From b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2021 11:27:59 +0200 Subject: xfrm: xfrm_state_mtu should return at least 1280 for ipv6 Jianwen reported that IPv6 Interoperability tests are failing in an IPsec case where one of the links between the IPsec peers has an MTU of 1280. The peer generates a packet larger than this MTU, the router replies with a "Packet too big" message indicating an MTU of 1280. When the peer tries to send another large packet, xfrm_state_mtu returns 1280 - ipsec_overhead, which causes ip6_setup_cork to fail with EINVAL. We can fix this by forcing xfrm_state_mtu to return IPV6_MIN_MTU when IPv6 is used. After going through IPsec, the packet will then be fragmented to obey the actual network's PMTU, just before leaving the host. Currently, TFC padding is capped to PMTU - overhead to avoid fragementation: after padding and encapsulation, we still fit within the PMTU. That behavior is preserved in this patch. Fixes: 91657eafb64b ("xfrm: take net hdr len into account for esp payload size calculation") Reported-by: Jianwen Ji Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index c58a6d4eb610..6232a5f048bd 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -1546,6 +1546,7 @@ void xfrm_sad_getinfo(struct net *net, struct xfrmk_sadinfo *si); void xfrm_spd_getinfo(struct net *net, struct xfrmk_spdinfo *si); u32 xfrm_replay_seqhi(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq); int xfrm_init_replay(struct xfrm_state *x); +u32 __xfrm_state_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu); u32 xfrm_state_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu); int __xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, bool init_replay, bool offload); int xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6e1e89418a5ccdfb325aed538307c2f9dba6ef51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shaokun Zhang Date: Sat, 29 May 2021 15:52:02 +0800 Subject: xfrm: Remove the repeated declaration Function 'xfrm_parse_spi' is declared twice, so remove the repeated declaration. Cc: Steffen Klassert Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 6232a5f048bd..b30623678430 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -1571,7 +1571,6 @@ int xfrm4_rcv_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type); int xfrm4_transport_finish(struct sk_buff *skb, int async); int xfrm4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb); -int xfrm_parse_spi(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 nexthdr, __be32 *spi, __be32 *seq); static inline int xfrm4_rcv_spi(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2f99619820c2269534eb2c0cde44870313c6d353 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Magnus Karlsson Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 11:22:55 +0200 Subject: xsk: Fix missing validation for skb and unaligned mode MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Fix a missing validation of a Tx descriptor when executing in skb mode and the umem is in unaligned mode. A descriptor could point to a buffer straddling the end of the umem, thus effectively tricking the kernel to read outside the allowed umem region. This could lead to a kernel crash if that part of memory is not mapped. In zero-copy mode, the descriptor validation code rejects such descriptors by checking a bit in the DMA address that tells us if the next page is physically contiguous or not. For the last page in the umem, this bit is not set, therefore any descriptor pointing to a packet straddling this last page boundary will be rejected. However, the skb path does not use this bit since it copies out data and can do so to two different pages. (It also does not have the array of DMA address, so it cannot even store this bit.) The code just returned that the packet is always physically contiguous. But this is unfortunately also returned for the last page in the umem, which means that packets that cross the end of the umem are being allowed, which they should not be. Fix this by introducing a check for this in the SKB path only, not penalizing the zero-copy path. Fixes: 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Björn Töpel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210617092255.3487-1-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com --- include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h b/include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h index eaa8386dbc63..7a9a23e7a604 100644 --- a/include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h +++ b/include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h @@ -147,11 +147,16 @@ static inline bool xp_desc_crosses_non_contig_pg(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool, { bool cross_pg = (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + len > PAGE_SIZE; - if (pool->dma_pages_cnt && cross_pg) { + if (likely(!cross_pg)) + return false; + + if (pool->dma_pages_cnt) { return !