Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

97 files changed, 2245 insertions, 609 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index b56aacc1fff..e4dbbdb1bd9 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This document has the following sections:
 	- Notes on accessing payload contents
 	- Defining a key type
 	- Request-key callback service
-	- Key access filesystem
+	- Garbage collection
 
 
 ============
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ Each key has a number of attributes:
 
      (*) Dead. The key's type was unregistered, and so the key is now useless.
 
+Keys in the last three states are subject to garbage collection.  See the
+section on "Garbage collection".
+
 
 ====================
 KEY SERVICE OVERVIEW
@@ -754,6 +757,26 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      successful.
 
 
+ (*) Install the calling process's session keyring on its parent.
+
+	long keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
+
+     This functions attempts to install the calling process's session keyring
+     on to the calling process's parent, replacing the parent's current session
+     keyring.
+
+     The calling process must have the same ownership as its parent, the
+     keyring must have the same ownership as the calling process, the calling
+     process must have LINK permission on the keyring and the active LSM module
+     mustn't deny permission, otherwise error EPERM will be returned.
+
+     Error ENOMEM will be returned if there was insufficient memory to complete
+     the operation, otherwise 0 will be returned to indicate success.
+
+     The keyring will be replaced next time the parent process leaves the
+     kernel and resumes executing userspace.
+
+
 ===============
 KERNEL SERVICES
 ===============
@@ -1231,3 +1254,17 @@ by executing:
 
 In this case, the program isn't required to actually attach the key to a ring;
 the rings are provided for reference.
+
+
+==================
+GARBAGE COLLECTION
+==================
+
+Dead keys (for which the type has been removed) will be automatically unlinked
+from those keyrings that point to them and deleted as soon as possible by a
+background garbage collector.
+
+Similarly, revoked and expired keys will be garbage collected, but only after a
+certain amount of time has passed.  This time is set as a number of seconds in:
+
+	/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 60c83abfde7..5076a8860b1 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$8");
 #define TIF_UAC_SIGBUS		7
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		8
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	9	/* restore signal mask in do_signal */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	10	/* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_FREEZE		16	/* is freezing for suspend */
 
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	(1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
@@ -82,10 +83,12 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$8");
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE		(1<<TIF_FREEZE)
 
 /* Work to do on interrupt/exception return.  */
-#define _TIF_WORK_MASK		(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#define _TIF_WORK_MASK		(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | \
+				 _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 
 /* Work to do on any return to userspace.  */
 #define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK	(_TIF_WORK_MASK		\
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c
index df65eaa84c4..0932dbb1ef8 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/signal.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/sigcontext.h>
@@ -683,4 +684,11 @@ do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, struct switch_stack *sw,
 {
 	if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 		do_signal(regs, sw, r0, r19);
+
+	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 73394e50cbc..d3a39b1e6c0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -130,11 +130,13 @@ extern void vfp_sync_state(struct thread_info *thread);
  *  TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	- syscall trace active
  *  TIF_SIGPENDING	- signal pending
  *  TIF_NEED_RESCHED	- rescheduling necessary
+ *  TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	- callback before returning to user
  *  TIF_USEDFPU		- FPU was used by this task this quantum (SMP)
  *  TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	- true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED
  */
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		0
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	1
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	2	/* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	8
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	16
 #define TIF_USING_IWMMXT	17
@@ -143,6 +145,7 @@ extern void vfp_sync_state(struct thread_info *thread);
 
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_USING_IWMMXT	(1 << TIF_USING_IWMMXT)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index 8c3de1a350b..7813ab782fd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ fast_work_pending:
 work_pending:
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_NEED_RESCHED
 	bne	work_resched
-	tst	r1, #_TIF_SIGPENDING
+	tst	r1, #_TIF_SIGPENDING|_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
 	beq	no_work_pending
 	mov	r0, sp				@ 'regs'
 	mov	r2, why				@ 'syscall'
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index f6bc5d44278..b76fe06d92e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/elf.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -707,4 +708,11 @@ do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int thread_flags, int syscall)
 {
 	if (thread_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
 		do_signal(&current->blocked, regs, syscall);
+
+	if (thread_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h
index fc42de5ca20..fd0c5d7e933 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/avr32/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		6
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	7	/* restore signal mask in do_signal */
 #define TIF_CPU_GOING_TO_SLEEP	8	/* CPU is entering sleep 0 mode */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	9	/* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_FREEZE		29
 #define TIF_DEBUG		30	/* debugging enabled */
 #define TIF_USERSPACE		31      /* true if FS sets userspace */
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 #define _TIF_MEMDIE		(1 << TIF_MEMDIE)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_CPU_GOING_TO_SLEEP (1 << TIF_CPU_GOING_TO_SLEEP)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE		(1 << TIF_FREEZE)
 
 /* Note: The masks below must never span more than 16 bits! */
@@ -103,13 +105,15 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 /* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK				\
 	((1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)			\
+	 | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME			\
 	 | (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)		\
 	 | (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)		\
 	 | (1 << TIF_BREAKPOINT)		\
 	 | (1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 
 /* work to do on any return to userspace */
-#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK	(_TIF_WORK_MASK | (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
+#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK	(_TIF_WORK_MASK | (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) | \
+				 _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 /* work to do on return from debug mode */
 #define _TIF_DBGWORK_MASK	(_TIF_WORK_MASK & ~(1 << TIF_BREAKPOINT))
 
diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S b/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S
index 009a80155d6..169268c40ae 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S
+++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/entry-avr32b.S
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ syscall_exit_work:
 	ld.w	r1, r0[TI_flags]
 	rjmp	1b
 
-2:	mov	r2, _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK
+2:	mov	r2, _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
 	tst	r1, r2
 	breq	3f
 	unmask_interrupts
diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c b/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c
index 27227561bad..64f886fac2e 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/signal.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/ucontext.h>
@@ -322,4 +323,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, struct thread_info *ti)
 
 	if (ti->flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 		do_signal(regs, &current->blocked, syscall);
+
+	if (ti->flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c
index b326023baab..48b0f391263 100644
--- a/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/cris/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/user.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -36,4 +37,11 @@ void do_notify_resume(int canrestart, struct pt_regs *regs,
 	/* deal with pending signal delivery */
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
 		do_signal(canrestart,regs);
+
+	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c b/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c
index 4a7a62c6e78..6b0a2b6fed6 100644
--- a/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/frv/kernel/signal.c
@@ -572,6 +572,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(__u32 thread_info_flags)
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(__frame);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 
 } /* end do_notify_resume() */
diff --git a/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 8bbc8b0ee45..70e67e47d02 100644
--- a/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/h8300/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 					   TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		4
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	5	/* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	6	/* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_FREEZE		16	/* is freezing for suspend */
 
