->supplies); @@ -1802,6 +1805,11 @@ static int sgtl5000_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client) return 0; } +static void sgtl5000_i2c_shutdown(struct i2c_client *client) +{ + sgtl5000_i2c_remove(client); +} + static const struct i2c_device_id sgtl5000_id[] = { {"sgtl5000", 0}, {}, @@ -1822,6 +1830,7 @@ static struct i2c_driver sgtl5000_i2c_driver = { }, .probe_new = sgtl5000_i2c_probe, .remove = sgtl5000_i2c_remove, + .shutdown = sgtl5000_i2c_shutdown, .id_table = sgtl5000_id, }; diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h index 56ec5863f250..3a808c762299 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/sgtl5000.h @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ /* * SGTL5000_CHIP_DIG_POWER */ +#define SGTL5000_DIG_POWER_DEFAULT 0x0000 #define SGTL5000_ADC_EN 0x0040 #define SGTL5000_DAC_EN 0x0020 #define SGTL5000_DAP_POWERUP 0x0010 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 242a88ff27b23cbf626f9764955d91200f12b53a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sascha Hauer Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 11:26:01 +0200 Subject: ASoC: audio_graph_card2: Fix port numbers in example The example in audio-graph-card2.c has multiple nodes with the same name in it. Change the port numbers to get different names. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220624092601.2445224-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card2.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card2.c b/sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card2.c index 77ac4051b827..d34b29a49268 100644 --- a/sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card2.c +++ b/sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card2.c @@ -90,12 +90,12 @@ links indicates connection part of CPU side (= A). ports@0 { (X) (A) mcpu: port@0 { mcpu0_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&mcodec0_ep>; }; }; (y) port@1 { mcpu1_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&cpu1_ep>; }; }; -(y) port@1 { mcpu2_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&cpu2_ep>; }; }; +(y) port@2 { mcpu2_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&cpu2_ep>; }; }; }; ports@1 { (X) port@0 { mcodec0_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&mcpu0_ep>; }; }; -(y) port@0 { mcodec1_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&codec1_ep>; }; }; -(y) port@1 { mcodec2_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&codec2_ep>; }; }; +(y) port@1 { mcodec1_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&codec1_ep>; }; }; +(y) port@2 { mcodec2_ep: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&codec2_ep>; }; }; }; }; }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f0d96937d31c4615a6418e4bed5cee50a952040e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Owens Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:37:43 -0500 Subject: ASoC: ti: omap-mcbsp: duplicate sysfs error Convert to managed versions of sysfs and clk allocation to simplify unbinding and error handling in probe. Managed sysfs node creation specifically addresses the following error seen the second time probe is attempted after sdma_pcm_platform_register() previously requsted probe deferral: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/68000000.ocp/49022000.mcbsp/max_tx_thres' Signed-off-by: David Owens Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620183744.3176557-1-dowens@precisionplanting.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h | 2 -- sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c | 14 ++------------ sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c | 19 ++----------------- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h index 7865cda4bf0a..da519ea1f303 100644 --- a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h +++ b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h @@ -316,8 +316,6 @@ static inline int omap_mcbsp_read(struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp, u16 reg, /* Sidetone specific API */ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev); -void omap_mcbsp_st_cleanup(struct platform_device *pdev); - int omap_mcbsp_st_start(struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp); int omap_mcbsp_st_stop(struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp); diff --git a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c index 0bc7d26c660a..7e8179cae92e 100644 --- a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c +++ b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!st_data) return -ENOMEM; - st_data->mcbsp_iclk = clk_get(mcbsp->dev, "ick"); + st_data->mcbsp_iclk = devm_clk_get(mcbsp->dev, "ick"); if (IS_ERR(st_data->mcbsp_iclk)) { dev_warn(mcbsp->dev, "Failed to get ick, sidetone might be broken\n"); @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!st_data->io_base_st) return -ENOMEM; - ret = sysfs_create_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &sidetone_attr_group); + ret = devm_device_add_group(mcbsp->dev, &sidetone_attr_group); if (ret) return ret; @@ -368,16 +368,6 @@ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } -void omap_mcbsp_st_cleanup(struct platform_device *pdev) -{ - struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); - - if (mcbsp->st_data) { - sysfs_remove_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &sidetone_attr_group); - clk_put(mcbsp->st_data->mcbsp_iclk); - } -} - static int omap_mcbsp_st_info_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_ctl_elem_info *uinfo) { diff --git a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c index 4479d74f0a45..9933b33c80ca 100644 --- a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c +++ b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c @@ -702,8 +702,7 @@ static int omap_mcbsp_init(struct platform_device *pdev) mcbsp->max_tx_thres = max_thres(mcbsp) - 0x10; mcbsp->max_rx_thres = max_thres(mcbsp) - 0x10; - ret = sysfs_create_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, - &additional_attr_group); + ret = devm_device_add_group(mcbsp->dev, &additional_attr_group); if (ret) { dev_err(mcbsp->dev, "Unable to create additional controls\n"); @@ -711,16 +710,7 @@ static int omap_mcbsp_init(struct platform_device *pdev) } } - ret = omap_mcbsp_st_init(pdev); - if (ret) - goto err_st; - - return 0; - -err_st: - if (mcbsp->pdata->buffer_size) - sysfs_remove_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &additional_attr_group); - return ret; + return omap_mcbsp_st_init(pdev); } /* @@ -1431,11 +1421,6 @@ static int asoc_mcbsp_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) if (cpu_latency_qos_request_active(&mcbsp->pm_qos_req)) cpu_latency_qos_remove_request(&mcbsp->pm_qos_req); - if (mcbsp->pdata->buffer_size) - sysfs_remove_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &additional_attr_group); - - omap_mcbsp_st_cleanup(pdev); - return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9e51ac6ea6041641f64fb761ccf9de271e6576cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Mack Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 12:47:10 +0200 Subject: ASoC: max98396: Fix register access for PCM format settings max98396_dai_set_fmt() modifes register 2041 and touches bits in the mask 0x3a. Make sure to use the right mask for that operation. Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220624104712.1934484-7-daniel@zonque.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/max98396.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/max98396.c b/sound/soc/codecs/max98396.c index 56eb62bb041f..34db38812807 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/max98396.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/max98396.c @@ -342,12 +342,15 @@ static int max98396_dai_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai, unsigned int fmt) { struct snd_soc_component *component = codec_dai->component; struct max98396_priv *max98396 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); - unsigned int format = 0; + unsigned int format_mask, format = 0; unsigned int bclk_pol = 0; int ret, status; int reg; bool update = false; + format_mask = MAX98396_PCM_MODE_CFG_FORMAT_MASK | + MAX98396_PCM_MODE_CFG_LRCLKEDGE; + dev_dbg(component->dev, "%s: fmt 0x%08X\n", __func__, fmt); switch (fmt & SND_SOC_DAIFMT_INV_MASK) { @@ -395,7 +398,7 @@ static int max98396_dai_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai, unsigned int fmt) ret = regmap_read(max98396->regmap, MAX98396_R2041_PCM_MODE_CFG, ®); if (ret < 0) return -EINVAL; - if (format != (reg & MAX98396_PCM_BCLKEDGE_BSEL_MASK)) { + if (format != (reg & format_mask)) { update = true; } else { ret = regmap_read(max98396->regmap, @@ -412,8 +415,7 @@ static int max98396_dai_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai, unsigned int fmt) regmap_update_bits(max98396->regmap, MAX98396_R2041_PCM_MODE_CFG, - MAX98396_PCM_BCLKEDGE_BSEL_MASK, - format); + format_mask, format); regmap_update_bits(max98396->regmap, MAX98396_R2042_PCM_CLK_SETUP, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7d90c8e6396ba245da16bedd789df6d669375408 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sascha Hauer Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 12:57:16 +0200 Subject: ASoC: tlv320adcx140: Fix tx_mask check The tx_mask check doesn't reflect what the driver and the chip support. The check currently checks for exactly two slots being enabled. The tlv320adcx140 supports anything between one and eight channels, so relax the check accordingly. The tlv320adcx140 supports arbitrary tx_mask settings, but the driver currently only supports adjacent slots beginning with the first slot, so extend the check to check that the first slot is being used and that there are no holes in the tx_mask. Leave a comment to make it's the driver that limits the tx_mask settings, not the chip itself. While at it remove the set-but-unused struct adcx140p_priv::tdm_delay field. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220624105716.2579539-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/tlv320adcx140.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tlv320adcx140.c b/sound/soc/codecs/tlv320adcx140.c index b55f0b836932..0b729658fde8 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tlv320adcx140.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tlv320adcx140.c @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct adcx140_priv { bool micbias_vg; unsigned int dai_fmt; - unsigned int tdm_delay; unsigned int slot_width; }; @@ -792,12 +791,13 @@ static int adcx140_set_dai_tdm_slot(struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai, { struct snd_soc_component *component = codec_dai->component; struct adcx140_priv *adcx140 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); - unsigned int lsb; - /* TDM based on DSP mode requires slots to be adjacent */ - lsb = __ffs(tx_mask); - if ((lsb + 1) != __fls(tx_mask)) { - dev_err(component->dev, "Invalid mask, slots must be adjacent\n"); + /* + * The chip itself supports arbitrary masks, but the driver currently + * only supports adjacent slots beginning at the first slot. + */ + if (tx_mask != GENMASK(__fls(tx_mask), 0)) { + dev_err(component->dev, "Only lower adjacent slots are supported\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -812,7 +812,6 @@ static int adcx140_set_dai_tdm_slot(struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai, return -EINVAL; } - adcx140->tdm_delay = lsb; adcx140->slot_width = slot_width; return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a5d6d28e2ea38dff017cb562dfbe0259d093a851 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yassine Oudjana Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 10:17:45 +0400 Subject: ASoC: wcd9335: Use int array instead of bitmask for TX mixers Currently slim_tx_mixer_get reports all TX mixers as enabled when at least one is, due to it reading the entire tx_port_value bitmask without testing the specific bit corresponding to a TX port. Furthermore, using the same bitmask for all capture DAIs makes setting one mixer affect them all. To prevent this, and since the SLIM TX muxes effectively only connect to one of the mixers at a time, turn tx_port_value into an int array storing the DAI index each of the ports is connected to. Signed-off-by: Yassine Oudjana Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622061745.35399-1-y.oudjana@protonmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c index d9f135200688..3cb7a3eab8c7 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ struct wcd9335_codec { struct regulator_bulk_data supplies[WCD9335_MAX_SUPPLY]; unsigned int rx_port_value[WCD9335_RX_MAX]; - unsigned int tx_port_value; + unsigned int tx_port_value[WCD9335_TX_MAX]; int hph_l_gain; int hph_r_gain; u32 rx_bias_count; @@ -1334,8 +1334,13 @@ static int slim_tx_mixer_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kc, struct snd_soc_dapm_context *dapm = snd_soc_dapm_kcontrol_dapm(kc); struct wcd9335_codec *wcd = dev_get_drvdata(dapm->dev); + struct snd_soc_dapm_widget *widget = snd_soc_dapm_kcontrol_widget(kc); + struct soc_mixer_control *mixer = + (struct soc_mixer_control *)kc->private_value; + int dai_id = widget->shift; + int port_id = mixer->shift; - ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = wcd->tx_port_value; + ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = wcd->tx_port_value[port_id] == dai_id; return 0; } @@ -1358,12 +1363,12 @@ static int slim_tx_mixer_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kc, case AIF2_CAP: case AIF3_CAP: /* only add to the list if value not set */ - if (enable && !(wcd->tx_port_value & BIT(port_id))) { - wcd->tx_port_value |= BIT(port_id); + if (enable && wcd->tx_port_value[port_id] != dai_id) { + wcd->tx_port_value[port_id] = dai_id; list_add_tail(&wcd->tx_chs[port_id].list, &wcd->dai[dai_id].slim_ch_list); - } else if (!enable && (wcd->tx_port_value & BIT(port_id))) { - wcd->tx_port_value &= ~BIT(port_id); + } else if (!enable && wcd->tx_port_value[port_id] == dai_id) { + wcd->tx_port_value[port_id] = -1; list_del_init(&wcd->tx_chs[port_id].list); } break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 71b5ab96ffe6589abe7a2e302b83f7a426ebe099 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:34:06 +0100 Subject: ASoC: wm5102: Fix event generation for output compensation The output compensation controls always returns zero regardless of if the control value was updated. This results in missing notifications to user-space of the control change. Update the handling to return 1 when the value is changed. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628153409.3266932-1-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c index da2f8998df87..b034df47a5ef 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c @@ -680,12 +680,17 @@ static int wm5102_out_comp_coeff_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, { struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol); struct arizona *arizona = dev_get_drvdata(component->dev->parent); + uint16_t dac_comp_coeff = get_unaligned_be16(ucontrol->value.bytes.data); + int ret = 0; mutex_lock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock); - arizona->dac_comp_coeff = get_unaligned_be16(ucontrol->value.bytes.data); + if (arizona->dac_comp_coeff != dac_comp_coeff) { + arizona->dac_comp_coeff = dac_comp_coeff; + ret = 1; + } mutex_unlock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock); - return 0; + return ret; } static int wm5102_out_comp_switch_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, @@ -706,12 +711,20 @@ static int wm5102_out_comp_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, { struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol); struct arizona *arizona = dev_get_drvdata(component->dev->parent); + struct soc_mixer_control *mc = (struct soc_mixer_control *)kcontrol->private_value; + int ret = 0; + + if (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] > mc->max) + return -EINVAL; mutex_lock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock); - arizona->dac_comp_enabled = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; + if (arizona->dac_comp_enabled != ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]) { + arizona->dac_comp_enabled = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; + ret = 1; + } mutex_unlock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock); - return 0; + return ret; } static const char * const wm5102_osr_text[] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 15b2e5d10ccf32a1a1ae7c636511e2f51320fdb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:34:07 +0100 Subject: ASoC: wm8998: Fix event generation for input mux wm8998_inmux_put returns the value of snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power, which returns a 1 if a path was found for the kcontrol. This is obviously different to the expected return a 1 if the control was updated value. This results in spurious notifications to user-space. Update the handling to only return a 1 when the value is changed. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628153409.3266932-2-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/wm8998.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8998.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8998.c index 00b59fc9b1fe..ab5481187c71 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8998.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8998.c @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static int wm8998_inmux_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct soc_enum *e = (struct soc_enum *)kcontrol->private_value; unsigned int mode_reg, mode_index; unsigned int mux, inmode, src_val, mode_val; + int change, ret; mux = ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0]; if (mux > 1) @@ -137,14 +138,20 @@ static int wm8998_inmux_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, mode_reg, ARIZONA_IN1_MODE_MASK, mode_val); - snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, e->reg, - ARIZONA_IN1L_SRC_MASK | - ARIZONA_IN1L_SRC_SE_MASK, - src_val); + change = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, e->reg, + ARIZONA_IN1L_SRC_MASK | + ARIZONA_IN1L_SRC_SE_MASK, + src_val); - return snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, - ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0], - e, NULL); + ret = snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, + ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0], + e, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(arizona->dev, "Failed to update demux power state: %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + return change; } static const char * const wm8998_inmux_texts[] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 870d72ab9228575b2f005c9a23ea08787e0f63e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:34:08 +0100 Subject: ASoC: cs47l92: Fix event generation for OUT1 demux cs47l92_put_demux returns the value of snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power, which returns a 1 if a path was found for the kcontrol. This is obviously different to the expected return a 1 if the control was updated value. This results in spurious notifications to user-space. Update the handling to only return a 1 when the value is changed. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628153409.3266932-3-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c index a1b8dcdb9f7b..444026b7d54b 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c @@ -119,7 +119,13 @@ static int cs47l92_put_demux(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, end: snd_soc_dapm_mutex_unlock(dapm); - return snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, mux, e, NULL); + ret = snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, mux, e, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(madera->dev, "Failed to update demux power state: %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + return change; } static SOC_ENUM_SINGLE_DECL(cs47l92_outdemux_enum, -- cgit v1.2.3 From f99e930655f411453170a5f332e12c2d2748822e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Charles Keepax Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 16:34:09 +0100 Subject: ASoC: arizona: Update arizona_aif_cfg_changed to use RX_BCLK_RATE Currently the function arizona_aif_cfg_changed uses the TX_BCLK_RATE, however this register is not used on wm8998. This was not noticed as previously snd_soc_component_read did not print an error message. However, now the log gets filled with error messages, further more the test for if the LRCLK changed will return spurious results. Update the code to use the RX_BCLK_RATE register, the LRCLK parameters are written to both registers and the RX_BCLK_RATE register is used across all Arizona devices. Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628153409.3266932-4-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/arizona.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/arizona.c b/sound/soc/codecs/arizona.c index e32871b3f68a..7434aeeda292 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/arizona.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/arizona.c @@ -1760,8 +1760,8 @@ static bool arizona_aif_cfg_changed(struct snd_soc_component *component, if (bclk != (val & ARIZONA_AIF1_BCLK_FREQ_MASK)) return true; - val = snd_soc_component_read(component, base + ARIZONA_AIF_TX_BCLK_RATE); - if (lrclk != (val & ARIZONA_AIF1TX_BCPF_MASK)) + val = snd_soc_component_read(component, base + ARIZONA_AIF_RX_BCLK_RATE); + if (lrclk != (val & ARIZONA_AIF1RX_BCPF_MASK)) return true; val = snd_soc_component_read(component, base + ARIZONA_AIF_FRAME_CTRL_1); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0735e400fa07a3687797f241f5b74d77a6d383c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Vasut Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 18:58:40 +0200 Subject: ASoC: doc: Capitalize RESET line name Make sure all AC97 interface lines are spelled in capitals, to avoid confusing readers about where the 5th line is. Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Takashi Iwai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628165840.152235-1-marex@denx.de Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- Documentation/sound/soc/dai.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/sound/soc/dai.rst b/Documentation/sound/soc/dai.rst index 009b07e5a0f3..bf8431386d26 100644 --- a/Documentation/sound/soc/dai.rst +++ b/Documentation/sound/soc/dai.rst @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ AC97 ==== AC97 is a five wire interface commonly found on many PC sound cards. It is -now also popular in many portable devices. This DAI has a reset line and time +now also popular in many portable devices. This DAI has a RESET line and time multiplexes its data on its SDATA_OUT (playback) and SDATA_IN (capture) lines. The bit clock (BCLK) is always driven by the CODEC (usually 12.288MHz) and the frame (FRAME) (usually 48kHz) is always driven by the controller. Each AC97 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 94c65dffd4c4af052b3ea8934fbcb2fa8da276a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryan O'Donoghue Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 12:40:12 +0100 Subject: ASoC: dt-bindings: Fix description for msm8916 For the existing msm8916 bindings the minimum reg/reg-names is 1 not 2. Similarly the minimum interrupt/interrupt-names is 1 not 2. Fixes: f3fc4fbfa2d2 ("ASoC: dt-bindings: Add SC7280 lpass cpu bindings") Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629114012.3282945-1-bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/qcom,lpass-cpu.yaml | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/qcom,lpass-cpu.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/qcom,lpass-cpu.yaml index e9a533080b32..ef18a572a1ff 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/qcom,lpass-cpu.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/qcom,lpass-cpu.yaml @@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ properties: - qcom,sc7280-lpass-cpu reg: - minItems: 2 + minItems: 1 maxItems: 6 description: LPAIF core registers reg-names: - minItems: 2 + minItems: 1 maxItems: 6 clocks: @@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ properties: maxItems: 10 interrupts: - minItems: 2 + minItems: 1 maxItems: 4 description: LPAIF DMA buffer interrupt interrupt-names: - minItems: 2 + minItems: 1 maxItems: 4 qcom,adsp: -- cgit v1.2.3 From cd10bb89b0d57bca98eb75e0444854a1c129a14e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Povišer Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:51:32 +0200 Subject: ASoC: tas2764: Add post reset delays MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Make sure there is at least 1 ms delay from reset to first command as is specified in the datasheet. This is a fix similar to commit 307f31452078 ("ASoC: tas2770: Insert post reset delay"). Fixes: 827ed8a0fa50 ("ASoC: tas2764: Add the driver for the TAS2764") Signed-off-by: Martin Povišer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630075135.2221-1-povik+lin@cutebit.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c index d395feffb30b..d702a39eaa7b 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c @@ -42,10 +42,12 @@ static void tas2764_reset(struct tas2764_priv *tas2764) gpiod_set_value_cansleep(tas2764->reset_gpio, 0); msleep(20); gpiod_set_value_cansleep(tas2764->reset_gpio, 1); + usleep_range(1000, 2000); } snd_soc_component_write(tas2764->component, TAS2764_SW_RST, TAS2764_RST); + usleep_range(1000, 2000); } static int tas2764_set_bias_level(struct snd_soc_component *component, @@ -107,8 +109,10 @@ static int tas2764_codec_resume(struct snd_soc_component *component) struct tas2764_priv *tas2764 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); int ret; - if (tas2764->sdz_gpio) + if (tas2764->sdz_gpio) { gpiod_set_value_cansleep(tas2764->sdz_gpio, 1); + usleep_range(1000, 2000); + } ret = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, TAS2764_PWR_CTRL, TAS2764_PWR_CTRL_MASK, @@ -501,8 +505,10 @@ static int tas2764_codec_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component) tas2764->component = component; - if (tas2764->sdz_gpio) + if (tas2764->sdz_gpio) { gpiod_set_value_cansleep(tas2764->sdz_gpio, 1); + usleep_range(1000, 2000); + } tas2764_reset(tas2764); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d1a10f1b48202e2d183cce144c218a211e98d906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Povišer Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:51:33 +0200 Subject: ASoC: tas2764: Fix and extend FSYNC polarity handling MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Fix setting of FSYNC polarity in case of LEFT_J and DSP_A/B formats. Do NOT set the SCFG field as was previously done, because that is not correct and is also in conflict with the "ASI1 Source" control which sets the same SCFG field! Also add support for explicit polarity inversion. Fixes: 827ed8a0fa50 ("ASoC: tas2764: Add the driver for the TAS2764") Signed-off-by: Martin Povišer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630075135.2221-2-povik+lin@cutebit.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++------------- sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.h | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c index d702a39eaa7b..2d045631bfe9 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ static const char * const tas2764_ASI1_src[] = { }; static SOC_ENUM_SINGLE_DECL( - tas2764_ASI1_src_enum, TAS2764_TDM_CFG2, 4, tas2764_ASI1_src); + tas2764_ASI1_src_enum, TAS2764_TDM_CFG2, TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_SHIFT, + tas2764_ASI1_src); static const struct snd_kcontrol_new tas2764_asi1_mux = SOC_DAPM_ENUM("ASI1 Source", tas2764_ASI1_src_enum); @@ -333,20 +334,22 @@ static int tas2764_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, unsigned int fmt) { struct snd_soc_component *component = dai->component; struct tas2764_priv *tas2764 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component); - u8 tdm_rx_start_slot = 0, asi_cfg_1 = 0; - int iface; + u8 tdm_rx_start_slot = 0, asi_cfg_0 = 0, asi_cfg_1 = 0; int ret; switch (fmt & SND_SOC_DAIFMT_INV_MASK) { + case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_NB_IF: + asi_cfg_0 ^= TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_FRAME_START; + fallthrough; case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_NB_NF: asi_cfg_1 = TAS2764_TDM_CFG1_RX_RISING; break; + case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_IB_IF: + asi_cfg_0 ^= TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_FRAME_START; + fallthrough; case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_IB_NF: asi_cfg_1 = TAS2764_TDM_CFG1_RX_FALLING; break; - default: - dev_err(tas2764->dev, "ASI format Inverse is not found\n"); - return -EINVAL; } ret = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, TAS2764_TDM_CFG1, @@ -357,13 +360,13 @@ static int tas2764_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, unsigned int fmt) switch (fmt & SND_SOC_DAIFMT_FORMAT_MASK) { case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_I2S: + asi_cfg_0 ^= TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_FRAME_START; + fallthrough; case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_DSP_A: - iface = TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_I2S; tdm_rx_start_slot = 1; break; case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_DSP_B: case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_LEFT_J: - iface = TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_LEFT_J; tdm_rx_start_slot = 0; break; default: @@ -372,14 +375,15 @@ static int tas2764_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, unsigned int fmt) return -EINVAL; } - ret = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, TAS2764_TDM_CFG1, - TAS2764_TDM_CFG1_MASK, - (tdm_rx_start_slot << TAS2764_TDM_CFG1_51_SHIFT)); + ret = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, TAS2764_TDM_CFG0, + TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_FRAME_START, + asi_cfg_0); if (ret < 0) return ret; - ret = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, TAS2764_TDM_CFG2, - TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_MASK, iface); + ret = snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, TAS2764_TDM_CFG1, + TAS2764_TDM_CFG1_MASK, + (tdm_rx_start_slot << TAS2764_TDM_CFG1_51_SHIFT)); if (ret < 0) return ret; diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.h b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.h index 67d6fd903c42..f015f22a083b 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.h +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.h @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_MASK GENMASK(3, 1) #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_44_1_48KHZ BIT(3) #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_88_2_96KHZ (BIT(3) | BIT(1)) +#define TAS2764_TDM_CFG0_FRAME_START BIT(0) /* TDM Configuration Reg1 */ #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG1 TAS2764_REG(0X0, 0x09) @@ -66,10 +67,7 @@ #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_RXS_16BITS 0x0 #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_RXS_24BITS BIT(0) #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_RXS_32BITS BIT(1) -#define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_MASK GENMASK(5, 4) -#define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_I2S 0x0 -#define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_LEFT_J BIT(4) -#define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_RIGHT_J BIT(5) +#define TAS2764_TDM_CFG2_SCFG_SHIFT 4 /* TDM Configuration Reg3 */ #define TAS2764_TDM_CFG3 TAS2764_REG(0X0, 0x0c) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3e99e5697e1f7120b5abc755e8a560b22612d6ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hector Martin Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:51:34 +0200 Subject: ASoC: tas2764: Correct playback volume range MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit DVC value 0xc8 is -100dB and 0xc9 is mute; this needs to map to -100.5dB as far as the dB scale is concerned. Fix that and enable the mute flag, so alsamixer correctly shows the control as <0 dB .. -100 dB, mute>. Signed-off-by: Hector Martin Fixes: 827ed8a0fa50 ("ASoC: tas2764: Add the driver for the TAS2764") Signed-off-by: Martin Povišer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630075135.2221-3-povik+lin@cutebit.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c index 2d045631bfe9..2bcb407c3cdd 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static int tas2764_codec_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component) } static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(tas2764_digital_tlv, 1100, 50, 0); -static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(tas2764_playback_volume, -10000, 50, 0); +static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(tas2764_playback_volume, -10050, 50, 1); static const struct snd_kcontrol_new tas2764_snd_controls[] = { SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Speaker Volume", TAS2764_DVC, 0, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1c4f29ec878bbf1cc0a1eb54ae7da5ff98e19641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hector Martin Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:51:35 +0200 Subject: ASoC: tas2764: Fix amp gain register offset & default MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The register default is 0x28 per the datasheet, and the amp gain field is supposed to be shifted left by one. With the wrong default, the ALSA controls lie about the power-up state. With the wrong shift, we get only half the gain we expect. Signed-off-by: Hector Martin Fixes: 827ed8a0fa50 ("ASoC: tas2764: Add the driver for the TAS2764") Signed-off-by: Martin Povišer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630075135.2221-4-povik+lin@cutebit.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c index 2bcb407c3cdd..4cb788f3e5f7 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/tas2764.c @@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(tas2764_playback_volume, -10050, 50, 1); static const struct snd_kcontrol_new tas2764_snd_controls[] = { SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Speaker Volume", TAS2764_DVC, 0, TAS2764_DVC_MAX, 1, tas2764_playback_volume), - SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Amp Gain Volume", TAS2764_CHNL_0, 0, 0x14, 0, + SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Amp Gain Volume", TAS2764_CHNL_0, 1, 0x14, 0, tas2764_digital_tlv), }; @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static const struct reg_default tas2764_reg_defaults[] = { { TAS2764_SW_RST, 0x00 }, { TAS2764_PWR_CTRL, 0x1a }, { TAS2764_DVC, 0x00 }, - { TAS2764_CHNL_0, 0x00 }, + { TAS2764_CHNL_0, 0x28 }, { TAS2764_TDM_CFG0, 0x09 }, { TAS2764_TDM_CFG1, 0x02 }, { TAS2764_TDM_CFG2, 0x0a }, -- cgit v1.2.3 From df5b4aca7248dc5a5cae93f162eae0decf972e48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianglei Nie Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 02:25:20 +0800 Subject: ASoC: qdsp6: fix potential memory leak in q6apm_get_audioreach_graph() q6apm_get_audioreach_graph() allocates a memory chunk for graph->graph with audioreach_alloc_graph_pkt(). When idr_alloc() fails, graph->graph is not released, which will lead to a memory leak. We can release the graph->graph with kfree() when idr_alloc() fails to fix the memory leak. Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629182520.2164409-1-niejianglei2021@163.