<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>snowball/igloo-kernel.git/net, branch KNOWN_GOOD</title>
<subtitle>Igloo kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.etezian.org/cgit.cgi/snowball/igloo-kernel.git/atom?h=KNOWN_GOOD</id>
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<updated>2011-04-18T20:19:07+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'upstream/linaro.38' into linaro-android.38</title>
<updated>2011-04-18T20:19:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Stultz</name>
<email>john.stultz@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-18T20:19:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.etezian.org/cgit.cgi/snowball/igloo-kernel.git/commit/?id=775d71e49c65f1f6aa57776ea1da62988fc9a30a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:775d71e49c65f1f6aa57776ea1da62988fc9a30a</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge commit 'v2.6.38.3' into linaro-2.6.38</title>
<updated>2011-04-15T02:54:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Pitre</name>
<email>nicolas.pitre@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-15T02:54:21+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3ec10cd8b526c6b10170c2649002672ee2019e73</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm/solos-pci: Don't flap VCs when carrier state changes</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Philip A. Prindeville</name>
<email>philipp@redfish-solutions.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-30T13:17:04+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a691a7c96629740253fc52c30460607b98e05328</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c031235b395433350f25943b7580a5e343c7b7b2 upstream.

Don't flap VCs when carrier state changes; higher-level protocols
can detect loss of connectivity and act accordingly. This is more
consistent with how other network interfaces work.

We no longer use release_vccs() so we can delete it.

release_vccs() was duplicated from net/atm/common.c; make the
corresponding function exported, since other code duplicates it
and could leverage it if it were public.

Signed-off-by: Philip A. Prindeville &lt;philipp@redfish-solutions.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: h323: bug in parsing of ASN1 SEQOF field</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Sterba</name>
<email>dsterba@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-04T13:21:02+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7f96f975d3419d9155be5c82c6a1eac2f840b761</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b4232a22776aa5d063f890d21ca69870dbbe431b upstream.

Static analyzer of clang found a dead store which appears to be a bug in
reading count of items in SEQOF field, only the lower byte of word is
stored. This may lead to corrupted read and communication shutdown.

The bug has been in the module since it's first inclusion into linux
kernel.

[Patrick: the bug is real, but without practical consequence since the
 largest amount of sequence-of members we parse is 30.]

Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>econet: 4 byte infoleak to the network</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-17T01:40:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.etezian.org/cgit.cgi/snowball/igloo-kernel.git/commit/?id=0fc073e4b3b2cd9f5770190e585349adf9743ee3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0fc073e4b3b2cd9f5770190e585349adf9743ee3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 67c5c6cb8129c595f21e88254a3fc6b3b841ae8e upstream.

struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on
x86_64.  These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before
sending 'ah' to the network.  This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack
infoleak.

This bug was introduced before the git epoch.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Acked-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T12:37:13+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7a25e7511718fa16f65ff783d65f7f42fca823e6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.

Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipt_CLUSTERIP: fix buffer overflow</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-20T14:42:52+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5e8ba35db5884f7e3449eba28886a8f10c7e911e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream.

'buffer' string is copied from userspace.  It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated.  This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.

It was introduced before the git epoch.  Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Acked-by: Changli Gao &lt;xiaosuo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspace</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T12:35:21+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a988a0f40682cd871e3f5ad61fc779e5c7d36f5e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream.

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: xtables: fix reentrancy</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-20T14:40:06+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:53a080a724fd79d44132cc6e2f08246021503622</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db856674ac69e31946e56085239757cca3f7655f upstream.

commit f3c5c1bfd4308 (make ip_tables reentrant) introduced a race in
handling the stackptr restore, at the end of ipt_do_table()

We should do it before the call to xt_info_rdunlock_bh(), or we allow
cpu preemption and another cpu overwrites stackptr of original one.

A second fix is to change the underflow test to check the origptr value
instead of 0 to detect underflow, or else we allow a jump from different
hooks.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Engelhardt &lt;jengelh@medozas.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T20:02:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T12:36:05+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ebb12d3d3feb70061157ec5f71d7366f7b6e6dd9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream.

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1).  To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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