 /* as above, but as bit values */
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE		(1<<TIF_FREEZE)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK		0x0000FFFE	/* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
diff --git a/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c b/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c
index cf3472f7389..af842c369d2 100644
--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/signal.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -552,4 +553,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 thread_info_flags)
 {
 	if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 		do_signal(regs, NULL);
+
+	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c
index 5d7c0e5b9e7..89969e95004 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/process.c
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ do_notify_resume_user(sigset_t *unused, struct sigscratch *scr, long in_syscall)
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(&scr->pt);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 
 	/* copy user rbs to kernel rbs */
diff --git a/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 07bb5bd00e2..71578151a40 100644
--- a/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/m32r/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_thread_fault_code(void)
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	2	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		3	/* restore singlestep on return to user mode */
 #define TIF_IRET		4	/* return with iret */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	5	/* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	8	/* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
 #define TIF_USEDFPU		16	/* FPU was used by this task this quantum (SMP) */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	17	/* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
@@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_thread_fault_code(void)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1<<TIF_SINGLESTEP)
 #define _TIF_IRET		(1<<TIF_IRET)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_USEDFPU		(1<<TIF_USEDFPU)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
diff --git a/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c b/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c
index 18124542a6e..144b0f124fc 100644
--- a/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/m32r/kernel/signal.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/ucontext.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -408,5 +409,12 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *oldset,
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
 		do_signal(regs,oldset);
 
+	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
+
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_IRET);
 }
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
index f9df720d2e4..01cc1630b66 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$28");
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	2	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	3	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		4	/* secure computing */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	5	/* callback before returning to user */
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	9	/* restore signal mask in do_signal() */
 #define TIF_USEDFPU		16	/* FPU was used by this task this quantum (SMP) */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	17	/* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$28");
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1<<TIF_SECCOMP)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1<<TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_USEDFPU		(1<<TIF_USEDFPU)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c b/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c
index 830c5ef9932..6254041b942 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/signal.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 
 #include <asm/abi.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
@@ -700,4 +701,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, void *unused,
 	/* deal with pending signal delivery */
 	if (thread_info_flags & (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 		do_signal(regs);
+
+	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c b/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c
index feb2f2e810d..a21f43bc68e 100644
--- a/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/mn10300/kernel/signal.c
@@ -568,5 +568,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 thread_info_flags)
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(__frame);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 4ce0edfbe96..ac775a76bff 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		5
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	6	/* restore saved signal mask */
 #define TIF_FREEZE		7	/* is freezing for suspend */
+#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	8	/* callback before returning to user */
 
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
@@ -67,8 +68,9 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_32BIT		(1 << TIF_32BIT)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE		(1 << TIF_FREEZE)
+#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 
-#define _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK     (_TIF_SIGPENDING | \
+#define _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK     (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | \
                                  _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S b/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
index e552e547cb9..8c4712b74dc 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ intr_check_sig:
 	/* As above */
 	mfctl   %cr30,%r1
 	LDREG	TI_FLAGS(%r1),%r19
-	ldi	(_TIF_SIGPENDING|_TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK), %r20
+	ldi	(_TIF_SIGPENDING|_TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK|_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME), %r20
 	and,COND(<>)	%r19, %r20, %r0
 	b,n	intr_restore	/* skip past if we've nothing to do */
 
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c
index f82544225e8..8eb3c63c407 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/signal.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <asm/ucontext.h>
 #include <asm/rt_sigframe.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -645,4 +646,11 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, long in_syscall)
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING) ||
 	    test_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
 		do_signal(regs, in_syscall);
+
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)) {
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c b/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c
index 062bd64e65f..6b4fef877f9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/signal.c
@@ -536,4 +536,6 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 	tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+	if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+		key_replace_session_keyring();
 }
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c
index b5afbec1db5..04a21883f32 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -640,5 +640,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int save_r0,
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c
index 0663a0ee602..9e5c9b1d7e9 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -772,5 +772,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long thread_info
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c
index 181d069a2d4..7ce1a1005b1 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_32.c
@@ -590,6 +590,8 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0,
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
index ec82d76dc6f..647afbda7ae 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -613,5 +613,8 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0, unsigned long
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 }
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 4c578751e94..81e58238c4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -869,6 +869,8 @@ do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, void *unused, __u32 thread_info_flags)
 	if (thread_info_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
 		tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
+		if (current->replacement_session_keyring)
+			key_replace_session_keyring();
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index aec1931608a..0b73e4ec1ad 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -450,6 +450,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
+	/* Default timeouts */
+	chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+	chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
+
 	if (request_locality(chip, 0) != 0) {
 		rc = -ENODEV;
 		goto out_err;
@@ -457,12 +463,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
 
 	vendor = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_DID_VID(0));
 
-	/* Default timeouts */
-	chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
-	chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT);
-	chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
-	chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT);
-
 	dev_info(dev,
 		 "1.2 TPM (device-id 0x%X, rev-id %d)\n",
 		 vendor >> 16, ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_RID(0)));
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index 42b6c6319bc..87214a257d2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -130,17 +130,10 @@ static inline struct tun_sock *tun_sk(struct sock *sk)
 static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int err;
 
 	ASSERT_RTNL();
 
-	/* Check permissions */
-	if (((tun->owner != -1 && cred->euid != tun->owner) ||
-	     (tun->group != -1 && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) &&
-		!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	netif_tx_lock_bh(tun->dev);
 
 	err = -EINVAL;
@@ -926,6 +919,8 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 
 	dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
 	if (dev) {
+		const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
 		if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
 			return -EBUSY;
 		if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
@@ -935,6 +930,14 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 		else
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		if (((tun->owner != -1 && cred->euid != tun->owner) ||
+		     (tun->group != -1 && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+		err = security_tun_dev_attach(tun->sk);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+
 		err = tun_attach(tun, file);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
@@ -947,6 +950,9 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 
 		if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
+		err = security_tun_dev_create();
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
 
 		/* Set dev type */
 		if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
@@ -989,6 +995,8 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
 		tun->sk = sk;
 		container_of(sk, struct tun_sock, sk)->tun = tun;
 
+		security_tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+
 		tun_net_init(dev);
 
 		if (strchr(dev->name, '%')) {
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
index 9d7c99394ec..640f65c6ef8 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c
@@ -1752,12 +1752,12 @@ static int comedi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
 	if (dev->attached)
 		goto ok;
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) && dev->in_request_module) {
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module) {
 		DPRINTK("in request module\n");
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
-	if (capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) && dev->in_request_module)
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && dev->in_request_module)
 		goto ok;
 
 	dev->in_request_module = 1;
@@ -1770,8 +1770,8 @@ static int comedi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	dev->in_request_module = 0;
 
-	if (!dev->attached && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
-		DPRINTK("not attached and not CAP_SYS_MODULE\n");
+	if (!dev->attached && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+		DPRINTK("not attached and not CAP_NET_ADMIN\n");
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index b7c1603cd4b..7c1e65d5487 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -501,22 +501,22 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,
 		}
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Now fill out the bss section.  First pad the last page up
-	 * to the page boundary, and then perform a mmap to make sure
-	 * that there are zero-mapped pages up to and including the 
-	 * last bss page.
-	 */
-	if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
-		error = -EFAULT;
-		goto out_close;
-	}
+	if (last_bss > elf_bss) {
+		/*
+		 * Now fill out the bss section.  First pad the last page up
+		 * to the page boundary, and then perform a mmap to make sure
+		 * that there are zero-mapped pages up to and including the
+		 * last bss page.
+		 */
+		if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_close;
+		}
 
