From af8ff04917169805b151280155bf772d3ca9bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2009 21:23:01 -0400 Subject: SELinux: reset the security_ops before flushing the avc cache This patch resets the security_ops to the secondary_ops before it flushes the avc. It's still possible that a task on another processor could have already passed the security_ops dereference and be executing an selinux hook function which would add a new avc entry. That entry would still not be freed. This should however help to reduce the number of needless avcs the kernel has when selinux is disabled at run time. There is no wasted memory if selinux is disabled on the command line or not compiled. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index bb230d5d7085..a985d0bc59bb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5830,12 +5830,12 @@ int selinux_disable(void) selinux_disabled = 1; selinux_enabled = 0; - /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ - avc_disable(); - /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */ security_ops = secondary_ops; + /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ + avc_disable(); + /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ selinux_nf_ip_exit(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 13:37:50 -0400 Subject: selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c | 151 ++----- security/selinux/avc.c | 76 +--- security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h | 34 -- security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 183 -------- security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 44 +- security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h | 21 +- security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h | 80 ---- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 150 +++++++ security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h | 58 --- security/selinux/include/flask.h | 40 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 13 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 +- security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 47 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 7 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 540 ++++++++++++----------- 16 files changed, 583 insertions(+), 867 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/classmap.h delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c index b4ced8562587..62b34ce1f50d 100644 --- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c +++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c @@ -29,86 +29,27 @@ #include #include -#include "flask.h" - static void usage(char *name) { printf("usage: %s [-m] policy_file context_file\n", name); exit(1); } -static void find_common_name(char *cname, char *dest, int len) -{ - char *start, *end; - - start = strchr(cname, '_')+1; - end = strchr(start, '_'); - if (!start || !end || start-cname > len || end-start > len) { - printf("Error with commons defines\n"); - exit(1); - } - strncpy(dest, start, end-start); - dest[end-start] = '\0'; -} - -#define S_(x) x, -static char *classlist[] = { -#include "class_to_string.h" - NULL +/* Class/perm mapping support */ +struct security_class_mapping { + const char *name; + const char *perms[sizeof(unsigned) * 8 + 1]; }; -#undef S_ +#include "classmap.h" #include "initial_sid_to_string.h" -#define TB_(x) char *x[] = { -#define TE_(x) NULL }; -#define S_(x) x, -#include "common_perm_to_string.h" -#undef TB_ -#undef TE_ -#undef S_ - -struct common { - char *cname; - char **perms; -}; -struct common common[] = { -#define TB_(x) { #x, x }, -#define S_(x) -#define TE_(x) -#include "common_perm_to_string.h" -#undef TB_ -#undef TE_ -#undef S_ -}; - -#define S_(x, y, z) {x, #y}, -struct av_inherit { - int class; - char *common; -}; -struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = { -#include "av_inherit.h" -}; -#undef S_ - -#include "av_permissions.h" -#define S_(x, y, z) {x, y, z}, -struct av_perms { - int class; - int perm_i; - char *perm_s; -}; -struct av_perms av_perms[] = { -#include "av_perm_to_string.h" -}; -#undef S_ - int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, j, mls = 0; + int initial_sid_to_string_len; char **arg, *polout, *ctxout; - int classlist_len, initial_sid_to_string_len; + FILE *fout; if (argc < 3) @@ -127,64 +68,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) usage(argv[0]); } - classlist_len = sizeof(classlist) / sizeof(char *); /* print out the classes */ - for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) { - if(classlist[i]) - fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]); - else - fprintf(fout, "class user%d\n", i); - } + for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) + fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", secclass_map[i].name); fprintf(fout, "\n"); initial_sid_to_string_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *); /* print out the sids */ - for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++) + for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++) fprintf(fout, "sid %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]); fprintf(fout, "\n"); - /* print out the commons */ - for (i=0; i< sizeof(common)/sizeof(struct common); i++) { - char cname[101]; - find_common_name(common[i].cname, cname, 100); - cname[100] = '\0'; - fprintf(fout, "common %s\n{\n", cname); - for (j=0; common[i].perms[j]; j++) - fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", common[i].perms[j]); - fprintf(fout, "}\n\n"); - } - fprintf(fout, "\n"); - /* print out the class permissions */ - for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) { - if (classlist[i]) { - int firstperm = -1, numperms = 0; - - fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]); - /* does it inherit from a common? */ - for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_inherit)/sizeof(struct av_inherit); j++) - if (av_inherit[j].class == i) - fprintf(fout, "inherits %s\n", av_inherit[j].common); - - for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_perms)/sizeof(struct av_perms); j++) { - if (av_perms[j].class == i) { - if (firstperm == -1) - firstperm = j; - numperms++; - } - } - if (!numperms) { - fprintf(fout, "\n"); - continue; - } - - fprintf(fout, "{\n"); - /* print out the av_perms */ - for (j=0; j < numperms; j++) { - fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", av_perms[firstperm+j].perm_s); - } - fprintf(fout, "}\n\n"); - } + for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) { + struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i]; + fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", map->name); + fprintf(fout, "{\n"); + for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) + fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", map->perms[j]); + fprintf(fout, "}\n\n"); } fprintf(fout, "\n"); @@ -197,31 +99,34 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) /* types, roles, and allows */ fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n"); - for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) { - if (classlist[i]) - fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n", classlist[i]); - else - fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:user%d *;\n", i); - } + for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) + fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n", + secclass_map[i].name); fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r };\n"); fprintf(fout, "\n"); /* default sids */ - for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++) + for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++) fprintf(fout, "sid %s user_u:base_r:base_t\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]); fprintf(fout, "\n"); - fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext3 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext4 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr xfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr reiserfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jffs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr gfs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr lustre user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task eventpollfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task pipefs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task sockfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans mqueue user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans devpts user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans hugetlbfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans tmpfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans shm user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index b4b5da1c0a42..18f4103e02b7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -31,43 +31,7 @@ #include #include "avc.h" #include "avc_ss.h" - -static const struct av_perm_to_string av_perm_to_string[] = { -#define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s }, -#include "av_perm_to_string.h" -#undef S_ -}; - -static const char *class_to_string[] = { -#define S_(s) s, -#include "class_to_string.h" -#undef S_ -}; - -#define TB_(s) static const char *s[] = { -#define TE_(s) }; -#define S_(s) s, -#include "common_perm_to_string.h" -#undef TB_ -#undef TE_ -#undef S_ - -static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = { -#define S_(c, i, b) { .tclass = c,\ - .common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\ - .common_base = b }, -#include "av_inherit.h" -#undef S_ -}; - -const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = { - .av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string, - .av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string), - .class_to_string = class_to_string, - .cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string), - .av_inherit = av_inherit, - .av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit) -}; +#include "classmap.h" #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512 #define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512 @@ -139,52 +103,28 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) */ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av) { - const char **common_pts = NULL; - u32 common_base = 0; - int i, i2, perm; + const char **perms; + int i, perm; if (av == 0) { audit_log_format(ab, " null"); return; } - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) { - if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) { - common_pts = av_inherit[i].common_pts; - common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base; - break; - } - } + perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms; audit_log_format(ab, " {"); i = 0; perm = 1; - while (perm < common_base) { + while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) { if (perm & av) { - audit_log_format(ab, " %s", common_pts[i]); + audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]); av &= ~perm; } i++; perm <<= 1; } - while (i < sizeof(av) * 8) { - if (perm & av) { - for (i2 = 0; i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string); i2++) { - if ((av_perm_to_string[i2].tclass == tclass) && - (av_perm_to_string[i2].value == perm)) - break; - } - if (i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " %s", - av_perm_to_string[i2].name); - av &= ~perm; - } - } - i++; - perm <<= 1; - } - if (av) audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av); @@ -219,8 +159,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla kfree(scontext); } - BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass]); - audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]); + BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map)); + audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h deleted file mode 100644 index abedcd704dae..000000000000 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_LNK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL) - S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL) - S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL) - S_(SECCLASS_SHM, ipc, 0x00000200UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) - S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2b683ad83d21..000000000000 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, "mount") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, "remount") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, "unmount") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, "getattr") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, "relabelfrom") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, "relabelto") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION, "transition") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, "associate") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, "quotamod") - S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, "quotaget") - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME, "add_name") - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME, "remove_name") - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent") - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search") - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir") - S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open") - S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") - S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") - S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") - S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open") - S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") - S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") - S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") - S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open") - S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open") - S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open") - S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open") - S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use") - S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto") - S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn") - S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom") - S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind") - S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect") - S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind") - S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__UDP_SEND, "udp_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__ENFORCE_DEST, "enforce_dest") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, "recvfrom") - S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, "sendto") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_SEND, "udp_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, "ingress") - S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, "egress") - S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto") - S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn") - S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, "fork") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, "transition") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGCHLD, "sigchld") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGKILL, "sigkill") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGSTOP, "sigstop") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGNULL, "signull") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGNAL, "signal") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, "ptrace") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, "getsched") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, "setsched") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, "getsession") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, "getpgid") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, "setpgid") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, "getcap") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, "setcap") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, "share") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, "getattr") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, "setexec") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, "setfscreate") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, "noatsecure") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, "siginh") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, "setrlimit") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, "rlimitinh") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, "dyntransition") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, "setcurrent") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, "execmem") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, "execstack") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate") - S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate") - S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue") - S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send") - S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive") - S_(SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__LOCK, "lock") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, "compute_av") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE, "compute_create") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER, "compute_member") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, "check_context") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, "load_policy") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL, "compute_relabel") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER, "compute_user") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE, "setenforce") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL, "setbool") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM, "setsecparam") - S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT, "setcheckreqprot") - S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, "ipc_info") - S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read") - S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod") - S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console") - S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__FOWNER, "fowner") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__FSETID, "fsetid") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__KILL, "kill") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETGID, "setgid") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETUID, "setuid") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETPCAP, "setpcap") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE, "linux_immutable") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE, "net_bind_service") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST, "net_broadcast") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN, "net_admin") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