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c index f424d7aa389a..794019286c70 100644 --- a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c +++ b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static struct audioreach_graph *q6apm_get_audioreach_graph(struct q6apm *apm, ui id = idr_alloc(&apm->graph_idr, graph, graph_id, graph_id + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (id < 0) { dev_err(apm->dev, "Unable to allocate graph id (%d)\n", graph_id); + kfree(graph->graph); kfree(graph); mutex_unlock(&apm->lock); return ERR_PTR(id); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c7dab6745f4288af1e45d3809bf86a3778301616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brent Lu Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 22:15:17 +0800 Subject: ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: fix out-of-bounds array access Starting from ADL platform we have four HDMI PCM devices which exceeds the size of sof_hdmi array. Since each sof_hdmi_pcm structure represents one HDMI PCM device, we remove the sof_hdmi array and add a new member hdmi_jack to the sof_hdmi_pcm structure to fix the out-of-bounds problem. Signed-off-by: Brent Lu Reviewed-by: Peter Ujfalusi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701141517.264070-1-brent.lu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c b/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c index 5d67a2c87a1d..4a90a0a5d831 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c @@ -69,11 +69,10 @@ static unsigned long sof_rt5682_quirk = SOF_RT5682_MCLK_EN | static int is_legacy_cpu; -static struct snd_soc_jack sof_hdmi[3]; - struct sof_hdmi_pcm { struct list_head head; struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai; + struct snd_soc_jack hdmi_jack; int device; }; @@ -434,7 +433,6 @@ static int sof_card_late_probe(struct snd_soc_card *card) char jack_name[NAME_SIZE]; struct sof_hdmi_pcm *pcm; int err; - int i = 0; /* HDMI is not supported by SOF on Baytrail/CherryTrail */ if (is_legacy_cpu || !ctx->idisp_codec) @@ -455,17 +453,15 @@ static int sof_card_late_probe(struct snd_soc_card *card) snprintf(jack_name, sizeof(jack_name), "HDMI/DP, pcm=%d Jack", pcm->device); err = snd_soc_card_jack_new(card, jack_name, - SND_JACK_AVOUT, &sof_hdmi[i]); + SND_JACK_AVOUT, &pcm->hdmi_jack); if (err) return err; err = hdac_hdmi_jack_init(pcm->codec_dai, pcm->device, - &sof_hdmi[i]); + &pcm->hdmi_jack); if (err < 0) return err; - - i++; } if (sof_rt5682_quirk & SOF_MAX98373_SPEAKER_AMP_PRESENT) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 051dade346957d5b68ad986f497835805fa7a9dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oder Chiou Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 18:11:33 +0800 Subject: ASoC: rt5640: Fix the wrong state of JD1 and JD2 The patch fixes the wrong state of JD1 and JD2 while the bst1 or bst2 is power on in the HDA JD using. Signed-off-by: Oder Chiou Reported-by: Sameer Pujar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705101134.16792-1-oder_chiou@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/codecs/rt5640.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5640.c b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5640.c index 69c80d80ed9d..18b3da9211e3 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5640.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5640.c @@ -1984,7 +1984,12 @@ static int rt5640_set_bias_level(struct snd_soc_component *component, snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_DIG2, 0x0000); snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_VOL, 0x0000); snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_MIXER, 0x0000); - snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_ANLG1, 0x0000); + if (rt5640->jd_src == RT5640_JD_SRC_HDA_HEADER) + snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_ANLG1, + 0x0018); + else + snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_ANLG1, + 0x0000); snd_soc_component_write(component, RT5640_PWR_ANLG2, 0x0000); break; @@ -2393,9 +2398,15 @@ static void rt5640_jack_work(struct work_struct *work) static irqreturn_t rt5640_irq(int irq, void *data) { struct rt5640_priv *rt5640 = data; + int delay = 0; + + if (rt5640->jd_src == RT5640_JD_SRC_HDA_HEADER) { + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&rt5640->jack_work); + delay = 100; + } if (rt5640->jack) - queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &rt5640->jack_work, 0); + queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &rt5640->jack_work, delay); return IRQ_HANDLED; } @@ -2580,6 +2591,12 @@ static void rt5640_enable_hda_jack_detect( snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, RT5640_DUMMY1, 0x400, 0x0); + snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, RT5640_PWR_ANLG1, + RT5640_PWR_VREF2, RT5640_PWR_VREF2); + usleep_range(10000, 15000); + snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, RT5640_PWR_ANLG1, + RT5640_PWR_FV2, RT5640_PWR_FV2); + rt5640->jack = jack; ret = request_irq(rt5640->irq, rt5640_irq, @@ -2696,16 +2713,13 @@ static int rt5640_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component) if (device_property_read_u32(component->dev, "realtek,jack-detect-source", &val) == 0) { - if (val <= RT5640_JD_SRC_GPIO4) { + if (val <= RT5640_JD_SRC_GPIO4) rt5640->jd_src = val << RT5640_JD_SFT; - } else if (val == RT5640_JD_SRC_HDA_HEADER) { + else if (val == RT5640_JD_SRC_HDA_HEADER) rt5640->jd_src = RT5640_JD_SRC_HDA_HEADER; - snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, RT5640_DUMMY1, - 0x0300, 0x0); - } else { + else dev_warn(component->dev, "Warning: Invalid jack-detect-source value: %d, leaving jack-detect disabled\n", val); - } } if (!device_property_read_bool(component->dev, "realtek,jack-detect-not-inverted")) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 219af251bd1694bce1f627d238347d2eaf13de61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Ujfalusi Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:56:37 +0300 Subject: ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Correct the ssp rate discovery in skl_get_ssp_clks() The present flag is only set once when one rate has been found to be saved. This will effectively going to ignore any rate discovered at later time and based on the code, this is not the intention. Fixes: bc2bd45b1f7f3 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Parse nhlt and register clock device") Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630065638.11183-2-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c b/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c index 2439a574ac2f..366f7bd9bc02 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c @@ -99,7 +99,6 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *fmt_cfg; struct wav_fmt_ext *wav_fmt; unsigned long rate; - bool present = false; int rate_index = 0; u16 channels, bps; u8 clk_src; @@ -113,6 +112,8 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, return; for (i = 0; i < fmt->fmt_count; i++) { + bool present = false; + fmt_cfg = &fmt->fmt_config[i]; wav_fmt = &fmt_cfg->fmt_ext; -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc976f5629afb4160ee77798b14a693eac903ffd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Ujfalusi Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:56:38 +0300 Subject: ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Correct the handling of fmt_config flexible array The struct nhlt_format's fmt_config is a flexible array, it must not be used as normal array. When moving to the next nhlt_fmt_cfg we need to take into account the data behind the ->config.caps (indicated by ->config.size). The logic of the code also changed: it is no longer saves the _last_ fmt_cfg for all found rates. Fixes: bc2bd45b1f7f3 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Parse nhlt and register clock device") Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630065638.11183-3-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c b/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c index 366f7bd9bc02..deb7b820325e 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-nhlt.c @@ -111,11 +111,12 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, if (fmt->fmt_count == 0) return; + fmt_cfg = (struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *)fmt->fmt_config; for (i = 0; i < fmt->fmt_count; i++) { + struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *saved_fmt_cfg = fmt_cfg; bool present = false; - fmt_cfg = &fmt->fmt_config[i]; - wav_fmt = &fmt_cfg->fmt_ext; + wav_fmt = &saved_fmt_cfg->fmt_ext; channels = wav_fmt->fmt.channels; bps = wav_fmt->fmt.bits_per_sample; @@ -133,12 +134,18 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, * derive the rate. */ for (j = i; j < fmt->fmt_count; j++) { - fmt_cfg = &fmt->fmt_config[j]; - wav_fmt = &fmt_cfg->fmt_ext; + struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *tmp_fmt_cfg = fmt_cfg; + + wav_fmt = &tmp_fmt_cfg->fmt_ext; if ((fs == wav_fmt->fmt.samples_per_sec) && - (bps == wav_fmt->fmt.bits_per_sample)) + (bps == wav_fmt->fmt.bits_per_sample)) { channels = max_t(u16, channels, wav_fmt->fmt.channels); + saved_fmt_cfg = tmp_fmt_cfg; + } + /* Move to the next nhlt_fmt_cfg */ + tmp_fmt_cfg = (struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *)(tmp_fmt_cfg->config.caps + + tmp_fmt_cfg->config.size); } rate = channels * bps * fs; @@ -154,8 +161,11 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, /* Fill rate and parent for sclk/sclkfs */ if (!present) { + struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *first_fmt_cfg; + + first_fmt_cfg = (struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *)fmt->fmt_config; i2s_config_ext = (struct skl_i2s_config_blob_ext *) - fmt->fmt_config[0].config.caps; + first_fmt_cfg->config.caps; /* MCLK Divider Source Select */ if (is_legacy_blob(i2s_config_ext->hdr.sig)) { @@ -169,6 +179,9 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, parent = skl_get_parent_clk(clk_src); + /* Move to the next nhlt_fmt_cfg */ + fmt_cfg = (struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *)(fmt_cfg->config.caps + + fmt_cfg->config.size); /* * Do not copy the config data if there is no parent * clock available for this clock source select @@ -177,9 +190,9 @@ static void skl_get_ssp_clks(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *ssp_clks, continue; sclk[id].rate_cfg[rate_index].rate = rate; - sclk[id].rate_cfg[rate_index].config = fmt_cfg; + sclk[id].rate_cfg[rate_index].config = saved_fmt_cfg; sclkfs[id].rate_cfg[rate_index].rate = rate; - sclkfs[id].rate_cfg[rate_index].config = fmt_cfg; + sclkfs[id].rate_cfg[rate_index].config = saved_fmt_cfg; sclk[id].parent_name = parent->name; sclkfs[id].parent_name = parent->name; @@ -193,13 +206,13 @@ static void skl_get_mclk(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *mclk, { struct skl_i2s_config_blob_ext *i2s_config_ext; struct skl_i2s_config_blob_legacy *i2s_config; - struct nhlt_specific_cfg *fmt_cfg; + struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *fmt_cfg; struct skl_clk_parent_src *parent; u32 clkdiv, div_ratio; u8 clk_src; - fmt_cfg = &fmt->fmt_config[0].config; - i2s_config_ext = (struct skl_i2s_config_blob_ext *)fmt_cfg->caps; + fmt_cfg = (struct nhlt_fmt_cfg *)fmt->fmt_config; + i2s_config_ext = (struct skl_i2s_config_blob_ext *)fmt_cfg->config.caps; /* MCLK Divider Source Select and divider */ if (is_legacy_blob(i2s_config_ext->hdr.sig)) { @@ -228,7 +241,7 @@ static void skl_get_mclk(struct skl_dev *skl, struct skl_ssp_clk *mclk, return; mclk[id].rate_cfg[0].rate = parent->rate/div_ratio; - mclk[id].rate_cfg[0].config = &fmt->fmt_config[0]; + mclk[id].rate_cfg[0].config = fmt_cfg; mclk[id].parent_name = parent->name; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0326195f523a549e0a9d7fd44c70b26fd7265090 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 12:39:00 +0000 Subject: bpf: Make sure mac_header was set before using it Classic BPF has a way to load bytes starting from the mac header. Some skbs do not have a mac header, and skb_mac_header() in this case is returning a pointer that 65535 bytes after skb->head. Existing range check in bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper() was properly kicking and no illegal access was happening. New sanity check in skb_mac_header() is firing, so we need to avoid it. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper+0x1b1/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:74 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00865-g4874fb9484be #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/29/2022 RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper+0x1b1/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:74 Code: ff ff 45 31 f6 e9 5a ff ff ff e8 aa 27 40 00 e9 3b ff ff ff e8 90 27 40 00 e9 df fe ff ff e8 86 27 40 00 eb 9e e8 2f 2c f3 ff <0f> 0b eb b1 e8 96 27 40 00 e9 79 fe ff ff 90 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000309f668 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000118 RBX: ffffffffffeff00c RCX: ffffc9000e417000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff81873f21 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffff8880842878c0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: ffff88803ac56c00 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f5c88a16700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fdaa9f6c058 CR3: 000000003a82c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ____bpf_skb_load_helper_32 net/core/filter.c:276 [inline] bpf_skb_load_helper_32+0x191/0x220 net/core/filter.c:264 Fixes: f9aefd6b2aa3 ("net: warn if mac header was not set") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220707123900.945305-1-edumazet@google.com --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 5f6f3f829b36..e7961508a47d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -68,11 +68,13 @@ void *bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper(const struct sk_buff *skb, int k, uns { u8 *ptr = NULL; - if (k >= SKF_NET_OFF) + if (k >= SKF_NET_OFF) { ptr = skb_network_header(skb) + k - SKF_NET_OFF; - else if (k >= SKF_LL_OFF) + } else if (k >= SKF_LL_OFF) { + if (unlikely(!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb))) + return NULL; ptr = skb_mac_header(skb) + k - SKF_LL_OFF; - + } if (ptr >= skb->head && ptr + size <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) return ptr; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0ed8f619b412b52360ccdfaf997223ccd9319569 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:50:04 +0200 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: fix crash due to confirmed bit load reordering Kajetan Puchalski reports crash on ARM, with backtrace of: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists nf_ct_delete early_drop __nf_conntrack_alloc Unlike atomic_inc_not_zero, refcount_inc_not_zero is not a full barrier. conntrack uses SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, i.e. it is possible that a 'newly' allocated object is still in use on another CPU: CPU1 CPU2 encounter 'ct' during hlist walk delete_from_lists refcount drops to 0 kmem_cache_free(ct); __nf_conntrack_alloc() // returns same object refcount_inc_not_zero(ct); /* might fail */ /* If set, ct is public/in the hash table */ test_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &ct->status); In case CPU1 already set refcount back to 1, refcount_inc_not_zero() will succeed. The expected possibilities for a CPU that obtained the object 'ct' (but no reference so far) are: 1. refcount_inc_not_zero() fails. CPU2 ignores the object and moves to the next entry in the list. This happens for objects that are about to be free'd, that have been free'd, or that have been reallocated by __nf_conntrack_alloc(), but where the refcount has not been increased back to 1 yet. 2. refcount_inc_not_zero() succeeds. CPU2 checks the CONFIRMED bit in ct->status. If set, the object is public/in the table. If not, the object must be skipped; CPU2 calls nf_ct_put() to un-do the refcount increment and moves to the next object. Parallel deletion from the hlists is prevented by a 'test_and_set_bit(IPS_DYING_BIT, &ct->status);' check, i.e. only one cpu will do the unlink, the other one will only drop its reference count. Because refcount_inc_not_zero is not a full barrier, CPU2 may try to delete an object that is not on any list: 1. refcount_inc_not_zero() successful (refcount inited to 1 on other CPU) 2. CONFIRMED test also successful (load was reordered or zeroing of ct->status not yet visible) 3. delete_from_lists unlinks entry not on the hlist, because IPS_DYING_BIT is 0 (already cleared). 2) is already wrong: CPU2 will handle a partially initited object that is supposed to be private to CPU1. Add needed barriers when refcount_inc_not_zero() is successful. It also inserts a smp_wmb() before the refcount is set to 1 during allocation. Because other CPU might still see the object, refcount_set(1) "resurrects" it, so we need to make sure that other CPUs will also observe the right content. In particular, the CONFIRMED bit test must only pass once the object is fully initialised and either in the hash or about to be inserted (with locks held to delay possible unlink from early_drop or gc worker). I did not change flow_offload_alloc(), as far as I can see it should call refcount_inc(), not refcount_inc_not_zero(): the ct object is attached to the skb so its refcount should be >= 1 in all cases. v2: prefer smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep to smp_rmb (Will Deacon). v3: keep smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep close to refcount_inc_not_zero call add comment in nf_conntrack_netlink, no control dependency there due to locks. Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yr7WTfd6AVTQkLjI@e126311.manchester.arm.com/ Reported-by: Kajetan Puchalski Diagnosed-by: Will Deacon Fixes: 719774377622 ("netfilter: conntrack: convert to refcount_t api") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Acked-by: Will Deacon --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 1 + net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 082a2fd8d85b..369aeabb94fe 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -729,6 +729,9 @@ static void nf_ct_gc_expired(struct nf_conn *ct) if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use)) return; + /* load ->status after refcount increase */ + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + if (nf_ct_should_gc(ct)) nf_ct_kill(ct); @@ -795,6 +798,9 @@ __nf_conntrack_find_get(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, */ ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))) { + /* re-check key after refcount */ + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + if (likely(nf_ct_key_equal(h, tuple, zone, net))) goto found; @@ -1387,6 +1393,9 @@ static unsigned int early_drop_list(struct net *net, if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&tmp->ct_general.use)) continue; + /* load ->ct_net and ->status after refcount increase */ + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + /* kill only if still in same netns -- might have moved due to * SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU rules. * @@ -1536,6 +1545,9 @@ static void gc_worker(struct work_struct *work) if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&tmp->ct_general.use)) continue; + /* load ->status after refcount increase */ + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + if (gc_worker_skip_ct(tmp)) { nf_ct_put(tmp); continue; @@ -1775,6 +1787,16 @@ init_conntrack(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl, if (!exp) __nf_ct_try_assign_helper(ct, tmpl, GFP_ATOMIC); + /* Other CPU might have obtained a pointer to this object before it was + * released. Because refcount is 0, refcount_inc_not_zero() will fail. + * + * After refcount_set(1) it will succeed; ensure that zeroing of + * ct->status and the correct ct->net pointer are visible; else other + * core might observe CONFIRMED bit which means the entry is valid and + * in the hash table, but its not (anymore). + */ + smp_wmb(); + /* Now it is going to be associated with an sk_buff, set refcount to 1. */ refcount_set(&ct->ct_general.use, 1); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c index 722af5e309ba..f5905b5201a7 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -1203,6 +1203,7 @@ restart: hnnode) { ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); if (nf_ct_is_expired(ct)) { + /* need to defer nf_ct_kill() until lock is released */ if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(nf_ct_evict) && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use)) nf_ct_evict[i++] = ct; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c index 6ad7bbc90d38..05895878610c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c @@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) if (unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))) return 0; + /* load ->status after refcount increase */ + smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep(); + if (nf_ct_should_gc(ct)) { nf_ct_kill(ct); goto release; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c8934e4e348915caac54085c01fd9d04fa16134a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Marangi Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 15:31:26 +0200 Subject: PM / devfreq: exynos-bus: Fix NULL pointer dereference Fix exynos-bus NULL pointer dereference by correctly using the local generated freq_table to output the debug values instead of using the profile freq_table that is not used in the driver. Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski Fixes: b5d281f6c16d ("PM / devfreq: Rework freq_table to be local to devfreq struct") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi Acked-by: Chanwoo Choi Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi --- drivers/devfreq/exynos-bus.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/devfreq/exynos-bus.c b/drivers/devfreq/exynos-bus.c index e689101abc93..f7dcc44f9414 100644 --- a/drivers/devfreq/exynos-bus.c +++ b/drivers/devfreq/exynos-bus.c @@ -447,9 +447,9 @@ static int exynos_bus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } } - max_state = bus->devfreq->profile->max_state; - min_freq = (bus->devfreq->profile->freq_table[0] / 1000); - max_freq = (bus->devfreq->profile->freq_table[max_state - 1] / 1000); + max_state = bus->devfreq->max_state; + min_freq = (bus->devfreq->freq_table[0] / 1000); + max_freq = (bus->devfreq->freq_table[max_state - 1] / 1000); pr_info("exynos-bus: new bus device registered: %s (%6ld KHz ~ %6ld KHz)\n", dev_name(dev), min_freq, max_freq); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3501f0c663063513ad604fb1b3f06af637d3396d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Satish Nagireddy Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:12:16 -0700 Subject: i2c: cadence: Unregister the clk notifier in error path This patch ensures that the clock notifier is unregistered when driver probe is returning error. Fixes: df8eb5691c48 ("i2c: Add driver for Cadence I2C controller") Signed-off-by: Satish Nagireddy Tested-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Reviewed-by: Michal Simek Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c index b4c1ad19cdae..3d6f8ee355bf 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cadence.c @@ -1338,6 +1338,7 @@ static int cdns_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; err_clk_dis: + clk_notifier_unregister(id->clk, &id->clk_rate_change_nb); clk_disable_unprepare(id->clk); pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_set_suspended(&pdev->dev); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bdb2c48e4b38e6dbe82533b437468999ba3ae498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 15:00:38 +0100 Subject: io_uring: explicit sqe padding for ioctl commands 32 bit sqe->cmd_op is an union with 64 bit values. It's always a good idea to do padding explicitly. Also zero check it in prep, so it can be used in the future if needed without compatibility concerns. Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e6b95a05e970af79000435166185e85b196b2ba2.1657202417.git.asml.silence@gmail.com [axboe: turn bitwise OR into logical variant] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 0d491ad15b66..cddc0e8490af 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -5066,7 +5066,7 @@ static int io_uring_cmd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, { struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd = &req->uring_cmd; - if (sqe->rw_flags) + if (sqe->rw_flags || sqe->__pad1) return -EINVAL; ioucmd->cmd = sqe->cmd; ioucmd->cmd_op = READ_ONCE(sqe->cmd_op); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h b/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h index f10b59d6693e..0ad3da28d2fc 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h @@ -22,7 +22,10 @@ struct io_uring_sqe { union { __u64 off; /* offset into file */ __u64 addr2; - __u32 cmd_op; + struct { + __u32 cmd_op; + __u32 __pad1; + }; }; union { __u64 addr; /* pointer to buffer or iovecs */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 029c1c2059e9c4b38f97a06204cdecd10cfbeb8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Hunter Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 09:39:13 +0100 Subject: net: stmmac: dwc-qos: Disable split header for Tegra194 There is a long-standing issue with the Synopsys DWC Ethernet driver for Tegra194 where random system crashes have been observed [0]. The problem occurs when the split header feature is enabled in the stmmac driver. In the bad case, a larger than expected buffer length is received and causes the calculation of the total buffer length to overflow. This results in a very large buffer length that causes the kernel to crash. Why this larger buffer length is received is not clear, however, the feedback from the NVIDIA design team is that the split header feature is not supported for Tegra194. Therefore, disable split header support for Tegra194 to prevent these random crashes from occurring. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-tegra/b0b17697-f23e-8fa5-3757-604a86f3a095@nvidia.com/ Fixes: 67afd6d1cfdf ("net: stmmac: Add Split Header support and enable it in XGMAC cores") Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706083913.13750-1-jonathanh@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c index bc91fd867dcd..358fc26f8d1f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-dwc-qos-eth.c @@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ bypass_clk_reset_gpio: data->fix_mac_speed = tegra_eqos_fix_speed; data->init = tegra_eqos_init; data->bsp_priv = eqos; + data->sph_disable = 1; err = tegra_eqos_init(pdev, eqos); if (err < 0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0680e20af5fbf41df8a11b11bd9a7c25b2ca0746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Siddharth Vadapalli Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 12:32:08 +0530 Subject: net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpsw: Fix devlink port register sequence Renaming interfaces using udevd depends on the interface being registered before its netdev is registered. Otherwise, udevd reads an empty phys_port_name value, resulting in the interface not being renamed. Fix this by registering the interface before registering its netdev by invoking am65_cpsw_nuss_register_devlink() before invoking register_netdev() for the interface. Move the function call to devlink_port_type_eth_set(), invoking it after register_netdev() is invoked, to ensure that netlink notification for the port state change is generated after the netdev is completely initialized. Fixes: 58356eb31d60 ("net: ti: am65-cpsw-nuss: Add devlink support") Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706070208.12207-1-s-vadapalli@ti.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c index fb92d4c1547d..f4a6b590a1e3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c @@ -2467,7 +2467,6 @@ static int am65_cpsw_nuss_register_devlink(struct am65_cpsw_common *common) port->port_id, ret); goto dl_port_unreg; } - devlink_port_type_eth_set(dl_port, port->ndev); } devlink_register(common->devlink); return ret; @@ -2511,6 +2510,7 @@ static void am65_cpsw_unregister_devlink(struct am65_cpsw_common *common) static int am65_cpsw_nuss_register_ndevs(struct am65_cpsw_common *common) { struct device *dev = common->dev; + struct devlink_port *dl_port; struct am65_cpsw_port *port; int ret = 0, i; @@ -2527,6 +2527,10 @@ static int am65_cpsw_nuss_register_ndevs(struct am65_cpsw_common *common) return ret; } + ret = am65_cpsw_nuss_register_devlink(common); + if (ret) + return ret; + for (i = 0; i < common->port_num; i++) { port = &common->ports[i]; @@ -2539,25 +2543,24 @@ static int am65_cpsw_nuss_register_ndevs(struct am65_cpsw_common *common) i, ret); goto err_cleanup_ndev; } + + dl_port = &port->devlink_port; + devlink_port_type_eth_set(dl_port, port->ndev); } ret = am65_cpsw_register_notifiers(common); if (ret) goto err_cleanup_ndev; - ret = am65_cpsw_nuss_register_devlink(common); - if (ret) - goto clean_unregister_notifiers; - /* can't auto unregister ndev using devm_add_action() due to * devres release sequence in DD core for DMA */ return 0; -clean_unregister_notifiers: - am65_cpsw_unregister_notifiers(common); + err_cleanup_ndev: am65_cpsw_nuss_cleanup_ndev(common); + am65_cpsw_unregister_devlink(common); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f46fd3d7c3bd5d7bd5bb664135cf32ca9e97190b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Skripkin Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:28:45 +0300 Subject: net: ocelot: fix wrong time_after usage Accidentally noticed, that this driver is the only user of while (time_after(jiffies...)). It looks like typo, because likely this while loop will finish after 1st iteration, because time_after() returns true when 1st argument _is after_ 2nd one. There is one possible problem with this poll loop: the scheduler could put the thread to sleep, and it does not get woken up for OCELOT_FDMA_CH_SAFE_TIMEOUT_US. During that time, the hardware has done its thing, but you exit the while loop and return -ETIMEDOUT. Fix it by using sane poll API that avoids all problems described above Fixes: 753a026cfec1 ("net: ocelot: add FDMA support") Suggested-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706132845.27968-1-paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot_fdma.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot_fdma.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot_fdma.c index 083fddd263ec..8e3894cf5f7c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot_fdma.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mscc/ocelot_fdma.c @@ -94,19 +94,18 @@ static void ocelot_fdma_activate_chan(struct ocelot *ocelot, dma_addr_t dma, ocelot_fdma_writel(ocelot, MSCC_FDMA_CH_ACTIVATE, BIT(chan)); } +static u32 ocelot_fdma_read_ch_safe(struct ocelot *ocelot) +{ + return ocelot_fdma_readl(ocelot, MSCC_FDMA_CH_SAFE); +} + static int ocelot_fdma_wait_chan_safe(struct ocelot *ocelot, int chan) { - unsigned long timeout; u32 safe; - timeout = jiffies + usecs_to_jiffies(OCELOT_FDMA_CH_SAFE_TIMEOUT_US); - do { - safe = ocelot_fdma_readl(ocelot, MSCC_FDMA_CH_SAFE); - if (safe & BIT(chan)) - return 0; - } while (time_after(jiffies, timeout)); - - return -ETIMEDOUT; + return readx_poll_timeout_atomic(ocelot_fdma_read_ch_safe, ocelot, safe, + safe & BIT(chan), 0, + OCELOT_FDMA_CH_SAFE_TIMEOUT_US); } static void ocelot_fdma_dcb_set_data(struct ocelot_fdma_dcb *dcb, -- cgit v1.2.3 From c51b8f85c4157eb91c2f4ab34b0c52fea642e77c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joerg Roedel Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 12:33:31 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Remove iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org The IOMMU mailing list has moved to iommu@lists.linux.dev and the old list should bounce by now. Remove it from the MAINTAINERS file. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706103331.10215-1-joro@8bytes.org --- MAINTAINERS | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 66bffb24a348..ead381fdfc5a 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -426,7 +426,6 @@ F: drivers/acpi/*thermal* ACPI VIOT DRIVER M: Jean-Philippe Brucker L: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Maintained F: drivers/acpi/viot.c @@ -960,7 +959,6 @@ F: drivers/video/fbdev/geode/ AMD IOMMU (AMD-VI) M: Joerg Roedel R: Suravee Suthikulpanit -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu.git @@ -5979,7 +5977,6 @@ DMA MAPPING HELPERS M: Christoph Hellwig M: Marek Szyprowski R: Robin Murphy -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Supported W: http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping.git @@ -5992,7 +5989,6 @@ F: kernel/dma/ DMA MAPPING BENCHMARK M: Xiang Chen -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev F: kernel/dma/map_benchmark.c F: tools/testing/selftests/dma/ @@ -7577,7 +7573,6 @@ F: drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_dp* EXYNOS SYSMMU (IOMMU) driver M: Marek Szyprowski -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Maintained F: drivers/iommu/exynos-iommu.c @@ -9999,7 +9994,6 @@ F: drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ INTEL IOMMU (VT-d) M: David Woodhouse M: Lu Baolu -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Supported T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu.git @@ -10379,7 +10373,6 @@ F: include/linux/iomap.h IOMMU DRIVERS M: Joerg Roedel M: Will Deacon -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu.git @@ -12539,7 +12532,6 @@ F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mt65xx.c MEDIATEK IOMMU DRIVER M: Yong Wu -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev L: linux-mediatek@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers) S: Supported @@ -16591,7 +16583,6 @@ F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c QUALCOMM IOMMU M: Rob Clark -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev L: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained @@ -19217,7 +19208,6 @@ F: arch/x86/boot/video* SWIOTLB SUBSYSTEM M: Christoph Hellwig -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Supported W: http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping.git @@ -21893,7 +21883,6 @@ XEN SWIOTLB SUBSYSTEM M: Juergen Gross M: Stefano Stabellini L: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org (moderated for non-subscribers) -L: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org L: iommu@lists.linux.dev S: Supported F: arch/x86/xen/*swiotlb* -- cgit v1.2.3 From f8d3da4ef8faf027261e06b7864583930dd7c7b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joanne Koong Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:25:47 -0700 Subject: bpf: Add flags arg to bpf_dynptr_read and bpf_dynptr_write APIs Commit 13bbbfbea759 ("bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_read and bpf_dynptr_write") added the bpf_dynptr_write() and bpf_dynptr_read() APIs. However, it will be needed for some dynptr types to pass in flags as well (e.g. when writing to a skb, the user may like to invalidate the hash or recompute the checksum). This patch adds a "u64 flags" arg to the bpf_dynptr_read() and bpf_dynptr_write() APIs before their UAPI signature freezes where we then cannot change them anymore with a 5.19.x released kernel. Fixes: 13bbbfbea759 ("bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_read and bpf_dynptr_write") Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706232547.4016651-1-joannelkoong@gmail.com --- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 11 +++++++---- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 12 ++++++++---- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 11 +++++++---- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 10 +++++----- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index f4009dbdf62d..ef78e0e1a754 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -5222,22 +5222,25 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * Nothing. Always succeeds. * - * long bpf_dynptr_read(void *dst, u32 len, struct bpf_dynptr *src, u32 offset) + * long bpf_dynptr_read(void *dst, u32 len, struct bpf_dynptr *src, u32 offset, u64 flags) * Description * Read *len* bytes from *src* into *dst*, starting from *offset* * into *src*. + * *flags* is currently unused. * Return * 0 on success, -E2BIG if *offset* + *len* exceeds the length - * of *src*'s data, -EINVAL if *src* is an invalid dynptr. + * of *src*'s data, -EINVAL if *src* is an invalid dynptr or if + * *flags* is not 0. * - * long bpf_dynptr_write(struct bpf_dynptr *dst, u32 offset, void *src, u32 len) + * long bpf_dynptr_write(struct bpf_dynptr *dst, u32 offset, void *src, u32 len, u64 flags) * Description * Write *len* bytes from *src* into *dst*, starting from *offset* * into *dst*. + * *flags* is currently unused. * Return * 0 on success, -E2BIG if *offset* + *len* exceeds the length * of *dst*'s data, -EINVAL if *dst* is an invalid dynptr or if *dst* - * is a read-only dynptr. + * is a read-only dynptr or if *flags* is not 0. * * void *bpf_dynptr_data(struct bpf_dynptr *ptr, u32 offset, u32 len) * Description diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 225806a02efb..bb1254f07667 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -1497,11 +1497,12 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_from_mem_proto = { .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL | MEM_UNINIT, }; -BPF_CALL_4(bpf_dynptr_read, void *, dst, u32, len, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, src, u32, offset) +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_read, void *, dst, u32, len, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, src, + u32, offset, u64, flags) { int err; - if (!src->data) + if (!src->data || flags) return -EINVAL; err = bpf_dynptr_check_off_len(src, offset, len); @@ -1521,13 +1522,15 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_read_proto = { .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, .arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING, + .arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; -BPF_CALL_4(bpf_dynptr_write, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, dst, u32, offset, void *, src, u32, len) +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_write, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, dst, u32, offset, void *, src, + u32, len, u64, flags) { int err; - if (!dst->data || bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(dst)) + if (!dst->data || flags || bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(dst)) return -EINVAL; err = bpf_dynptr_check_off_len(dst, offset, len); @@ -1547,6 +1550,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_write_proto = { .arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING, .