-	/* What we have mapped so far */
-	elf_bss = ELF_PAGESTART(elf_bss + ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
+		/* What we have mapped so far */
+		elf_bss = ELF_PAGESTART(elf_bss + ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
 
-	/* Map the last of the bss segment */
-	if (last_bss > elf_bss) {
+		/* Map the last of the bss segment */
 		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 		error = do_brk(elf_bss, last_bss - elf_bss);
 		up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
index b6440f52178..52366e877d7 100644
--- a/fs/locks.c
+++ b/fs/locks.c
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(flock, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd)
 	if (can_sleep)
 		lock->fl_flags |= FL_SLEEP;
 
-	error = security_file_lock(filp, cmd);
+	error = security_file_lock(filp, lock->fl_type);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_free;
 
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1f13751693a..fcfc5539252 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1533,9 +1533,11 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	error = ima_path_check(path,
-			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+	error = ima_path_check(path, acc_mode ?
+			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC) :
+			       ACC_MODE(flag) & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE),
 			       IMA_COUNT_UPDATE);
+
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	/*
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 5573508f707..36fcabbf518 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
 	int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
 	int ret;
 
+	validate_process_creds();
+
 	/* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
 	revert_creds(get_cred(current->real_cred));
 	new = prepare_creds();
@@ -86,8 +88,10 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
 	else
 		new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
 							new->cap_permitted);
+	validate_process_creds();
 	put_cred(override_creds(new));
 	put_cred(new);
+	validate_process_creds();
 	return 0;
 
 oom:
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
index 492c79b7800..24d58adfe5f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
@@ -496,7 +496,9 @@ nfsd(void *vrqstp)
 		/* Lock the export hash tables for reading. */
 		exp_readlock();
 
+		validate_process_creds();
 		svc_process(rqstp);
+		validate_process_creds();
 
 		/* Unlock export hash tables */
 		exp_readunlock();
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 23341c1063b..8fa09bfbcba 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -684,6 +684,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
 	__be32		err;
 	int		host_err;
 
+	validate_process_creds();
+
 	/*
 	 * If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
 	 * and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
@@ -740,6 +742,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
 out_nfserr:
 	err = nfserrno(host_err);
 out:
+	validate_process_creds();
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index dd98e807602..31191bf513e 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ out:
 int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
 	struct file *filp)
 {
-	int err;
+	int ret;
 	struct iattr newattrs;
 
 	/* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
@@ -214,12 +214,14 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
 	}
 
 	/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
-	newattrs.ia_valid |= should_remove_suid(dentry);
+	ret = should_remove_suid(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		newattrs.ia_valid |= ret | ATTR_FORCE;
 
 	mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-	err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+	ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
 	mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-	return err;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
@@ -957,6 +959,8 @@ struct file *dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags,
 	int error;
 	struct file *f;
 
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
 	/*
 	 * We must always pass in a valid mount pointer.   Historically
 	 * callers got away with not passing it, but we must enforce this at
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
index 14f2d71ea3c..0050fc40e8c 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ static struct dentry * sysfs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 const struct inode_operations sysfs_dir_inode_operations = {
 	.lookup		= sysfs_lookup,
 	.setattr	= sysfs_setattr,
+	.setxattr	= sysfs_setxattr,
 };
 
 static void remove_dir(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/inode.c b/fs/sysfs/inode.c
index 555f0ff988d..2b6a8d9de73 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/inode.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include "sysfs.h"
 
 extern struct super_block * sysfs_sb;
@@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ static struct backing_dev_info sysfs_backing_dev_info = {
 
 static const struct inode_operations sysfs_inode_operations ={
 	.setattr	= sysfs_setattr,
+	.setxattr	= sysfs_setxattr,
 };
 
 int __init sysfs_inode_init(void)
@@ -42,18 +45,37 @@ int __init sysfs_inode_init(void)
 	return bdi_init(&sysfs_backing_dev_info);
 }
 
+struct sysfs_inode_attrs *sysfs_init_inode_attrs(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
+{
+	struct sysfs_inode_attrs *attrs;
+	struct iattr *iattrs;
+
+	attrs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sysfs_inode_attrs), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!attrs)
+		return NULL;
+	iattrs = &attrs->ia_iattr;
+
+	/* assign default attributes */
+	iattrs->ia_mode = sd->s_mode;
+	iattrs->ia_uid = 0;
+	iattrs->ia_gid = 0;
+	iattrs->ia_atime = iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
+
+	return attrs;
+}
 int sysfs_setattr(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * iattr)
 {
 	struct inode * inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct sysfs_dirent * sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
-	struct iattr * sd_iattr;
+	struct sysfs_inode_attrs *sd_attrs;
+	struct iattr *iattrs;
 	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
 	int error;
 
 	if (!sd)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	sd_iattr = sd->s_iattr;
+	sd_attrs = sd->s_iattr;
 
 	error = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
 	if (error)
@@ -65,42 +87,77 @@ int sysfs_setattr(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * iattr)
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	if (!sd_iattr) {
+	if (!sd_attrs) {
 		/* setting attributes for the first time, allocate now */
-		sd_iattr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iattr), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!sd_iattr)
+		sd_attrs = sysfs_init_inode_attrs(sd);
+		if (!sd_attrs)
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		/* assign default attributes */
-		sd_iattr->ia_mode = sd->s_mode;
-		sd_iattr->ia_uid = 0;
-		sd_iattr->ia_gid = 0;
-		sd_iattr->ia_atime = sd_iattr->ia_mtime = sd_iattr->ia_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
-		sd->s_iattr = sd_iattr;
+		sd->s_iattr = sd_attrs;
+	} else {
+		/* attributes were changed at least once in past */
+		iattrs = &sd_attrs->ia_iattr;
+
+		if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
+			iattrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
+		if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
+			iattrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
+		if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
+			iattrs->ia_atime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_atime,
+					inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
+		if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
+			iattrs->ia_mtime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime,
+					inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
+		if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
+			iattrs->ia_ctime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime,
+					inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
+		if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
+			umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode;
+
+			if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
+				mode &= ~S_ISGID;
+			iattrs->ia_mode = sd->s_mode = mode;
+		}
 	}
+	return error;
+}
 