(pool->dma_pages[addr >> PAGE_SHIFT] & XSK_NEXT_PG_CONTIG_MASK); } - return false; + + /* skb path */ + return addr + len > pool->addrs_cnt; } static inline u64 xp_aligned_extract_addr(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool, u64 addr) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9f2470fbc4cb4583c080bb729a998933ba61aca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 19:13:35 -0700 Subject: skmsg: Improve udp_bpf_recvmsg() accuracy I tried to reuse sk_msg_wait_data() for different protocols, but it turns out it can not be simply reused. For example, UDP actually uses two queues to receive skb: udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue and sk->sk_receive_queue. So we have to check both of them to know whether we have received any packet. Also, UDP does not lock the sock during BH Rx path, it makes no sense for its ->recvmsg() to lock the sock. It is always possible for ->recvmsg() to be called before packets actually arrive in the receive queue, we just use best effort to make it accurate here. Fixes: 1f5be6b3b063 ("udp: Implement udp_bpf_recvmsg() for sockmap") Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com --- include/linux/skmsg.h | 2 -- net/core/skmsg.c | 23 ----------------------- net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h index aba0f0f429be..e3d080c299f6 100644 --- a/include/linux/skmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h @@ -126,8 +126,6 @@ int sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from, struct sk_msg *msg, u32 bytes); int sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from, struct sk_msg *msg, u32 bytes); -int sk_msg_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, int flags, - long timeo, int *err); int sk_msg_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int flags); diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 43ce17a6a585..f9a81b314e4c 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -399,29 +399,6 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter); -int sk_msg_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, int flags, - long timeo, int *err) -{ - DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); - int ret = 0; - - if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) - return 1; - - if (!timeo) - return ret; - - add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); - sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); - ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, - !list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg) || - !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue), &wait); - sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); - remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_msg_wait_data); - /* Receive sk_msg from psock->ingress_msg to @msg. */ int sk_msg_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int flags) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index ad9d17923fc5..bb49b52d7be8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -163,6 +163,28 @@ static bool tcp_bpf_stream_read(const struct sock *sk) return !empty; } +static int tcp_msg_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, int flags, + long timeo, int *err) +{ + DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); + int ret = 0; + + if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) + return 1; + + if (!timeo) + return ret; + + add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); + ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, + !list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg) || + !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue), &wait); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); + remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); + return ret; +} + static int tcp_bpf_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int nonblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { @@ -188,7 +210,7 @@ msg_bytes_ready: long timeo; timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); - data = sk_msg_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err); + data = tcp_msg_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err); if (data) { if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) goto msg_bytes_ready; diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c index 954c4591a6fd..565a70040c57 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c @@ -21,6 +21,45 @@ static int sk_udp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, return udp_prot.recvmsg(sk, msg, len, noblock, flags, addr_len); } +static bool udp_sk_has_data(struct sock *sk) +{ + return !skb_queue_empty(&udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue) || + !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue); +} + +static bool psock_has_data(struct sk_psock *psock) +{ + return !skb_queue_empty(&psock->ingress_skb) || + !