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY, .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, + .arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; BPF_CALL_3(bpf_dynptr_data, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, ptr, u32, offset, u32, len) diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index f4009dbdf62d..ef78e0e1a754 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -5222,22 +5222,25 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * Nothing. Always succeeds. * - * long bpf_dynptr_read(void *dst, u32 len, struct bpf_dynptr *src, u32 offset) + * long bpf_dynptr_read(void *dst, u32 len, struct bpf_dynptr *src, u32 offset, u64 flags) * Description * Read *len* bytes from *src* into *dst*, starting from *offset* * into *src*. + * *flags* is currently unused. * Return * 0 on success, -E2BIG if *offset* + *len* exceeds the length - * of *src*'s data, -EINVAL if *src* is an invalid dynptr. + * of *src*'s data, -EINVAL if *src* is an invalid dynptr or if + * *flags* is not 0. * - * long bpf_dynptr_write(struct bpf_dynptr *dst, u32 offset, void *src, u32 len) + * long bpf_dynptr_write(struct bpf_dynptr *dst, u32 offset, void *src, u32 len, u64 flags) * Description * Write *len* bytes from *src* into *dst*, starting from *offset* * into *dst*. + * *flags* is currently unused. * Return * 0 on success, -E2BIG if *offset* + *len* exceeds the length * of *dst*'s data, -EINVAL if *dst* is an invalid dynptr or if *dst* - * is a read-only dynptr. + * is a read-only dynptr or if *flags* is not 0. * * void *bpf_dynptr_data(struct bpf_dynptr *ptr, u32 offset, u32 len) * Description diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c index d811cff73597..0a26c243e6e9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c @@ -140,12 +140,12 @@ int use_after_invalid(void *ctx) bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(&ringbuf, sizeof(read_data), 0, &ptr); - bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0); + bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0, 0); bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ptr, 0); /* this should fail */ - bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0); + bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0, 0); return 0; } @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int invalid_helper2(void *ctx) get_map_val_dynptr(&ptr); /* this should fail */ - bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), (void *)&ptr + 8, 0); + bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), (void *)&ptr + 8, 0, 0); return 0; } @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ int invalid_write2(void *ctx) memcpy((void *)&ptr + 8, &x, sizeof(x)); /* this should fail */ - bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0); + bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0, 0); bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ptr, 0); @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ int invalid_read2(void *ctx) get_map_val_dynptr(&ptr); /* this should fail */ - bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), (void *)&ptr + 1, 0); + bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), (void *)&ptr + 1, 0, 0); return 0; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c index d67be48df4b2..a3a6103c8569 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c @@ -43,10 +43,10 @@ int test_read_write(void *ctx) bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(&ringbuf, sizeof(write_data), 0, &ptr); /* Write data into the dynptr */ - err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_write(&ptr, 0, write_data, sizeof(write_data)); + err = bpf_dynptr_write(&ptr, 0, write_data, sizeof(write_data), 0); /* Read the data that was written into the dynptr */ - err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0); + err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_read(read_data, sizeof(read_data), &ptr, 0, 0); /* Ensure the data we read matches the data we wrote */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(read_data); i++) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2259da159fbe5dba8ac00b560cf00b6a6537fa18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 13:41:52 -0300 Subject: x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going to be killed and kernel is going to panic. If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also, do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported. Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index cf08a1b8f3c7..d26c57d98b98 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -865,7 +865,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); @@ -880,7 +883,7 @@ do_cmd_auto: boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; - else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 820b8963adaea34a87abbecb906d1f54c0aabfb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 10:50:40 -0400 Subject: net: sock: tracing: Fix sock_exceed_buf_limit not to dereference stale pointer The trace event sock_exceed_buf_limit saves the prot->sysctl_mem pointer and then dereferences it in the TP_printk() portion. This is unsafe as the TP_printk() portion is executed at the time the buffer is read. That is, it can be seconds, minutes, days, months, even years later. If the proto is freed, then this dereference will can also lead to a kernel crash. Instead, save the sysctl_mem array into the ring buffer and have the TP_printk() reference that instead. This is the proper and safe way to read pointers in trace events. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220706052130.16368-12-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3847ce32aea9f ("core: add tracepoints for queueing skb to rcvbuf") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/trace/events/sock.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/trace/events/sock.h b/include/trace/events/sock.h index 12c315782766..777ee6cbe933 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/sock.h +++ b/include/trace/events/sock.h @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit, TP_STRUCT__entry( __array(char, name, 32) - __field(long *, sysctl_mem) + __array(long, sysctl_mem, 3) __field(long, allocated) __field(int, sysctl_rmem) __field(int, rmem_alloc) @@ -110,7 +110,9 @@ TRACE_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit, TP_fast_assign( strncpy(__entry->name, prot->name, 32); - __entry->sysctl_mem = prot->sysctl_mem; + __entry->sysctl_mem[0] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[0]); + __entry->sysctl_mem[1] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[1]); + __entry->sysctl_mem[2] = READ_ONCE(prot->sysctl_mem[2]); __entry->allocated = allocated; __entry->sysctl_rmem = sk_get_rmem0(sk, prot); __entry->rmem_alloc = atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f1be04b4d48a2475ea1aab46a99221bfc5c0968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:52 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_dointvec(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dointvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dointvec() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index e52b6e372c60..c8a05655ae60 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -446,14 +446,14 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, if (*negp) { if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX + 1) return -EINVAL; - *valp = -*lvalp; + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, -*lvalp); } else { if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX) return -EINVAL; - *valp = *lvalp; + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp); } } else { - int val = *valp; + int val = READ_ONCE(*valp); if (val < 0) { *negp = true; *lvalp = -(unsigned long)val; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4762b532ec9539755aab61445d5da6e1926ccb99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:53 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: e7d316a02f68 ("sysctl: handle error writing UINT_MAX to u32 fields") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index c8a05655ae60..2ab8c2a37e8f 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -472,9 +472,9 @@ static int do_proc_douintvec_conv(unsigned long *lvalp, if (write) { if (*lvalp > UINT_MAX) return -EINVAL; - *valp = *lvalp; + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp); } else { - unsigned int val = *valp; + unsigned int val = READ_ONCE(*valp); *lvalp = (unsigned long)val; } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f613d86d014b6375a4085901de39406598121e35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:54 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_dointvec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dointvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dointvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 2ab8c2a37e8f..4d87832367f2 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, if ((param->min && *param->min > tmp) || (param->max && *param->max < tmp)) return -EINVAL; - *valp = tmp; + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, tmp); } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2d3b559df3ed39258737789aae2ae7973d205bc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:55 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_douintvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 61d9b56a8920 ("sysctl: add unsigned int range support") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 4d87832367f2..379721a03d41 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv(unsigned long *lvalp, (param->max && *param->max < tmp)) return -ERANGE; - *valp = tmp; + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, tmp); } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c31bcc8fb89fc2812663900589c6325ba35d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:56 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_doulongvec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_doulongvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_doulongvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 379721a03d41..8c55ba01f41b 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1090,9 +1090,9 @@ static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table *table, err = -EINVAL; break; } - *i = val; + WRITE_ONCE(*i, val); } else { - val = convdiv * (*i) / convmul; + val = convdiv * READ_ONCE(*i) / convmul; if (!first) proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\t'); proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, val, false); -- cgit v1.2.3 From e877820877663fbae8cb9582ea597a7230b94df3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:57 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data races in proc_dointvec_jiffies(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dointvec_jiffies() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dointvec_jiffies() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 8c55ba01f41b..bf9383d17e1b 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1173,9 +1173,12 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, if (write) { if (*lvalp > INT_MAX / HZ) return 1; - *valp = *negp ? -(*lvalp*HZ) : (*lvalp*HZ); + if (*negp) + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, -*lvalp * HZ); + else + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp * HZ); } else { - int val = *valp; + int val = READ_ONCE(*valp); unsigned long lval; if (val < 0) { *negp = true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 47e6ab24e8c6e3ca10ceb5835413f401f90de4bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:58 -0700 Subject: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_max_orphans. While reading sysctl_tcp_max_orphans, it can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid a data-race. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 028513d3e2a2..2222dfdde316 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2715,7 +2715,8 @@ static void tcp_orphan_update(struct timer_list *unused) static bool tcp_too_many_orphans(int shift) { - return READ_ONCE(tcp_orphan_cache) << shift > sysctl_tcp_max_orphans; + return READ_ONCE(tcp_orphan_cache) << shift > + READ_ONCE(sysctl_tcp_max_orphans); } bool tcp_check_oom(struct sock *sk, int shift) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d32edf1f3c38d3301f6434e56316f293466d7fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:39:59 -0700 Subject: inetpeer: Fix data-races around sysctl. While reading inetpeer sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/inetpeer.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c index da21dfce24d7..e9fed83e9b3c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c @@ -141,16 +141,20 @@ static void inet_peer_gc(struct inet_peer_base *base, struct inet_peer *gc_stack[], unsigned int gc_cnt) { + int peer_threshold, peer_maxttl, peer_minttl; struct inet_peer *p; __u32 delta, ttl; int i; - if (base->total >= inet_peer_threshold) + peer_threshold = READ_ONCE(inet_peer_threshold); + peer_maxttl = READ_ONCE(inet_peer_maxttl); + peer_minttl = READ_ONCE(inet_peer_minttl); + + if (base->total >= peer_threshold) ttl = 0; /* be aggressive */ else - ttl = inet_peer_maxttl - - (inet_peer_maxttl - inet_peer_minttl) / HZ * - base->total / inet_peer_threshold * HZ; + ttl = peer_maxttl - (peer_maxttl - peer_minttl) / HZ * + base->total / peer_threshold * HZ; for (i = 0; i < gc_cnt; i++) { p = gc_stack[i]; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 310731e2f1611d1d13aae237abcf8e66d33345d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:00 -0700 Subject: net: Fix data-races around sysctl_mem. While reading .sysctl_mem, it can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sock.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 72ca97ccb460..9fa54762e077 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ void __sk_mem_reclaim(struct sock *sk, int amount); /* sysctl_mem values are in pages, we convert them in SK_MEM_QUANTUM units */ static inline long sk_prot_mem_limits(const struct sock *sk, int index) { - long val = sk->sk_prot->sysctl_mem[index]; + long val = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot->sysctl_mem[index]); #if PAGE_SIZE > SK_MEM_QUANTUM val <<= PAGE_SHIFT - SK_MEM_QUANTUM_SHIFT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From dd44f04b9214adb68ef5684ae87a81ba03632250 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:01 -0700 Subject: cipso: Fix data-races around sysctl. While reading cipso sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 446fda4f2682 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 2 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 12 +++++++----- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index 9f41961d11d5..0e58001f8580 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ cipso_cache_enable - BOOLEAN cipso_cache_bucket_size - INTEGER The CIPSO label cache consists of a fixed size hash table with each hash bucket containing a number of cache entries. This variable limits - the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value the + the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value is, the more CIPSO label mappings that can be cached. When the number of entries in a given hash bucket reaches this limit adding new entries causes the oldest entry in the bucket to be removed to make room. diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c index 62d5f99760aa..6cd3b6c559f0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_cache_check(const unsigned char *key, struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *prev_entry = NULL; u32 hash; - if (!cipso_v4_cache_enabled) + if (!READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_cache_enabled)) return -ENOENT; hash = cipso_v4_map_cache_hash(key, key_len); @@ -296,13 +296,14 @@ static int cipso_v4_cache_check(const unsigned char *key, int cipso_v4_cache_add(const unsigned char *cipso_ptr, const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { + int bkt_size = READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize); int ret_val = -EPERM; u32 bkt; struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *entry = NULL; struct cipso_v4_map_cache_entry *old_entry = NULL; u32 cipso_ptr_len; - if (!cipso_v4_cache_enabled || cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize <= 0) + if (!READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_cache_enabled) || bkt_size <= 0) return 0; cipso_ptr_len = cipso_ptr[1]; @@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ int cipso_v4_cache_add(const unsigned char *cipso_ptr, bkt = entry->hash & (CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETS - 1); spin_lock_bh(&cipso_v4_cache[bkt].lock); - if (cipso_v4_cache[bkt].size < cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize) { + if (cipso_v4_cache[bkt].size < bkt_size) { list_add(&entry->list, &cipso_v4_cache[bkt].list); cipso_v4_cache[bkt].size += 1; } else { @@ -1199,7 +1200,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, /* This will send packets using the "optimized" format when * possible as specified in section 3.4.2.6 of the * CIPSO draft. */ - if (cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt && ret_val > 0 && ret_val <= 10) + if (READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt) && ret_val > 0 && + ret_val <= 10) tag_len = 14; else tag_len = 4 + ret_val; @@ -1603,7 +1605,7 @@ int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option) * all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't * really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate * ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */ - if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) { + if (READ_ONCE(cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid)) { if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def, tag[3]) < 0) { err_offset = opt_iter + 3; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 48d7ee321ea5182c6a70782aa186422a70e67e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:02 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl. While reading icmp sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid data-races. Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index efea0e796f06..0f9e61d29f73 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -253,11 +253,12 @@ bool icmp_global_allow(void) spin_lock(&icmp_global.lock); delta = min_t(u32, now - icmp_global.stamp, HZ); if (delta >= HZ / 50) { - incr = sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec * delta / HZ ; + incr = READ_ONCE(sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec) * delta / HZ; if (incr) WRITE_ONCE(icmp_global.stamp, now); } - credit = min_t(u32, icmp_global.credit + incr, sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst); + credit = min_t(u32, icmp_global.credit + incr, + READ_ONCE(sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst)); if (credit) { /* We want to use a credit of one in average, but need to randomize * it for security reasons. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 73318c4b7dbd0e781aaababff17376b2894745c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:40:03 -0700 Subject: ipv4: Fix a data-race around sysctl_fib_sync_mem. While reading sysctl_fib_sync_mem, it can be changed concurrently. So, we need to add READ_ONCE() to avoid a data-race. Fixes: 9ab948a91b2c ("ipv4: Allow amount of dirty memory from fib resizing to be controllable") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index 2734c3af7e24..46e8a5125853 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static void tnode_free(struct key_vector *tn) tn = container_of(head, struct tnode, rcu)->kv; } - if (tnode_free_size >= sysctl_fib_sync_mem) { + if (tnode_free_size >= READ_ONCE(sysctl_fib_sync_mem)) { tnode_free_size = 0; synchronize_rcu(); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a47c6385bb4e0786826e75bd4555aba32953653 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Brauner Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 15:56:11 +0200 Subject: ovl: turn of SB_POSIXACL with idmapped layers temporarily This cycle we added support for mounting overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts. Recently I've started looking into potential corner cases when trying to add additional tests and I noticed that reporting for POSIX ACLs is currently wrong when using idmapped layers with overlayfs mounted on top of it. I have sent out an patch that fixes this and makes POSIX ACLs work correctly but the patch is a bit bigger and we're already at -rc5 so I recommend we simply don't raise SB_POSIXACL when idmapped layers are used. Then we can fix the VFS part described below for the next merge window so we can have good exposure in -next. I'm going to give a rather detailed explanation to both the origin of the problem and mention the solution so people know what's going on. Let's assume the user creates the following directory layout and they have a rootfs /var/lib/lxc/c1/rootfs. The files in this rootfs are owned as you would expect files on your host system to be owned. For example, ~/.bashrc for your regular user would be owned by 1000:1000 and /root/.bashrc would be owned by 0:0. IOW, this is just regular boring filesystem tree on an ext4 or xfs filesystem. The user chooses to set POSIX ACLs using the setfacl binary granting the user with uid 4 read, write, and execute permissions for their .bashrc file: setfacl -m u:4:rwx /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc Now they to expose the whole rootfs to a container using an idmapped mount. So they first create: mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/{ctrover,merge,lowermap,overmap} mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} chown 10000000:10000000 /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work} The user now creates an idmapped mount for the rootfs: mount-idmapped/mount-idmapped --map-mount=b:0:10000000:65536 \ /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs \ /vol/contpool/lowermap This for example makes it so that /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc which is owned by uid and gid 1000 as being owned by uid and gid 10001000 at /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc. Assume the user wants to expose these idmapped mounts through an overlayfs mount to a container. mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/vol/contpool/lowermap, \ upperdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/over, \ workdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/work \ /vol/contpool/merge The user can do this in two ways: (1) Mount overlayfs in the initial user namespace and expose it to the container. (2) Mount overlayfs on top of the idmapped mounts inside of the container's user namespace. Let's assume the user chooses the (1) option and mounts overlayfs on the host and then changes into a container which uses the idmapping 0:10000000:65536 which is the same used for the two idmapped mounts. Now the user tries to retrieve the POSIX ACLs using the getfacl command getfacl -n /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc and to their surprise they see: # file: vol/contpool/merge/home/ubuntu/.bashrc # owner: 1000 # group: 1000 user::rw- user:4294967295:rwx group::r-- mask::rwx other::r-- indicating the uid wasn't correctly translated according to the idmapped mount. The problem is how we currently translate POSIX ACLs. Let's inspect the callchain in this example: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } If the user chooses to use option (2) and mounts overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container things don't look that much better: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | -> ovl_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> __vfs_getxattr() | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() { 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); 4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns, 4); /* FAILURE */ -1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4); } As is easily seen the problem arises because the idmapping of the lower mount isn't taken into account as all of this happens in do_gexattr(). But do_getxattr() is always called on an overlayfs mount and inode and thus cannot possible take the idmapping of the lower layers into account. This problem is similar for fscaps but there the translation happens as part of vfs_getxattr() already. Let's walk through an fscaps overlayfs callchain: setcap 'cap_net_raw+ep' /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc The expected outcome here is that we'll receive the cap_net_raw capability as we are able to map the uid associated with the fscap to 0 within our container. IOW, we want to see 0 as the result of the idmapping translations. If the user chooses option (1) we get the following callchain for fscaps: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() ________________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | -> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 10000000 = from_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ And if the user chooses option (2) we get: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() -> vfs_getxattr() -> xattr_getsecurity() -> security_inode_getsecurity() _______________________________ -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | | { V | 10000000 = make_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); | /* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); | } | -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() | -> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() | |-> vfs_getxattr() | -> xattr_getsecurity() | -> security_inode_getsecurity() | -> cap_inode_getsecurity() | { | 0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); | 10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); | 0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); | |____________________________________________________________________| } -> vfs_getxattr_alloc() -> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */ We can see how the translation happens correctly in those cases as the conversion happens within the vfs_getxattr() helper. For POSIX ACLs we need to do something similar. However, in contrast to fscaps we cannot apply the fix directly to the kernel internal posix acl data structure as this would alter the cached values and would also require a rework of how we currently deal with POSIX ACLs in general which almost never take the filesystem idmapping into account (the noteable exception being FUSE but even there the implementation is special) and instead retrieve the raw values based on the initial idmapping. The correct values are then generated right before returning to userspace. The fix for this is to move taking the mount's idmapping into account directly in vfs_getxattr() instead of having it be part of posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(). To this end we simply move the idmapped mount translation into a separate step performed in vfs_{g,s}etxattr() instead of in posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user(). To see how this fixes things let's go back to the original example. Assume the user chose option (1) and mounted overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts on the host: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */ sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | } |_________________________________________________ | | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000004); } And similarly if the user chooses option (1) and mounted overayfs on top of idmapped mounts inside the container: idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536 caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536 overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536 sys_getxattr() -> path_getxattr() -> getxattr() -> do_getxattr() |> vfs_getxattr() | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get() | | -> ovl_xattr_get() | | -> vfs_getxattr() | | |> __vfs_getxattr() | | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */ | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { | | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4); | | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4); | | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | | |_______________________ | | } | | | | | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() | | { V | 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004); | 10000004 = from_kuid(0(&init_user_ns, 10000004); | |_________________________________________________ | } | | | |> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() | { V 10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004); /* SUCCESS */ 4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmappings */, 10000004); } The last remaining problem we need to fix here is ovl_get_acl(). During ovl_permission() overlayfs will call: ovl_permission() -> generic_permission() -> acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> inode->i_op->get_acl() == ovl_get_acl() > get_acl() /* on the underlying filesystem) ->inode->i_op->get_acl() == /*lower filesystem callback */ -> posix_acl_permission() passing through the get_acl request to the underlying filesystem. This will retrieve the acls stored in the lower filesystem without taking the idmapping of the underlying mount into account as this would mean altering the cached values for the lower filesystem. The simple solution is to have ovl_get_acl() simply duplicate the ACLs, update the values according to the idmapped mount and return it to acl_permission_check() so it can be used in posix_acl_permission(). Since overlayfs doesn't cache ACLs they'll be released right after. Link: https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/issues/9 Cc: Seth Forshee Cc: Amir Goldstein Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Aleksa Sarai Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) Fixes: bc70682a497c ("ovl: support idmapped layers") Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi --- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst | 4 ++++ fs/overlayfs/super.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst index 7da6c30ed596..316cfd8b1891 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst @@ -466,6 +466,10 @@ overlay filesystem and the value of st_ino for filesystem objects may not be persistent and could change even while the overlay filesystem is mounted, as summarized in the `Inode properties`_ table above. +4) "idmapped mounts" +When the upper or lower layers are idmapped mounts overlayfs will be mounted +without support for POSIX Access Control Lists (ACLs). This limitation will +eventually be lifted. Changes to underlying filesystems --------------------------------- diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index e0a2e0468ee7..1ce5c9698393 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -1003,6 +1003,9 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) { + if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size); } @@ -1018,6 +1021,9 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct posix_acl *acl = NULL; int err; + if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + /* Check that everything is OK before copy-up */ if (value) { acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size); @@ -1960,6 +1966,20 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_get_root(struct super_block *sb, return root; } +static bool ovl_has_idmapped_layers(struct ovl_fs *ofs) +{ + + unsigned int i; + const struct vfsmount *mnt; + + for (i = 0; i < ofs->numlayer; i++) { + mnt = ofs->layers[i].mnt; + if (mnt && is_idmapped_mnt(mnt)) + return true; + } + return false; +} + static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) { struct path upperpath = { }; @@ -2129,7 +2149,10 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) sb->s_xattr = ofs->config.userxattr ? ovl_user_xattr_handlers : ovl_trusted_xattr_handlers; sb->s_fs_info = ofs; - sb->s_flags |= SB_POSIXACL; + if (ovl_has_idmapped_layers(ofs)) + pr_warn("POSIX ACLs are not yet supported with idmapped layers, mounting without ACL support.\n"); + else + sb->s_flags |= SB_POSIXACL; sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_SKIP_SYNC; err = -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a4527e1853f8ff6e0b7c2dadad6268bd38427a31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2022 12:42:03 +0100 Subject: btrfs: return -EAGAIN for NOWAIT dio reads/writes on compressed and inline extents When doing a direct IO read or write, we always return -ENOTBLK when we find a compressed extent (or an inline extent) so that we fallback to buffered IO. This however is not ideal in case we are in a NOWAIT context (io_uring for example), because buffered IO can block and we currently have no support for NOWAIT semantics for buffered IO, so if we need to fallback to buffered IO we should first signal the caller that we may need to block by returning -EAGAIN instead. This behaviour can also result in short reads being returned to user space, which although it's not incorrect and user space should be able to deal with partial reads, it's somewhat surprising and even some popular applications like QEMU (Link tag #1) and MariaDB (Link tag #2) don't deal with short reads properly (or at all). The short read case happens when we try to read from a range that has a non-compressed and non-inline extent followed by a compressed extent. After having read the first extent, when we find the compressed extent we return -ENOTBLK from btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), which results in iomap to treat the request as a short read, returning 0 (success) and waiting for previously submitted bios to complete (this happens at fs/iomap/direct-io.c:__iomap_dio_rw()). After that, and while at btrfs_file_read_iter(), we call filemap_read() to use buffered IO to read the remaining data, and pass it the number of bytes we were able to read with direct IO. Than at filemap_read() if we get a page fault error when accessing the read buffer, we return a partial read instead of an -EFAULT error, because the number of bytes previously read is greater than zero. So fix this by returning -EAGAIN for NOWAIT direct IO when we find a compressed or an inline extent. Reported-by: Dominique MARTINET Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/YrrFGO4A1jS0GI0G@atmark-techno.com/ Link: https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/MDEV-27900?focusedCommentId=216582&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-216582 Tested-by: Dominique MARTINET CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index ba527da61732..00c9ad053a7a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -7681,7 +7681,19 @@ static int btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(struct inode *inode, loff_t start, if (test_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_COMPRESSED, &em->flags) || em->block_start == EXTENT_MAP_INLINE) { free_extent_map(em); - ret = -ENOTBLK; + /* + * If we are in a NOWAIT context, return -EAGAIN in order to + * fallback to buffered IO. This is not only because we can + * block with buffered IO (no support for NOWAIT semantics at + * the moment) but also to avoid returning short reads to user + * space - this happens if we were able to read some data from + * previous non-compressed extents and then when we fallback to + * buffered IO, at btrfs_file_read_iter() by calling + * filemap_read(), we fail to fault in pages for the read buffer, + * in which case filemap_read() returns a short read (the number + * of bytes previously read is > 0, so it does not return -EFAULT). + */ + ret = (flags & IOMAP_NOWAIT) ? -EAGAIN : -ENOTBLK; goto unlock_err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2963457829decf0c824a443238d251151ed18ff5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 18:03:19 +0200 Subject: btrfs: zoned: fix a leaked bioc in read_zone_info The bioc would leak on the normal completion path and also on the RAID56 check (but that one won't happen in practice due to the invalid combination with zoned mode). Fixes: 7db1c5d14dcd ("btrfs: zoned: support dev-replace in zoned filesystems") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig [ update changelog ] Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/zoned.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/zoned.c b/fs/btrfs/zoned.c index 8aec53528efa..9892f7413705 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/zoned.