-	/* attributes were changed atleast once in past */
-
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
-		sd_iattr->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
-		sd_iattr->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
-		sd_iattr->ia_atime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_atime,
-						inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
-		sd_iattr->ia_mtime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime,
-						inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
-		sd_iattr->ia_ctime = timespec_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime,
-						inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
-		umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode;
-
-		if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
-			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
-		sd_iattr->ia_mode = sd->s_mode = mode;
-	}
+int sysfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+		size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct sysfs_dirent *sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
+	struct sysfs_inode_attrs *iattrs;
+	void *secdata;
+	int error;
+	u32 secdata_len = 0;
+
+	if (!sd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!sd->s_iattr)
+		sd->s_iattr = sysfs_init_inode_attrs(sd);
+	if (!sd->s_iattr)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	iattrs = sd->s_iattr;
+
+	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+		const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
+		error = security_inode_setsecurity(dentry->d_inode, suffix,
+						value, size, flags);
+		if (error)
+			goto out;
+		error = security_inode_getsecctx(dentry->d_inode,
+						&secdata, &secdata_len);
+		if (error)
+			goto out;
+		if (iattrs->ia_secdata)
+			security_release_secctx(iattrs->ia_secdata,
+						iattrs->ia_secdata_len);
+		iattrs->ia_secdata = secdata;
+		iattrs->ia_secdata_len = secdata_len;
 
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+out:
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -146,6 +203,7 @@ static int sysfs_count_nlink(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
 static void sysfs_init_inode(struct sysfs_dirent *sd, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct bin_attribute *bin_attr;
+	struct sysfs_inode_attrs *iattrs;
 
 	inode->i_private = sysfs_get(sd);
 	inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &sysfs_aops;
@@ -154,16 +212,20 @@ static void sysfs_init_inode(struct sysfs_dirent *sd, struct inode *inode)
 	inode->i_ino = sd->s_ino;
 	lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_mutex, &sysfs_inode_imutex_key);
 
-	if (sd->s_iattr) {
+	iattrs = sd->s_iattr;
+	if (iattrs) {
 		/* sysfs_dirent has non-default attributes
 		 * get them for the new inode from persistent copy
 		 * in sysfs_dirent
 		 */
-		set_inode_attr(inode, sd->s_iattr);
+		set_inode_attr(inode, &iattrs->ia_iattr);
+		if (iattrs->ia_secdata)
+			security_inode_notifysecctx(inode,
+						iattrs->ia_secdata,
+						iattrs->ia_secdata_len);
 	} else
 		set_default_inode_attr(inode, sd->s_mode);
 
-
 	/* initialize inode according to type */
 	switch (sysfs_type(sd)) {
 	case SYSFS_DIR:
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/symlink.c b/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
index 1d897ad808e..c5081ad7702 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "sysfs.h"
 
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ static void sysfs_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd, void *co
 }
 
 const struct inode_operations sysfs_symlink_inode_operations = {
+	.setxattr = sysfs_setxattr,
 	.readlink = generic_readlink,
 	.follow_link = sysfs_follow_link,
 	.put_link = sysfs_put_link,
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h b/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h
index 3fa0d98481e..af4c4e7482a 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h
+++ b/fs/sysfs/sysfs.h
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
  * This file is released under the GPLv2.
  */
 
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
 struct sysfs_open_dirent;
 
 /* type-specific structures for sysfs_dirent->s_* union members */
@@ -31,6 +33,12 @@ struct sysfs_elem_bin_attr {
 	struct hlist_head	buffers;
 };
 
+struct sysfs_inode_attrs {
+	struct iattr	ia_iattr;
+	void		*ia_secdata;
+	u32		ia_secdata_len;
+};
+
 /*
  * sysfs_dirent - the building block of sysfs hierarchy.  Each and
  * every sysfs node is represented by single sysfs_dirent.
@@ -56,7 +64,7 @@ struct sysfs_dirent {
 	unsigned int		s_flags;
 	ino_t			s_ino;
 	umode_t			s_mode;
-	struct iattr		*s_iattr;
+	struct sysfs_inode_attrs *s_iattr;
 };
 
 #define SD_DEACTIVATED_BIAS		INT_MIN
@@ -148,6 +156,8 @@ static inline void __sysfs_put(struct sysfs_dirent *sd)
 struct inode *sysfs_get_inode(struct sysfs_dirent *sd);
 void sysfs_delete_inode(struct inode *inode);
 int sysfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr);
+int sysfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+		size_t size, int flags);
 int sysfs_hash_and_remove(struct sysfs_dirent *dir_sd, const char *name);
 int sysfs_inode_init(void);
 
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 1c3d0af59dd..6d4f6d3449f 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -66,22 +66,28 @@ xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, const char *name, int mask)
 	return inode_permission(inode, mask);
 }
 
-int
-vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
-		size_t size, int flags)
+/**
+ *  __vfs_setxattr_noperm - perform setxattr operation without performing
+ *  permission checks.
+ *
+ *  @dentry - object to perform setxattr on
+ *  @name - xattr name to set
+ *  @value - value to set @name to
+ *  @size - size of @value
+ *  @flags - flags to pass into filesystem operations
+ *
+ *  returns the result of the internal setxattr or setsecurity operations.
+ *
+ *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
+ *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
+ *  permission checks.
+ */
+int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+		const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	int error;
-
-	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
+	int error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	if (error)
-		goto out;
-	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (inode->i_op->setxattr) {
 		error = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 		if (!error) {
@@ -97,6 +103,29 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 		if (!error)
 			fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+int
+vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+		size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	int error;
+
+	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 4fa99969631..24520a539c6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -114,6 +114,13 @@ struct thread_group_cred {
  */
 struct cred {
 	atomic_t	usage;
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	atomic_t	subscribers;	/* number of processes subscribed */
+	void		*put_addr;
+	unsigned	magic;
+#define CRED_MAGIC	0x43736564
+#define CRED_MAGIC_DEAD	0x44656144
+#endif
 	uid_t		uid;		/* real UID of the task */
 	gid_t		gid;		/* real GID of the task */
 	uid_t		suid;		/* saved UID of the task */
@@ -143,7 +150,9 @@ struct cred {
 };
 
 extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
+extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
 extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
+extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
 extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
 extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
 extern struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void);
@@ -158,6 +167,60 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
 extern void __init cred_init(void);
 
+/*
+ * check for validity of credentials
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
+extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
+				     const char *, unsigned);
+
+static inline bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
+		return true;
+	if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
+		return true;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+	if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
+		return true;
+	if ((*(u32*)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
+	    (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
+		return true;
+#endif
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
+				    const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+	if (unlikely(creds_are_invalid(cred)))
+		__invalid_creds(cred, file, line);
+}
+
+#define validate_creds(cred)				\
+do {							\
+	__validate_creds((cred), __FILE__, __LINE__);	\
+} while(0)
+
+#define validate_process_creds()				\
+do {								\
+	__validate_process_creds(current, __FILE__, __LINE__);	\
+} while(0)
+
+extern void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *);
+#else
+static inline void validate_creds(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+}
+static inline void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+}
+static inline void validate_process_creds(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 /**
  * get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials
  * @cred: The new credentials to reference
@@ -186,7 +249,9 @@ static inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
  */
 static inline const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return get_new_cred((struct cred *) cred);
+	struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred;
+	validate_creds(cred);
+	return get_new_cred(nonconst_cred);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -204,7 +269,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
 
