From 4aed9c46afb80164401143aa0fdcfe3798baa9d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 20:21:21 -0500 Subject: nfsd4: fix bad bounds checking A number of spots in the xdr decoding follow a pattern like n = be32_to_cpup(p++); READ_BUF(n + 4); where n is a u32. The only bounds checking is done in READ_BUF itself, but since it's checking (n + 4), it won't catch cases where n is very large, (u32)(-4) or higher. I'm not sure exactly what the consequences are, but we've seen crashes soon after. Instead, just break these up into two READ_BUF()s. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index d6ef0955a979..1600ec470ce7 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -1072,8 +1072,9 @@ nfsd4_decode_rename(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_rename *rename READ_BUF(4); rename->rn_snamelen = be32_to_cpup(p++); - READ_BUF(rename->rn_snamelen + 4); + READ_BUF(rename->rn_snamelen); SAVEMEM(rename->rn_sname, rename->rn_snamelen); + READ_BUF(4); rename->rn_tnamelen = be32_to_cpup(p++); READ_BUF(rename->rn_tnamelen); SAVEMEM(rename->rn_tname, rename->rn_tnamelen); @@ -1155,13 +1156,14 @@ nfsd4_decode_setclientid(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_setclient READ_BUF(8); setclientid->se_callback_prog = be32_to_cpup(p++); setclientid->se_callback_netid_len = be32_to_cpup(p++); - - READ_BUF(setclientid->se_callback_netid_len + 4); + READ_BUF(setclientid->se_callback_netid_len); SAVEMEM(setclientid->se_callback_netid_val, setclientid->se_callback_netid_len); + READ_BUF(4); setclientid->se_callback_addr_len = be32_to_cpup(p++); - READ_BUF(setclientid->se_callback_addr_len + 4); + READ_BUF(setclientid->se_callback_addr_len); SAVEMEM(setclientid->se_callback_addr_val, setclientid->se_callback_addr_len); + READ_BUF(4); setclientid->se_callback_ident = be32_to_cpup(p++); DECODE_TAIL; @@ -1835,8 +1837,9 @@ nfsd4_decode_compound(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp) READ_BUF(4); argp->taglen = be32_to_cpup(p++); - READ_BUF(argp->taglen + 8); + READ_BUF(argp->taglen); SAVEMEM(argp->tag, argp->taglen); + READ_BUF(8); argp->minorversion = be32_to_cpup(p++); argp->opcnt = be32_to_cpup(p++); max_reply += 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(argp->taglen) << 2); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8edf4b028818336ccff7dff5ef60b3d81fac5380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kinglong Mee Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 22:36:42 +0800 Subject: nfsd: Fix a memory leak when meeting unsupported state_protect_how4 Remember free allocated client when meeting unsupported state protect how. Fixes: 50c7b948adbd ("nfsd: minor consolidation of mach_cred handling code") Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index c484a2b6cd10..9d20c6a54734 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2408,7 +2408,8 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, default: /* checked by xdr code */ WARN_ON_ONCE(1); case SP4_SSV: - return nfserr_encr_alg_unsupp; + status = nfserr_encr_alg_unsupp; + goto out_nolock; } /* Cases below refer to rfc 5661 section 18.35.4: */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4ce85c8cf8a8ecfff932642cf20677d7efc90ad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 13:05:27 -0500 Subject: nfsd: Update NFS server comments related to RDMA support The server does indeed now support NFSv4.1 on RDMA transports. It does not support shifting an RDMA-capable TCP transport (such as iWARP) to RDMA mode. Reported-by: Shirley Ma Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 5 ++--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 9d20c6a54734..d4b0b789ea24 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2711,10 +2711,9 @@ nfsd4_create_session(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, goto out_free_conn; } status = nfs_ok; - /* - * We do not support RDMA or persistent sessions - */ + /* Persistent sessions are not supported */ cr_ses->flags &= ~SESSION4_PERSIST; + /* Upshifting from TCP to RDMA is not supported */ cr_ses->flags &= ~SESSION4_RDMA; init_session(rqstp, new, conf, cr_ses); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 1600ec470ce7..aa87954b4af2 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -3063,7 +3063,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_encode_bind_conn_to_session(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, bcts->sessionid.data, NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(bcts->dir); - /* Sorry, we do not yet support RDMA over 4.1: */ + /* Upshifting from TCP to RDMA is not supported */ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); } return nfserr; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4500632f60fa0d85e4101c374898cdf9b7b0cfac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 13:06:02 -0500 Subject: nfsd: Lower NFSv4.1 callback message size limit The maximum size of a backchannel message on RPC-over-RDMA depends on the connection's inline threshold. Today that threshold is typically 1024 bytes, making the maximum message size 996 bytes. The Linux server's CREATE_SESSION operation checks that the size of callback Calls can be as large as 1044 bytes, to accommodate RPCSEC_GSS. Thus CREATE_SESSION fails if a client advertises the true message size maximum of 996 bytes. But the server's backchannel currently does not support RPCSEC_GSS. The actual maximum size it needs is much smaller. It is safe to reduce the limit to enable NFSv4.1 on RDMA backchannel operation. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h | 7 +++++++ net/sunrpc/auth_null.c | 4 ++-- net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c | 6 ++---- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index d4b0b789ea24..0462eeddfff9 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2587,21 +2587,26 @@ static __be32 check_forechannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca, struct nfs return nfs_ok; } +/* + * Server's NFSv4.1 backchannel support is AUTH_SYS-only for now. + * These are based on similar macros in linux/sunrpc/msg_prot.h . + */ +#define RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS \ + (RPC_CALLHDRSIZE + 2 * (2 + UNX_CALLSLACK)) + +#define RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS \ + (RPC_REPHDRSIZE + (2 + NUL_REPLYSLACK)) + #define NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ ((NFS4_enc_cb_recall_sz + \ - RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH) * sizeof(__be32)) + RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS) * sizeof(__be32)) #define NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ ((NFS4_dec_cb_recall_sz + \ - RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH) * sizeof(__be32)) + RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS) * \ + sizeof(__be32)) static __be32 check_backchannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca) { ca->headerpadsz = 0; - /* - * These RPC_MAX_HEADER macros are overkill, especially since we - * don't even do gss on the backchannel yet. But this is still - * less than 1k. Tighten up this estimate in the unlikely event - * it turns out to be a problem for some client: - */ if (ca->maxreq_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ) return nfserr_toosmall; if (ca->maxresp_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ) diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h index 1ecf13e148b8..6a241a277249 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h @@ -20,11 +20,18 @@ #include #include +/* + * Maximum size of AUTH_NONE authentication information, in XDR words. + */ +#define NUL_CALLSLACK (4) +#define NUL_REPLYSLACK (2) + /* * Size of the nodename buffer. RFC1831 specifies a hard limit of 255 bytes, * but Linux hostnames are actually limited to __NEW_UTS_LEN bytes. */ #define UNX_MAXNODENAME __NEW_UTS_LEN +#define UNX_CALLSLACK (21 + XDR_QUADLEN(UNX_MAXNODENAME)) struct rpcsec_gss_info; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c index c2a2b584a056..8d9eb4d5ddd8 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ const struct rpc_authops authnull_ops = { static struct rpc_auth null_auth = { - .au_cslack = 4, - .au_rslack = 2, + .au_cslack = NUL_CALLSLACK, + .au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK, .au_ops = &authnull_ops, .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL, .au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0), diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c index 548240dd15fc..0d3dd364c22f 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c @@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ struct unx_cred { }; #define uc_uid uc_base.cr_uid -#define UNX_WRITESLACK (21 + XDR_QUADLEN(UNX_MAXNODENAME)) - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif @@ -228,8 +226,8 @@ const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = { static struct rpc_auth unix_auth = { - .au_cslack = UNX_WRITESLACK, - .au_rslack = 2, /* assume AUTH_NULL verf */ + .au_cslack = UNX_CALLSLACK, + .au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK, .au_ops = &authunix_ops, .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX, .au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0f1738a10bf03f6406b7b071c2a76b22e687d9c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2016 15:26:36 -0800 Subject: nfsd4: resfh unused in nfsd4_secinfo Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 4cba7865f496..410516e9867f 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -864,12 +864,10 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_secinfo(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_secinfo *secinfo) { - struct svc_fh resfh; struct svc_export *exp; struct dentry *dentry; __be32 err; - fh_init(&resfh, NFS4_FHSIZE); err = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFDIR, NFSD_MAY_EXEC); if (err) return err; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2f6fc056e899bd0144a08da5cacaecbe8997cd74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2016 16:36:21 -0800 Subject: nfsd: fix deadlock secinfo+readdir compound nfsd_lookup_dentry exits with the parent filehandle locked. fh_put also unlocks if necessary (nfsd filehandle locking is probably too lenient), so it gets unlocked eventually, but if the following op in the compound needs to lock it again, we can deadlock. A fuzzer ran into this; normal clients don't send a secinfo followed by a readdir in the same compound. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 410516e9867f..40b912407d51 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -876,6 +876,7 @@ nfsd4_secinfo(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, &exp, &dentry); if (err) return err; + fh_unlock(&cstate->current_fh); if (d_really_is_negative(dentry)) { exp_put(exp); err = nfserr_noent; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 956ccef3c97662c4ba07da9a19e4e62d3e286a8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sudip Mukherjee Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 15:40:03 +0530 Subject: nfsd: recover: fix memory leak nfsd4_cltrack_grace_start() will allocate the memory for grace_start but when we returned due to error we missed freeing it. Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs/nfsd') diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c index dc8ebecf5618..a8d6a83d4216 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c @@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ nfsd4_umh_cltrack_init(struct net *net) /* XXX: The usermode helper s not working in container yet. */ if (net != &init_net) { pr_warn("NFSD: attempt to initialize umh client tracking in a container ignored.\n"); + kfree(grace_start); return -EINVAL; } -- cgit v1.2.3