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/zoned.c @@ -1736,12 +1736,14 @@ static int read_zone_info(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 logical, ret = btrfs_map_sblock(fs_info, BTRFS_MAP_GET_READ_MIRRORS, logical, &mapped_length, &bioc); if (ret || !bioc || mapped_length < PAGE_SIZE) { - btrfs_put_bioc(bioc); - return -EIO; + ret = -EIO; + goto out_put_bioc; } - if (bioc->map_type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID56_MASK) - return -EINVAL; + if (bioc->map_type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID56_MASK) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_bioc; + } nofs_flag = memalloc_nofs_save(); nmirrors = (int)bioc->num_stripes; @@ -1760,7 +1762,8 @@ static int read_zone_info(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 logical, break; } memalloc_nofs_restore(nofs_flag); - +out_put_bioc: + btrfs_put_bioc(bioc); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b3a3b0255797e1d395253366ba24a4cc6c8bdf9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Naohiro Aota Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:00:38 +0900 Subject: btrfs: zoned: drop optimization of zone finish We have an optimization in do_zone_finish() to send REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH only when necessary, i.e. we don't send REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH when we assume we wrote fully into the zone. The assumption is determined by "alloc_offset == capacity". This condition won't work if the last ordered extent is canceled due to some errors. In that case, we consider the zone is deactivated without sending the finish command while it's still active. This inconstancy results in activating another block group while we cannot really activate the underlying zone, which causes the active zone exceeds errors like below. BTRFS error (device nvme3n2): allocation failed flags 1, wanted 520192 tree-log 0, relocation: 0 nvme3n2: I/O Cmd(0x7d) @ LBA 160432128, 127 blocks, I/O Error (sct 0x1 / sc 0xbd) MORE DNR active zones exceeded error, dev nvme3n2, sector 0 op 0xd:(ZONE_APPEND) flags 0x4800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 nvme3n2: I/O Cmd(0x7d) @ LBA 160432128, 127 blocks, I/O Error (sct 0x1 / sc 0xbd) MORE DNR active zones exceeded error, dev nvme3n2, sector 0 op 0xd:(ZONE_APPEND) flags 0x4800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 Fix the issue by removing the optimization for now. Fixes: 8376d9e1ed8f ("btrfs: zoned: finish superblock zone once no space left for new SB") Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/zoned.c | 21 ++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/zoned.c b/fs/btrfs/zoned.c index 9892f7413705..e33987cefbd4 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/zoned.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/zoned.c @@ -1889,7 +1889,6 @@ static int do_zone_finish(struct btrfs_block_group *block_group, bool fully_writ { struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = block_group->fs_info; struct map_lookup *map; - bool need_zone_finish; int ret = 0; int i; @@ -1946,12 +1945,6 @@ static int do_zone_finish(struct btrfs_block_group *block_group, bool fully_writ } } - /* - * The block group is not fully allocated, so not fully written yet. We - * need to send ZONE_FINISH command to free up an active zone. - */ - need_zone_finish = !btrfs_zoned_bg_is_full(block_group); - block_group->zone_is_active = 0; block_group->alloc_offset = block_group->zone_capacity; block_group->free_space_ctl->free_space = 0; @@ -1967,15 +1960,13 @@ static int do_zone_finish(struct btrfs_block_group *block_group, bool fully_writ if (device->zone_info->max_active_zones == 0) continue; - if (need_zone_finish) { - ret = blkdev_zone_mgmt(device->bdev, REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH, - physical >> SECTOR_SHIFT, - device->zone_info->zone_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT, - GFP_NOFS); + ret = blkdev_zone_mgmt(device->bdev, REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH, + physical >> SECTOR_SHIFT, + device->zone_info->zone_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT, + GFP_NOFS); - if (ret) - return ret; - } + if (ret) + return ret; btrfs_dev_clear_active_zone(device, physical); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3418357a32db6c8ce5e4417964bac1edcc3f281a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Schnelle Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 12:16:25 +0200 Subject: ptrace: fix clearing of JOBCTL_TRACED in ptrace_unfreeze_traced() CI reported the following splat while running the strace testsuite: [ 3976.640309] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 at kernel/ptrace.c:272 ptrace_check_attach+0x12e/0x178 [ 3976.640391] CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 Comm: strace Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-20220624.rc3.git0.ee819a77d4e7.300.fc36.s390x #1 [ 3976.640410] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.1.0) [ 3976.640452] Call Trace: [ 3976.640454] [<00000000ab4b645a>] ptrace_check_attach+0x132/0x178 [ 3976.640457] ([<00000000ab4b6450>] ptrace_check_attach+0x128/0x178) [ 3976.640460] [<00000000ab4b6cde>] __s390x_sys_ptrace+0x86/0x160 [ 3976.640463] [<00000000ac03fcec>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200 [ 3976.640468] [<00000000ac04e312>] system_call+0x82/0xb0 [ 3976.640470] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 3976.640471] [<00000000ab4ea3c8>] wait_task_inactive+0x98/0x190 This is because JOBCTL_TRACED is set, but the task is not in TASK_TRACED state. Caused by ptrace_unfreeze_traced() which does: task->jobctl &= ~TASK_TRACED but it should be: task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED Fixes: 31cae1eaae4f ("sched,signal,ptrace: Rework TASK_TRACED, TASK_STOPPED state") Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220706101625.2100298-1-svens@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YrHA5UkJLornOdCz@li-4a3a4a4c-28e5-11b2-a85c-a8d192c6f089.ibm.com Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2101641 Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev Tested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 156a99283b11..1893d909e45c 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void ptrace_unfreeze_traced(struct task_struct *task) if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN; if (__fatal_signal_pending(task)) { - task->jobctl &= ~TASK_TRACED; + task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED; wake_up_state(task, __TASK_TRACED); } unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 437ac2592c09fcf27430db3ac878d2a566a58692 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Blumenstingl Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 15:55:31 +0200 Subject: selftests: forwarding: Install local_termination.sh When using the Makefile from tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/ all tests should be installed. Add local_termination.sh to the list of "to be installed tests" where it has been missing so far. Fixes: 90b9566aa5cd3f ("selftests: forwarding: add a test for local_termination.sh") Signed-off-by: Martin Blumenstingl Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile index 8f481218a492..46ca437af95a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ TEST_PROGS = bridge_igmp.sh \ ipip_hier_gre_key.sh \ ipip_hier_gre_keys.sh \ ipip_hier_gre.sh \ + local_termination.sh \ loopback.sh \ mirror_gre_bound.sh \ mirror_gre_bridge_1d.sh \ -- cgit v1.2.3 From cfbba7b46aef631445909ab4c35b98c16e36074b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Blumenstingl Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 15:55:32 +0200 Subject: selftests: forwarding: Install no_forwarding.sh When using the Makefile from tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/ all tests should be installed. Add no_forwarding.sh to the list of "to be installed tests" where it has been missing so far. Fixes: 476a4f05d9b83f ("selftests: forwarding: add a no_forwarding.sh test") Signed-off-by: Martin Blumenstingl Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile index 46ca437af95a..57b84e0c879e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ TEST_PROGS = bridge_igmp.sh \ mirror_gre_vlan_bridge_1q.sh \ mirror_gre_vlan.sh \ mirror_vlan.sh \ + no_forwarding.sh \ pedit_dsfield.sh \ pedit_ip.sh \ pedit_l4port.sh \ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a847c00eeba9744353ecdfad253143b9115678a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 10:26:15 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_log: incorrect offset to network header NFPROTO_ARP is expecting to find the ARP header at the network offset. In the particular case of ARP, HTYPE= field shows the initial bytes of the ethernet header destination MAC address. netdev out: IN= OUT=bridge0 MACSRC=c2:76:e5:71:e1:de MACDST=36:b0:4a:e2:72:ea MACPROTO=0806 ARP HTYPE=14000 PTYPE=0x4ae2 OPCODE=49782 NFPROTO_NETDEV egress hook is also expecting to find the IP headers at the network offset. Fixes: 35b9395104d5 ("netfilter: add generic ARP packet logger") Reported-by: Tom Yan Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c b/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c index 77bcb10fc586..cb894f0d63e9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ dump_arp_packet(struct nf_log_buf *m, unsigned int logflags; struct arphdr _arph; - ah = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, sizeof(_arph), &_arph); + ah = skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_arph), &_arph); if (!ah) { nf_log_buf_add(m, "TRUNCATED"); return; @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ dump_arp_packet(struct nf_log_buf *m, ah->ar_pln != sizeof(__be32)) return; - ap = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_arph), sizeof(_arpp), &_arpp); + ap = skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff + sizeof(_arph), sizeof(_arpp), &_arpp); if (!ap) { nf_log_buf_add(m, " INCOMPLETE [%zu bytes]", skb->len - sizeof(_arph)); @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static void nf_log_arp_packet(struct net *net, u_int8_t pf, nf_log_dump_packet_common(m, pf, hooknum, skb, in, out, loginfo, prefix); - dump_arp_packet(m, loginfo, skb, 0); + dump_arp_packet(m, loginfo, skb, skb_network_offset(skb)); nf_log_buf_close(m); } @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static void nf_log_ip_packet(struct net *net, u_int8_t pf, if (in) dump_mac_header(m, loginfo, skb); - dump_ipv4_packet(net, m, loginfo, skb, 0); + dump_ipv4_packet(net, m, loginfo, skb, skb_network_offset(skb)); nf_log_buf_close(m); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 697977d8415d61f3acbc4ee6d564c9dcf0309507 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 19:10:11 +0200 Subject: x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file must be PIC independent. This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ] Reported-by: Edward Tran Reported-by: Awais Tanveer Suggested-by: Ankur Arora Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S index fcc8a7699103..c7c4b1917336 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S @@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* - * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function + * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function, in particular + * there must be a plain RET and not jump to return thunk. */ #define PTR(x) (x << 2) @@ -91,7 +93,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) movl %edi, %eax addl $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax pushl %eax - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) @@ -159,12 +163,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) xorl %edx, %edx xorl %esi, %esi xorl %ebp, %ebp - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 1: popl %edx movl CP_PA_SWAP_PAGE(%edi), %esp addl $PAGE_SIZE, %esp 2: + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE call *%edx /* get the re-entry point of the peer system */ @@ -190,7 +197,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) movl %edi, %eax addl $(virtual_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax pushl %eax - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) @@ -208,7 +217,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) popl %edi popl %esi popl %ebx - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped) /* Do the copies */ @@ -271,7 +282,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages) popl %edi popl %ebx popl %ebp - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages) .globl kexec_control_code_size diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index c1d8626c53b6..4809c0dc4eb0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ #include /* - * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function + * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function, in particular + * there must be a plain RET and not jump to return thunk. */ #define PTR(x) (x << 3) @@ -105,7 +106,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) /* jump to identity mapped page */ addq $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %r8 pushq %r8 - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) @@ -200,7 +203,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) xorl %r14d, %r14d xorl %r15d, %r15d - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 1: popq %rdx @@ -219,7 +224,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) call swap_pages movq $virtual_mapped, %rax pushq %rax - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) @@ -241,7 +248,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) popq %r12 popq %rbp popq %rbx - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped) /* Do the copies */ @@ -298,7 +307,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages) lea PAGE_SIZE(%rax), %rsi jmp 0b 3: - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages) .globl kexec_control_code_size -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 13:36:09 -0700 Subject: x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 7e8099fd5ec1..00f5227c8459 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ #define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ -/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 7b411d9a6efb..cc615be27a54 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -141,6 +143,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d26c57d98b98..0dd04713434b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1318,6 +1318,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; } +/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ +static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) + return; + + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); + } +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1412,6 +1428,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and + * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET + * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk. + */ + if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) + spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index dbaa8326d6f2..fd44b54c90d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, CPUID_EBX, 0, 0x00000007, 1 }, + { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 }, diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index d27e0581b777..2eab6a3a8a8c 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -140,6 +142,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9c840d5f9aaef87e65db900bae21c70b059aba5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baowen Zheng Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 11:07:18 +0100 Subject: nfp: fix issue of skb segments exceeds descriptor limitation TCP packets will be dropped if the segments number in the tx skb exceeds limitation when sending iperf3 traffic with --zerocopy option. we make the following changes: Get nr_frags in nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block instead of passing from outside because it will be changed after skb_linearize operation. Fill maximum dma_len in first tx descriptor to make sure the whole head is included in the first descriptor. Fixes: c10d12e3dce8 ("nfp: add support for NFDK data path") Signed-off-by: Baowen Zheng Reviewed-by: Louis Peens Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfdk/dp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfdk/dp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfdk/dp.c index e509d6dcba5c..805071d64a20 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfdk/dp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfdk/dp.c @@ -125,17 +125,18 @@ nfp_nfdk_tx_csum(struct nfp_net_dp *dp, struct nfp_net_r_vector *r_vec, static int nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block(struct nfp_net_tx_ring *tx_ring, - unsigned int nr_frags, struct sk_buff *skb) + struct sk_buff *skb) { unsigned int n_descs, wr_p, nop_slots; const skb_frag_t *frag, *fend; struct nfp_nfdk_tx_desc *txd; + unsigned int nr_frags; unsigned int wr_idx; int err; recount_descs: n_descs = nfp_nfdk_headlen_to_segs(skb_headlen(skb)); - + nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frags; fend = frag + nr_frags; for (; frag < fend; frag++) @@ -281,10 +282,13 @@ netdev_tx_t nfp_nfdk_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) if (unlikely((int)metadata < 0)) goto err_flush; - nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; - if (nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block(tx_ring, nr_frags, skb)) + if (nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block(tx_ring, skb)) goto err_flush; + /* nr_frags will change after skb_linearize so we get nr_frags after + * nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block function + */ + nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; /* DMA map all */ wr_idx = D_IDX(tx_ring, tx_ring->wr_p); txd = &tx_ring->ktxds[wr_idx]; @@ -310,7 +314,16 @@ netdev_tx_t nfp_nfdk_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) /* FIELD_PREP() implicitly truncates to chunk */ dma_len -= 1; - dlen_type = FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD, dma_len) | + + /* We will do our best to pass as much data as we can in descriptor + * and we need to make sure the first descriptor includes whole head + * since there is limitation in firmware side. Sometimes the value of + * dma_len bitwise and NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD will less than + * headlen. + */ + dlen_type = FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD, + dma_len > NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD ? + NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD : dma_len) | FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_TYPE_HEAD, type); txd->dma_len_type = cpu_to_le16(dlen_type); @@ -925,7 +938,9 @@ nfp_nfdk_tx_xdp_buf(struct nfp_net_dp *dp, struct nfp_net_rx_ring *rx_ring, /* FIELD_PREP() implicitly truncates to chunk */ dma_len -= 1; - dlen_type = FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD, dma_len) | + dlen_type = FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD, + dma_len > NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD ? + NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD : dma_len) | FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_TYPE_HEAD, type); txd->dma_len_type = cpu_to_le16(dlen_type); @@ -1303,7 +1318,7 @@ nfp_nfdk_ctrl_tx_one(struct nfp_net *nn, struct nfp_net_r_vector *r_vec, skb_push(skb, 4)); } - if (nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block(tx_ring, 0, skb)) + if (nfp_nfdk_tx_maybe_close_block(tx_ring, skb)) goto err_free; /* DMA map all */ @@ -1328,7 +1343,9 @@ nfp_nfdk_ctrl_tx_one(struct nfp_net *nn, struct nfp_net_r_vector *r_vec, txbuf++; dma_len -= 1; - dlen_type = FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD, dma_len) | + dlen_type = FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD, + dma_len > NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD ? + NFDK_DESC_TX_DMA_LEN_HEAD : dma_len) | FIELD_PREP(NFDK_DESC_TX_TYPE_HEAD, type); txd->dma_len_type = cpu_to_le16(dlen_type); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 72a0b329114b1caa8e69dfa7cdad1dd3c69b8602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 15:11:53 +0000 Subject: vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_newlink() Blamed commit added back a bug I fixed in commit 9bbd917e0bec ("vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_dev_set_egress_priority") If a memory allocation fails in vlan_changelink() after other allocations succeeded, we need to call vlan_dev_free_egress_priority() to free all allocated memory because after a failed ->newlink() we do not call any methods like ndo_uninit() or dev->priv_destructor(). In following example, if the allocation for last element 2000:2001 fails, we need to free eight prior allocations: ip link add link dummy0 dummy0.100 type vlan id 100 \ egress-qos-map 1:2 2:3 3:4 4:5 5:6 6:7 7:8 8:9 2000:2001 syzbot report was: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888117bd1060 (size 32): comm "syz-executor408", pid 3759, jiffies 4294956555 (age 34.090s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 09 00 00 00 00 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline] [] vlan_dev_set_egress_priority+0xed/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:193 [] vlan_changelink+0x178/0x1d0 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:128 [] vlan_newlink+0x148/0x260 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:185 [] rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3363 [inline] [] __rtnl_newlink+0xa58/0xdc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3580 [] rtnl_newlink+0x49/0x70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3593 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x5c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6089 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x87/0x1d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 [] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] [] netlink_unicast+0x397/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 [] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] [] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x80 net/socket.c:734 [] ____sys_sendmsg+0x36c/0x390 net/socket.c:2488 [] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8b/0xd0 net/socket.c:2542 [] __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2571 [inline] [] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2580 [inline] [] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline] [] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xf0 net/socket.c:2578 [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Fixes: 37aa50c539bc ("vlan: introduce vlan_dev_free_egress_priority") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Xin Long Reviewed-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c index 53b1955b027f..214532173536 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c @@ -182,10 +182,14 @@ static int vlan_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, else if (dev->mtu > max_mtu) return -EINVAL; + /* Note: If this initial vlan_changelink() fails, we need + * to call vlan_dev_free_egress_priority() to free memory. + */ err = vlan_changelink(dev, tb, data, extack); - if (err) - return err; - err = register_vlan_dev(dev, extack); + + if (!err) + err = register_vlan_dev(dev, extack); + if (err) vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(dev); return err; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d785a773bed966a75ca1f11d108ae1897189975b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2022 07:02:10 -0600 Subject: io_uring: check that we have a file table when allocating update slots If IORING_FILE_INDEX_ALLOC is set asking for an allocated slot, the helper doesn't check if we actually have a file table or not. The non alloc path does do that correctly, and returns -ENXIO if we haven't set one up. Do the same for the allocated path, avoiding a NULL pointer dereference when trying to find a free bit. Fixes: a7c41b4687f5 ("io_uring: let IORING_OP_FILES_UPDATE support choosing fixed file slots") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- fs/io_uring.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index cddc0e8490af..a01ea49f3017 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -7973,6 +7973,9 @@ static int io_files_update_with_index_alloc(struct io_kiocb *req, struct file *file; int ret, fd; + if (!req->ctx->file_data) + return -ENXIO; + for (done = 0; done < req->rsrc_update.nr_args; done++) { if (copy_from_user(&fd, &fds[done], sizeof(fd))) { ret = -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c39ba4de6b0a843bec5d46c2b6f2064428dada5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:41:59 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: replace BUG_ON by element length check BUG_ON can be triggered from userspace with an element with a large userdata area. Replace it by length check and return EINVAL instead. Over time extensions have been growing in size. Pick a sufficiently old Fixes: tag to propagate this fix. Fixes: 7d7402642eaf ("netfilter: nf_tables: variable sized set element keys / data") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 14 +++++--- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h index 5c4e5a96a984..64cf655c818c 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h @@ -657,18 +657,22 @@ static inline void nft_set_ext_prepare(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl) tmpl->len = sizeof(struct nft_set_ext); } -static inline void nft_set_ext_add_length(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id, - unsigned int len) +static inline int nft_set_ext_add_length(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id, + unsigned int len) { tmpl->len = ALIGN(tmpl->len, nft_set_ext_types[id].align); - BUG_ON(tmpl->len > U8_MAX); + if (tmpl->len > U8_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + tmpl->offset[id] = tmpl->len; tmpl->len += nft_set_ext_types[id].len + len; + + return 0; } -static inline void nft_set_ext_add(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id) +static inline int nft_set_ext_add(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id) { - nft_set_ext_add_length(tmpl, id, 0); + return nft_set_ext_add_length(tmpl, id, 0); } static inline void nft_set_ext_init(struct nft_set_ext *ext, diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index d6b59beab3a9..646d5fd53604 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -5833,8 +5833,11 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (!nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY] && !(flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL)) return -EINVAL; - if (flags != 0) - nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS); + if (flags != 0) { + err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } if (set->flags & NFT_SET_MAP) { if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] == NULL && @@ -5943,7 +5946,9 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (err < 0) goto err_set_elem_expr; - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen); + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_key; } if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END]) { @@ -5952,22 +5957,31 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (err < 0) goto err_parse_key; - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen); + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_key_end; } if (timeout > 0) { - nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPIRATION); - if (timeout != set->timeout) - nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_TIMEOUT); + err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPIRATION); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_key_end; + + if (timeout != set->timeout) { + err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_TIMEOUT); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_key_end; + } } if (num_exprs) { for (i = 0; i < num_exprs; i++) size += expr_array[i]->ops->size; - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPRESSIONS, - sizeof(struct nft_set_elem_expr) + - size); + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPRESSIONS, + sizeof(struct nft_set_elem_expr) + size); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_key_end; } if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_OBJREF] != NULL) { @@ -5982,7 +5996,9 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, err = PTR_ERR(obj); goto err_parse_key_end; } - nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_OBJREF); + err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_OBJREF); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_key_end; } if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] != NULL) { @@ -6016,7 +6032,9 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, NFT_VALIDATE_NEED); } - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_DATA, desc.len); + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_DATA, desc.len); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_data; } /* The full maximum length of userdata can exceed the maximum @@ -6026,9 +6044,12 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, ulen = 0; if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_USERDATA] != NULL) { ulen = nla_len(nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_USERDATA]); - if (ulen > 0) - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_USERDATA, - ulen); + if (ulen > 0) { + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_USERDATA, + ulen); + if (err < 0) + goto err_parse_data; + } } err = -ENOMEM; @@ -6256,8 +6277,11 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, nft_set_ext_prepare(&tmpl); - if (flags != 0) - nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS); + if (flags != 0) { + err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY]) { err = nft_setelem_parse_key(ctx, set, &elem.key.val, @@ -6265,16 +6289,20 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (err < 0) return err; - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen); + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen); + if (err < 0) + goto fail_elem; } if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END]) { err = nft_setelem_parse_key(ctx, set, &elem.key_end.val, nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END]); if (err < 0) - return err; + goto fail_elem; - nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen); + err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen); + if (err < 0) + goto fail_elem_key_end; } err = -ENOMEM; @@ -6282,7 +6310,7 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, elem.key_end.val.data, NULL, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (elem.priv == NULL) - goto fail_elem; + goto fail_elem_key_end; ext = nft_set_elem_ext(set, elem.priv); if (flags) @@ -6306,6 +6334,8 @@ fail_ops: kfree(trans); fail_trans: kfree(elem.priv); +fail_elem_key_end: + nft_data_release(&elem.key_end.val, NFT_DATA_VALUE); fail_elem: nft_data_release(&elem.key.val, NFT_DATA_VALUE); return err; -- cgit v1.2.3 From de2a34771f5123270bc3842535ac91673116dd03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Schnelle Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 12:16:25 +0200 Subject: ptrace: fix clearing of JOBCTL_TRACED in ptrace_unfreeze_traced() CI reported the following splat while running the strace testsuite: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 at kernel/ptrace.c:272 ptrace_check_attach+0x12e/0x178 CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 Comm: strace Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-20220624.rc3.git0.ee819a77d4e7.300.fc36.s390x #1 Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.1.0) Call Trace: [<00000000ab4b645a>] ptrace_check_attach+0x132/0x178 ([<00000000ab4b6450>] ptrace_check_attach+0x128/0x178) [<00000000ab4b6cde>] __s390x_sys_ptrace+0x86/0x160 [<00000000ac03fcec>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200 [<00000000ac04e312>] system_call+0x82/0xb0 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<00000000ab4ea3c8>] wait_task_inactive+0x98/0x190 This is because JOBCTL_TRACED is set, but the task is not in TASK_TRACED state. Caused by ptrace_unfreeze_traced() which does: task->jobctl &= ~TASK_TRACED but it should be: task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED Fixes: 31cae1eaae4f ("sched,signal,ptrace: Rework TASK_TRACED, TASK_STOPPED state") Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 156a99283b11..1893d909e45c 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void ptrace_unfreeze_traced(struct task_struct *task) if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN; if (__fatal_signal_pending(task)) { - task->jobctl &= ~TASK_TRACED; + task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED; wake_up_state(task, __TASK_TRACED); } unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 84499c5d220a4f8fb0a35fa4673148525c81ea83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Zimmermann Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 14:10:27 +0200 Subject: drm/aperture: Run fbdev removal before internal helpers Always run fbdev removal first to remove simpledrm via sysfb_disable(). This clears the internal state. The later call to drm_aperture_detach_drivers() then does nothing. Otherwise, with drm_aperture_detach_drivers() running first, the call to sysfb_disable() uses inconsistent state. Example backtrace show below: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in device_del+0x79/0x5f0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888108185050 by task systemd-udevd/311 CPU: 0 PID: 311 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.19.0-rc2-1-default+ #1689 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL120 G7, BIOS J01 04/21/2011 Call Trace: device_del+0x79/0x5f0 platform_device_del.part.0+0x19/0xe0 platform_device_unregister+0x1c/0x30 sysfb_disable+0x2d/0x70 remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x1c/0xf0 remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x130/0x1a0 drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x86/0xb0 mgag200_pci_probe+0x2d/0x140 [mgag200] Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann Fixes: 873eb3b11860 ("fbdev: Disable sysfb device registration when removing conflicting FBs") Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Daniel Vetter Cc: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Helge Deller Cc: Thomas Zimmermann Cc: Alex Deucher Cc: Zhen Lei Cc: Changcheng Deng Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c index 74bd4a76b253..059fd71424f6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_aperture.c @@ -329,7 +329,20 @@ int drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct drm_driver *req_driver) { resource_size_t base, size; - int bar, ret = 0; + int bar, ret; + + /* + * WARNING: Apparently we must kick fbdev drivers before vgacon, + * otherwise the vga fbdev driver falls over. + */ +#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_FB) + ret = remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(pdev, req_driver->name); + if (ret) + return ret; +#endif + ret = vga_remove_vgacon(pdev); + if (ret) + return ret; for (bar = 0; bar < PCI_STD_NUM_BARS; ++bar) { if (!(pci_resource_flags(pdev, bar) & IORESOURCE_MEM)) @@ -339,15 +352,6 @@ int drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(struct pci_dev *pdev, drm_aperture_detach_drivers(base, size); } - /* - * WARNING: Apparently we must kick fbdev drivers before vgacon, - * otherwise the vga fbdev driver falls over. - */ -#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_FB) - ret = remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(pdev, req_driver->name); -#endif - if (ret == 0) - ret = vga_remove_vgacon(pdev); - return ret; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers); -- cgit v1.2.3 From cb8a4beac39b90cd60abbf9fd639a3357274e469 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 11:15:47 +0200 Subject: x86/boot: Fix the setup data types max limit Commit in Fixes forgot to change the SETUP_TYPE_MAX definition which contains the highest valid setup data type. Correct that. Fixes: 5ea98e01ab52 ("x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data") Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ddba81dd-cc92-699c-5274-785396a17fb5@zytor.com --- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index bea5cdcdf532..e02a8a8ef23c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #define SETUP_INDIRECT (1<<31) /* SETUP_INDIRECT | max(SETUP_*) */ -#define SETUP_TYPE_MAX (SETUP_INDIRECT | SETUP_JAILHOUSE) +#define SETUP_TYPE_MAX (SETUP_INDIRECT | SETUP_CC_BLOB) /* ram_size flags */ #define RAMDISK_IMAGE_START_MASK 0x07FF -- cgit v1.2.3 From f5a4618587fb5c5eb5fec3dcce165ca8fd7d7f91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 17:09:35 +0900 Subject: kbuild: remove unused cmd_none in scripts/Makefile.modinst Commit 65ce9c38326e ("kbuild: move module strip/compression code into scripts/Makefile.modinst") added this unused code. Perhaps, I thought cmd_none was useful for CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS_NONE, but I did not use it after all. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers --- scripts/Makefile.modinst | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modinst b/scripts/Makefile.modinst index c2c43a0ecfe0..16a02e9237d3 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.modinst +++ b/scripts/Makefile.modinst @@ -28,9 +28,6 @@ modules := $(patsubst $(extmod_prefix)%, $(dst)/%$(suffix-y), $(modules)) __modinst: $(modules) @: -quiet_cmd_none = - cmd_none = : - # # Installation # -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc82bbf4dede758007763867d0282353c06d1121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 13:55:49 -0700 Subject: ida: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging This is another old BUG_ON() that just shouldn't exist (see also commit a382f8fee42c: "signal handling: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging"). In fact, as Matthew Wilcox points out, this condition shouldn't really even result in a warning, since a negative id allocation result is just a normal allocation failure: "I wonder if we should even warn here -- sure, the caller is trying to free something that wasn't allocated, but we don't warn for kfree(NULL)" and goes on to point out how that current error check is only causing people to unnecessarily do their own index range checking before freeing it. This was noted by Itay Iellin, because the bluetooth HCI socket cookie code does *not* do that range checking, and ends up just freeing the error case too, triggering the BUG_ON(). The HCI code requires CAP_NET_RAW, and seems to just result in an ugly splat, but there really is no reason to BUG_ON() here, and we have generally striven for allocation models where it's always ok to just do free(alloc()); even if the allocation were to fail for some random reason (usually obviously that "random" reason being some resource limit). Fixes: 88eca0207cf1 ("ida: simplified functions for id allocation") Reported-by: Itay Iellin Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- lib/idr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/idr.c b/lib/idr.c index f4ab4f4aa3c7..7ecdfdb5309e 100644 --- a/lib/idr.c +++ b/lib/idr.c @@ -491,7 +491,8 @@ void ida_free(struct ida *ida, unsigned int id) struct ida_bitmap *bitmap; unsigned long flags; - BUG_ON((int)id < 0); + if ((int)id < 0) + return; xas_lock_irqsave(&xas, flags); bitmap = xas_load(&xas); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 32346491ddf24599decca06190ebca03ff9de7f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 14:40:51 -0700 Subject: Linux 5.19-rc6 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 990d2ee79186..faa4880f25f7 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 19 SUBLEVEL = 0 -EXTRAVERSION = -rc5 +EXTRAVERSION = -rc6 NAME = Superb Owl # *DOCUMENTATION* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 50e2ab39291947b6c6c7025cf01707c270fcde59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 16:52:27 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: fix queue selection for mesh/OCB interfaces When using iTXQ, the code assumes that there is only one vif queue for broadcast packets, using the BE queue. Allowing non-BE queue marking violates that assumption and txq->ac == skb_queue_mapping is no longer guaranteed. This can cause issues with queue handling in the driver and also causes issues with the recent ATF change, resulting in an AQL underflow warning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220702145227.39356-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/wme.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/wme.c b/net/mac80211/wme.c index 62c6733e0792..d50480b31750 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wme.c @@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ u16 __ieee80211_select_queue(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, bool qos; /* all mesh/ocb stations are required to support WME */ - if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT || - sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB) + if (sta && (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT || + sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB)) qos = true; else if (sta) qos = sta->sta.wme; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c835bb142d4013c2ab24bff5ae9f6709a39cbcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 16:36:09 -0700 Subject: mptcp: fix subflow traversal at disconnect time At disconnect time the MPTCP protocol traverse the subflows list closing each of them. In some circumstances - MPJ subflow, passive MPTCP socket, the latter operation can remove the subflow from the list, invalidating the current iterator. Address the issue using the safe list traversing helper variant. Reported-by: van fantasy Fixes: b29fcfb54cd7 ("mptcp: full disconnect implementation") Tested-by: Matthieu Baerts Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index cc21fafd9726..21a3ed64226e 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -2919,12 +2919,12 @@ static void mptcp_copy_inaddrs(struct sock *msk, const struct sock *ssk) static int mptcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags) { - struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow; + struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow, *tmp; struct mptcp_sock *msk = mptcp_sk(sk); inet_sk_state_store(sk, TCP_CLOSE); - mptcp_for_each_subflow(msk, subflow) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(subflow, tmp, &msk->conn_list, node) { struct sock *ssk = mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock(subflow); __mptcp_close_ssk(sk, ssk, subflow, MPTCP_CF_FASTCLOSE); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3ddabc433670292492d217e0f3b5ce017c42da2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthieu Baerts Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 16:36:10 -0700 Subject: selftests: mptcp: validate userspace PM tests by default The new script was not listed in the programs to test. By consequence, some CIs running MPTCP selftests were not validating these new tests. Note that MPTCP CI was validating it as it executes all .sh scripts from 'tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp' directory. Fixes: 259a834fadda ("selftests: mptcp: functional tests for the userspace PM type") Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile index f905d5358e68..48a99e1453e1 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/Makefile @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ KSFT_KHDR_INSTALL := 1 CFLAGS = -Wall -Wl,--no-as-needed -O2 -g -I$(top_srcdir)/usr/include $(KHDR_INCLUDES) TEST_PROGS := mptcp_connect.sh pm_netlink.sh mptcp_join.sh diag.sh \ - simult_flows.sh mptcp_sockopt.sh + simult_flows.sh mptcp_sockopt.sh userspace_pm.sh TEST_GEN_FILES = mptcp_connect pm_nl_ctl mptcp_sockopt mptcp_inq -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5f3fe25e70559fa3b096ab17e13316c93ddb7020 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 16:15:27 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda/realtek: Fix headset mic for Acer SF313-51 The issue on Acer SWIFT SF313-51 is that headset microphone doesn't work. The following quirk fixed headset microphone issue. Note that the fixup of SF314-54/55 (ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_HEADSET_MIC) was not successful on my SF313-51. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711081527.6254-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 007dd8b5e1f2..fe7c1194d052 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -8886,6 +8886,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1290, "Acer Veriton Z4860G", ALC286_FIXUP_ACER_AIO_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1291, "Acer Veriton Z4660G", ALC286_FIXUP_ACER_AIO_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x129c, "Acer SWIFT SF314-55", ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_HEADSET_MIC), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x129d, "Acer SWIFT SF313-51", ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1300, "Acer SWIFT SF314-56", ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1308, "Acer Aspire Z24-890", ALC286_FIXUP_ACER_AIO_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x132a, "Acer TravelMate B114-21", ALC233_FIXUP_ACER_HEADSET_MIC), -- cgit v1.2.3 From d16d69bf5a25d91c6d8f3e29711be12551bf56cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 18:17:44 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda/conexant: Apply quirk for another HP ProDesk 600 G3 model There is another HP ProDesk 600 G3 model with the PCI SSID 103c:82b4 that requires the quirk HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE. Add the corresponding entry to the quirk table. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711101744.25189-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c index 3e541a4c0423..83ae21a01bbf 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c @@ -944,6 +944,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cxt5066_fixups[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x828c, "HP EliteBook 840 G4", CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8299, "HP 800 G3 SFF", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x829a, "HP 800 G3 DM", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x82b4, "HP ProDesk 600 G3", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x836e, "HP ProBook 455 G5", CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x837f, "HP ProBook 470 G5", CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x83b2, "HP EliteBook 840 G5", CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK), -- cgit v1.2.3 From d5b36a4dbd06c5e8e36ca8ccc552f679069e2946 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 18:16:25 +0200 Subject: fix race between exit_itimers() and /proc/pid/timers As Chris explains, the comment above exit_itimers() is not correct, we can race with proc_timers_seq_ops. Change exit_itimers() to clear signal->posix_timers with ->siglock held. Cc: Reported-by: chris@accessvector.net Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/exec.c | 2 +- include/linux/sched/task.h | 2 +- kernel/exit.c | 2 +- kernel/time/posix-timers.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 0989fb8472a1..778123259e42 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) bprm->mm = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS - exit_itimers(me->signal); + exit_itimers(me); flush_itimer_signals(); #endif diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h index 505aaf9fe477..81cab4b01edc 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/task.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static inline void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) extern __noreturn void do_group_exit(int); extern void exit_files(struct task_struct *); -extern void exit_itimers(struct signal_struct *); +extern void exit_itimers(struct task_struct *); extern pid_t kernel_clone(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs); struct task_struct *create_io_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, int node); diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index f072959fcab7..64c938ce36fe 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code) #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS hrtimer_cancel(&tsk->signal->real_timer); - exit_itimers(tsk->signal); + exit_itimers(tsk); #endif if (tsk->mm) setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, tsk->mm); diff --git a/kernel/time/posix-timers.c b/kernel/time/posix-timers.c index 1cd10b102c51..5dead89308b7 100644 --- a/kernel/time/posix-timers.c +++ b/kernel/time/posix-timers.c @@ -1051,15 +1051,24 @@ retry_delete: } /* - * This is called by do_exit or de_thread, only when there are no more - * references to the shared signal_struct. + * This is called by do_exit or de_thread, only when nobody else can + * modify the signal->posix_timers list. Yet we need sighand->siglock + * to prevent the race with /proc/pid/timers. */ -void exit_itimers(struct signal_struct *sig) +void exit_itimers(struct task_struct *tsk) { + struct list_head timers; struct k_itimer *tmr; - while (!list_empty(&sig->posix_timers)) { - tmr = list_entry(sig->posix_timers.next, struct k_itimer, list); + if (list_empty(&tsk->signal->posix_timers)) + return; + + spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); + list_replace_init(&tsk->signal->posix_timers, &timers); + spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); + + while (!list_empty(&timers)) { + tmr = list_first_entry(&timers, struct k_itimer, list); itimer_delete(tmr); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From e69a66147d49506062cd837f3b230ee3e98102ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Tomlin Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 18:17:19 +0100 Subject: module: kallsyms: Ensure preemption in add_kallsyms() with PREEMPT_RT The commit 08126db5ff73 ("module: kallsyms: Fix suspicious rcu usage") under PREEMPT_RT=y, disabling preemption introduced an unbounded latency since the loop is not fixed. This change caused a regression since previously preemption was not disabled and we would dereference RCU-protected pointers explicitly. That being said, these pointers cannot change. Before kallsyms-specific data is prepared/or set-up, we ensure that the unformed module is known to be unique i.e. does not already exist (see load_module()). Therefore, we can fix this by using the common and more appropriate RCU flavour as this section of code can be safely preempted. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt Fixes: 08126db5ff73 ("module: kallsyms: Fix suspicious rcu usage") Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain --- kernel/module/kallsyms.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module/kallsyms.c b/kernel/module/kallsyms.c index 18c23545b984..77e75bead569 100644 --- a/kernel/module/kallsyms.c +++ b/kernel/module/kallsyms.c @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ void add_kallsyms(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) mod->kallsyms = (void __rcu *)mod->init_layout.base + info->mod_kallsyms_init_off; - preempt_disable(); + rcu_read_lock(); /* The following is safe since this pointer cannot change */ - rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->symtab = (void *)symsec->sh_addr; - rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->num_symtab = symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); + rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->symtab = (void *)symsec->sh_addr; + rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->num_symtab = symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); /* Make sure we get permanent strtab: don't use info->strtab. */ - rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->strtab = + rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->strtab = (void *)info->sechdrs[info->index.str].sh_addr; - rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->typetab = mod->init_layout.base + info->init_typeoffs; + rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->typetab = mod->init_layout.base + info->init_typeoffs; /* * Now populate the cut down core kallsyms for after init @@ -193,20 +193,20 @@ void add_kallsyms(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) mod->core_kallsyms.strtab = s = mod->data_layout.base + info->stroffs; mod->core_kallsyms.typetab = mod->data_layout.base + info->core_typeoffs; strtab_size = info->core_typeoffs - info->stroffs; - src = rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->symtab; - for (ndst = i = 0; i < rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->num_symtab; i++) { - rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->typetab[i] = elf_type(src + i, info); + src = rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->symtab; + for (ndst = i = 0; i < rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->num_symtab; i++) { + rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->typetab[i] = elf_type(src + i, info); if (i == 0 || is_livepatch_module(mod) || is_core_symbol(src + i, info->sechdrs, info->hdr->e_shnum, info->index.pcpu)) { ssize_t ret; mod->core_kallsyms.typetab[ndst] = - rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->typetab[i]; + rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->typetab[i]; dst[ndst] = src[i]; dst[ndst++].st_name = s - mod->core_kallsyms.strtab; ret = strscpy(s, - &rcu_dereference_sched(mod->kallsyms)->strtab[src[i].st_name], + &rcu_dereference(mod->kallsyms)->strtab[src[i].st_name], strtab_size); if (ret < 0) break; @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ void add_kallsyms(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) strtab_size -= ret + 1; } } - preempt_enable(); + rcu_read_unlock(); mod->core_kallsyms.num_symtab = ndst; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5b2f3e0777da2a5dd62824bbe2fdab1d12caaf8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 14:46:04 -0400 Subject: NFSD: Decode NFSv4 birth time attribute NFSD has advertised support for the NFSv4 time_create attribute since commit e377a3e698fb ("nfsd: Add support for the birth time attribute"). Igor Mammedov reports that Mac OS clients attempt to set the NFSv4 birth time attribute via OPEN(CREATE) and SETATTR if the server indicates that it supports it, but since the above commit was merged, those attempts now fail. Table 5 in RFC 8881 lists the time_create attribute as one that can be both set and retrieved, but the above commit did not add server support for clients to provide a time_create attribute. IMO that's a bug in our implementation of the NFSv4 protocol, which this commit addresses. Whether NFSD silently ignores the new birth time or actually sets it is another matter. I haven't found another filesystem service in the Linux kernel that enables users or clients to modify a file's birth time attribute. This commit reflects my (perhaps incorrect) understanding of whether Linux users can set a file's birth time. NFSD will now recognize a time_create attribute but it ignores its value. It clears the time_create bit in the returned attribute bitmask to indicate that the value was not used. Reported-by: Igor Mammedov Fixes: e377a3e698fb ("nfsd: Add support for the birth time attribute") Tested-by: Igor Mammedov Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 9 +++++++++ fs/nfsd/nfsd.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 61b2aae81abb..2acea7792bb2 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -470,6 +470,15 @@ nfsd4_decode_fattr4(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, u32 *bmval, u32 bmlen, return nfserr_bad_xdr; } } + if (bmval[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_CREATE) { + struct timespec64 ts; + + /* No Linux filesystem supports setting this attribute. */ + bmval[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_CREATE; + status = nfsd4_decode_nfstime4(argp, &ts); + if (status) + return status; + } if (bmval[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY_SET) { u32 set_it; diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h b/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h index 847b482155ae..9a8b09afc173 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h @@ -465,7 +465,8 @@ static inline bool nfsd_attrs_supported(u32 minorversion, const u32 *bmval) (FATTR4_WORD0_SIZE | FATTR4_WORD0_ACL) #define NFSD_WRITEABLE_ATTRS_WORD1 \ (FATTR4_WORD1_MODE | FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER | FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP \ - | FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS_SET | FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY_SET) + | FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS_SET | FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_CREATE \ + | FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY_SET) #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL #define MAYBE_FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL \ FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL -- cgit v1.2.3 From aec158242b87a43d83322e99bc71ab4428e5ab79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 14:30:13 -0400 Subject: lockd: set fl_owner when unlocking files Unlocking a POSIX lock on an inode with vfs_lock_file only works if the owner matches. Ensure we set it in the request. Cc: J. Bruce Fields Fixes: 7f024fcd5c97 ("Keep read and write fds with each nlm_file") Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c index 0a22a2faf552..b2f277727469 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ nlm_delete_file(struct nlm_file *file) } } -static int nlm_unlock_files(struct nlm_file *file) +static int nlm_unlock_files(struct nlm_file *file, fl_owner_t owner) { struct file_lock lock; @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static int nlm_unlock_files(struct nlm_file *file) lock.fl_type = F_UNLCK; lock.fl_start = 0; lock.fl_end = OFFSET_MAX; + lock.fl_owner = owner; if (file->f_file[O_RDONLY] && vfs_lock_file(file->f_file[O_RDONLY], F_SETLK, &lock, NULL)) goto out_err; @@ -225,7 +226,7 @@ again: if (match(lockhost, host)) { spin_unlock(&flctx->flc_lock); - if (nlm_unlock_files(file)) + if (nlm_unlock_files(file, fl->fl_owner)) return 1; goto again; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1197eb5906a5464dbaea24cac296dfc38499cc00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 14:30:14 -0400 Subject: lockd: fix nlm_close_files This loop condition tries a bit too hard to be clever. Just test for the two indices we care about explicitly. Cc: J. Bruce Fields Fixes: 7f024fcd5c97 ("Keep read and write fds with each nlm_file") Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c index b2f277727469..e1c4617de771 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c @@ -283,11 +283,10 @@ nlm_file_inuse(struct nlm_file *file) static void nlm_close_files(struct nlm_file *file) { - struct file *f; - - for (f = file->f_file[0]; f <= file->f_file[1]; f++) - if (f) - nlmsvc_ops->fclose(f); + if (file->f_file[O_RDONLY]) + nlmsvc_ops->fclose(file->f_file[O_RDONLY]); + if (file->f_file[O_WRONLY]) + nlmsvc_ops->fclose(file->f_file[O_WRONLY]); } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a46de446d3fb9ae304dd0f4b4fceb551b152498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 19:41:41 -0700 Subject: selftest: net: add tun to .gitignore Add missing .gitignore entry. Fixes: 839b92fede7b ("selftest: tun: add test for NAPI dismantle") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220709024141.321683-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore index a29f79618934..ffc35a22e914 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore @@ -36,4 +36,5 @@ test_unix_oob gro ioam6_parser toeplitz +tun cmsg_sender -- cgit v1.2.3 From 841bdf85c226803a78a9319af9b2caa9bf3e2eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:00:05 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda - Add fixup for Dell Latitidue E5430 Another Dell model, another fixup entry: Latitude E5430 needs the same fixup as other Latitude E series as workaround for noise problems. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712060005.20176-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index fe7c1194d052..ecc737342fcc 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -8896,6 +8896,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1430, "Acer TravelMate B311R-31", ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1466, "Acer Aspire A515-56", ALC255_FIXUP_ACER_HEADPHONE_AND_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0470, "Dell M101z", ALC269_FIXUP_DELL_M101Z), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x053c, "Dell Latitude E5430", ALC292_FIXUP_DELL_E7X), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x054b, "Dell XPS one 2710", ALC275_FIXUP_DELL_XPS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x05bd, "Dell Latitude E6440", ALC292_FIXUP_DELL_E7X), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x05be, "Dell Latitude E6540", ALC292_FIXUP_DELL_E7X), -- cgit v1.2.3 From dbe75d314748e08fc6e4576d153d8a69621ee5ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 17:22:22 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix headset mic problem for a HP machine with alc671 On a HP 288 Pro G6, the front mic could not be detected.In order to get it working, the pin configuration needs to be set correctly, and the ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2 fixup needs to be applied. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712092222.21738-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index ecc737342fcc..34139c26795f 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -11219,6 +11219,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x1632, "HP RP5800", ALC662_FIXUP_HP_RP5800), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8719, "HP", ALC897_FIXUP_HP_HSMIC_VERB), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x873e, "HP", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x877e, "HP 288 Pro G6", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x885f, "HP 288 Pro G8", ALC671_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC2), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1080, "Asus UX501VW", ALC668_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x11cd, "Asus N550", ALC662_FIXUP_ASUS_Nx50), -- cgit v1.2.3 From f946964a9f79f8dcb5a6329265281eebfc23aee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yevhen Orlov Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2022 15:20:21 +0300 Subject: net: marvell: prestera: fix missed deinit sequence Add unregister_fib_notifier as rollback of register_fib_notifier. Fixes: 4394fbcb78cf ("net: marvell: prestera: handle fib notifications") Signed-off-by: Yevhen Orlov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220710122021.7642-1-yevhen.orlov@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/prestera/prestera_router.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/prestera/prestera_router.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/prestera/prestera_router.c index 3754d8aec76d..3c8116f16b4d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/prestera/prestera_router.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/prestera/prestera_router.c @@ -588,6 +588,7 @@ err_router_lib_init: void prestera_router_fini(struct prestera_switch *sw) { + unregister_fib_notifier(&init_net, &sw->router->fib_nb); unregister_inetaddr_notifier(&sw->router->inetaddr_nb); unregister_inetaddr_validator_notifier(&sw->router->inetaddr_valid_nb); rhashtable_destroy(&sw->router->kern_fib_cache_ht); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c27c753ea6fd1237f4f96abf8b623d7bab505513 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:01:06 +0200 Subject: x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly __static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp(). Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells it to use text_poke_early() for it. Fixes: ee88d363d156 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index be7038a0da4d..aaaba85d6d7f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x31, 0xc0 }; static const u8 retinsn[] = { RET_INSN_OPCODE, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc }; -static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void *func) +static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, + void *func, bool modinit) { const void *emulate = NULL; int size = CALL_INSN_SIZE; @@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void if (memcmp(insn, code, size) == 0) return; - if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING)) + if (system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING || modinit) return text_poke_early(insn, code, size); text_poke_bp(insn, code, size, emulate); @@ -114,12 +115,12 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) if (tramp) { __static_call_validate(tramp, true, true); - __static_call_transform(tramp, __sc_insn(!func, true), func); + __static_call_transform(tramp, __sc_insn(!func, true), func, false); } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) && site) { __static_call_validate(site, tail, false); - __static_call_transform(site, __sc_insn(!func, tail), func); + __static_call_transform(site, __sc_insn(!func, tail), func, false); } mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); @@ -145,8 +146,10 @@ bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest) return false; } + mutex_lock(&text_mutex); if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk) - __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL); + __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL, true); + mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); return true; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 50bd7d5a647bdf533575111c5335f49707c2ce2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shyam Prasad N Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 11:16:24 +0000 Subject: cifs: fix race condition with delayed threads On failure to create a new channel, first cancel the delayed threads, which could try to search for this channel, and not find it. The other option was to put the tcp session for the channel first, before decrementing chan_count. But that would leave a reference to the tcp session, when it has been freed already. So going with the former option and cancelling the delayed works first, before rolling back the channel. Fixes: aa45dadd34e4 ("cifs: change iface_list from array to sorted linked list") Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N Acked-by: Enzo Matsumiya Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/sess.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c index b85718f32b53..02c8b2906196 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/sess.c +++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c @@ -474,6 +474,14 @@ cifs_ses_add_channel(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct cifs_ses *ses, out: if (rc && chan->server) { + /* + * we should avoid race with these delayed works before we + * remove this channel + */ + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&chan->server->echo); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&chan->server->resolve); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&chan->server->reconnect); + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); /* we rely on all bits beyond chan_count to be clear */ cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(ses, chan->server); @@ -484,10 +492,9 @@ out: */ WARN_ON(ses->chan_count < 1); spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); - } - if (rc && chan->server) cifs_put_tcp_session(chan->server, 0); + } return rc; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2883f4b5a0e1ac9472c7e3ae9bbdb4ea5a2117c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shyam Prasad N Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:29:12 +0000 Subject: cifs: remove unnecessary locking of chan_lock while freeing session In cifs_put_smb_ses, when we're freeing the last ref count to the session, we need to free up each channel. At this point, it is unnecessary to take chan_lock, since we have the last reference to the ses. Picking up this lock also introduced a deadlock because it calls cifs_put_tcp_ses, which locks cifs_tcp_ses_lock. Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N Acked-by: Enzo Matsumiya Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index fa29c9aae24b..386bb523c69e 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -1918,7 +1918,6 @@ void cifs_put_smb_ses(struct cifs_ses *ses) list_del_init(&ses->smb_ses_list); spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); - spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); chan_count = ses->chan_count; /* close any extra channels */ @@ -1934,7 +1933,6 @@ void cifs_put_smb_ses(struct cifs_ses *ses) ses->chans[i].server = NULL; } } - spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); sesInfoFree(ses); cifs_put_tcp_session(server, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f52d166819a4d8e0d5cca07d8a8dd6397c96dcf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul M Stillwell Jr Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 14:09:52 -0700 Subject: ice: handle E822 generic device ID in PLDM header The driver currently presumes that the record data in the PLDM header of the firmware image will match the device ID of the running device. This is true for E810 devices. It appears that for E822 devices that this is not guaranteed to be true. Fix this by adding a check for the generic E822 device. Fixes: d69ea414c9b4 ("ice: implement device flash update via devlink") Signed-off-by: Paul M Stillwell Jr Tested-by: Gurucharan (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devids.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_fw_update.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devids.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devids.h index 61dd2f18dee8..b41bc3dc1745 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devids.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devids.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #define _ICE_DEVIDS_H_ /* Device IDs */ +#define ICE_DEV_ID_E822_SI_DFLT 0x1888 /* Intel(R) Ethernet Connection E823-L for backplane */ #define ICE_DEV_ID_E823L_BACKPLANE 0x124C /* Intel(R) Ethernet Connection E823-L for SFP */ diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_fw_update.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_fw_update.c index 665a344fb9c0..3dc5662d62a6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_fw_update.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_fw_update.c @@ -736,7 +736,87 @@ static int ice_finalize_update(struct pldmfw *context) return 0; } -static const struct pldmfw_ops ice_fwu_ops = { +struct ice_pldm_pci_record_id { + u32 vendor; + u32 device; + u32 subsystem_vendor; + u32 subsystem_device; +}; + +/** + * ice_op_pci_match_record - Check if a PCI device matches the record + * @context: PLDM fw update structure + * @record: list of records extracted from the PLDM image + * + * Determine if the PCI device associated with this device matches the record + * data provided. + * + * Searches the descriptor TLVs and extracts the relevant descriptor data into + * a pldm_pci_record_id. This is then compared against the PCI device ID + * information. + * + * Returns: true if the device matches the record, false otherwise. + */ +static bool +ice_op_pci_match_record(struct pldmfw *context, struct pldmfw_record *record) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(context->dev); + struct ice_pldm_pci_record_id id = { + .vendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .device = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subsystem_vendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subsystem_device = PCI_ANY_ID, + }; + struct pldmfw_desc_tlv *desc; + + list_for_each_entry(desc, &record->descs, entry) { + u16 value; + int *ptr; + + switch (desc->type) { + case PLDM_DESC_ID_PCI_VENDOR_ID: + ptr = &id.vendor; + break; + case PLDM_DESC_ID_PCI_DEVICE_ID: + ptr = &id.device; + break; + case PLDM_DESC_ID_PCI_SUBVENDOR_ID: + ptr = &id.subsystem_vendor; + break; + case PLDM_DESC_ID_PCI_SUBDEV_ID: + ptr = &id.subsystem_device; + break; + default: + /* Skip unrelated TLVs */ + continue; + } + + value = get_unaligned_le16(desc->data); + /* A value of zero for one of the descriptors is sometimes + * used when the record should ignore this field when matching + * device. For example if the record applies to any subsystem + * device or vendor. + */ + if (value) + *ptr = value; + else + *ptr = PCI_ANY_ID; + } + + /* the E822 device can have a generic device ID so check for that */ + if ((id.vendor == PCI_ANY_ID || id.vendor == pdev->vendor) && + (id.device == PCI_ANY_ID || id.device == pdev->device || + id.device == ICE_DEV_ID_E822_SI_DFLT) && + (id.subsystem_vendor == PCI_ANY_ID || + id.subsystem_vendor == pdev->subsystem_vendor) && + (id.subsystem_device == PCI_ANY_ID || + id.subsystem_device == pdev->subsystem_device)) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static const struct pldmfw_ops ice_fwu_ops_e810 = { .match_record = &pldmfw_op_pci_match_record, .send_package_data = &ice_send_package_data, .send_component_table = &ice_send_component_table, @@ -744,6 +824,14 @@ static const struct pldmfw_ops ice_fwu_ops = { .finalize_update = &ice_finalize_update, }; +static const struct pldmfw_ops ice_fwu_ops_e822 = { + .match_record = &ice_op_pci_match_record, + .send_package_data = &ice_send_package_data, + .send_component_table = &ice_send_component_table, + .flash_component = &ice_flash_component, + .finalize_update = &ice_finalize_update, +}; + /** * ice_get_pending_updates - Check if the component has a pending update * @pf: the PF driver structure @@ -921,7 +1009,11 @@ int ice_devlink_flash_update(struct devlink *devlink, memset(&priv, 0, sizeof(priv)); - priv.context.ops = &ice_fwu_ops; + /* the E822 device needs a slightly different ops */ + if (hw->mac_type == ICE_MAC_GENERIC) + priv.context.ops = &ice_fwu_ops_e822; + else + priv.context.ops = &ice_fwu_ops_e810; priv.context.dev = dev; priv.extack = extack; priv.pf = pf; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c index c1ac2f746714..ff2eac2f8c64 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c @@ -5413,6 +5413,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ice_pci_tbl[] = { { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, ICE_DEV_ID_E823L_10G_BASE_T), 0 }, { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, ICE_DEV_ID_E823L_1GBE), 0 }, { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, ICE_DEV_ID_E823L_QSFP), 0 }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, ICE_DEV_ID_E822_SI_DFLT), 0 }, /* required last entry */ { 0, } }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7b6f9462a3234c35cf808453d39a074a04e71de1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul M Stillwell Jr Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 14:48:32 -0700 Subject: ice: change devlink code to read NVM in blocks When creating a snapshot of the NVM the driver needs to read the entire contents from the NVM and store it. The NVM reads are protected by a lock that is shared between the driver and the firmware. If the driver takes too long to read the entire NVM (which can happen on some systems) then the firmware could reclaim the lock and cause subsequent reads from the driver to fail. We could fix this by increasing the timeout that we pass to the firmware, but we could end up in the same situation again if the system is slow. Instead have the driver break the reading of the NVM into blocks that are small enough that we have confidence that the read will complete within the timeout time, but large enough not to cause significant AQ overhead. Fixes: dce730f17825 ("ice: add a devlink region for dumping NVM contents") Signed-off-by: Paul M Stillwell Jr Tested-by: Gurucharan (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devlink.