-	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(cred)->usage) <= 0);
+	validate_creds(cred);
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
 		__put_cred(cred);
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index e544f466d69..cd50dfa1d4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -129,7 +129,10 @@ struct key {
 	struct rw_semaphore	sem;		/* change vs change sem */
 	struct key_user		*user;		/* owner of this key */
 	void			*security;	/* security data for this key */
-	time_t			expiry;		/* time at which key expires (or 0) */
+	union {
+		time_t		expiry;		/* time at which key expires (or 0) */
+		time_t		revoked_at;	/* time at which key was revoked */
+	};
 	uid_t			uid;
 	gid_t			gid;
 	key_perm_t		perm;		/* access permissions */
@@ -275,6 +278,8 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key)
 extern ctl_table key_sysctls[];
 #endif
 
+extern void key_replace_session_keyring(void);
+
 /*
  * the userspace interface
  */
@@ -297,6 +302,7 @@ extern void key_init(void);
 #define key_fsuid_changed(t)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_fsgid_changed(t)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_init()			do { } while(0)
+#define key_replace_session_keyring()	do { } while(0)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/include/linux/keyctl.h b/include/linux/keyctl.h
index c0688eb7209..bd383f1944f 100644
--- a/include/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -52,5 +52,6 @@
 #define KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT		15	/* set key timeout */
 #define KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY		16	/* assume request_key() authorisation */
 #define KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY		17	/* get key security label */
+#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18	/* apply session keyring to parent process */
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index e461b2c3d71..190c3785487 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC     4
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK    5
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY     6
+#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT     7
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	union 	{
 		struct {
@@ -66,16 +67,19 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 		} key_struct;
 #endif
 	} u;
-	const char *function;
 	/* this union contains LSM specific data */
 	union {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 		/* SMACK data */
 		struct smack_audit_data {
+			const char *function;
 			char *subject;
 			char *object;
 			char *request;
 			int result;
 		} smack_audit_data;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
 		/* SELinux data */
 		struct {
 			u32 ssid;
@@ -83,10 +87,12 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 			u16 tclass;
 			u32 requested;
 			u32 audited;
+			u32 denied;
 			struct av_decision *avd;
 			int result;
 		} selinux_audit_data;
-	} lsm_priv;
+#endif
+	};
 	/* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */
 	void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
 	void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
@@ -104,7 +110,7 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
 /* Initialize an LSM audit data structure. */
 #define COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d, _t) \
 	{ memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct common_audit_data)); \
-	 (_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; (_d)->function = __func__; }
+	 (_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
 
 void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 0f1ea4a6695..9304027673b 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ struct task_struct {
 	struct mutex cred_guard_mutex;	/* guard against foreign influences on
 					 * credential calculations
 					 * (notably. ptrace) */
+	struct cred *replacement_session_keyring; /* for KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT */
 
 	char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
 				     - access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock
@@ -2077,7 +2078,7 @@ static inline unsigned long wait_task_inactive(struct task_struct *p,
 #define for_each_process(p) \
 	for (p = &init_task ; (p = next_task(p)) != &init_task ; )
 
-extern bool is_single_threaded(struct task_struct *);
+extern bool current_is_single_threaded(void);
 
 /*
  * Careful: do_each_thread/while_each_thread is a double loop so
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1f16eea2017..d050b66ab9e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
 extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 		       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -653,6 +653,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
  *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @cred_alloc_blank:
+ *	@cred points to the credentials.
+ *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ *	Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
+ *	cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
  * @cred_free:
  *	@cred points to the credentials.
  *	Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
@@ -665,6 +670,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@new points to the new credentials.
  *	@old points to the original credentials.
  *	Install a new set of credentials.
+ * @cred_transfer:
+ *	@new points to the new credentials.
+ *	@old points to the original credentials.
+ *	Transfer data from original creds to new creds
  * @kernel_act_as:
  *	Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
  *	@new points to the credentials to be modified.
@@ -678,6 +687,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
  *	The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
  *	Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_module_request:
+ *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
+ *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ *	Return 0 if successful.
  * @task_setuid:
  *	Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
  *	attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates
@@ -994,6 +1007,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
  * @req_classify_flow:
  *	Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @tun_dev_create:
+ *	Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
+ * @tun_dev_post_create:
+ *	This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
+ *	structure.
+ *	@sk contains the newly created sock structure.
+ * @tun_dev_attach:
+ *	Check permissions prior to attaching to a persistent TUN device.  This
+ *	hook can also be used by the module to update any security state
+ *	associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
+ *	@sk contains the existing sock structure.
  *
  * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
  *
@@ -1088,6 +1112,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
  *      an error.
  *	May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ * @key_session_to_parent:
+ *	Forcibly assign the session keyring from a process to its parent
+ *	process.
+ *	@cred: Pointer to process's credentials
+ *	@parent_cred: Pointer to parent process's credentials
+ *	@keyring: Proposed new session keyring
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
  *
  * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
  *
@@ -1229,7 +1260,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
- * @ptrace_may_access:
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
  *	Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
  *	@child process.
  *	Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
@@ -1244,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
  *	current process before allowing the current process to present itself
  *	to the @parent process for tracing.
- *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
+ *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
  *	checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
  *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1351,12 +1382,47 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	audit_rule_init.
  *	@rule contains the allocated rule
  *
+ * @inode_notifysecctx:
+ *	Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
+ *	should be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the
+ *	security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS client invokes
+ *	this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
+ *	value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
+ *	file's attributes to the client.
+ *
+ * 	Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * 	@inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ * 	@ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ * 	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_setsecctx:
+ * 	Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
+ * 	incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
+ * 	fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
+ * 	xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
+ * 	this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
+ * 	backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
+ * 	operation.
+ *
+ * 	Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * 	@dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ * 	@ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ * 	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_getsecctx:
+ * 	Returns a string containing all relavent security context information
+ *
+ * 	@inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ *	@ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
+ *	@ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
  * This is the main security structure.
  */
 struct security_operations {
 	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-	int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+	int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 	int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
 	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
 		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1483,12 +1549,15 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 
 	int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
+	int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 	void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			    gfp_t gfp);
 	void (*cred_commit)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+	int (*kernel_module_request)(void);
 	int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				int flags);
@@ -1556,6 +1625,10 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+	int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+	int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+	int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket *sock,
 				    struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1592,6 +1665,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
 	void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 	void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
+	int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
+	void (*tun_dev_post_create)(struct sock *sk);
+	int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1620,6 +1696,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       key_perm_t perm);
 	int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+	int (*key_session_to_parent)(const struct cred *cred,
+				     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				     struct key *key);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -1637,7 +1716,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 /* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1736,11 +1815,14 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
 int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+int security_kernel_module_request(void);
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags);
@@ -1796,6 +1878,9 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 struct security_mnt_opts {
 };
@@ -1818,10 +1903,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					     unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -2266,6 +2351,11 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 { }
 
@@ -2281,6 +2371,11 @@ static inline void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new,
 {
 }
 
+static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
+					   const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -2292,6 +2387,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
 				       int flags)
 {
@@ -2537,6 +2637,19 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
 static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
+
+static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
@@ -2575,6 +2688,9 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 			const struct request_sock *req);
 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 			struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_tun_dev_create(void);
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk);
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk);
 