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock); +} + +#define udp_msg_has_data(__sk, __psock) \ + ({ udp_sk_has_data(__sk) || psock_has_data(__psock); }) + +static int udp_msg_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, int flags, + long timeo, int *err) +{ + DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); + int ret = 0; + + if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) + return 1; + + if (!timeo) + return ret; + + add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); + ret = udp_msg_has_data(sk, psock); + if (!ret) { + wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeo); + ret = udp_msg_has_data(sk, psock); + } + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); + remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); + return ret; +} + static int udp_bpf_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int nonblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { @@ -34,8 +73,7 @@ static int udp_bpf_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, if (unlikely(!psock)) return sk_udp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); - lock_sock(sk); - if (sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) { + if (!psock_has_data(psock)) { ret = sk_udp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); goto out; } @@ -47,9 +85,9 @@ msg_bytes_ready: long timeo; timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); - data = sk_msg_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err); + data = udp_msg_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err); if (data) { - if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) + if (psock_has_data(psock)) goto msg_bytes_ready; ret = sk_udp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); goto out; @@ -62,7 +100,6 @@ msg_bytes_ready: } ret = copied; out: - release_sock(sk); sk_psock_put(sk, psock); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 89837eb4b2463c556a123437f242d6c2bc62ce81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yunsheng Lin Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 09:04:14 +0800 Subject: net: sched: add barrier to ensure correct ordering for lockless qdisc The spin_trylock() was assumed to contain the implicit barrier needed to ensure the correct ordering between STATE_MISSED setting/clearing and STATE_MISSED checking in commit a90c57f2cedd ("net: sched: fix packet stuck problem for lockless qdisc"). But it turns out that spin_trylock() only has load-acquire semantic, for strongly-ordered system(like x86), the compiler barrier implicitly contained in spin_trylock() seems enough to ensure the correct ordering. But for weakly-orderly system (like arm64), the store-release semantic is needed to ensure the correct ordering as clear_bit() and test_bit() is store operation, see queued_spin_lock(). So add the explicit barrier to ensure the correct ordering for the above case. Fixes: a90c57f2cedd ("net: sched: fix packet stuck problem for lockless qdisc") Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index 1e625519ae96..57710303908c 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -163,6 +163,12 @@ static inline bool qdisc_run_begin(struct Qdisc *qdisc) if (spin_trylock(&qdisc->seqlock)) goto nolock_empty; + /* Paired with smp_mb__after_atomic() to make sure + * STATE_MISSED checking is synchronized with clearing + * in pfifo_fast_dequeue(). + */ + smp_mb__before_atomic(); + /* If the MISSED flag is set, it means other thread has * set the MISSED flag before second spin_trylock(), so * we can return false here to avoid multi cpus doing @@ -180,6 +186,12 @@ static inline bool qdisc_run_begin(struct Qdisc *qdisc) */ set_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); + /* spin_trylock() only has load-acquire semantic, so use + * smp_mb__after_atomic() to ensure STATE_MISSED is set + * before doing the second spin_trylock(). + */ + smp_mb__after_atomic(); + /* Retry again in case other CPU may not see the new flag * after it releases the lock at the end of qdisc_run_end(). */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f7fe5121127e037b86592ba42ce36515ea0e3f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Tenart Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 11:38:28 +0200 Subject: net: macsec: fix the length used to copy the key for offloading The key length used when offloading macsec to Ethernet or PHY drivers was set to MACSEC_KEYID_LEN (16), which is an issue as: - This was never meant to be the key length. - The key length can be > 16. Fix this by using MACSEC_MAX_KEY_LEN to store the key (the max length accepted in uAPI) and secy->key_len to copy it. Fixes: 3cf3227a21d1 ("net: macsec: hardware offloading infrastructure") Reported-by: Lior Nahmanson Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/macsec.c | 4 ++-- include/net/macsec.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c index 92425e1fd70c..93dc48b9b4f2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c @@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) ctx.sa.rx_sa = rx_sa; ctx.secy = secy; memcpy(ctx.sa.key, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]), - MACSEC_KEYID_LEN); + secy->key_len); err = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_add_rxsa, &ctx); if (err) @@ -2061,7 +2061,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) ctx.sa.tx_sa = tx_sa; ctx.secy = secy; memcpy(ctx.sa.key, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]), - MACSEC_KEYID_LEN); + secy->key_len); err = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_add_txsa, &ctx); if (err) diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h index 52874cdfe226..d6fa6b97f6ef 100644 --- a/include/net/macsec.h +++ b/include/net/macsec.h @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ struct macsec_context { struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc; struct { unsigned char assoc_num; - u8 key[MACSEC_KEYID_LEN]; + u8 