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devlink.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devlink.c index 3991d62473bf..3337314a7b35 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devlink.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_devlink.c @@ -814,6 +814,8 @@ void ice_devlink_destroy_vf_port(struct ice_vf *vf) devlink_port_unregister(devlink_port); } +#define ICE_DEVLINK_READ_BLK_SIZE (1024 * 1024) + /** * ice_devlink_nvm_snapshot - Capture a snapshot of the NVM flash contents * @devlink: the devlink instance @@ -840,8 +842,9 @@ static int ice_devlink_nvm_snapshot(struct devlink *devlink, struct ice_pf *pf = devlink_priv(devlink); struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw; - void *nvm_data; - u32 nvm_size; + u8 *nvm_data, *tmp, i; + u32 nvm_size, left; + s8 num_blks; int status; nvm_size = hw->flash.flash_size; @@ -849,26 +852,44 @@ static int ice_devlink_nvm_snapshot(struct devlink *devlink, if (!nvm_data) return -ENOMEM; - status = ice_acquire_nvm(hw, ICE_RES_READ); - if (status) { - dev_dbg(dev, "ice_acquire_nvm failed, err %d aq_err %d\n", - status, hw->adminq.sq_last_status); - NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Failed to acquire NVM semaphore"); - vfree(nvm_data); - return status; - } - status = ice_read_flat_nvm(hw, 0, &nvm_size, nvm_data, false); - if (status) { - dev_dbg(dev, "ice_read_flat_nvm failed after reading %u bytes, err %d aq_err %d\n", - nvm_size, status, hw->adminq.sq_last_status); - NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Failed to read NVM contents"); + num_blks = DIV_ROUND_UP(nvm_size, ICE_DEVLINK_READ_BLK_SIZE); + tmp = nvm_data; + left = nvm_size; + + /* Some systems take longer to read the NVM than others which causes the + * FW to reclaim the NVM lock before the entire NVM has been read. Fix + * this by breaking the reads of the NVM into smaller chunks that will + * probably not take as long. This has some overhead since we are + * increasing the number of AQ commands, but it should always work + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_blks; i++) { + u32 read_sz = min_t(u32, ICE_DEVLINK_READ_BLK_SIZE, left); + + status = ice_acquire_nvm(hw, ICE_RES_READ); + if (status) { + dev_dbg(dev, "ice_acquire_nvm failed, err %d aq_err %d\n", + status, hw->adminq.sq_last_status); + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Failed to acquire NVM semaphore"); + vfree(nvm_data); + return -EIO; + } + + status = ice_read_flat_nvm(hw, i * ICE_DEVLINK_READ_BLK_SIZE, + &read_sz, tmp, false); + if (status) { + dev_dbg(dev, "ice_read_flat_nvm failed after reading %u bytes, err %d aq_err %d\n", + read_sz, status, hw->adminq.sq_last_status); + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Failed to read NVM contents"); + ice_release_nvm(hw); + vfree(nvm_data); + return -EIO; + } ice_release_nvm(hw); - vfree(nvm_data); - return status; - } - ice_release_nvm(hw); + tmp += read_sz; + left -= read_sz; + } *data = nvm_data; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7edc3945bdce9c39198a10d6129377a5c53559c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zheng Yejian Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 09:47:31 +0800 Subject: tracing/histograms: Fix memory leak problem This reverts commit 46bbe5c671e06f070428b9be142cc4ee5cedebac. As commit 46bbe5c671e0 ("tracing: fix double free") said, the "double free" problem reported by clang static analyzer is: > In parse_var_defs() if there is a problem allocating > var_defs.expr, the earlier var_defs.name is freed. > This free is duplicated by free_var_defs() which frees > the rest of the list. However, if there is a problem allocating N-th var_defs.expr: + in parse_var_defs(), the freed 'earlier var_defs.name' is actually the N-th var_defs.name; + then in free_var_defs(), the names from 0th to (N-1)-th are freed; IF ALLOCATING PROBLEM HAPPENED HERE!!! -+ \ | 0th 1th (N-1)-th N-th V +-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+----------- var_defs: | name | expr | name | expr | ... | name | expr | name | /// +-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+----------- These two frees don't act on same name, so there was no "double free" problem before. Conversely, after that commit, we get a "memory leak" problem because the above "N-th var_defs.name" is not freed. If enable CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK and inject a fault at where the N-th var_defs.expr allocated, then execute on shell like: $ echo 'hist:key=call_site:val=$v1,$v2:v1=bytes_req,v2=bytes_alloc' > \ /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/trigger Then kmemleak reports: unreferenced object 0xffff8fb100ef3518 (size 8): comm "bash", pid 196, jiffies 4295681690 (age 28.538s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 76 31 00 00 b1 8f ff ff v1...... backtrace: [<0000000038fe4895>] kstrdup+0x2d/0x60 [<00000000c99c049a>] event_hist_trigger_parse+0x206f/0x20e0 [<00000000ae70d2cc>] trigger_process_regex+0xc0/0x110 [<0000000066737a4c>] event_trigger_write+0x75/0xd0 [<000000007341e40c>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x2a0 [<0000000087fde4c2>] ksys_write+0x59/0xd0 [<00000000581e9cdf>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [<00000000cf3b065c>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711014731.69520-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 46bbe5c671e0 ("tracing: fix double free") Reported-by: Hulk Robot Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) --- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c index 48e82e141d54..e87a46794079 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c @@ -4430,6 +4430,8 @@ static int parse_var_defs(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data) s = kstrdup(field_str, GFP_KERNEL); if (!s) { + kfree(hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[n_vars]); + hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[n_vars] = NULL; ret = -ENOMEM; goto free; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 495fcec8648cdfb483b5b9ab310f3839f07cb3b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Douglas Anderson Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 17:09:52 -0700 Subject: tracing: Fix sleeping while atomic in kdb ftdump If you drop into kdb and type "ftdump" you'll get a sleeping while atomic warning from memory allocation in trace_find_next_entry(). This appears to have been caused by commit ff895103a84a ("tracing: Save off entry when peeking at next entry"), which added the allocation in that path. The problematic commit was already fixed by commit 8e99cf91b99b ("tracing: Do not allocate buffer in trace_find_next_entry() in atomic") but that fix missed the kdb case. The fix here is easy: just move the assignment of the static buffer to the place where it should have been to begin with: trace_init_global_iter(). That function is called in two places, once is right before the assignment of the static buffer added by the previous fix and once is in kdb. Note that it appears that there's a second static buffer that we need to assign that was added in commit efbbdaa22bb7 ("tracing: Show real address for trace event arguments"), so we'll move that too. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220708170919.1.I75844e5038d9425add2ad853a608cb44bb39df40@changeid Fixes: ff895103a84a ("tracing: Save off entry when peeking at next entry") Fixes: efbbdaa22bb7 ("tracing: Show real address for trace event arguments") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) --- kernel/trace/trace.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index a8cfac0611bc..b8dd54627075 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -9864,6 +9864,12 @@ void trace_init_global_iter(struct trace_iterator *iter) /* Output in nanoseconds only if we are using a clock in nanoseconds. */ if (trace_clocks[iter->tr->clock_id].in_ns) iter->iter_flags |= TRACE_FILE_TIME_IN_NS; + + /* Can not use kmalloc for iter.temp and iter.fmt */ + iter->temp = static_temp_buf; + iter->temp_size = STATIC_TEMP_BUF_SIZE; + iter->fmt = static_fmt_buf; + iter->fmt_size = STATIC_FMT_BUF_SIZE; } void ftrace_dump(enum ftrace_dump_mode oops_dump_mode) @@ -9896,11 +9902,6 @@ void ftrace_dump(enum ftrace_dump_mode oops_dump_mode) /* Simulate the iterator */ trace_init_global_iter(&iter); - /* Can not use kmalloc for iter.temp and iter.fmt */ - iter.temp = static_temp_buf; - iter.temp_size = STATIC_TEMP_BUF_SIZE; - iter.fmt = static_fmt_buf; - iter.fmt_size = STATIC_FMT_BUF_SIZE; for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) { atomic_inc(&per_cpu_ptr(iter.array_buffer->data, cpu)->disabled); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0a6d7d45414a77876e8e9a77e454af754cea3a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 16:12:31 -0400 Subject: ftrace: Be more specific about arch impact when function tracer is enabled It was brought up that on ARMv7, that because the FUNCTION_TRACER does not use nops to keep function tracing disabled because of the use of a link register, it does have some performance impact. The start of functions when -pg is used to compile the kernel is: push {lr} bl 8010e7c0 <__gnu_mcount_nc> When function tracing is tuned off, it becomes: push {lr} add sp, sp, #4 Which just puts the stack back to its normal location. But these two instructions at the start of every function does incur some overhead. Be more honest in the Kconfig FUNCTION_TRACER description and specify that the overhead being in the noise was x86 specific, but other architectures may vary. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220705105416.GE5208@pengutronix.de/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220706161231.085a83da@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Sascha Hauer Acked-by: Sascha Hauer Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) --- kernel/trace/Kconfig | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/Kconfig b/kernel/trace/Kconfig index debbbb083286..ccd6a5ade3e9 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/trace/Kconfig @@ -194,7 +194,8 @@ config FUNCTION_TRACER sequence is then dynamically patched into a tracer call when tracing is enabled by the administrator. If it's runtime disabled (the bootup default), then the overhead of the instructions is very - small and not measurable even in micro-benchmarks. + small and not measurable even in micro-benchmarks (at least on + x86, but may have impact on other architectures). config FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER bool "Kernel Function Graph Tracer" -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0bb7e14c8e15ad78b7300e7d89a615ea8b8c89a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li kunyu Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:00:13 +0800 Subject: blk-iocost: tracing: atomic64_read(&ioc->vtime_rate) is assigned an extra semicolon Remove extra semicolon. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220629030013.10362-1-kunyu@nfschina.com Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Li kunyu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) --- include/trace/events/iocost.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/trace/events/iocost.h b/include/trace/events/iocost.h index e282ce02fa2d..6d1626e7a4ce 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/iocost.h +++ b/include/trace/events/iocost.h @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(iocost_ioc_vrate_adj, TP_fast_assign( __assign_str(devname, ioc_name(ioc)); - __entry->old_vrate = atomic64_read(&ioc->vtime_rate);; + __entry->old_vrate = atomic64_read(&ioc->vtime_rate); __entry->new_vrate = new_vrate; __entry->busy_level = ioc->busy_level; __entry->read_missed_ppm = missed_ppm[READ]; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e3655dfa58053d614ca9601c36657b469402650f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: sunliming Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 15:56:59 +0800 Subject: fprobe/samples: Make sample_probe static This symbol is not used outside of fprobe_example.c, so marks it static. Fixes the following warning: sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>) >> samples/fprobe/fprobe_example.c:23:15: sparse: sparse: symbol 'sample_probe' was not declared. Should it be static? Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220606075659.674556-1-sunliming@kylinos.cn Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: sunliming Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) --- samples/fprobe/fprobe_example.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/samples/fprobe/fprobe_example.c b/samples/fprobe/fprobe_example.c index 01ee6c8c8382..58f6e8358e97 100644 --- a/samples/fprobe/fprobe_example.c +++ b/samples/fprobe/fprobe_example.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ #define BACKTRACE_DEPTH 16 #define MAX_SYMBOL_LEN 4096 -struct fprobe sample_probe; +static struct fprobe sample_probe; static unsigned long nhit; static char symbol[MAX_SYMBOL_LEN] = "kernel_clone"; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1e1fb420fe68d9d938db360fec700dfd230cc22a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiezhu Yang Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 09:23:22 +0800 Subject: samples: Use KSYM_NAME_LEN for kprobes It is better and enough to use KSYM_NAME_LEN for kprobes in samples, no need to define and use the other values. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654651402-21552-1-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) --- samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c | 5 ++--- samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c b/samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c index f991a66b5b02..fd346f58ddba 100644 --- a/samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c +++ b/samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c @@ -16,9 +16,8 @@ #include #include -#define MAX_SYMBOL_LEN 64 -static char symbol[MAX_SYMBOL_LEN] = "kernel_clone"; -module_param_string(symbol, symbol, sizeof(symbol), 0644); +static char symbol[KSYM_NAME_LEN] = "kernel_clone"; +module_param_string(symbol, symbol, KSYM_NAME_LEN, 0644); /* For each probe you need to allocate a kprobe structure */ static struct kprobe kp = { diff --git a/samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c b/samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c index 228321ecb161..cbf16542d84e 100644 --- a/samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c +++ b/samples/kprobes/kretprobe_example.c @@ -23,11 +23,10 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include -static char func_name[NAME_MAX] = "kernel_clone"; -module_param_string(func, func_name, NAME_MAX, S_IRUGO); +static char func_name[KSYM_NAME_LEN] = "kernel_clone"; +module_param_string(func, func_name, KSYM_NAME_LEN, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(func, "Function to kretprobe; this module will report the" " function's execution time"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c5b744d38c36a407a41e918602eec4d89730787b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kashyap Desai Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 22:26:14 -0400 Subject: bnxt_en: reclaim max resources if sriov enable fails If bnxt_sriov_enable() fails after some resources have been reserved for the VFs, the current code is not unwinding properly and the reserved resources become unavailable afterwards. Fix it by properly unwinding with a call to bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps() to reset all maximum resources. Also, add the missing bnxt_ulp_sriov_cfg() call to let the RDMA driver know to abort. Fixes: c0c050c58d84 ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai Signed-off-by: Michael Chan Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c index 56b46b8206a7..7ba181ccaac2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -7790,7 +7790,7 @@ hwrm_dbg_qcaps_exit: static int bnxt_hwrm_queue_qportcfg(struct bnxt *bp); -static int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(struct bnxt *bp) +int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(struct bnxt *bp) { int rc; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h index a1dca8c58f54..075c6206325c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h @@ -2314,6 +2314,7 @@ int bnxt_cancel_reservations(struct bnxt *bp, bool fw_reset); int bnxt_hwrm_alloc_wol_fltr(struct bnxt *bp); int bnxt_hwrm_free_wol_fltr(struct bnxt *bp); int bnxt_hwrm_func_resc_qcaps(struct bnxt *bp, bool all); +int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(struct bnxt *bp); int bnxt_hwrm_fw_set_time(struct bnxt *); int bnxt_open_nic(struct bnxt *, bool, bool); int bnxt_half_open_nic(struct bnxt *bp); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c index ddf2f3963abe..a1a2c7a64fd5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c @@ -823,8 +823,10 @@ static int bnxt_sriov_enable(struct bnxt *bp, int *num_vfs) goto err_out2; rc = pci_enable_sriov(bp->pdev, *num_vfs); - if (rc) + if (rc) { + bnxt_ulp_sriov_cfg(bp, 0); goto err_out2; + } return 0; @@ -832,6 +834,9 @@ err_out2: /* Free the resources reserved for various VF's */ bnxt_hwrm_func_vf_resource_free(bp, *num_vfs); + /* Restore the max resources */ + bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(bp); + err_out1: bnxt_free_vf_resources(bp); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4279414bff8af9898e8c53ae6c5bc17f68ad67b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Chan Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 22:26:15 -0400 Subject: bnxt_en: Fix bnxt_reinit_after_abort() code path bnxt_reinit_after_abort() is called during ifup when a previous FW reset sequence has aborted or a previous ifup has failed after detecting FW reset. In all cases, it is safe to assume that a previous FW reset has completed and the driver may not have fully reinitialized. Prior to this patch, it is assumed that the FUNC_DRV_IF_CHANGE_RESP_FLAGS_HOT_FW_RESET_DONE flag will always be set by the firmware in bnxt_hwrm_if_change(). This may not be true if the driver has already attempted to register with the firmware. The firmware may not set the RESET_DONE flag again after the driver has registered, assuming that the driver has seen the flag already. Fix it to always go through the FW reset initialization path if the BNXT_STATE_FW_RESET_DET flag is set. This flag is always set by the driver after successfully going through bnxt_reinit_after_abort(). Fixes: 6882c36cf82e ("bnxt_en: attempt to reinitialize after aborted reset") Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi Signed-off-by: Michael Chan Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c index 7ba181ccaac2..cf9b00576ed3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -10065,7 +10065,8 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_if_change(struct bnxt *bp, bool up) if (flags & FUNC_DRV_IF_CHANGE_RESP_FLAGS_RESC_CHANGE) resc_reinit = true; - if (flags & FUNC_DRV_IF_CHANGE_RESP_FLAGS_HOT_FW_RESET_DONE) + if (flags & FUNC_DRV_IF_CHANGE_RESP_FLAGS_HOT_FW_RESET_DONE || + test_bit(BNXT_STATE_FW_RESET_DET, &bp->state)) fw_reset = true; else bnxt_remap_fw_health_regs(bp); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 619b9b1622c283cc5ca86f4c487db266a8f55dab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vikas Gupta Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 22:26:16 -0400 Subject: bnxt_en: fix livepatch query In the livepatch query fw_target BNXT_FW_SRT_PATCH is applicable for P5 chips only. Fixes: 3c4153394e2c ("bnxt_en: implement firmware live patching") Reviewed-by: Saravanan Vajravel Reviewed-by: Somnath Kotur Signed-off-by: Vikas Gupta Signed-off-by: Michael Chan Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_devlink.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_devlink.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_devlink.c index 3528ce9849e6..6b3d4f4c2a75 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_devlink.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_devlink.c @@ -979,9 +979,11 @@ static int bnxt_dl_info_get(struct devlink *dl, struct devlink_info_req *req, if (rc) return rc; - rc = bnxt_dl_livepatch_info_put(bp, req, BNXT_FW_SRT_PATCH); - if (rc) - return rc; + if (BNXT_CHIP_P5(bp)) { + rc = bnxt_dl_livepatch_info_put(bp, req, BNXT_FW_SRT_PATCH); + if (rc) + return rc; + } return bnxt_dl_livepatch_info_put(bp, req, BNXT_FW_CRT_PATCH); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 53f8c2d37efb5b03b9527ad04332df3bb889f0fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Chan Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 22:26:17 -0400 Subject: bnxt_en: Fix and simplify XDP transmit path Fix the missing length hint in the TX BD for the XDP transmit path. The length hint is required on legacy chips. Also, simplify the code by eliminating the first_buf local variable. tx_buf contains the same value. The opaque value only needs to be set on the first BD. Fix this also for correctness. Fixes: a7559bc8c17c ("bnxt: support transmit and free of aggregation buffers") Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek Signed-off-by: Michael Chan Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c index f02fe906dedb..f53387ed0167 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *bnxt_xmit_bd(struct bnxt *bp, struct xdp_buff *xdp) { struct skb_shared_info *sinfo; - struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *tx_buf, *first_buf; + struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *tx_buf; struct tx_bd *txbd; int num_frags = 0; u32 flags; @@ -43,13 +43,14 @@ struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *bnxt_xmit_bd(struct bnxt *bp, /* fill up the first buffer */ prod = txr->tx_prod; tx_buf = &txr->tx_buf_ring[prod]; - first_buf = tx_buf; tx_buf->nr_frags = num_frags; if (xdp) tx_buf->page = virt_to_head_page(xdp->data); txbd = &txr->tx_desc_ring[TX_RING(prod)][TX_IDX(prod)]; - flags = ((len) << TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | ((num_frags + 1) << TX_BD_FLAGS_BD_CNT_SHIFT); + flags = (len << TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | + ((num_frags + 1) << TX_BD_FLAGS_BD_CNT_SHIFT) | + bnxt_lhint_arr[len >> 9]; txbd->tx_bd_len_flags_type = cpu_to_le32(flags); txbd->tx_bd_opaque = prod; txbd->tx_bd_haddr = cpu_to_le64(mapping); @@ -82,7 +83,6 @@ struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *bnxt_xmit_bd(struct bnxt *bp, flags = frag_len << TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT; txbd->tx_bd_len_flags_type = cpu_to_le32(flags); - txbd->tx_bd_opaque = prod; txbd->tx_bd_haddr = cpu_to_le64(frag_mapping); len = frag_len; @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *bnxt_xmit_bd(struct bnxt *bp, prod = NEXT_TX(prod); txr->tx_prod = prod; - return first_buf; + return tx_buf; } static void __bnxt_xmit_xdp(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_tx_ring_info *txr, -- cgit v1.2.3 From ddde5412fdaa5048bbca31529d46cb8da882870c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavan Chebbi Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 22:26:18 -0400 Subject: bnxt_en: Fix bnxt_refclk_read() The upper 32-bit PHC register is not latched when reading the lower 32-bit PHC register. Current code leaves a small window where we may not read correct higher order bits if the lower order bits are just about to wrap around. This patch fixes this by reading higher order bits twice and makes sure that final value is correctly paired with its lower 32 bits. Fixes: 30e96f487f64 ("bnxt_en: Do not read the PTP PHC during chip reset") Cc: Richard Cochran Signed-off-by: Pavan Chebbi Signed-off-by: Michael Chan Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c index 562f8f68a47d..7f3c0875b6f5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c @@ -76,14 +76,23 @@ static int bnxt_refclk_read(struct bnxt *bp, struct ptp_system_timestamp *sts, u64 *ns) { struct bnxt_ptp_cfg *ptp = bp->ptp_cfg; + u32 high_before, high_now, low; if (test_bit(BNXT_STATE_IN_FW_RESET, &bp->state)) return -EIO; + high_before = readl(bp->bar0 + ptp->refclk_mapped_regs[1]); ptp_read_system_prets(sts); - *ns = readl(bp->bar0 + ptp->refclk_mapped_regs[0]); + low = readl(bp->bar0 + ptp->refclk_mapped_regs[0]); ptp_read_system_postts(sts); - *ns |= (u64)readl(bp->bar0 + ptp->refclk_mapped_regs[1]) << 32; + high_now = readl(bp->bar0 + ptp->refclk_mapped_regs[1]); + if (high_now != high_before) { + ptp_read_system_prets(sts); + low = readl(bp->bar0 + ptp->refclk_mapped_regs[0]); + ptp_read_system_postts(sts); + } + *ns = ((u64)high_now << 32) | low; + return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 61d307855eb1a2ae849da445edd5389db8a58a5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Szu Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 10:27:04 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda/realtek: fix mute/micmute LEDs for HP machines The HP ProBook 440/450 G9 and EliteBook 640/650 G9 have multiple motherboard design and they are using different subsystem ID of audio codec. Add the same quirk for other MBs. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Szu Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713022706.22892-1-jeremy.szu@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 34139c26795f..30aada1c73bf 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -9098,6 +9098,10 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x89c6, "Zbook Fury 17 G9", ALC245_FIXUP_CS35L41_SPI_2_HP_GPIO_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x89ca, "HP", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MICMUTE_VREF), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8a78, "HP Dev One", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8aa0, "HP ProBook 440 G9 (MB 8A9E)", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8aa3, "HP ProBook 450 G9 (MB 8AA1)", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8aa8, "HP EliteBook 640 G9 (MB 8AA6)", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8aab, "HP EliteBook 650 G9 (MB 8AA9)", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103e, "ASUS X540SA", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x103f, "ASUS TX300", ALC282_FIXUP_ASUS_TX300), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x106d, "Asus K53BE", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4ba5c853d7945b3855c3dcb293f7f9f019db641e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 14:33:32 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix headset mic problem for a HP machine with alc221 On a HP 288 Pro G2 MT (X9W02AV), the front mic could not be detected. In order to get it working, the pin configuration needs to be set correctly, and the ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE fixup needs to be applied. Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713063332.30095-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 30aada1c73bf..888547a2f1bc 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6901,6 +6901,7 @@ enum { ALC298_FIXUP_LENOVO_SPK_VOLUME, ALC256_FIXUP_DELL_INSPIRON_7559_SUBWOOFER, ALC269_FIXUP_ATIV_BOOK_8, + ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MODE, ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC, @@ -7837,6 +7838,16 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .chained = true, .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP }, + [ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x19, 0x01a1913c }, /* use as headset mic, without its own jack detect */ + { 0x1a, 0x01813030 }, /* use as headphone mic, without its own jack detect */ + { } + }, + .chained = true, + .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE + }, [ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { @@ -9012,6 +9023,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2335, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2336, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2337, "HP", ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC1), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x2b5e, "HP 288 Pro G2 MT", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_288PRO_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x802e, "HP Z240 SFF", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x802f, "HP Z240", ALC221_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8077, "HP", ALC256_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9b043a8f386485c74c0f8eea2c287d5bdbdf3279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meng Tang Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 17:41:33 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda/realtek - Enable the headset-mic on a Xiaomi's laptop The headset on this machine is not defined, after applying the quirk ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC, the headset-mic works well Signed-off-by: Meng Tang Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713094133.9894-1-tangmeng@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 888547a2f1bc..2f55bc43bfa9 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -9373,6 +9373,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1602, "RedmiBook", ALC255_FIXUP_XIAOMI_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1701, "XiaomiNotebook Pro", ALC298_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1901, "RedmiBook 14", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1945, "Redmi G", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1d72, 0x1947, "RedmiBook Air", ALC255_FIXUP_XIAOMI_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2074, "Intel NUC 8", ALC233_FIXUP_INTEL_NUC8_DMIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2080, "Intel NUC 8 Rugged", ALC256_FIXUP_INTEL_NUC8_RUGGED), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7dee5d7747a69aa2be41f04c6a7ecfe3ac8cdf18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:19 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data-races in proc_dou8vec_minmax(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dou8vec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dou8vec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: cb9444130662 ("sysctl: add proc_dou8vec_minmax()") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index bf9383d17e1b..b016d68da08a 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1007,13 +1007,13 @@ int proc_dou8vec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, tmp.maxlen = sizeof(val); tmp.data = &val; - val = *data; + val = READ_ONCE(*data); res = do_proc_douintvec(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos, do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv, ¶m); if (res) return res; if (write) - *data = val; + WRITE_ONCE(*data, val); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_dou8vec_minmax); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7d1025e559782b58824b36cb8ad547a69f2e4b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:20 -0700 Subject: sysctl: Fix data-races in proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies(). A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to avoid load/store-tearing. This patch changes proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/sysctl.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index b016d68da08a..d99bc3945445 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1224,9 +1224,9 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, if (jif > INT_MAX) return 1; - *valp = (int)jif; + WRITE_ONCE(*valp, (int)jif); } else { - int val = *valp; + int val = READ_ONCE(*valp); unsigned long lval; if (val < 0) { *negp = true; @@ -1294,8 +1294,8 @@ int proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write, * @ppos: the current position in the file * * Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer - * values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string. - * The values read are assumed to be in 1/1000 seconds, and + * values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string. + * The values read are assumed to be in 1/1000 seconds, and * are converted into jiffies. * * Returns 0 on success. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6f605b57f3782114e330e108ce1903ede22ec675 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:21 -0700 Subject: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_max_tw_buckets. While reading sysctl_max_tw_buckets, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c index 0ec501845cb3..47ccc343c9fb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c @@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ struct inet_timewait_sock *inet_twsk_alloc(const struct sock *sk, { struct inet_timewait_sock *tw; - if (refcount_read(&dr->tw_refcount) - 1 >= dr->sysctl_max_tw_buckets) + if (refcount_read(&dr->tw_refcount) - 1 >= + READ_ONCE(dr->sysctl_max_tw_buckets)) return NULL; tw = kmem_cache_alloc(sk->sk_prot_creator->twsk_prot->twsk_slab, -- cgit v1.2.3 From bb7bb35a63b4812da8e3aff587773678e31d23e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:22 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all. While reading sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 0f9e61d29f73..1df4aae310e0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ static enum skb_drop_reason icmp_echo(struct sk_buff *skb) net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev); /* should there be an ICMP stat for ignored echos? */ - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all)) return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; icmp_param.data.icmph = *icmp_hdr(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index cd448cdd3b38..64682a01914a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -599,6 +599,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(u8), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE }, { .procname = "icmp_echo_enable_probe", -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a2f7083cc6cb72dade9a63699ca352fad26d1cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:23 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe. While reading sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: d329ea5bd884 ("icmp: add response to RFC 8335 PROBE messages") Fixes: 1fd07f33c3ea ("ipv6: ICMPV6: add response to ICMPV6 RFC 8335 PROBE messages") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/icmp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 1df4aae310e0..c406e324c594 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ bool icmp_build_probe(struct sk_buff *skb, struct icmphdr *icmphdr) u16 ident_len; u8 status; - if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe) + if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe)) return false; /* We currently only support probing interfaces on the proxy node diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c index 61770220774e..9d92d51c4757 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c @@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) break; case ICMPV6_EXT_ECHO_REQUEST: if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all && - net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe) + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe)) icmpv6_echo_reply(skb); break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 66484bb98ed2dfa1dda37a32411483d8311ac269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:24 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts. While reading sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index c406e324c594..4b1d84d3feaa 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) */ if ((icmph->type == ICMP_ECHO || icmph->type == ICMP_TIMESTAMP) && - net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts) { + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts)) { reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_INVALID_PROTO; goto error; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 64682a01914a..cb53476a292e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(u8), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE }, { .procname = "icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses", -- cgit v1.2.3 From b04f9b7e85c7d7aecbada620e8759a662af068d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:25 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses. While reading sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 4b1d84d3feaa..0c01696c5584 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ static enum skb_drop_reason icmp_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb) * get the other vendor to fix their kit. */ - if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses && + if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses) && inet_addr_type_dev_table(net, skb->dev, iph->daddr) == RTN_BROADCAST) { net_warn_ratelimited("%pI4 sent an invalid ICMP type %u, code %u error to a broadcast: %pI4 on %s\n", &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index cb53476a292e..3122e652f3c3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -626,6 +626,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(u8), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE }, { .procname = "icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr", -- cgit v1.2.3 From d2efabce81db7eed1c98fa1a3f203f0edd738ac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:26 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr. While reading sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1c2fb7f93cb2 ("[IPV4]: Sysctl configurable icmp error source address.") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 0c01696c5584..a49b68d6b969 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ void __icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info, rcu_read_lock(); if (rt_is_input_route(rt) && - net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr) + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr)) dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, inet_iif(skb_in)); if (dev) diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 3122e652f3c3..66159d49a575 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -635,6 +635,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(u8), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE }, { .procname = "icmp_ratelimit", -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2a4eb714841f288cf51c7d942d98af6a8c6e4b01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:27 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_ratelimit. While reading sysctl_icmp_ratelimit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index a49b68d6b969..1d454cc41713 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -320,7 +320,8 @@ static bool icmpv4_xrlim_allow(struct net *net, struct rtable *rt, vif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(dst->dev); peer = inet_getpeer_v4(net->ipv4.peers, fl4->daddr, vif, 1); - rc = inet_peer_xrlim_allow(peer, net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit); + rc = inet_peer_xrlim_allow(peer, + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit)); if (peer) inet_putpeer(peer); out: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1ebcb25ad6fc3d50fca87350acf451b9a66dd31e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:28 -0700 Subject: icmp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_icmp_ratemask. While reading sysctl_icmp_ratemask, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 1d454cc41713..57c4f0d87a7a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static bool icmpv4_mask_allow(struct net *net, int type, int code) return true; /* Limit if icmp type is enabled in ratemask. */ - if (!((1 << type) & net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask)) + if (!((1 << type) & READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask))) return true; return false; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1dace014928e6e385363032d359a04dee9158af0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:29 -0700 Subject: raw: Fix a data-race around sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept. While reading sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 6897445fb194 ("net: provide a sysctl raw_l3mdev_accept for raw socket lookup with VRFs") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/raw.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/raw.h b/include/net/raw.h index 8ad8df594853..c51a635671a7 100644 --- a/include/net/raw.h +++ b/include/net/raw.h @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static inline bool raw_sk_bound_dev_eq(struct net *net, int bound_dev_if, int dif, int sdif) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV) - return inet_bound_dev_eq(!!net->ipv4.sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept, + return inet_bound_dev_eq(READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept), bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); #else return inet_bound_dev_eq(true, bound_dev_if, dif, sdif); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4785a66702f086cf2ea84bdbe6ec921f274bd9f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:30 -0700 Subject: tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_ecn. While reading sysctl_tcp_ecn, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/inline_crypto/chtls/chtls_cm.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/inline_crypto/chtls/chtls_cm.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/inline_crypto/chtls/chtls_cm.c index 4af5561cbfc5..7c760aa65540 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/inline_crypto/chtls/chtls_cm.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/inline_crypto/chtls/chtls_cm.c @@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ static void chtls_pass_accept_request(struct sock *sk, th_ecn = tcph->ece && tcph->cwr; if (th_ecn) { ect = !INET_ECN_is_not_ect(ip_dsfield); - ecn_ok = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn; + ecn_ok = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn); if ((!ect && ecn_ok) || tcp_ca_needs_ecn(sk)) inet_rsk(oreq)->ecn_ok = 1; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c index f33c31dd7366..b387c4835155 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ bool cookie_ecn_ok(const struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, if (!ecn_ok) return false; - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn) + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn)) return true; return dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_ECN); diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 66159d49a575..5e308c1715af 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -676,6 +676,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(u8), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO, }, { .procname = "tcp_ecn_fallback", diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 2e2a9ece9af2..3ec4edc37313 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6729,7 +6729,7 @@ static void tcp_ecn_create_request(struct request_sock *req, ect = !INET_ECN_is_not_ect(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield); ecn_ok_dst = dst_feature(dst, DST_FEATURE_ECN_MASK); - ecn_ok = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn || ecn_ok_dst; + ecn_ok = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn) || ecn_ok_dst; if (((!ect || th->res1) && ecn_ok) || tcp_ca_needs_ecn(listen_sk) || (ecn_ok_dst & DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA) || diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 1c054431e358..3dc17551ce25 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static void tcp_ecn_send_syn(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); bool bpf_needs_ecn = tcp_bpf_ca_needs_ecn(sk); - bool use_ecn = sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn == 1 || + bool use_ecn = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn) == 1 || tcp_ca_needs_ecn(sk) || bpf_needs_ecn; if (!use_ecn) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 12b8d9ca7e678abc48195294494f1815b555d658 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:31 -0700 Subject: tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback. While reading sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 492135557dc0 ("tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 5e308c1715af..108fd86f2718 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -685,6 +685,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(u8), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, }, { .procname = "ip_dynaddr", diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 3dc17551ce25..11aa0ab10bba 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static void tcp_ecn_send_syn(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) static void tcp_ecn_clear_syn(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback) + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback)) /* tp->ecn_flags are cleared at a later point in time when * SYN ACK is ultimatively being received. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From e49e4aff7ec19b2d0d0957ee30e93dade57dab9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:32 -0700 Subject: ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_dynaddr. While reading sysctl_ip_dynaddr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 2 +- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index 0e58001f8580..b3a534ed0e7c 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ ip_autobind_reuse - BOOLEAN option should only be set by experts. Default: 0 -ip_dynaddr - BOOLEAN +ip_dynaddr - INTEGER If set non-zero, enables support for dynamic addresses. If set to a non-zero value larger than 1, a kernel log message will be printed when dynamic address rewriting diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index 93da9f783bec..ac67f6b4ec70 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ static int inet_sk_reselect_saddr(struct sock *sk) if (new_saddr == old_saddr) return 0; - if (sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr > 1) { + if (READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr) > 1) { pr_info("%s(): shifting inet->saddr from %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__, &old_saddr, &new_saddr); } @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ int inet_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk) * Other protocols have to map its equivalent state to TCP_SYN_SENT. * DCCP maps its DCCP_REQUESTING state to TCP_SYN_SENT. -acme */ - if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr || + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr) || sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT || (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK) || (err = inet_sk_reselect_saddr(sk)) != 0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bdf00bf24bef9be1ca641a6390fd5487873e0d2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 17:15:33 -0700 Subject: nexthop: Fix data-races around nexthop_compat_mode. While reading nexthop_compat_mode, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 4f80116d3df3 ("net: ipv4: add sysctl for nexthop api compatibility mode") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c index a57ba23571c9..16dbd5075284 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c @@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ int fib_dump_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq, int event, goto nla_put_failure; if (nexthop_is_blackhole(fi->nh)) rtm->rtm_type = RTN_BLACKHOLE; - if (!fi->fib_net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode) + if (!READ_ONCE(fi->fib_net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode)) goto offload; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c index e459a391e607..853a75a8fbaf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c +++ b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c @@ -1858,7 +1858,7 @@ static void __remove_nexthop_fib(struct net *net, struct nexthop *nh) /* __ip6_del_rt does a release, so do a hold here */ fib6_info_hold(f6i); ipv6_stub->ip6_del_rt(net, f6i, - !net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode); + !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode)); } } @@ -2361,7 +2361,8 @@ out: if (!rc) { nh_base_seq_inc(net); nexthop_notify(RTM_NEWNEXTHOP, new_nh, &cfg->nlinfo); - if (replace_notify && net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode) + if (replace_notify && + READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode)) nexthop_replace_notify(net, new_nh, &cfg->nlinfo); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 828355710c57..916417944ec8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -5741,7 +5741,7 @@ static int rt6_fill_node(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, if (nexthop_is_blackhole(rt->nh)) rtm->rtm_type = RTN_BLACKHOLE; - if (net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode && + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode) && rt6_fill_node_nexthop(skb, rt->nh, &nh_flags) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 49b9f431ff0d845a36be0b3ede35ec324f2e5fee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liang He Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:14:17 +0800 Subject: net: ftgmac100: Hold reference returned by of_get_child_by_name() In ftgmac100_probe(), we should hold the refernece returned by of_get_child_by_name() and use it to call of_node_put() for reference balance. Fixes: 39bfab8844a0 ("net: ftgmac100: Add support for DT phy-handle property") Signed-off-by: Liang He Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c index 5231818943c6..c03663785a8d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c @@ -1764,6 +1764,19 @@ cleanup_clk: return rc; } +static bool ftgmac100_has_child_node(struct device_node *np, const char *name) +{ + struct device_node *child_np = of_get_child_by_name(np, name); + bool ret = false; + + if (child_np) { + ret = true; + of_node_put(child_np); + } + + return ret; +} + static int ftgmac100_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct resource *res; @@ -1883,7 +1896,7 @@ static int ftgmac100_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) /* Display what we found */ phy_attached_info(phy); - } else if (np && !of_get_child_by_name(np, "mdio")) { + } else if (np && !ftgmac100_has_child_node(np, "mdio")) { /* Support legacy ASPEED devicetree descriptions that decribe a * MAC with an embedded MDIO controller but have no "mdio" * child node. Automatically scan the MDIO bus for available -- cgit v1.2.3 From 23aa6d5088e3bd65de77c5c307237b9937f8b48a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 17:42:25 +0300 Subject: net: stmmac: fix leaks in probe These two error paths should clean up before returning. Fixes: 2bb4b98b60d7 ("net: stmmac: Add Ingenic SoCs MAC support.") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ingenic.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ingenic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ingenic.c index 9a6d819b84ae..378b4dd826bb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ingenic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ingenic.c @@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ static int ingenic_mac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) mac->tx_delay = tx_delay_ps * 1000; } else { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Invalid TX clock delay: %dps\n", tx_delay_ps); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_remove_config_dt; } } @@ -283,7 +284,8 @@ static int ingenic_mac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) mac->rx_delay = rx_delay_ps * 1000; } else { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Invalid RX clock delay: %dps\n", rx_delay_ps); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_remove_config_dt; } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 057cc8c9005e23330e368afd18839ce3764dc0af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hayes Wang Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:31:11 +0800 Subject: r8152: fix accessing unset transport header A warning is triggered by commit 66e4c8d95008 ("net: warn if transport header was not set"). The warning is harmless, because the value from skb_transport_offset() is only used for skb_is_gso() is true or the skb->ip_summed is equal to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. Fixes: 66e4c8d95008 ("net: warn if transport header was not set") Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c index 7389d6ef8569..b082819509e1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c @@ -2156,7 +2156,7 @@ static inline void rtl_rx_vlan_tag(struct rx_desc *desc, struct sk_buff *skb) } static int r8152_tx_csum(struct r8152 *tp, struct tx_desc *desc, - struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len, u32 transport_offset) + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len) { u32 mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size; u32 opts1, opts2 = 0; @@ -2167,6 +2167,8 @@ static int r8152_tx_csum(struct r8152 *tp, struct tx_desc *desc, opts1 = len | TX_FS | TX_LS; if (mss) { + u32 transport_offset = (u32)skb_transport_offset(skb); + if (transport_offset > GTTCPHO_MAX) { netif_warn(tp, tx_err, tp->netdev, "Invalid transport offset 0x%x for TSO\n", @@ -2197,6 +2199,7 @@ static int r8152_tx_csum(struct r8152 *tp, struct tx_desc *desc, opts1 |= transport_offset << GTTCPHO_SHIFT; opts2 |= min(mss, MSS_MAX) << MSS_SHIFT; } else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { + u32 transport_offset = (u32)skb_transport_offset(skb); u8 ip_protocol; if (transport_offset > TCPHO_MAX) { @@ -2260,7 +2263,6 @@ static int r8152_tx_agg_fill(struct r8152 *tp, struct tx_agg *agg) struct tx_desc *tx_desc; struct sk_buff *skb; unsigned int len; - u32 offset; skb = __skb_dequeue(&skb_head); if (!skb) @@ -2276,9 +2278,7 @@ static int r8152_tx_agg_fill(struct r8152 *tp, struct tx_agg *agg) tx_data = tx_agg_align(tx_data); tx_desc = (struct tx_desc *)tx_data; - offset = (u32)skb_transport_offset(skb); - - if (r8152_tx_csum(tp, tx_desc, skb, skb->len, offset)) { + if (r8152_tx_csum(tp, tx_desc, skb, skb->len)) { r8152_csum_workaround(tp, skb, &skb_head); continue; } @@ -2759,9 +2759,9 @@ rtl8152_features_check(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, { u32 mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size; int max_offset = mss ? GTTCPHO_MAX : TCPHO_MAX; - int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb); - if ((mss || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) && offset > max_offset) + if ((mss || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) && + skb_transport_offset(skb) > max_offset) features &= ~(NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK | NETIF_F_GSO_MASK); else if ((skb->len + sizeof(struct tx_desc)) > agg_buf_sz) features &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b11e5f6a3a5c170d16c2cf0b1d8053bbf1f6b7de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Bowler Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: net: sunhme: output link status with a single print. This driver currently prints the link status using four separate printk calls, which these days gets presented to the user as four distinct messages, not exactly ideal: [ 32.582778] eth0: Link is up using [ 32.582828] internal [ 32.582837] transceiver at [ 32.582888] 100Mb/s, Full Duplex. Restructure the display_link_mode function to use a single netdev_info call to present all this information as a single message, which is much nicer: [ 33.640143] hme 0000:00:01.1 eth0: Link is up using internal transceiver at 100Mb/s, Full Duplex. The display_forced_link_mode function has a similar structure, so adjust it in a similar fashion. Signed-off-by: Nick Bowler Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c | 43 +++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c index 77e5dffb558f..8594ee839628 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/sunhme.c @@ -545,43 +545,24 @@ static int try_next_permutation(struct happy_meal *hp, void __iomem *tregs) static void display_link_mode(struct happy_meal *hp, void __iomem *tregs) { - printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Link is up using ", hp->dev->name); - if (hp->tcvr_type == external) - printk("external "); - else - printk("internal "); - printk("transceiver at "); hp->sw_lpa = happy_meal_tcvr_read(hp, tregs, MII_LPA); - if (hp->sw_lpa & (LPA_100HALF | LPA_100FULL)) { - if (hp->sw_lpa & LPA_100FULL) - printk("100Mb/s, Full Duplex.\n"); - else - printk("100Mb/s, Half Duplex.\n"); - } else { - if (hp->sw_lpa & LPA_10FULL) - printk("10Mb/s, Full Duplex.\n"); - else - printk("10Mb/s, Half Duplex.\n"); - } + + netdev_info(hp->dev, + "Link is up using %s transceiver at %dMb/s, %s Duplex.\n", + hp->tcvr_type == external ? "external" : "internal", + hp->sw_lpa & (LPA_100HALF | LPA_100FULL) ? 100 : 10, + hp->sw_lpa & (LPA_100FULL | LPA_10FULL) ? "Full" : "Half"); } static void display_forced_link_mode(struct happy_meal *hp, void __iomem *tregs) { - printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Link has been forced up using ", hp->dev->name); - if (hp->tcvr_type == external) - printk("external "); - else - printk("internal "); - printk("transceiver at "); hp->sw_bmcr = happy_meal_tcvr_read(hp, tregs, MII_BMCR); - if (hp->sw_bmcr & BMCR_SPEED100) - printk("100Mb/s, "); - else - printk("10Mb/s, "); - if (hp->sw_bmcr & BMCR_FULLDPLX) - printk("Full Duplex.\n"); - else - printk("Half Duplex.\n"); + + netdev_info(hp->dev, + "Link has been forced up using %s transceiver at %dMb/s, %s Duplex.\n", + hp->tcvr_type == external ? "external" : "internal", + hp->sw_bmcr & BMCR_SPEED100 ? 100 : 10, + hp->sw_bmcr & BMCR_FULLDPLX ? "Full" : "Half"); } static int set_happy_link_modes(struct happy_meal *hp, void __iomem *tregs) -- cgit v1.2.3 From af16df54b89dee72df253abc5e7b5e8a6d16c11c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Coiby Xu Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 15:21:11 +0800 Subject: ima: force signature verification when CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG is configured Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA arch specific policy is configured. Fixes: 99d5cadfde2b ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE") Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/kexec.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 11 ++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h index ce6536f1d269..475683cd67f1 100644 --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -452,6 +452,12 @@ static inline int kexec_crash_loaded(void) { return 0; } #define kexec_in_progress false #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +void set_kexec_sig_enforced(void); +#else +static inline void set_kexec_sig_enforced(void) {} +#endif + #endif /* !defined(__ASSEBMLY__) */ #endif /* LINUX_KEXEC_H */ diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 145321a5e798..f9261c07b048 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ #include #include "kexec_internal.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE); + +void set_kexec_sig_enforced(void) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +} +#endif + static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image); /* @@ -159,7 +168,7 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image) image->kernel_buf_len); if (ret) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { + if (sig_enforce) { pr_notice("Enforced kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); return ret; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c index 71786d01946f..9db66fe310d4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)) set_module_sig_enforced(); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)) + set_kexec_sig_enforced(); return sb_arch_rules; } return NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 067d2521874135267e681c19d42761c601d503d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianglei Nie Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 09:10:37 +0800 Subject: ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto() On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak. Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie Fixes: 6d94809af6b0 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index a7206cc1d7d1..64499056648a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ out_array: crypto_free_shash(ima_algo_array[i].tfm); } + kfree(ima_algo_array); out: crypto_free_shash(ima_shash_tfm); return rc; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5750676b64a561f7ec920d7c6ba130fc9c7378f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Chinner Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 17:49:15 +1000 Subject: fs/remap: constrain dedupe of EOF blocks MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If dedupe of an EOF block is not constrainted to match against only other EOF blocks with the same EOF offset into the block, it can match against any other block that has the same matching initial bytes in it, even if the bytes beyond EOF in the source file do not match. Fix this by constraining the EOF block matching to only match against other EOF blocks that have identical EOF offsets and data. This allows "whole file dedupe" to continue to work without allowing eof blocks to randomly match against partial full blocks with the same data. Reported-by: Ansgar Lößer Fixes: 1383a7ed6749 ("vfs: check file ranges before cloning files") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/a7c93559-4ba1-df2f-7a85-55a143696405@tu-darmstadt.de/ Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/remap_range.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/remap_range.c b/fs/remap_range.c index e112b5424cdb..881a306ee247 100644 --- a/fs/remap_range.c +++ b/fs/remap_range.c @@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static int generic_remap_checks(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, * Otherwise, make sure the count is also block-aligned, having * already confirmed the starting offsets' block alignment. */ - if (pos_in + count == size_in) { + if (pos_in + count == size_in && + (!(remap_flags & REMAP_FILE_DEDUP) || pos_out + count == size_out)) { bcount = ALIGN(size_in, bs) - pos_in; } else { if (!IS_ALIGNED(count, bs)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a57a8400075bc5287c5c877702c68aeae2a033d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ansgar Lößer Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:51:44 +0200 Subject: vf/remap: return the amount of bytes actually deduplicated MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When using the FIDEDUPRANGE ioctl, in case of success the requested size is returned. In some cases this might not be the actual amount of bytes deduplicated. This change modifies vfs_dedupe_file_range() to report the actual amount of bytes deduplicated, instead of the requested amount. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/5548ef63-62f9-4f46-5793-03165ceccacc@tu-darmstadt.de/ Reported-by: Ansgar Lößer Reported-by: Max Schlecht Reported-by: Björn Scheuermann Cc: Dave Chinner Cc: Darrick J Wong Signed-off-by: Ansgar Lößer Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/remap_range.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/remap_range.c b/fs/remap_range.c index 881a306ee247..5e0d97e02f96 100644 --- a/fs/remap_range.c +++ b/fs/remap_range.c @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ int vfs_dedupe_file_range(struct file *file, struct file_dedupe_range *same) else if (deduped < 0) info->status = deduped; else - info->bytes_deduped = len; + info->bytes_deduped = deduped; next_fdput: fdput(dst_fd); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 32f319183c439b239294cb2d70ada3564c4c7c39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 00:11:42 -0500 Subject: smb3: workaround negprot bug in some Samba servers Mount can now fail to older Samba servers due to a server bug handling padding at the end of the last negotiate context (negotiate contexts typically are rounded up to 8 bytes by adding padding if needed). This server bug can be avoided by switching the order of negotiate contexts, placing a negotiate context at the end that does not require padding (prior to the recent netname context fix this was the case on the client). Fixes: 73130a7b1ac9 ("smb3: fix empty netname context on secondary channels") Reported-by: Julian Sikorski Tested-by: Julian Sikorski Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 12b4dddaedb0..c705de32e225 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -571,10 +571,6 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req, *total_len += ctxt_len; pneg_ctxt += ctxt_len; - build_posix_ctxt((struct smb2_posix_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt); - *total_len += sizeof(struct smb2_posix_neg_context); - pneg_ctxt += sizeof(struct smb2_posix_neg_context); - /* * secondary channels don't have the hostname field populated * use the hostname field in the primary channel instead @@ -586,9 +582,14 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req, hostname); *total_len += ctxt_len; pneg_ctxt += ctxt_len; - neg_context_count = 4; - } else /* second channels do not have a hostname */ neg_context_count = 3; + } else + neg_context_count = 2; + + build_posix_ctxt((struct smb2_posix_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt); + *total_len += sizeof(struct smb2_posix_neg_context); + pneg_ctxt += sizeof(struct smb2_posix_neg_context); + neg_context_count++; if (server->compress_algorithm) { build_compression_ctxt((struct smb2_compression_capabilities_context *) -- cgit v1.2.3 From ebe41da5d47ac0fff877e57bd14c54dccf168827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Íñigo Huguet Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 08:26:42 +0200 Subject: sfc: fix use after free when disabling sriov MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Use after free is detected by kfence when disabling sriov. What was read after being freed was vf->pci_dev: it was freed from pci_disable_sriov and later read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vports, called from efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching. Set the pointer to NULL at release time to not trying to read it later. Reproducer and dmesg log (note that kfence doesn't detect it every time): $ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs $ echo 0 > /sys/class/net/enp65s0f0np0/device/sriov_numvfs BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc] Use-after-free read at 0x00000000ff3c1ba5 (in kfence-#224): efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching+0x82/0x170 [sfc] efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x38/0x70 [sfc] efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc] sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae kfence-#224: 0x00000000edb8ef95-0x00000000671f5ce1, size=2792, cache=kmalloc-4k allocated by task 6771 on cpu 10 at 3137.860196s: pci_alloc_dev+0x21/0x60 pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x2a2/0x320 sriov_enable+0x212/0x3e0 efx_ef10_sriov_configure+0x67/0x80 [sfc] efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc] sriov_numvfs_store+0xba/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae freed by task 6771 on cpu 12 at 3170.991309s: device_release+0x34/0x90 kobject_cleanup+0x3a/0x130 pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xd9/0x120 sriov_disable+0x30/0xe0 efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable+0x57/0x70 [sfc] efx_pci_sriov_configure+0x24/0x40 [sfc] sriov_numvfs_store+0xfe/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: 3c5eb87605e85 ("sfc: create vports for VFs and assign random MAC addresses") Reported-by: Yanghang Liu Signed-off-by: Íñigo Huguet Acked-by: Martin Habets Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712062642.6915-1-ihuguet@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c index 7f5aa4a8c451..92550c7e85ce 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10_sriov.c @@ -408,8 +408,9 @@ fail1: static int efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable(struct efx_nic *efx, bool force) { struct pci_dev *dev = efx->pci_dev; + struct efx_ef10_nic_data *nic_data = efx->nic_data; unsigned int vfs_assigned = pci_vfs_assigned(dev); - int rc = 0; + int i, rc = 0; if (vfs_assigned && !force) { netif_info(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "VFs are assigned to guests; " @@ -417,10 +418,13 @@ static int efx_ef10_pci_sriov_disable(struct efx_nic *efx, bool force) return -EBUSY; } - if (!vfs_assigned) + if (!vfs_assigned) { + for (i = 0; i < efx->vf_count; i++) + nic_data->vf[i].pci_dev = NULL; pci_disable_sriov(dev); - else + } else { rc = -EBUSY; + } efx_ef10_sriov_free_vf_vswitching(efx); efx->vf_count = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From df8386d13ea280d55beee1b95f61a59234a3798b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 19:58:35 +0200 Subject: seg6: fix skb checksum evaluation in SRH encapsulation/insertion Support for SRH encapsulation and insertion was introduced with commit 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels"), through the seg6_do_srh_encap() and seg6_do_srh_inline() functions, respectively. The former encapsulates the packet in an outer IPv6 header along with the SRH, while the latter inserts the SRH between the IPv6 header and the payload. Then, the headers are initialized/updated according to the operating mode (i.e., encap/inline). Finally, the skb checksum is calculated to reflect the changes applied to the headers. The IPv6 payload length ('payload_len') is not initialized within seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}() but is deferred in seg6_do_srh(), i.e. the caller of seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}(). However, this operation invalidates the skb checksum, since the 'payload_len' is updated only after the checksum is evaluated. To solve this issue, the initialization of the IPv6 payload length is moved from seg6_do_srh() directly into the seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}() functions and before the skb checksum update takes place. Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220705190727.69d532417be7438b15404ee1@uniroma2.it Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c index d64855010948..e756ba705fd9 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c @@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, int proto) } #endif + hdr->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); + skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, hdr, tot_len); return 0; @@ -241,6 +243,8 @@ int seg6_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh) } #endif + hdr->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); + skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, hdr, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + hdrlen); return 0; @@ -302,7 +306,6 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb) break; } - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); nf_reset_ct(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f048880fc77058d864aff5c674af7918b30f312a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 19:58:36 +0200 Subject: seg6: fix skb checksum in SRv6 End.B6 and End.B6.Encaps behaviors The SRv6 End.B6 and End.B6.Encaps behaviors rely on functions seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to, respectively: i) encapsulate the packet within an outer IPv6 header with the specified Segment Routing Header (SRH); ii) insert the specified SRH directly after the IPv6 header of the packet. This patch removes the initialization of the IPv6 header payload length from the input_action_end_b6{_encap}() functions, as it is now handled properly by seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to avoid corruption of the skb checksum. Fixes: 140f04c33bbc ("ipv6: sr: implement several seg6local actions") Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/ipv6/seg6_local.