_RAW, "net_raw") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK, "ipc_lock") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER, "ipc_owner") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE, "sys_module") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO, "sys_rawio") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT, "sys_chroot") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE, "sys_ptrace") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT, "sys_pacct") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN, "sys_admin") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT, "sys_boot") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE, "sys_nice") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE, "sys_resource") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME, "sys_time") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG, "sys_tty_config") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__MKNOD, "mknod") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LEASE, "lease") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE, "audit_write") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL, "audit_control") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETFCAP, "setfcap") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, CAPABILITY2__MAC_OVERRIDE, "mac_override") - S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN, "mac_admin") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT, "nlmsg_tty_audit") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") - S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") - S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto") - S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom") - S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext") - S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, "polmatch") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_IN, "flow_in") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, "flow_out") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, "forward_in") - S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_OUT, "forward_out") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, "view") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__READ, "read") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__WRITE, "write") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__SEARCH, "search") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__LINK, "link") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__SETATTR, "setattr") - S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, "create") - S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind") - S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect") - S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero") - S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, "recv") - S_(SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, "use_as_override") - S_(SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, "create_files_as") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index 0546d616ccac..fef2582b734d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -423,28 +423,6 @@ #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL -#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL #define PROCESS__FORK 0x00000001UL #define PROCESS__TRANSITION 0x00000002UL #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD 0x00000004UL @@ -868,3 +846,25 @@ #define PEER__RECV 0x00000001UL #define KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE 0x00000001UL #define KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS 0x00000002UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL +#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index bb1ec801bdfe..4677aa519b04 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -10,26 +10,13 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno); -struct av_perm_to_string { - u16 tclass; - u32 value; +/* Class/perm mapping support */ +struct security_class_mapping { const char *name; + const char *perms[sizeof(u32) * 8 + 1]; }; -struct av_inherit { - const char **common_pts; - u32 common_base; - u16 tclass; -}; - -struct selinux_class_perm { - const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string; - u32 av_pts_len; - u32 cts_len; - const char **class_to_string; - const struct av_inherit *av_inherit; - u32 av_inherit_len; -}; +extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[]; #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7ab9299bfb6b..000000000000 --- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,80 +0,0 @@ -/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ -/* - * Security object class definitions - */ - S_(NULL) - S_("security") - S_("process") - S_("system") - S_("capability") - S_("filesystem") - S_("file") - S_("dir") - S_("fd") - S_("lnk_file") - S_("chr_file") - S_("blk_file") - S_("sock_file") - S_("fifo_file") - S_("socket") - S_("tcp_socket") - S_("udp_socket") - S_("rawip_socket") - S_("node") - S_("netif") - S_("netlink_socket") - S_("packet_socket") - S_("key_socket") - S_("unix_stream_socket") - S_("unix_dgram_socket") - S_("sem") - S_("msg") - S_("msgq") - S_("shm") - S_("ipc") - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_("netlink_route_socket") - S_("netlink_firewall_socket") - S_("netlink_tcpdiag_socket") - S_("netlink_nflog_socket") - S_("netlink_xfrm_socket") - S_("netlink_selinux_socket") - S_("netlink_audit_socket") - S_("netlink_ip6fw_socket") - S_("netlink_dnrt_socket") - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_("association") - S_("netlink_kobject_uevent_socket") - S_("appletalk_socket") - S_("packet") - S_("key") - S_(NULL) - S_("dccp_socket") - S_("memprotect") - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_("peer") - S_("capability2") - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_(NULL) - S_("kernel_service") - S_("tun_socket") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8b32e959bb2e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +#define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \ + "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append" + +#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \ + "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton" + +#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \ + "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \ + "sendto", "recv_msg", "send_msg", "name_bind" + +#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \ + "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write" + +struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { + { "security", + { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member", + "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel", + "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam", + "setcheckreqprot", NULL } }, + { "process", + { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill", + "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched", + "getsession", "getpgid", "setpgid", "getcap", "setcap", "share", + "getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh", + "setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent", + "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate", + "setsockcreate", NULL } }, + { "system", + { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", + "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } }, + { "capability", + { "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", + "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", + "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast", + "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module", + "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin", + "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time", + "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write", + "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } }, + { "filesystem", + { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr", + "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "transition", "associate", "quotamod", + "quotaget", NULL } }, + { "file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } }, + { "dir", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", + "reparent", "search", "rmdir", "open", NULL } }, + { "fd", { "use", NULL } }, + { "lnk_file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "chr_file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } }, + { "blk_file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } }, + { "sock_file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } }, + { "fifo_file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } }, + { "socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "tcp_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", "node_bind", "name_connect", + NULL } }, + { "udp_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "node_bind", NULL } }, + { "rawip_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "node_bind", NULL } }, + { "node", + { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send", + "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "enforce_dest", + "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } }, + { "netif", + { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send", + "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", + "ingress", "egress", NULL } }, + { "netlink_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "packet_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "key_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "unix_stream_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", NULL + } }, + { "unix_dgram_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL + } }, + { "sem", + { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } }, + { "msgq", + { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "enqueue", NULL } }, + { "shm", + { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "lock", NULL } }, + { "ipc", + { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_route_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, + { "netlink_firewall_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, + { "netlink_tcpdiag_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, + { "netlink_nflog_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_xfrm_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, + { "netlink_selinux_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_audit_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv", + "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } }, + { "netlink_ip6fw_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, + { "netlink_dnrt_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "association", + { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } }, + { "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "appletalk_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "packet", + { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "flow_in", "flow_out", + "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } }, + { "key", + { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create", + NULL } }, + { "dccp_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, + "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } }, + { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, + { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, + { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } }, + { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, + { "tun_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { NULL } + }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h deleted file mode 100644 index ce5b6e2fe9dd..000000000000 --- a/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ -TB_(common_file_perm_to_string) - S_("ioctl") - S_("read") - S_("write") - S_("create") - S_("getattr") - S_("setattr") - S_("lock") - S_("relabelfrom") - S_("relabelto") - S_("append") - S_("unlink") - S_("link") - S_("rename") - S_("execute") - S_("swapon") - S_("quotaon") - S_("mounton") -TE_(common_file_perm_to_string) - -TB_(common_socket_perm_to_string) - S_("ioctl") - S_("read") - S_("write") - S_("create") - S_("getattr") - S_("setattr") - S_("lock") - S_("relabelfrom") - S_("relabelto") - S_("append") - S_("bind") - S_("connect") - S_("listen") - S_("accept") - S_("getopt") - S_("setopt") - S_("shutdown") - S_("recvfrom") - S_("sendto") - S_("recv_msg") - S_("send_msg") - S_("name_bind") -TE_(common_socket_perm_to_string) - -TB_(common_ipc_perm_to_string) - S_("create") - S_("destroy") - S_("getattr") - S_("setattr") - S_("read") - S_("write") - S_("associate") - S_("unix_read") - S_("unix_write") -TE_(common_ipc_perm_to_string) - diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h index f248500a1e3c..5359ca2abf21 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h @@ -34,26 +34,26 @@ #define SECCLASS_MSGQ 27 #define SECCLASS_SHM 28 #define SECCLASS_IPC 29 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET 43 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET 44 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET 45 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET 46 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET 47 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET 48 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET 49 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET 50 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET 51 -#define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION 54 -#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET 55 -#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET 56 -#define SECCLASS_PACKET 57 -#define SECCLASS_KEY 58 -#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET 60 -#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 61 -#define SECCLASS_PEER 68 -#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 69 -#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE 74 -#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET 75 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET 30 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET 31 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET 32 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET 33 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET 34 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET 35 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET 36 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET 37 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET 38 +#define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION 39 +#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET 40 +#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET 41 +#define SECCLASS_PACKET 42 +#define SECCLASS_KEY 43 +#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET 44 +#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 45 +#define SECCLASS_PEER 46 +#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 47 +#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE 48 +#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET 49 /* * Security identifier indices for initial entities diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index ca835795a8b3..2553266ad793 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -97,11 +97,18 @@ struct av_decision { #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd); + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd); + +int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd); int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); + u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); + +int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index b4fc506e7a87..fab36fdf2769 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (length < 0) goto out2; - length = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd); + length = security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd); if (length < 0) goto out2; @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (length < 0) goto out2; - length = security_transition_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid); + length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid); if (length < 0) goto out2; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index b5407f16c2a4..3f2b2706b5bb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, } /* Fallthrough */ case AVTAB_CHANGE: - if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS) + if (tclass == policydb.process_class) /* Use the process MLS attributes. */ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext); else diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 72e4a54973aa..f03667213ea8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -713,7 +713,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]); } kfree(p->type_attr_map); - kfree(p->undefined_perms); ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps); ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map); @@ -1640,6 +1639,40 @@ static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p) extern int ss_initialized; +u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name) +{ + struct class_datum *cladatum; + + cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, name); + if (!cladatum) + return 0; + + return cladatum->value; +} + +u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name) +{ + struct class_datum *cladatum; + struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL; + struct common_datum *comdatum; + + if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim) + return 0; + + cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1]; + comdatum = cladatum->comdatum; + if (comdatum) + perdatum = hashtab_search(comdatum->permissions.table, + name); + if (!perdatum) + perdatum = hashtab_search(cladatum->permissions.table, + name); + if (!perdatum) + return 0; + + return 1U << (perdatum->value-1); +} + /* * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary * representation file into a policy database structure. @@ -1861,6 +1894,16 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (rc) goto bad; + p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process"); + if (!p->process_class) + goto bad; + p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, + "transition"); + p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, + "dyntransition"); + if (!p->process_trans_perms) + goto bad; + for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) { rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc < 0) @@ -2101,7 +2144,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) goto bad; rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); } else - rt->target_class = SECCLASS_PROCESS; + rt->target_class = p->process_class; if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) || !