key[MACSEC_MAX_KEY_LEN]; union { struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa; struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ff70202b2d1ad522275c6aadc8c53519b6a22c57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 10:05:05 +0200 Subject: dev_forward_skb: do not scrub skb mark within the same name space The goal is to keep the mark during a bpf_redirect(), like it is done for legacy encapsulation / decapsulation, when there is no x-netns. This was initially done in commit 213dd74aee76 ("skbuff: Do not scrub skb mark within the same name space"). When the call to skb_scrub_packet() was added in dev_forward_skb() (commit 8b27f27797ca ("skb: allow skb_scrub_packet() to be used by tunnels")), the second argument (xnet) was set to true to force a call to skb_orphan(). At this time, the mark was always cleanned up by skb_scrub_packet(), whatever xnet value was. This call to skb_orphan() was removed later in commit 9c4c325252c5 ("skbuff: preserve sock reference when scrubbing the skb."). But this 'true' stayed here without any real reason. Let's correctly set xnet in ____dev_forward_skb(), this function has access to the previous interface and to the new interface. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h index 5cbc950b34df..5ab2d1917ca1 100644 --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -4114,7 +4114,7 @@ static __always_inline int ____dev_forward_skb(struct net_device *dev, return NET_RX_DROP; } - skb_scrub_packet(skb, true); + skb_scrub_packet(skb, !net_eq(dev_net(dev), dev_net(skb->dev))); skb->priority = 0; return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From fade56410c22cacafb1be9f911a0afd3701d8366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vadim Fedorenko Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2021 19:21:39 +0300 Subject: net: lwtunnel: handle MTU calculation in forwading Commit 14972cbd34ff ("net: lwtunnel: Handle fragmentation") moved fragmentation logic away from lwtunnel by carry encap headroom and use it in output MTU calculation. But the forwarding part was not covered and created difference in MTU for output and forwarding and further to silent drops on ipv4 forwarding path. Fix it by taking into account lwtunnel encap headroom. The same commit also introduced difference in how to treat RTAX_MTU in IPv4 and IPv6 where latter explicitly removes lwtunnel encap headroom from route MTU. Make IPv4 version do the same. Fixes: 14972cbd34ff ("net: lwtunnel: Handle fragmentation") Suggested-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/ip.h | 12 ++++++++---- include/net/ip6_route.h | 16 ++++++++++++---- net/ipv4/route.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/ip.h b/include/net/ip.h index e20874059f82..d9683bef8684 100644 --- a/include/net/ip.h +++ b/include/net/ip.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define IPV4_MAX_PMTU 65535U /* RFC 2675, Section 5.1 */ #define IPV4_MIN_MTU 68 /* RFC 791 */ @@ -445,22 +446,25 @@ static inline unsigned int ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(const struct dst_entry *dst, /* 'forwarding = true' case should always honour route mtu */ mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU); - if (mtu) - return mtu; + if (!mtu) + mtu = min(READ_ONCE(dst->dev->mtu), IP_MAX_MTU); - return min(READ_ONCE(dst->dev->mtu), IP_MAX_MTU); + return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(dst->lwtstate, mtu); } static inline unsigned int ip_skb_dst_mtu(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { + unsigned int mtu; + if (!sk || !sk_fullsock(sk) || ip_sk_use_pmtu(sk)) { bool forwarding = IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED; return ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(skb_dst(skb), forwarding); } - return min(READ_ONCE(skb_dst(skb)->dev->mtu), IP_MAX_MTU); + mtu = min(READ_ONCE(skb_dst(skb)->dev->mtu), IP_MAX_MTU); + return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(skb_dst(skb)->lwtstate, mtu); } struct dst_metrics *ip_fib_metrics_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *fc_mx, diff --git a/include/net/ip6_route.h b/include/net/ip6_route.h index f51a118bfce8..f14149df5a65 100644 --- a/include/net/ip6_route.h +++ b/include/net/ip6_route.h @@ -265,11 +265,18 @@ int ip6_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static inline int ip6_skb_dst_mtu(struct sk_buff *skb) { + int mtu; + struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk && !dev_recursion_level() ? inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL; - return (np && np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE) ? - skb_dst(skb)->dev->mtu : dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb)); + if (np && np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE) { + mtu = READ_ONCE(skb_dst(skb)->dev->mtu); + mtu -= lwtunnel_headroom(skb_dst(skb)->lwtstate, mtu); + } else + mtu = dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb)); + + return mtu; } static inline bool ip6_sk_accept_pmtu(const struct sock *sk) @@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ip6_dst_mtu_forward(const struct dst_entry *dst) if (dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU)) { mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU); if (mtu) - return mtu; + goto out; } mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU; @@ -327,7 +334,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ip6_dst_mtu_forward(const struct dst_entry *dst) mtu = idev->cnf.mtu6; rcu_read_unlock(); - return mtu; +out: + return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(dst->lwtstate, mtu); } u32 ip6_mtu_from_fib6(const struct fib6_result *res, diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 6a36ac98476f..78d1e5afc452 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE unsigned int ipv4_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst) mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU); if (mtu) - return mtu; + goto out; mtu = READ_ONCE(dst->dev->mtu); @@ -1315,6 +1315,7 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE unsigned int ipv4_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst) mtu = 576; } +out: mtu = min_t(unsigned int, mtu, IP_MAX_MTU); return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(dst->lwtstate, mtu); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9ea3e52c5bc8bb4a084938dc1e3160643438927a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: gushengxian Date: Sat, 26 Jun 2021 04:56:06 -0700 Subject: flow_offload: action should not be NULL when it is referenced "action" should not be NULL when it is referenced. Signed-off-by: gushengxian <13145886936@163.com> Signed-off-by: gushengxian Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/flow_offload.h | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/flow_offload.h b/include/net/flow_offload.h index dc5c1e69cd9f..69c9eabf8325 100644 --- a/include/net/flow_offload.h +++ b/include/net/flow_offload.h @@ -319,12 +319,14 @@ flow_action_mixed_hw_stats_check(const struct flow_action *action, if (flow_offload_has_one_action(action)) return true; - flow_action_for_each(i, action_entry, action) { - if (i && action_entry->hw_stats != last_hw_stats) { - NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Mixing HW stats types for actions is not supported"); - return false; + if (action) { + flow_action_for_each(i, action_entry, action) { + if (i && action_entry->hw_stats != last_hw_stats) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Mixing HW stats types for actions is not supported"); + return false; + } + last_hw_stats = action_entry->hw_stats; } - last_hw_stats = action_entry->hw_stats; } return true; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0c5dc070ff3d6246d22ddd931f23a6266249e3db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 16:13:41 -0300 Subject: sctp: validate from_addr_param return Ilja reported that, simply putting it, nothing was validating that from_addr_param functions were operating on initialized memory. That is, the parameter itself was being validated by sctp_walk_params, but it doesn't check for types and their specific sizes and it could be a 0-length one, causing from_addr_param to potentially work over the next parameter or even uninitialized memory. The fix here is to, in all calls to from_addr_param, check if enough space is there for the wanted IP address type. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 2 +- net/sctp/bind_addr.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- net/sctp/input.c | 6 ++++-- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 7 ++++++- net/sctp/protocol.c | 7 ++++++- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h index 1aa585216f34..d49593c72a55 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ struct sctp_af { int saddr); void (*from_sk) (union sctp_addr *, struct sock *sk); - void (*from_addr_param) (union sctp_addr *, + bool (*from_addr_param) (union sctp_addr *, union sctp_addr_param *, __be16 port, int iif); int (*to_addr_param) (const union sctp_addr *, diff --git a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c index 53e5ed79f63f..59e653b528b1 100644 --- a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c +++ b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c @@ -270,22 +270,19 @@ int sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs(struct sctp_bind_addr *bp, __u8 *raw_addr_list, rawaddr = (union sctp_addr_param *)raw_addr_list; af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->type)); - if (unlikely(!af)) { + if (unlikely(!af) || + !af->from_addr_param(&addr, rawaddr, htons(port), 0)) { retval = -EINVAL; - sctp_bind_addr_clean(bp); - break; + goto out_err; } - af->from_addr_param(&addr, rawaddr, htons(port), 0); if (sctp_bind_addr_state(bp, &addr) != -1) goto next; retval = sctp_add_bind_addr(bp, &addr, sizeof(addr), SCTP_ADDR_SRC, gfp); - if (retval) { + if (retval) /* Can't finish building the list, clean up. */ - sctp_bind_addr_clean(bp); - break; - } + goto out_err; next: len = ntohs(param->length); @@ -294,6 +291,12 @@ next: } return retval; + +out_err: + if (retval) + sctp_bind_addr_clean(bp); + + return retval; } /******************************************************************** diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index d508f6f3dd08..8924e2e142c8 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -1131,7 +1131,8 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_init_lookup(struct net *net, if (!af) continue; - af->from_addr_param(paddr, params.addr, sh->source, 0); + if (!af->from_addr_param(paddr, params.addr, sh->source, 0)) + continue; asoc = __sctp_lookup_association(net, laddr, paddr, transportp); if (asoc) @@ -1174,7 +1175,8 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( if (unlikely(!af)) return NULL; - af->from_addr_param(&paddr, param, peer_port, 0); + if (af->from_addr_param(&paddr, param, peer_port, 0)) + return NULL; return __sctp_lookup_association(net, laddr, &paddr, transportp); } diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c index bd08807c9e44..5c6f5ced9cfa 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c @@ -551,15 +551,20 @@ static void sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk) } /* Initialize a sctp_addr from an address parameter. */ -static void sctp_v6_from_addr_param(union sctp_addr *addr, +static bool sctp_v6_from_addr_param(union sctp_addr *addr, union sctp_addr_param *param, __be16 port, int iif) { + if (ntohs(param->v6.param_hdr.length) < sizeof(struct sctp_ipv6addr_param)) + return false; + addr->v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; addr->v6.sin6_port = port; addr->v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0; /* BUG */ addr->v6.sin6_addr = param->v6.addr; addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = iif; + + return true; } /* Initialize an address parameter from a sctp_addr and return the length diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c index 6f2bbfeec3a4..25192b378e2e 100644 --- a/net/sctp/protocol.c +++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c @@ -254,14 +254,19 @@ static void sctp_v4_to_sk_daddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk) } /* Initialize a sctp_addr from an address parameter. */ -static void sctp_v4_from_addr_param(union sctp_addr *addr, +static bool sctp_v4_from_addr_param(union sctp_addr *addr, union sctp_addr_param *param, __be16 port, int iif) { + if (ntohs(param->v4.param_hdr.length) < sizeof(struct sctp_ipv4addr_param)) + return false; + addr->v4.sin_family = AF_INET; addr->v4.sin_port = port; addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr = param->v4.addr.s_addr; memset(addr->v4.sin_zero, 0, sizeof(addr->v4.sin_zero)); + + return true; } /* Initialize an address parameter from a sctp_addr and return the length diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 5b44d228b6ca..f33a870b483d 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -2346,11 +2346,13 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *chunk, /* Process the initialization parameters. */ sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) { - if (!src_match && (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS || - param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)) { + if (!src_match && + (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS || + param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)) { af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type)); - af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, - chunk->sctp_hdr->source, 0); + if (!af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, + chunk->sctp_hdr->source, 0)) + continue; if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), &addr)) src_match = 1; } @@ -2531,7 +2533,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, break; do_addr_param: af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type)); - af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0); + if (!af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0)) + break; scope = sctp_scope(peer_addr); if (sctp_in_scope(net, &addr, scope)) if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, gfp, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED)) @@ -2632,15 +2635,13 @@ do_addr_param: addr_param = param.v + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param); af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type)); - if (af == NULL) + if (!af) break; - af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, - htons(asoc->peer.port), 0); + if (!af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, + htons(asoc->peer.port), 0)) + break; - /* if the address is invalid, we can't process it. - * XXX: see spec for what to do. - */ if (!af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, NULL)) break; @@ -3054,7 +3055,8 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, if (unlikely(!af)) return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; - af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0); + if (!af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0)) + return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; /* ADDIP 4.2.1 This parameter MUST NOT contain a broadcast * or multicast address. @@ -3331,7 +3333,8 @@ static void sctp_asconf_param_success(struct sctp_association *asoc, /* We have checked the packet before, so we do not check again. */ af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type)); - af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(bp->port), 0); + if (!af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(bp->port), 0)) + return; switch (asconf_param->param_hdr.type) { case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: -- cgit v1.2.3