 #else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
@@ -2725,6 +2841,20 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 			struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
+
+static inline int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2881,6 +3011,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key);
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 			    const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+				   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				   struct key *key);
 
 #else
 
@@ -2908,6 +3041,13 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+						 const struct cred *parent_cred,
+						 struct key *key)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
index d131e352cfe..5c84af8c5f6 100644
--- a/include/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct xattr_handler {
 ssize_t xattr_getsecurity(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
+int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
 int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
 int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);
 
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
index 9f3391090b3..9a4715a2f6b 100644
--- a/kernel/acct.c
+++ b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -491,13 +491,17 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct,
 	u64 run_time;
 	struct timespec uptime;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
+	const struct cred *orig_cred;
+
+	/* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled accounting */
+	orig_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);
 
 	/*
 	 * First check to see if there is enough free_space to continue
 	 * the process accounting system.
 	 */
 	if (!check_free_space(acct, file))
-		return;
+		goto out;
 
 	/*
 	 * Fill the accounting struct with the needed info as recorded
@@ -578,6 +582,8 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct,
 			       sizeof(acct_t), &file->f_pos);
 	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = flim;
 	set_fs(fs);
+out:
+	revert_creds(orig_cred);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 1bb4d7e5d61..006fcab009d 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
 #include "cred-internals.h"
 
+#if 0
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+	printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
+void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+}
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+	no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
 
 /*
@@ -36,6 +48,10 @@ static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
  */
 struct cred init_cred = {
 	.usage			= ATOMIC_INIT(4),
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	.subscribers		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
+	.magic			= CRED_MAGIC,
+#endif
 	.securebits		= SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
 	.cap_inheritable	= CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
 	.cap_permitted		= CAP_FULL_SET,
@@ -48,6 +64,31 @@ struct cred init_cred = {
 #endif
 };
 
+static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
+
+	atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
+#endif
+}
+
 /*
  * Dispose of the shared task group credentials
  */
@@ -85,9 +126,22 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
 
+	kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
+	    atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
+	    read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
+		panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
+		      " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
+		      cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
+		      atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+		      read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+#else
 	if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
 		panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
 		      cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
+#endif
 
 	security_cred_free(cred);
 	key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
@@ -106,12 +160,90 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
  */
 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
 {
+	kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
+	       atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
+	cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
+	cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
+#endif
+	BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
+	BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
 
 	call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
 
+/*
+ * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
+ */
+void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct cred *cred;
+
+	kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
+	       atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
+
+	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
+	tsk->real_cred = NULL;
+	validate_creds(cred);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
+	tsk->cred = NULL;
+	validate_creds(cred);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->replacement_session_keyring;
+	if (cred) {
+		tsk->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+		validate_creds(cred);
+		put_cred(cred);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
+ * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
+ */
+struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
+{
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new)
+		return NULL;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new->tgcred) {
+		kfree(new);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1);
+#endif
+
+	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+
+	if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
+#endif
+	return new;
+
+error:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /**
  * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
  *
@@ -132,16 +264,19 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
 	const struct cred *old;
 	struct cred *new;
 
-	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);
+	validate_process_creds();
 
 	new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new)
 		return NULL;
 
+	kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
 	old = task->cred;
 	memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
 
 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
 	get_uid(new->user);
 
@@ -157,6 +292,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
 
 	if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
 		goto error;
+	validate_creds(new);
 	return new;
 
 error:
@@ -229,9 +365,12 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
 	if (!new)
 		return NULL;
 
+	kdebug("prepare_usermodehelper_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
 	memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
 
 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
 	get_uid(new->user);
 
@@ -250,6 +389,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
 #endif
 	if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
 		goto error;
+	validate_creds(new);
 
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
 	return new;
@@ -286,6 +426,10 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
 	    ) {
 		p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
 		get_cred(p->cred);
+		alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
+		kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
+		       p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
+		       read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
 		atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -331,6 +475,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
 
 	atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
 	p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
+	validate_creds(new);
 	return 0;
 
 error_put:
@@ -355,13 +501,20 @@ error_put:
 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 {
 	struct task_struct *task = current;
-	const struct cred *old;
+	const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
 
-	BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
-	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
+	kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+	BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
+	validate_creds(old);
+	validate_creds(new);
+#endif
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
 
-	old = task->real_cred;
 	security_commit_creds(new, old);
 
 	get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
@@ -390,12 +543,14 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 	 *   cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
 	 *   we should be checking for it.  -DaveM
 	 */
+	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
 	if (new->user != old->user)
 		atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
 	if (new->user != old->user)
 		atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
 
 	sched_switch_user(task);
 
@@ -428,6 +583,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
  */
 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
 {
+	kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
+#endif
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
 	put_cred(new);
 }
@@ -444,7 +606,20 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
 	const struct cred *old = current->cred;
 
-	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
+	kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+	validate_creds(old);
+	validate_creds(new);
+	get_cred(new);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
+
+	kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
+	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(old));
 	return old;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
@@ -460,7 +635,15 @@ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
 {
 	const struct cred *override = current->cred;
 
+	kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
+	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(old));
+
+	validate_creds(old);
+	validate_creds(override);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
+	alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
 	put_cred(override);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
@@ -502,11 +685,15 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
 	if (!new)
 		return NULL;
 
+	kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
+
 	if (daemon)
 		old = get_task_cred(daemon);
 	else
 		old = get_cred(&init_cred);
 
+	validate_creds(old);
+
 	*new = *old;
 	get_uid(new->user);
 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
@@ -526,7 +713,9 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
 		goto error;
 
 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
 	put_cred(old);
+	validate_creds(new);
 	return new;
 
 error:
@@ -589,3 +778,95 @@ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+
+/*
+ * dump invalid credentials
+ */
+static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
+			       const struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
+	       label, cred,
+	       cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
+	       cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
+	       cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
+	       cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
+	       atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
+	       cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
+	       cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
+	if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
+	    (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
+	     (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
+		printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
+		       ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
+		       ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * report use of invalid credentials
+ */
+void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
+	dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
+	BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
+
+/*
+ * check the credentials on a process
+ */
+void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			      const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+	if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
+		if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
+			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
+			goto invalid_creds;
+	} else {
+		if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
+			     read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
+			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
+			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
+			goto invalid_creds;
+	}
+	return;
+
+invalid_creds:
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
+	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
+
+	dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
+	if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
+		dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
+	else
+		printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
+	BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
+
+/*
+ * check creds for do_exit()
+ */
+void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
+	       tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
+	       atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
+	       read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
+
+	__validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 869dc221733..c98ff7a8025 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
 
 	tracehook_report_exit(&code);
 
+	validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
+
 	/*
 	 * We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
 	 * leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
@@ -1009,6 +1011,8 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
 	if (tsk->splice_pipe)
 		__free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
 
+	validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
+
 	preempt_disable();
 	/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
 	tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index e6c04d462ab..aab8579c609 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -152,8 +152,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
 	WARN_ON(tsk == current);
 