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) { diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index 55152d498b53..cdcc5700946f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -254,7 +254,9 @@ struct policydb { unsigned int reject_unknown : 1; unsigned int allow_unknown : 1; - u32 *undefined_perms; + + u16 process_class; + u32 process_trans_perms; }; extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p); @@ -295,5 +297,8 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes) return 0; } +extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name); +extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name); + #endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ff17820d35ec..e19baa81fdec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -70,11 +70,6 @@ unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; int selinux_policycap_netpeer; int selinux_policycap_openperm; -/* - * This is declared in avc.c - */ -extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm; - static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); static struct sidtab sidtab; @@ -98,6 +93,158 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd); + +struct selinux_mapping { + u16 value; /* policy value */ + unsigned num_perms; + u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; +}; + +static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping; +static u16 current_mapping_size; + +static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, + struct security_class_mapping *map, + struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p, + u16 *out_map_size) +{ + struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL; + size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping); + u16 i, j; + unsigned k; + bool print_unknown_handle = false; + + /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */ + if (!map) + return -EINVAL; + i = 0; + while (map[i].name) + i++; + + /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */ + out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!out_map) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Store the raw class and permission values */ + j = 0; + while (map[j].name) { + struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++); + struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j; + + /* An empty class string skips ahead */ + if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) { + p_out->num_perms = 0; + continue; + } + + p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name); + if (!p_out->value) { + printk(KERN_INFO + "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n", + p_in->name); + if (pol->reject_unknown) + goto err; + p_out->num_perms = 0; + print_unknown_handle = true; + continue; + } + + k = 0; + while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { + /* An empty permission string skips ahead */ + if (!*p_in->perms[k]) { + k++; + continue; + } + p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value, + p_in->perms[k]); + if (!p_out->perms[k]) { + printk(KERN_INFO + "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n", + p_in->perms[k], p_in->name); + if (pol->reject_unknown) + goto err; + print_unknown_handle = true; + } + + k++; + } + p_out->num_perms = k; + } + + if (print_unknown_handle) + printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", + pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied"); + + *out_map_p = out_map; + *out_map_size = i; + return 0; +err: + kfree(out_map); + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * Get real, policy values from mapped values + */ + +static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass) +{ + if (tclass < current_mapping_size) + return current_mapping[tclass].value; + + return tclass; +} + +static u32 unmap_perm(u16 tclass, u32 tperm) +{ + if (tclass < current_mapping_size) { + unsigned i; + u32 kperm = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++) + if (tperm & (1<allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + result |= 1<allowed = result; + + for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) + if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + result |= 1<auditallow = result; + + for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { + if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + result |= 1<auditdeny = result; + } +} + + /* * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression * when it is applied to the specified source and target @@ -467,7 +614,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, struct class_datum *tclass_datum; struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr; struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode; - const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm; unsigned int i, j; /* @@ -477,9 +623,9 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, * to remain in the correct class. */ if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) - if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET && - tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET) - tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; + if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) && + tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)) + tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET); /* * Initialize the access vectors to the default values. @@ -490,33 +636,11 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, avd->seqno = latest_granting; avd->flags = 0; - /* - * Check for all the invalid cases. - * - tclass 0 - * - tclass > policy and > kernel - * - tclass > policy but is a userspace class - * - tclass > policy but we do not allow unknowns - */ - if (unlikely(!tclass)) - goto inval_class; - if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) - if (tclass > kdefs->cts_len || - !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass] || - !policydb.allow_unknown) - goto inval_class; - - /* - * Kernel class and we allow unknown so pad the allow decision - * the pad will be all 1 for unknown classes. - */ - if (tclass <= kdefs->cts_len && policydb.allow_unknown) - avd->allowed = policydb.undefined_perms[tclass - 1]; - - /* - * Not in policy. Since decision is completed (all 1 or all 0) return. - */ - if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) - return 0; + if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); + return -EINVAL; + } tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; @@ -568,8 +692,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role) * pair. */ - if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS && - (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) && + if (tclass == policydb.process_class && + (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) && scontext->role != tcontext->role) { for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) { if (scontext->role == ra->role && @@ -577,8 +701,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, break; } if (!ra) - avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION | - PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION); + avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms; } /* @@ -590,21 +713,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, tclass, requested, avd); return 0; - -inval_class: - if (!tclass || tclass > kdefs->cts_len || - !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass]) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", - __func__, tclass); - return -EINVAL; - } - - /* - * Known to the kernel, but not to the policy. - * Handle as a denial (allowed is 0). - */ - return 0; } static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext, @@ -636,13 +744,14 @@ out: } int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, - u16 tclass) + u16 orig_tclass) { struct context *ocontext; struct context *ncontext; struct context *tcontext; struct class_datum *tclass_datum; struct constraint_node *constraint; + u16 tclass; int rc = 0; if (!ss_initialized) @@ -650,6 +759,8 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + /* * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions. * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class() @@ -657,9 +768,9 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, * to remain in the correct class. */ if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) - if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET && - tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET) - tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; + if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) && + tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)) + tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET); if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", @@ -792,6 +903,38 @@ out: } +static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid, + u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, + u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd) +{ + struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); + if (!scontext) { + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + __func__, ssid); + return -EINVAL; + } + tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid); + if (!tcontext) { + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + __func__, tsid); + return -EINVAL; + } + + rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, + requested, avd); + + /* permissive domain? */ + if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) + avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; + + return