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c index 98a34287439c..2cd4a8d3b30a 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c @@ -826,7 +826,6 @@ static int input_action_end_b6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct seg6_local_lwt *slwt) if (err) goto drop; - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); seg6_lookup_nexthop(skb, NULL, 0); @@ -858,7 +857,6 @@ static int input_action_end_b6_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, if (err) goto drop; - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); seg6_lookup_nexthop(skb, NULL, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4889fbd98deaf243c3baadc54e296d71c6af1eb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Mayer Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 19:58:37 +0200 Subject: seg6: bpf: fix skb checksum in bpf_push_seg6_encap() Both helper functions bpf_lwt_seg6_action() and bpf_lwt_push_encap() use the bpf_push_seg6_encap() to encapsulate the packet in an IPv6 with Segment Routing Header (SRH) or insert an SRH between the IPv6 header and the payload. To achieve this result, such helper functions rely on bpf_push_seg6_encap() which, in turn, leverages seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to perform the required operation (i.e. encap/inline). This patch removes the initialization of the IPv6 header payload length from bpf_push_seg6_encap(), as it is now handled properly by seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to prevent corruption of the skb checksum. Fixes: fe94cc290f53 ("bpf: Add IPv6 Segment Routing helpers") Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/core/filter.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 5d16d66727fc..2a6a0b0ce43e 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -6158,7 +6158,6 @@ static int bpf_push_seg6_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 type, void *hdr, u32 len if (err) return err; - ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); skb_set_transport_header(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); return seg6_lookup_nexthop(skb, NULL, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3 From ada74c5539eba06cf8b47d068f92e0b3963a9a6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Íñigo Huguet Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:21:16 +0200 Subject: sfc: fix kernel panic when creating VF MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When creating VFs a kernel panic can happen when calling to efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf. When releasing a DMA coherent buffer, sometimes, I don't know in what specific circumstances, it has to unmap memory with vunmap. It is disallowed to do that in IRQ context or with BH disabled. Otherwise, we hit this line in vunmap, causing the crash: BUG_ON(in_interrupt()); This patch reenables BH to release the buffer. Log messages when the bug is hit: kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2727! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 PID: 1462 Comm: NetworkManager Kdump: loaded Tainted: G I --------- --- 5.14.0-119.el9.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/06WXJT, BIOS 2.8.2 08/27/2020 RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x2e/0x30 ...skip... Call Trace: __iommu_dma_free+0x96/0x100 efx_nic_free_buffer+0x2b/0x40 [sfc] efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf+0x14a/0x1c0 [sfc] efx_ef10_update_stats_vf+0x18/0x40 [sfc] efx_start_all+0x15e/0x1d0 [sfc] efx_net_open+0x5a/0xe0 [sfc] __dev_open+0xe7/0x1a0 __dev_change_flags+0x1d7/0x240 dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60 ...skip... Fixes: d778819609a2 ("sfc: DMA the VF stats only when requested") Reported-by: Ma Yuying Signed-off-by: Íñigo Huguet Acked-by: Edward Cree Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713092116.21238-1-ihuguet@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c index 186cb28c03bd..8b62ce21aff3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c @@ -1932,7 +1932,10 @@ static int efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf(struct efx_nic *efx) efx_update_sw_stats(efx, stats); out: + /* releasing a DMA coherent buffer with BH disabled can panic */ + spin_unlock_bh(&efx->stats_lock); efx_nic_free_buffer(efx, &stats_buf); + spin_lock_bh(&efx->stats_lock); return rc; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0f33250760384e05c36466b0a2f92f3c6007ba92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Chia-Lin Kao (AceLan)" Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 19:12:23 +0800 Subject: net: atlantic: remove deep parameter on suspend/resume functions Below commit claims that atlantic NIC requires to reset the device on pm op, and had set the deep to true for all suspend/resume functions. commit 1809c30b6e5a ("net: atlantic: always deep reset on pm op, fixing up my null deref regression") So, we could remove deep parameter on suspend/resume functions without any functional change. Fixes: 1809c30b6e5a ("net: atlantic: always deep reset on pm op, fixing up my null deref regression") Signed-off-by: Chia-Lin Kao (AceLan) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713111224.1535938-1-acelan.kao@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- .../net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c | 24 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c index 831833911a52..dbd5263130f9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static void aq_pci_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev) } } -static int aq_suspend_common(struct device *dev, bool deep) +static int aq_suspend_common(struct device *dev) { struct aq_nic_s *nic = pci_get_drvdata(to_pci_dev(dev)); @@ -392,17 +392,15 @@ static int aq_suspend_common(struct device *dev, bool deep) if (netif_running(nic->ndev)) aq_nic_stop(nic); - if (deep) { - aq_nic_deinit(nic, !nic->aq_hw->aq_nic_cfg->wol); - aq_nic_set_power(nic); - } + aq_nic_deinit(nic, !nic->aq_hw->aq_nic_cfg->wol); + aq_nic_set_power(nic); rtnl_unlock(); return 0; } -static int atl_resume_common(struct device *dev, bool deep) +static int atl_resume_common(struct device *dev) { struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); struct aq_nic_s *nic; @@ -415,10 +413,8 @@ static int atl_resume_common(struct device *dev, bool deep) pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D0); pci_restore_state(pdev); - if (deep) { - /* Reinitialize Nic/Vecs objects */ - aq_nic_deinit(nic, !nic->aq_hw->aq_nic_cfg->wol); - } + /* Reinitialize Nic/Vecs objects */ + aq_nic_deinit(nic, !nic->aq_hw->aq_nic_cfg->wol); if (netif_running(nic->ndev)) { ret = aq_nic_init(nic); @@ -444,22 +440,22 @@ err_exit: static int aq_pm_freeze(struct device *dev) { - return aq_suspend_common(dev, true); + return aq_suspend_common(dev); } static int aq_pm_suspend_poweroff(struct device *dev) { - return aq_suspend_common(dev, true); + return aq_suspend_common(dev); } static int aq_pm_thaw(struct device *dev) { - return atl_resume_common(dev, true); + return atl_resume_common(dev); } static int aq_pm_resume_restore(struct device *dev) { - return atl_resume_common(dev, true); + return atl_resume_common(dev); } static const struct dev_pm_ops aq_pm_ops = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2e15c51fefaffaf9f72255eaef4fada05055e4c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Chia-Lin Kao (AceLan)" Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 19:12:24 +0800 Subject: net: atlantic: remove aq_nic_deinit() when resume aq_nic_deinit() has been called while suspending, so we don't have to call it again on resume. Actually, call it again leads to another hang issue when resuming from S3. Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992345] Call Trace: Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992346] Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992348] aq_nic_deinit+0xb4/0xd0 [atlantic] Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992356] aq_pm_thaw+0x7f/0x100 [atlantic] Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992362] pci_pm_resume+0x5c/0x90 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992366] ? pci_pm_thaw+0x80/0x80 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992368] dpm_run_callback+0x4e/0x120 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992371] device_resume+0xad/0x200 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992373] async_resume+0x1e/0x40 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992374] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992377] process_one_work+0x220/0x3c0 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992380] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3f0 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992382] ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992384] kthread+0x12a/0x150 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992386] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992387] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992391] Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992392] ---[ end trace 1ec8c79604ed5e0d ]--- Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992394] PM: dpm_run_callback(): pci_pm_resume+0x0/0x90 returns -110 Jul 8 03:09:44 u-Precision-7865-Tower kernel: [ 5910.992397] atlantic 0000:02:00.0: PM: failed to resume async: error -110 Fixes: 1809c30b6e5a ("net: atlantic: always deep reset on pm op, fixing up my null deref regression") Signed-off-by: Chia-Lin Kao (AceLan) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713111224.1535938-2-acelan.kao@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c index dbd5263130f9..8647125d60ae 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_pci_func.c @@ -413,9 +413,6 @@ static int atl_resume_common(struct device *dev) pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D0); pci_restore_state(pdev); - /* Reinitialize Nic/Vecs objects */ - aq_nic_deinit(nic, !nic->aq_hw->aq_nic_cfg->wol); - if (netif_running(nic->ndev)) { ret = aq_nic_init(nic); if (ret) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8030aa3ce12e3b9d47afa62344c601ed508c2d9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wang Kefeng Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 09:03:46 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9207/1: amba: fix refcount underflow if amba_device_add() fails "ARM: 9192/1: amba: fix memory leak in amba_device_try_add()" leads to a refcount underflow if amba_device_add() fails, which called by of_amba_device_create(), the of_amba_device_create() already exists the error handling, so amba_put_device() only need to be added into amba_deferred_retry(). Fixes: 7719a68b2fa4 ("ARM: 9192/1: amba: fix memory leak in amba_device_try_add()") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- drivers/amba/bus.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/amba/bus.c b/drivers/amba/bus.c index 0e3ed5eb367b..0cb20324da16 100644 --- a/drivers/amba/bus.c +++ b/drivers/amba/bus.c @@ -493,13 +493,8 @@ static int amba_device_try_add(struct amba_device *dev, struct resource *parent) goto skip_probe; ret = amba_read_periphid(dev); - if (ret) { - if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER) { - amba_device_put(dev); - goto err_out; - } + if (ret) goto err_release; - } skip_probe: ret = device_add(&dev->dev); @@ -546,6 +541,7 @@ static int amba_deferred_retry(void) continue; list_del_init(&ddev->node); + amba_device_put(ddev->dev); kfree(ddev); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 29589ca09a74cfc0c50ad002e298bf4b8e69e0bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 09:49:24 +0100 Subject: ARM: 9208/1: entry: add .ltorg directive to keep literals in range LKP reports a build issue on Clang, related to a literal load of __current issued through the ldr_va macro. This turns out to be due to the fact that group relocations are disabled when CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST=y, which means that the ldr_va macro resolves to a pair of LDR instructions, the first one being a literal load issued too far from its literal pool. Due to the introduction of a couple of new uses of this macro in commit 508074607c7b95b2 ("ARM: 9195/1: entry: avoid explicit literal loads"), the literal pools end up getting rearranged in a way that causes the literal for __current to go out of range. Let's fix this up by putting a .ltorg directive in a suitable place in the code. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202205290805.1vZLAr36-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: 508074607c7b95b2 ("ARM: 9195/1: entry: avoid explicit literal loads") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) --- arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S index 7aa3ded4af92..6a447ac67d80 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S @@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ local_restart: b ret_fast_syscall #endif ENDPROC(vector_swi) + .ltorg /* * This is the really slow path. We're going to be doing -- cgit v1.2.3 From 747c14307214b55dbd8250e1ab44cad8305756f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:48:52 +0200 Subject: ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop When a nexthop is added, without a gw address, the default scope was set to 'host'. Thus, when a source address is selected, 127.0.0.1 may be chosen but rejected when the route is used. When using a route without a nexthop id, the scope can be configured in the route, thus the problem doesn't exist. To explain more deeply: when a user creates a nexthop, it cannot specify the scope. To create it, the function nh_create_ipv4() calls fib_check_nh() with scope set to 0. fib_check_nh() calls fib_check_nh_nongw() wich was setting scope to 'host'. Then, nh_create_ipv4() calls fib_info_update_nhc_saddr() with scope set to 'host'. The src addr is chosen before the route is inserted. When a 'standard' route (ie without a reference to a nexthop) is added, fib_create_info() calls fib_info_update_nhc_saddr() with the scope set by the user. iproute2 set the scope to 'link' by default. Here is a way to reproduce the problem: ip netns add foo ip -n foo link set lo up ip netns add bar ip -n bar link set lo up sleep 1 ip -n foo link add name eth0 type dummy ip -n foo link set eth0 up ip -n foo address add 192.168.0.1/24 dev eth0 ip -n foo link add name veth0 type veth peer name veth1 netns bar ip -n foo link set veth0 up ip -n bar link set veth1 up ip -n bar address add 192.168.1.1/32 dev veth1 ip -n bar route add default dev veth1 ip -n foo nexthop add id 1 dev veth0 ip -n foo route add 192.168.1.1 nhid 1 Try to get/use the route: > $ ip -n foo route get 192.168.1.1 > RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument > $ ip netns exec foo ping -c1 192.168.1.1 > ping: connect: Invalid argument Try without nexthop group (iproute2 sets scope to 'link' by dflt): ip -n foo route del 192.168.1.1 ip -n foo route add 192.168.1.1 dev veth0 Try to get/use the route: > $ ip -n foo route get 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.1 dev veth0 src 192.168.0.1 uid 0 > cache > $ ip netns exec foo ping -c1 192.168.1.1 > PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data. > 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.039 ms > > --- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics --- > 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms > rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.039/0.039/0.039/0.000 ms CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 597cfe4fc339 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops") Reported-by: Edwin Brossette Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713114853.29406-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c index 16dbd5075284..d9fdcbae16ee 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c @@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ static int fib_check_nh_nongw(struct net *net, struct fib_nh *nh, nh->fib_nh_dev = in_dev->dev; dev_hold_track(nh->fib_nh_dev, &nh->fib_nh_dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC); - nh->fib_nh_scope = RT_SCOPE_HOST; + nh->fib_nh_scope = RT_SCOPE_LINK; if (!netif_carrier_ok(nh->fib_nh_dev)) nh->fib_nh_flags |= RTNH_F_LINKDOWN; err = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From cd72e61bad145a0968df85193dcf1261cb66c4c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:48:53 +0200 Subject: selftests/net: test nexthop without gw This test implement the scenario described in the commit "ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop". The test configures a nexthop object with an output device only (no gateway address) and a route that uses this nexthop. The goal is to check if the kernel selects a valid source address. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220712095545.10947-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com/ Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713114853.29406-2-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthop_nongw.sh | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthop_nongw.sh diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile index ddad703ace34..db05b3764b77 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ TEST_PROGS += udpgso_bench.sh fib_rule_tests.sh msg_zerocopy.sh psock_snd.sh TEST_PROGS += udpgro_bench.sh udpgro.sh test_vxlan_under_vrf.sh reuseport_addr_any.sh TEST_PROGS += test_vxlan_fdb_changelink.sh so_txtime.sh ipv6_flowlabel.sh TEST_PROGS += tcp_fastopen_backup_key.sh fcnal-test.sh l2tp.sh traceroute.sh -TEST_PROGS += fin_ack_lat.sh fib_nexthop_multiprefix.sh fib_nexthops.sh +TEST_PROGS += fin_ack_lat.sh fib_nexthop_multiprefix.sh fib_nexthops.sh fib_nexthop_nongw.sh TEST_PROGS += altnames.sh icmp.sh icmp_redirect.sh ip6_gre_headroom.sh TEST_PROGS += route_localnet.sh TEST_PROGS += reuseaddr_ports_exhausted.sh diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthop_nongw.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthop_nongw.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..b7b928b38ce4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_nexthop_nongw.sh @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# ns: h1 | ns: h2 +# 192.168.0.1/24 | +# eth0 | +# | 192.168.1.1/32 +# veth0 <---|---> veth1 +# Validate source address selection for route without gateway + +PAUSE_ON_FAIL=no +VERBOSE=0 +ret=0 + +################################################################################ +# helpers + +log_test() +{ + local rc=$1 + local expected=$2 + local msg="$3" + + if [ ${rc} -eq ${expected} ]; then + printf "TEST: %-60s [ OK ]\n" "${msg}" + nsuccess=$((nsuccess+1)) + else + ret=1 + nfail=$((nfail+1)) + printf "TEST: %-60s [FAIL]\n" "${msg}" + if [ "${PAUSE_ON_FAIL}" = "yes" ]; then + echo + echo "hit enter to continue, 'q' to quit" + read a + [ "$a" = "q" ] && exit 1 + fi + fi + + [ "$VERBOSE" = "1" ] && echo +} + +run_cmd() +{ + local cmd="$*" + local out + local rc + + if [ "$VERBOSE" = "1" ]; then + echo "COMMAND: $cmd" + fi + + out=$(eval $cmd 2>&1) + rc=$? + if [ "$VERBOSE" = "1" -a -n "$out" ]; then + echo "$out" + fi + + [ "$VERBOSE" = "1" ] && echo + + return $rc +} + +################################################################################ +# config +setup() +{ + ip netns add h1 + ip -n h1 link set lo up + ip netns add h2 + ip -n h2 link set lo up + + # Add a fake eth0 to support an ip address + ip -n h1 link add name eth0 type dummy + ip -n h1 link set eth0 up + ip -n h1 address add 192.168.0.1/24 dev eth0 + + # Configure veths (same @mac, arp off) + ip -n h1 link add name veth0 type veth peer name veth1 netns h2 + ip -n h1 link set veth0 up + + ip -n h2 link set veth1 up + + # Configure @IP in the peer netns + ip -n h2 address add 192.168.1.1/32 dev veth1 + ip -n h2 route add default dev veth1 + + # Add a nexthop without @gw and use it in a route + ip -n h1 nexthop add id 1 dev veth0 + ip -n h1 route add 192.168.1.1 nhid 1 +} + +cleanup() +{ + ip netns del h1 2>/dev/null + ip netns del h2 2>/dev/null +} + +trap cleanup EXIT + +################################################################################ +# main + +while getopts :pv o +do + case $o in + p) PAUSE_ON_FAIL=yes;; + v) VERBOSE=1;; + esac +done + +cleanup +setup + +run_cmd ip -netns h1 route get 192.168.1.1 +log_test $? 0 "nexthop: get route with nexthop without gw" +run_cmd ip netns exec h1 ping -c1 192.168.1.1 +log_test $? 0 "nexthop: ping through nexthop without gw" + +exit $ret -- cgit v1.2.3 From d11219ad53dcf61ced53ca60fe0c4a8d34393e6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 12:36:50 -0700 Subject: amdgpu: disable powerpc support for the newer display engine The DRM_AMD_DC_DCN display engine support (Raven, Navi, and newer) has not been building cleanly on powerpc and causes link errors due to mixing hard- and soft-float object files: powerpc64-linux-ld: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml/display_mode_lib.o uses hard float, drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn31/dcn31_resource.o uses soft float powerpc64-linux-ld: failed to merge target specific data of file drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn31/dcn31_resource.o [..] and while patches are floating around, it's not exactly obvious what is going on. The problem bisects to commit 41b7a347bf14 ("powerpc: Book3S 64-bit outline-only KASAN support") but that is probably more about changing config variables than the fundamental cause. Despite the bisection result, a more directly related commit seems to be 26f4712aedbd ("drm/amd/display: move FPU related code from dcn31 to dml/dcn31 folder"). It's probably a combination of the two. This has been going on since the merge window, without any final word. So instead of blindly applying patches that may or may not be the right thing, let's disable this for now. As Michael Ellerman says: "IIUIC this code was never enabled on ppc before, so disabling it seems like a reasonable fix to get the build clean" and once we have more actual feedback (and find any potential users) we can always re-enable it with the patch that fixes the issues and back-port as necessary. Fixes: 41b7a347bf14 ("powerpc: Book3S 64-bit outline-only KASAN support") Fixes: 26f4712aedbd ("drm/amd/display: move FPU related code from dcn31 to dml/dcn31 folder") Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220606153910.GA1773067@roeck-us.net/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220618232737.2036722-1-linux@roeck-us.net/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220713050724.GA2471738@roeck-us.net/ Acked-by: Michael Ellerman Acked-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/Kconfig b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/Kconfig index b4029c0d5d8c..0ba0598eba20 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/Kconfig @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ config DRM_AMD_DC bool "AMD DC - Enable new display engine" default y select SND_HDA_COMPONENT if SND_HDA_CORE - select DRM_AMD_DC_DCN if (X86 || PPC64) && !(KCOV_INSTRUMENT_ALL && KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS) + select DRM_AMD_DC_DCN if X86 && !(KCOV_INSTRUMENT_ALL && KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS) help Choose this option if you want to use the new display engine support for AMDGPU. This adds required support for Vega and -- cgit v1.2.3 From 94e8100678889ab428e68acadf042de723f094b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 15:53:22 +0200 Subject: xen/netback: avoid entering xenvif_rx_next_skb() with an empty rx queue xenvif_rx_next_skb() is expecting the rx queue not being empty, but in case the loop in xenvif_rx_action() is doing multiple iterations, the availability of another skb in the rx queue is not being checked. This can lead to crashes: [40072.537261] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080 [40072.537407] IP: xenvif_rx_skb+0x23/0x590 [xen_netback] [40072.537534] PGD 0 P4D 0 [40072.537644] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [40072.537749] CPU: 0 PID: 12505 Comm: v1-c40247-q2-gu Not tainted 4.12.14-122.121-default #1 SLE12-SP5 [40072.537867] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 11/23/2021 [40072.537999] task: ffff880433b38100 task.stack: ffffc90043d40000 [40072.538112] RIP: e030:xenvif_rx_skb+0x23/0x590 [xen_netback] [40072.538217] RSP: e02b:ffffc90043d43de0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [40072.538319] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90043cd7cd0 RCX: 00000000000000f7 [40072.538430] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffc90043d43df8 [40072.538531] RBP: 000000000000003f R08: 000077ff80000000 R09: 0000000000000008 [40072.538644] R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 00000000000008f6 R12: ffffc90043ce2708 [40072.538745] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90043d43ed0 R15: ffff88043ea748c0 [40072.538861] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880484600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [40072.538988] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [40072.539088] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 0000000407ac8000 CR4: 0000000000040660 [40072.539211] Call Trace: [40072.539319] xenvif_rx_action+0x71/0x90 [xen_netback] [40072.539429] xenvif_kthread_guest_rx+0x14a/0x29c [xen_netback] Fix that by stopping the loop in case the rx queue becomes empty. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98f6d57ced73 ("xen-netback: process guest rx packets in batches") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713135322.19616-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c index dbac4c03d21a..a0335407be42 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif_queue *queue) queue->rx_copy.completed = &completed_skbs; while (xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available(queue) && + !skb_queue_empty(&queue->rx_queue) && work_done < RX_BATCH_SIZE) { xenvif_rx_skb(queue); work_done++; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 51f1c31f8ba713f70f1659e7c91e837fe5f5554f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 17:31:41 -0500 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add an additional maintainer to the AMD XGBE driver Add Shyam Sundar S K as an additional maintainer to support the AMD XGBE network device driver. Cc: Shyam Sundar S K Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/db367f24089c2bbbcd1cec8e21af49922017a110.1657751501.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 926bdf8ac096..3a8eccdd4db8 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -1040,6 +1040,7 @@ F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/amd/ AMD XGBE DRIVER M: Tom Lendacky +M: "Shyam Sundar S K" L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Supported F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/amd/amd-seattle-xgbe*.dtsi -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d8c51b25a235e283e37750943bbf356ef187230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tariq Toukan Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 10:07:54 +0300 Subject: net/tls: Check for errors in tls_device_init Add missing error checks in tls_device_init. Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure") Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714070754.1428-1-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/tls.h | 4 ++-- net/tls/tls_device.c | 4 ++-- net/tls/tls_main.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h index 8017f1703447..8bd938f98bdd 100644 --- a/include/net/tls.h +++ b/include/net/tls.h @@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ int tls_sw_fallback_init(struct sock *sk, struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info); #ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE -void tls_device_init(void); +int tls_device_init(void); void tls_device_cleanup(void); void tls_device_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk); int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx); @@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static inline bool tls_is_sk_rx_device_offloaded(struct sock *sk) return tls_get_ctx(sk)->rx_conf == TLS_HW; } #else -static inline void tls_device_init(void) {} +static inline int tls_device_init(void) { return 0; } static inline void tls_device_cleanup(void) {} static inline int diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c index ec6f4b699a2b..ce827e79c66a 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c @@ -1419,9 +1419,9 @@ static struct notifier_block tls_dev_notifier = { .notifier_call = tls_dev_event, }; -void __init tls_device_init(void) +int __init tls_device_init(void) { - register_netdevice_notifier(&tls_dev_notifier); + return register_netdevice_notifier(&tls_dev_notifier); } void __exit tls_device_cleanup(void) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c index 2ffede463e4a..d80ab3d1764e 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c @@ -1048,7 +1048,12 @@ static int __init tls_register(void) if (err) return err; - tls_device_init(); + err = tls_device_init(); + if (err) { + unregister_pernet_subsys(&tls_proc_ops); + return err; + } + tcp_register_ulp(&tcp_tls_ulp_ops); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 656bd03a2cd853e7c7c4e08968ad8c0ea993737d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianyu Yuan Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 10:19:15 +0200 Subject: nfp: flower: configure tunnel neighbour on cmsg rx nfp_tun_write_neigh() function will configure a tunnel neighbour when calling nfp_tun_neigh_event_handler() or nfp_flower_cmsg_process_one_rx() (with no tunnel neighbour type) from firmware. When configuring IP on physical port as a tunnel endpoint, no operation will be performed after receiving the cmsg mentioned above. Therefore, add a progress to configure tunnel neighbour in this case. v2: Correct format of fixes tag. Fixes: f1df7956c11f ("nfp: flower: rework tunnel neighbour configuration") Signed-off-by: Tianyu Yuan Reviewed-by: Louis Peens Reviewed-by: Baowen Zheng Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714081915.148378-1-simon.horman@corigine.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- .../net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/tunnel_conf.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/tunnel_conf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/tunnel_conf.c index 6bf3ec448e7e..97dcf8db7ed2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/tunnel_conf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/flower/tunnel_conf.c @@ -447,7 +447,8 @@ void nfp_tun_unlink_and_update_nn_entries(struct nfp_app *app, static void nfp_tun_write_neigh(struct net_device *netdev, struct nfp_app *app, - void *flow, struct neighbour *neigh, bool is_ipv6) + void *flow, struct neighbour *neigh, bool is_ipv6, + bool override) { bool neigh_invalid = !(neigh->nud_state & NUD_VALID) || neigh->dead; size_t neigh_size = is_ipv6 ? sizeof(struct nfp_tun_neigh_v6) : @@ -546,6 +547,13 @@ nfp_tun_write_neigh(struct net_device *netdev, struct nfp_app *app, if (nn_entry->flow) list_del(&nn_entry->list_head); kfree(nn_entry); + } else if (nn_entry && !neigh_invalid && override) { + mtype = is_ipv6 ? NFP_FLOWER_CMSG_TYPE_TUN_NEIGH_V6 : + NFP_FLOWER_CMSG_TYPE_TUN_NEIGH; + nfp_tun_link_predt_entries(app, nn_entry); + nfp_flower_xmit_tun_conf(app, mtype, neigh_size, + nn_entry->payload, + GFP_ATOMIC); } spin_unlock_bh(&priv->predt_lock); @@ -610,7 +618,7 @@ nfp_tun_neigh_event_handler(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, dst_release(dst); } - nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow6, n, true); + nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow6, n, true, false); #else return NOTIFY_DONE; #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ @@ -633,7 +641,7 @@ nfp_tun_neigh_event_handler(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, ip_rt_put(rt); } - nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow4, n, false); + nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow4, n, false, false); } #else return NOTIFY_DONE; @@ -676,7 +684,7 @@ void nfp_tunnel_request_route_v4(struct nfp_app *app, struct sk_buff *skb) ip_rt_put(rt); if (!n) goto fail_rcu_unlock; - nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow, n, false); + nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow, n, false, true); neigh_release(n); rcu_read_unlock(); return; @@ -718,7 +726,7 @@ void nfp_tunnel_request_route_v6(struct nfp_app *app, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!n) goto fail_rcu_unlock; - nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow, n, true); + nfp_tun_write_neigh(n->dev, app, &flow, n, true, true); neigh_release(n); rcu_read_unlock(); return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 097da1a44d1aef15739214fecf8f4c63792bb665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 11:46:00 -0700 Subject: um: Replace to_phys() and to_virt() with less generic function names MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The UML function names to_virt() and to_phys() are exposed by UML headers, and are very generic and may be defined by drivers. As it turns out, commit 9409c9b6709e ("pmem: refactor pmem_clear_poison()") did exactly that. This results in build errors such as the following when trying to build um:allmodconfig: drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c: In function ‘pmem_dax_zero_page_range’: ./arch/um/include/asm/page.h:105:20: error: too few arguments to function ‘to_phys’ 105 | #define __pa(virt) to_phys((void *) (unsigned long) (virt)) | ^~~~~~~ Use less generic function names for the um specific to_phys() and to_virt() functions to fix the problem and to avoid similar problems in the future. Fixes: 9409c9b6709e ("pmem: refactor pmem_clear_poison()") Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/um/include/asm/page.h | 4 ++-- arch/um/include/shared/mem.h | 4 ++-- arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/page.h b/arch/um/include/asm/page.h index 95af12e82a32..cdbd9653aa14 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/asm/page.h +++ b/arch/um/include/asm/page.h @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ extern unsigned long uml_physmem; * casting is the right thing, but 32-bit UML can't have 64-bit virtual * addresses */ -#define __pa(virt) to_phys((void *) (unsigned long) (virt)) -#define __va(phys) to_virt((unsigned long) (phys)) +#define __pa(virt) uml_to_phys((void *) (unsigned long) (virt)) +#define __va(phys) uml_to_virt((unsigned long) (phys)) #define phys_to_pfn(p) ((p) >> PAGE_SHIFT) #define pfn_to_phys(pfn) PFN_PHYS(pfn) diff --git a/arch/um/include/shared/mem.h b/arch/um/include/shared/mem.h index 4862c91d4213..98aacd544108 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/shared/mem.h +++ b/arch/um/include/shared/mem.h @@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ extern int phys_mapping(unsigned long phys, unsigned long long *offset_out); extern unsigned long uml_physmem; -static inline unsigned long to_phys(void *virt) +static inline unsigned long uml_to_phys(void *virt) { return(((unsigned long) virt) - uml_physmem); } -static inline void *to_virt(unsigned long phys) +static inline void *uml_to_virt(unsigned long phys) { return((void *) uml_physmem + phys); } diff --git a/arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c b/arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c index 87d3129e7362..c316c993a949 100644 --- a/arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c +++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static int userspace_tramp(void *stack) signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_IGN); - fd = phys_mapping(to_phys(__syscall_stub_start), &offset); + fd = phys_mapping(uml_to_phys(__syscall_stub_start), &offset); addr = mmap64((void *) STUB_CODE, UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE, fd, offset); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int userspace_tramp(void *stack) } if (stack != NULL) { - fd = phys_mapping(to_phys(stack), &offset); + fd = phys_mapping(uml_to_phys(stack), &offset); addr = mmap((void *) STUB_DATA, UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED, fd, offset); @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ int copy_context_skas0(unsigned long new_stack, int pid) struct stub_data *data = (struct stub_data *) current_stack; struct stub_data *child_data = (struct stub_data *) new_stack; unsigned long long new_offset; - int new_fd = phys_mapping(to_phys((void *)new_stack), &new_offset); + int new_fd = phys_mapping(uml_to_phys((void *)new_stack), &new_offset); /* * prepare offset and fd of child's stack as argument for parent's -- cgit v1.2.3 From db886979683a8360ced9b24ab1125ad0c4d2cf76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 08:24:37 -0700 Subject: x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Clang warns: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:58:21: error: section attribute is specified on redeclared variable [-Werror,-Wsection] DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); ^ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:283:12: note: previous declaration is here extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; ^ 1 error generated. The declaration should be using DECLARE_PER_CPU instead so all attributes stay in sync. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index bb05ed4f46bd..10a3bfc1eb23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32 @@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; -extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; +DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); -- cgit v1.2.3