rc; +} + /** * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions. * @ssid: source security identifier @@ -807,12 +950,45 @@ out: */ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, - u32 requested, + u16 orig_tclass, + u32 orig_requested, struct av_decision *avd) { - struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; - int rc = 0; + u16 tclass; + u32 requested; + int rc; + + if (!ss_initialized) + goto allow; + + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested); + tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { + if (policydb.allow_unknown) + goto allow; + return -EINVAL; + } + rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); + map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + return rc; +allow: + avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; + avd->auditallow = 0; + avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; + avd->seqno = latest_granting; + avd->flags = 0; + return 0; +} + +int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, + u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, + u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd) +{ + int rc; if (!ss_initialized) { avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; @@ -823,29 +999,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, } read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - - scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); - if (!scontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", - __func__, ssid); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid); - if (!tcontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", - __func__, tsid); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - - rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, - requested, avd); - - /* permissive domain? */ - if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) - avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; -out: + rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -1204,20 +1358,22 @@ out: static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, + u16 orig_tclass, u32 specified, - u32 *out_sid) + u32 *out_sid, + bool kern) { struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext; struct role_trans *roletr = NULL; struct avtab_key avkey; struct avtab_datum *avdatum; struct avtab_node *node; + u16 tclass; int rc = 0; if (!ss_initialized) { - switch (tclass) { - case SECCLASS_PROCESS: + switch (orig_tclass) { + case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */ *out_sid = ssid; break; default: @@ -1231,6 +1387,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + if (kern) + tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + else + tclass = orig_tclass; + scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", @@ -1260,13 +1421,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, } /* Set the role and type to default values. */ - switch (tclass) { - case SECCLASS_PROCESS: + if (tclass == policydb.process_class) { /* Use the current role and type of process. */ newcontext.role = scontext->role; newcontext.type = scontext->type; - break; - default: + } else { /* Use the well-defined object role. */ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; /* Use the type of the related object. */ @@ -1297,8 +1456,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, } /* Check for class-specific changes. */ - switch (tclass) { - case SECCLASS_PROCESS: + if (tclass == policydb.process_class) { if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) { /* Look for a role transition rule. */ for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; @@ -1311,9 +1469,6 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, } } } - break; - default: - break; } /* Set the MLS attributes. @@ -1358,7 +1513,17 @@ int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid); + return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, + out_sid, true); +} + +int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, + u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, + u32 *out_sid) +{ + return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, + out_sid, false); } /** @@ -1379,7 +1544,8 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid); + return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid, + false); } /** @@ -1400,144 +1566,8 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid); -} - -/* - * Verify that each kernel class that is defined in the - * policy is correct - */ -static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p) -{ - int i, j; - struct class_datum *cladatum; - struct perm_datum *perdatum; - u32 nprim, tmp, common_pts_len, perm_val, pol_val; - u16 class_val; - const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm; - const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class; - struct symtab *perms; - bool print_unknown_handle = 0; - - if (p->allow_unknown) { - u32 num_classes = kdefs->cts_len; - p->undefined_perms = kcalloc(num_classes, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!p->undefined_perms) - return -ENOMEM; - } - - for (i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++) { - def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i]; - if (!def_class) - continue; - if (i > p->p_classes.nprim) { - printk(KERN_INFO - "SELinux: class %s not defined in policy\n", - def_class); - if (p->reject_unknown) - return -EINVAL; - if (p->allow_unknown) - p->undefined_perms[i-1] = ~0U; - print_unknown_handle = 1; - continue; - } - pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1]; - if (strcmp(pol_class, def_class)) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n", - i, pol_class, def_class); - return -EINVAL; - } - } - for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_pts_len; i++) { - class_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].tclass; - perm_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].value; - def_perm = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].name; - if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim) - continue; - pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1]; - cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class); - BUG_ON(!cladatum); - perms = &cladatum->permissions; - nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1); - if (perm_val > nprim) { - printk(KERN_INFO - "SELinux: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n", - def_perm, pol_class); - if (p->reject_unknown) - return -EINVAL; - if (p->allow_unknown) - p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= perm_val; - print_unknown_handle = 1; - continue; - } - perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm); - if (perdatum == NULL) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n", - def_perm, pol_class); - return -EINVAL; - } - pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1); - if (pol_val != perm_val) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n", - def_perm, pol_class); - return -EINVAL; - } - } - for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_inherit_len; i++) { - class_val = kdefs->av_inherit[i].tclass; - if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim) - continue; - pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1]; - cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class); - BUG_ON(!cladatum); - if (!cladatum->comdatum) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n", - pol_class); - return -EINVAL; - } - tmp = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_base; - common_pts_len = 0; - while (!(tmp & 0x01)) { - common_pts_len++; - tmp >>= 1; - } - perms = &cladatum->comdatum->permissions; - for (j = 0; j < common_pts_len; j++) { - def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j]; - if (j >= perms->nprim) { - printk(KERN_INFO - "SELinux: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n", - def_perm, pol_class); - if (p->reject_unknown) - return -EINVAL; - if (p->allow_unknown) - p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= (1 << j); - print_unknown_handle = 1; - continue; - } - perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm); - if (perdatum == NULL) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n", - def_perm, pol_class); - return -EINVAL; - } - if (perdatum->value != j + 1) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n", - def_perm, pol_class); - return -EINVAL; - } - } - } - if (print_unknown_handle) - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", - (security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allowed" : "denied")); - return 0; + return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid, + false); } /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */ @@ -1710,8 +1740,10 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) { struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb; struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab; + struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL; struct convert_context_args args; u32 seqno; + u16 map_size; int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; @@ -1721,16 +1753,14 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; } - if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) { + if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map, + ¤t_mapping, + ¤t_mapping_size)) { policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; } - /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */ - if (validate_classes(&policydb)) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: the definition of a class is incorrect\n"); - sidtab_destroy(&sidtab); + if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) { policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; @@ -1759,13 +1789,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) return -ENOMEM; } - /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */ - if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: the definition of a class is incorrect\n"); - rc = -EINVAL; + if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, + &map, &map_size)) goto err; - } rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb); if (rc) { @@ -1799,6 +1825,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb); sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab); security_load_policycaps(); + oldmap = current_mapping; + current_mapping = map; + current_mapping_size = map_size; seqno = ++latest_granting; policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); @@ -1806,6 +1835,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb); sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab); + kfree(oldmap); avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); @@ -1815,6 +1845,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) return 0; err: + kfree(map); sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab); policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); return rc; @@ -2091,7 +2122,7 @@ out_unlock: } for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) { rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i], - SECCLASS_PROCESS, + SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT, NULL); if (!rc) @@ -2119,10 +2150,11 @@ out: */ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *path, - u16 sclass, + u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { int len; + u16 sclass; struct genfs *genfs; struct ocontext *c; int rc = 0, cmp = 0; @@ -2132,6 +2164,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass); + for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype); if (cmp <= 0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8753f6bec352392b52ed9b5e290afb34379f4612 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 13:41:02 -0400 Subject: selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the security class mapping definitions in classmap.h. Adding new kernel classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- scripts/selinux/Makefile | 4 +- scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile | 5 + scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c | 118 ++++ security/selinux/Makefile | 10 +- security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 870 ------------------------------ security/selinux/include/flask.h | 91 ---- security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- 7 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 965 deletions(-) create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/flask.h (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/scripts/selinux/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/Makefile index ca4b1ec01822..e8049da1831f 100644 --- a/scripts/selinux/Makefile +++ b/scripts/selinux/Makefile @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -subdir-y := mdp -subdir- += mdp +subdir-y := mdp genheaders +subdir- += mdp genheaders diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..417b165008ee --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +hostprogs-y := genheaders +HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include + +always := $(hostprogs-y) +clean-files := $(hostprogs-y) diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3b16145dabe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct security_class_mapping { + const char *name; + const char *perms[sizeof(unsigned) * 8 + 1]; +}; + +#include "classmap.h" +#include "initial_sid_to_string.h" + +#define max(x, y) ((x > y) ? x : y) + +const char *progname; + +void usage(void) +{ + printf("usage: %s flask.h av_permissions.h\n", progname); + exit(1); +} + +char *stoupperx(const char *s) +{ + char *s2 = strdup(s); + char *p; + + if (!s2) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", progname); + exit(3); + } + + for (p = s2; *p; p++) + *p = toupper(*p); + return s2; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int i, j, k; + int isids_len; + FILE *fout; + + progname = argv[0]; + + if (argc < 3) + usage(); + + fout = fopen(argv[1], "w"); + if (!fout) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s for writing: %s\n", + argv[1], strerror(errno)); + exit(2); + } + + for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) { + struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i]; + map->name = stoupperx(map->name); + for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) + map->perms[j] = stoupperx(map->perms[j]); + } + + isids_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *); + for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) + initial_sid_to_string[i] = stoupperx(initial_sid_to_string[i]); + + fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */\n"); + fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n#define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n\n"); + + for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) { + struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i]; + fprintf(fout, "#define SECCLASS_%s", map->name); + for (j = 0; j < max(1, 40 - strlen(map->name)); j++) + fprintf(fout, " "); + fprintf(fout, "%2d\n", i+1); + } + + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) { + char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i]; + fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%s", s); + for (j = 0; j < max(1, 40 - strlen(s)); j++) + fprintf(fout, " "); + fprintf(fout, "%2d\n", i); + } + fprintf(fout, "\n#define SECINITSID_NUM %d\n", i-1); + fprintf(fout, "\n#endif\n"); + fclose(fout); + + fout = fopen(argv[2], "w"); + if (!fout) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s for writing: %s\n", + argv[2], strerror(errno)); + exit(4); + } + + fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */\n"); + fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_AV_PERMISSIONS_H_\n#define _SELINUX_AV_PERMISSIONS_H_\n\n"); + + for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) { + struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i]; + for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) { + fprintf(fout, "#define %s__%s", map->name, + map->perms[j]); + for (k = 0; k < max(1, 40 - strlen(map->name) - strlen(map->perms[j])); k++) + fprintf(fout, " "); + fprintf(fout, "0x%08xUL\n", (1< Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2009 14:48:23 -0400 Subject: selinux: drop remapping of netlink classes Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking based on netlink message type for policy version < 18. This removes compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink security class used for all netlink sockets was split into finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux 2.6.8. The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11. Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +----- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 25 ------------------------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a985d0bc59bb..a29d6612a328 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 -extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); extern struct security_operations *security_ops; @@ -4714,10 +4713,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (err) return err; - if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) - err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); - - return err; + return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); } static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e19baa81fdec..f270e378c0e4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ #include "audit.h" extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); -unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; int selinux_policycap_netpeer; int selinux_policycap_openperm; @@ -616,17 +615,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode; unsigned int i, j; - /* - * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions. - * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class() - * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets - * to remain in the correct class. - */ - if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) - if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) && - tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)) - tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET); - /* * Initialize the access vectors to the default values. */ @@ -761,17 +749,6 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); - /* - * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions. - * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class() - * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets - * to remain in the correct class. - */ - if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) - if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) && - tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)) - tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET); - if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", __func__, tclass); @@ -1766,7 +1743,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) return -EINVAL; } security_load_policycaps(); - policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; ss_initialized = 1; seqno = ++latest_granting; selinux_complete_init(); @@ -1829,7 +1805,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) current_mapping = map; current_mapping_size = map_size; seqno = ++latest_granting; - policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From b7f3008ad1d795935551e4dd810b0255a7bfa3c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 10:08:50 -0400 Subject: SELinux: fix locking issue introduced with c6d3aaa4e35c71a3 Ensure that we release the policy read lock on all exit paths from security_compute_av. Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f270e378c0e4..77f6e54bb43f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -935,19 +935,22 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 requested; int rc; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + if (!ss_initialized) goto allow; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { if (policydb.allow_unknown) goto allow; - return -EINVAL; + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; } rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); +out: read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; allow: @@ -956,7 +959,8 @@ allow: avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; avd->seqno = latest_granting; avd->flags = 0; - return 0; + rc = 0; + goto out; } int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6e8e16c7bc298d7887584c3d027e05db3e86eed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2009 15:38:26 -0400 Subject: SELinux: add .gitignore files for dynamic classes The SELinux dynamic class work in c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c creates a number of dynamic header files and scripts. Add .gitignore files so git doesn't complain about these. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/dontdiff | 3 +++ scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore | 1 + security/selinux/.gitignore | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore create mode 100644 security/selinux/.gitignore (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/Documentation/dontdiff b/Documentation/dontdiff index e1efc400bed6..e151b2a36267 100644 --- a/Documentation/dontdiff +++ b/Documentation/dontdiff @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ aicdb.h* asm-offsets.h asm_offsets.h autoconf.h* +av_permissions.h bbootsect bin2c binkernel.spec @@ -95,12 +96,14 @@ docproc elf2ecoff elfconfig.h* fixdep +flask.h fore200e_mkfirm fore200e_pca_fw.c* gconf gen-devlist gen_crc32table gen_init_cpio +genheaders genksyms *_gray256.c ihex2fw diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4c0b646ff8d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +genheaders diff --git a/security/selinux/.gitignore b/security/selinux/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2e5040a3d48b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +av_permissions.h +flask.h -- cgit v1.2.3 From dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 16:35:32 +1100 Subject: security: report the module name to security_module_request For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request. Example output: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 18 ++++++++++-------- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/kmod.c | 8 ++++---- security/capability.c | 2 +- security/lsm_audit.c | 4 ++++ security/security.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 190c37854870..f78f83d7663f 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -26,14 +26,15 @@ /* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */ struct common_audit_data { - char type; -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS 1 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET 2 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP 3 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC 4 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK 5 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY 6 -#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT 7 + char type; +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS 1 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET 2 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP 3 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC 4 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK 5 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY 6 +#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT 7 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8 struct task_struct *tsk; union { struct { @@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ struct common_audit_data { char *key_desc; } key_struct; #endif + char *kmod_name; } u; /* this union contains LSM specific data */ union { diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ed0faea60b82..466cbadbd1ef 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -706,6 +706,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @kernel_module_request: * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. + * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel * Return 0 if successful. * @task_setuid: * Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity @@ -1577,7 +1578,7 @@ struct security_operations { void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); - int (*kernel_module_request)(void); + int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags); int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); @@ -1842,7 +1843,7 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); -int security_kernel_module_request(void); +int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags); int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); @@ -2407,7 +2408,7 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred, return 0; } -static inline int security_kernel_module_request(void) +static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 9fcb53a11f87..25b103190364 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -80,16 +80,16 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */ static int kmod_loop_msg; - ret = security_kernel_module_request(); - if (ret) - return ret; - va_start(args, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args); va_end(args); if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN) return -ENAMETOOLONG; + ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* If modprobe needs a service that is in a module, we get a recursive * loop. Limit the number of running kmod threads to max_threads/2 or * MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT, whichever is the smaller. A cleaner method diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 4f3ab476937f..5c700e1a4fd3 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return 0; } -static int cap_kernel_module_request(void) +static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index 3bb90b6f1dd3..51bd0fd9c9f0 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, } break; #endif + case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD: + audit_log_format(ab, " kmod="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.kmod_name); + break; } /* switch (a->type) */ } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index aad71b2ca195..24e060be9fa5 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -764,9 +764,9 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode); } -int security_kernel_module_request(void) +int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - return security_ops->kernel_module_request(); + return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a29d6612a328..c96d63ec4753 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3337,9 +3337,18 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return 0; } -static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void) +static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST); + u32 sid; + struct common_audit_data ad; + + sid = task_sid(current); + + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); + ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; + + return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0bce95279909aa4cc401a2e3140b4295ca22e72a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 16:47:23 -0500 Subject: SELinux: print denials for buggy kernel with unknown perms Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes where they do not exist. In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file. This used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something. Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not print ANY information (bad thing). First the auditdeny field is no extended to include unknown permissions. After that is fixed the logic in avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove the permission from the av and print the phrase "". This takes us back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 18f4103e02b7..f2dde268165a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av) i = 0; perm = 1; while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) { - if (perm & av) { + if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) { audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]); av &= ~perm; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 77f6e54bb43f..d6bb20cbad62 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -239,6 +239,13 @@ static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) result |= 1<auditdeny = result; } } -- cgit v1.2.3