-	put_cred(tsk->real_cred);
-	put_cred(tsk->cred);
+	exit_creds(tsk);
 	delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
 
 	if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk))
@@ -1297,8 +1296,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
 	module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
 bad_fork_cleanup_count:
 	atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
-	put_cred(p->real_cred);
-	put_cred(p->cred);
+	exit_creds(p);
 bad_fork_free:
 	free_task(p);
 fork_out:
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 385c31a1bdb..4e8cae2e914 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
 #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50	/* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
 	static int kmod_loop_msg;
 
+	ret = security_kernel_module_request();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	va_start(args, fmt);
 	ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);
@@ -462,6 +466,7 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info,
 	int retval = 0;
 
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
+	validate_creds(sub_info->cred);
 
 	helper_lock();
 	if (sub_info->path[0] == '\0')
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 082c320e4db..307c285af59 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
 }
 
 bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 58be76017fd..71d8dc7f992 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/slow-work.h>
 #include <linux/perf_counter.h>
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 12327b2bb78..fbb87cf138c 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -653,6 +653,21 @@ config DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
 	  This is a relatively cheap check but if you care about maximum
 	  performance, say N.
 
+config DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+	bool "Debug credential management"
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
+	help
+	  Enable this to turn on some debug checking for credential
+	  management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
+	  pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to
+	  see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred
+	  struct.
+
+	  Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, this also checks that the
+	  security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 #
 # Select this config option from the architecture Kconfig, if it
 # it is preferred to always offer frame pointers as a config
diff --git a/lib/is_single_threaded.c b/lib/is_single_threaded.c
index f1ed2fe76c6..bd2bea96336 100644
--- a/lib/is_single_threaded.c
+++ b/lib/is_single_threaded.c
@@ -12,34 +12,47 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
-/**
- * is_single_threaded - Determine if a thread group is single-threaded or not
- * @p: A task in the thread group in question
- *
- * This returns true if the thread group to which a task belongs is single
- * threaded, false if it is not.
+/*
+ * Returns true if the task does not share ->mm with another thread/process.
  */
-bool is_single_threaded(struct task_struct *p)
+bool current_is_single_threaded(void)
 {
-	struct task_struct *g, *t;
-	struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
+	struct task_struct *task = current;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
+	struct task_struct *p, *t;
+	bool ret;
 
-	if (atomic_read(&p->signal->count) != 1)
-		goto no;
+	if (atomic_read(&task->signal->live) != 1)
+		return false;
 
-	if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-		do_each_thread(g, t) {
-			if (t->mm == mm && t != p)
-				goto no_unlock;
-		} while_each_thread(g, t);
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-	}
+	if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) == 1)
+		return true;
 
-	return true;
+	ret = false;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for_each_process(p) {
+		if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+			continue;
+		if (unlikely(p == task->group_leader))
+			continue;
+
+		t = p;
+		do {
+			if (unlikely(t->mm == mm))
+				goto found;
+			if (likely(t->mm))
+				break;
+			/*
+			 * t->mm == NULL. Make sure next_thread/next_task
+			 * will see other CLONE_VM tasks which might be
+			 * forked before exiting.
+			 */
+			smp_rmb();
+		} while_each_thread(p, t);
+	}
+	ret = true;
+found:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-no_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-no:
-	return false;
+	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 6a94475aee8..278d489aad3 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ void dev_load(struct net *net, const char *name)
 	dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, name);
 	read_unlock(&dev_base_lock);
 
-	if (!dev && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+	if (!dev && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		request_module("%s", name);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
index e92beb9e55e..6428b342b16 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int tcp_set_default_congestion_control(const char *name)
 	spin_lock(&tcp_cong_list_lock);
 	ca = tcp_ca_find(name);
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
-	if (!ca && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
+	if (!ca && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
 		spin_unlock(&tcp_cong_list_lock);
 
 		request_module("tcp_%s", name);
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
 	/* not found attempt to autoload module */
-	if (!ca && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
+	if (!ca && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		request_module("tcp_%s", name);
 		rcu_read_lock();
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index b56e7f9ecbc..95ecc06392d 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= lsm_audit.o
-endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 88f752e8152..fce07a7bc82 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -386,6 +391,10 @@ static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
 
+static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -396,6 +405,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -701,10 +715,26 @@ static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
 
+
+
 static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 				  struct flowi *fl)
 {
 }
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cap_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -792,6 +822,20 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 			 unsigned long flags)
@@ -815,6 +859,13 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+				     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				     struct key *key)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -854,7 +905,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 
 void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
@@ -940,11 +991,14 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
@@ -992,6 +1046,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
@@ -1020,6 +1077,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
@@ -1038,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e3097c0a131..fe30751a6cd 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
  *			   another
  * @child: The process to be accessed
  * @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
  * granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 747a464943a..74d5447d7df 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-y := \
+	gc.o \
 	key.o \
 	keyring.o \
 	keyctl.o \
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c766c68a63b..792c0a611a6 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
 		return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
 
+	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1e616aef55f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/* Key garbage collector
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Delay between key revocation/expiry in seconds
+ */
+unsigned key_gc_delay = 5 * 60;
+
+/*
+ * Reaper
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long);
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *);
+static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0);
+static DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
+static key_serial_t key_gc_cursor; /* the last key the gc considered */
+static unsigned long key_gc_executing;
+static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+
+/*
+ * Schedule a garbage collection run
+ * - precision isn't particularly important
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
+{
+	unsigned long expires;
+	time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+
+	kenter("%ld", gc_at - now);
+
+	gc_at += key_gc_delay;
+
+	if (now >= gc_at) {
+		schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+	} else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
+		expires = jiffies + (gc_at - now) * HZ;
+		mod_timer(&key_gc_timer, expires);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * The garbage collector timer kicked off
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
+{
+	kenter("");
+	key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+	schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring
+ * - return true if we altered the keyring
+ */
+static bool key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+	__releases(key_serial_lock)
+{
+	struct keyring_list *klist;
+	struct key *key;
+	int loop;
+
+	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+		goto dont_gc;
+
+	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
+	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+	if (!klist)
+		goto dont_gc;
+
+	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+		key = klist->keys[loop];
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+		    (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit))
+			goto do_gc;
+	}
+
+dont_gc:
+	kleave(" = false");
+	return false;
+
+do_gc:
+	key_gc_cursor = keyring->serial;
+	key_get(keyring);
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
+	key_put(keyring);
+	kleave(" = true");
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collector for keys
+ * - this involves scanning the keyrings for dead, expired and revoked keys
+ *   that have overstayed their welcome
+ */
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct rb_node *rb;
+	key_serial_t cursor;
+	struct key *key, *xkey;
+	time_t new_timer = LONG_MAX, limit;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &key_gc_executing)) {
+		key_schedule_gc(current_kernel_time().tv_sec);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+	if (limit > key_gc_delay)
+		limit -= key_gc_delay;
+	else
+		limit = key_gc_delay;
+
+	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+	if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&key_serial_tree))
+		goto reached_the_end;
+
+	cursor = key_gc_cursor;
+	if (cursor < 0)
+		cursor = 0;
+
+	/* find the first key above the cursor */
+	key = NULL;
+	rb = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+	while (rb) {
+		xkey = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (cursor < xkey->serial) {
+			key = xkey;
+			rb = rb->rb_left;
+		} else if (cursor > xkey->serial) {
+			rb = rb->rb_right;
+		} else {
+			rb = rb_next(rb);
+			if (!rb)
+				goto reached_the_end;
+			key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!key)
+		goto reached_the_end;
+
+	/* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
+	for (;;) {
+		if (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry < new_timer)
+			new_timer = key->expiry;
+
+		if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
+		    key_gc_keyring(key, limit)) {
+			/* the gc ate our lock */
+			schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+			goto no_unlock;
+		}
+
+		rb = rb_next(&key->serial_node);
+		if (!rb) {
+			key_gc_cursor = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+no_unlock:
+	clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+	if (new_timer < LONG_MAX)
+		key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+
+	kleave("");
+	return;
+
+reached_the_end:
+	key_gc_cursor = 0;
+	goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 9fb679c66b8..24ba0307b7a 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -124,11 +124,18 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 					struct key *dest_keyring,
 					unsigned long flags);
 
-extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 				 key_perm_t perm);
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE	0x01
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL	0x02
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK	0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
 
+extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
+extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t expiry_at);
+
 /*
  * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way
  */
@@ -194,6 +201,7 @@ extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
 extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
 				size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
 
 /*
  * debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 4a1297d1ada..08531ad0f25 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
+		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
 
 		if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
 			awaken = 1;
@@ -642,10 +643,8 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
 	goto error;
 
  found:
-	/* pretend it doesn't exist if it's dead */
-	if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0 ||
-	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
-	    key->type == &key_type_dead)
+	/* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
+	if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
 		goto not_found;
 
 	/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
@@ -890,6 +889,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
  */
 void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 {
+	struct timespec now;
+	time_t time;
+
 	key_check(key);
 
 	/* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
@@ -902,6 +904,14 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 	    key->type->revoke)
 		key->type->revoke(key);
 
+	/* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
+	now = current_kernel_time();
+	time = now.tv_sec;
+	if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
+		key->revoked_at = time;
+		key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at);
+	}
+
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 
 } /* end key_revoke() */
@@ -958,8 +968,10 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
 	for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
 		key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
 
-		if (key->type == ktype)
+		if (key->type == ktype) {
 			key->type = &key_type_dead;
+			set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
+		}
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
@@ -984,6 +996,8 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
 	up_write(&key_types_sem);
 
+	key_schedule_gc(0);
+
 } /* end unregister_key_type() */
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 7f09fb897d2..74c96852459 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error3;
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
-		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+					   KEY_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -233,9 +234,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	unsigned long lflags;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -309,7 +312,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -337,10 +340,16 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
-		goto error;
+		if (ret != -EACCES)
+			goto error;
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+		if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+			goto error;
+		}
 	}
 
 	key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
@@ -363,7 +372,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -389,13 +398,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -423,13 +432,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, 0);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -465,7 +474,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *tmpbuf;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
 		 * authorisation token handy */
@@ -474,7 +483,8 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 			if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
 				key_put(instkey);
 				key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
-							  0, 1, 0);
+							  KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+							  0);
 				if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 					goto okay;
 			}
@@ -558,7 +568,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	}
 
 	/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -567,7 +577,8 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
-		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+					   KEY_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -637,7 +648,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	long ret;
 
 	/* find the key first */
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0, 0);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = -ENOKEY;
 		goto error;
@@ -700,7 +711,8 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 	if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
 		goto error;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -805,7 +817,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
 	if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
 		goto error;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -847,7 +860,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
 	if (ringid > 0) {
-		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dkref))
 			return PTR_ERR(dkref);
 		*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1083,7 +1096,8 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	time_t expiry;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -1101,6 +1115,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	}
 
 	key->expiry = expiry;
+	key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 	key_put(key);
@@ -1170,7 +1185,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *context;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1182,7 +1197,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		key_put(instkey);
 
-		key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 	}
@@ -1213,6 +1228,105 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
+ * parent process
+ * - the keyring must exist and must grant us LINK permission
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT)
+ */
+long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *me, *parent;
+	const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
+	struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+	key_ref_t keyring_r;
+	int ret;
+
+	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+
+	/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
+	 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
+	 * our parent */
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	cred = cred_alloc_blank();
+	if (!cred)
+		goto error_keyring;
+
+	cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+	keyring_r = NULL;
+
+	me = current;
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	parent = me->real_parent;
+	ret = -EPERM;
+
+	/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
+	if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the parent must be single threaded */
+	if (atomic_read(&parent->signal->count) != 1)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
+	 * there's no point */
+	mycred = current_cred();
+	pcred = __task_cred(parent);
+	if (mycred == pcred ||
+	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+		goto already_same;
+
+	/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
+	 * SUID/SGID */
+	if (pcred-> uid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	    pcred->euid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	    pcred->suid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	    pcred-> gid	!= mycred->egid	||
+	    pcred->egid	!= mycred->egid	||
+	    pcred->sgid	!= mycred->egid)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
+	if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
+	 * keyring from this process */
+	ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
+					     key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
+	 * that */
+	oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+
+	/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
+	 * restarting */
+	parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
+	cred = NULL;
+	set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	if (oldcred)
+		put_cred(oldcred);
+	return 0;
+
+already_same:
+	ret = 0;
+not_permitted:
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return ret;
+
+error_keyring:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_r);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * the key control system call
@@ -1298,6 +1412,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 					   (char __user *) arg3,
 					   (size_t) arg4);
 
+	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 3dba81c2eba..ac977f661a7 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1000,3 +1000,88 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
 	}
 
 } /* end keyring_revoke() */
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a key is dead
+ */
+static bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
+{
+	return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+		(key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect garbage from the contents of a keyring
+ */
+void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+{
+	struct keyring_list *klist, *new;
+	struct key *key;
+	int loop, keep, max;
+
+	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
+	if (!klist)
+		goto just_return;
+
+	/* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
+	keep = 0;
+	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
+		if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit));
+			keep++;
+
+	if (keep == klist->nkeys)
+		goto just_return;
+
+	/* allocate a new keyring payload */
+	max = roundup(keep, 4);
+	new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new)
+		goto just_return;
+	new->maxkeys = max;
+	new->nkeys = 0;
+	new->delkey = 0;
+
+	/* install the live keys
+	 * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life
+	 */
+	keep = 0;
+	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+		key = klist->keys[loop];
+		if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
+			if (keep >= max)
+				goto discard_new;
+			new->keys[keep++] = key_get(key);
+		}
+	}
+	new->nkeys = keep;
+
+	/* adjust the quota */
+	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+			    sizeof(struct keyring_list) +
+			    KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep);
+
+	if (keep == 0) {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
+		kfree(new);
+	} else {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
+	kleave(" [yes]");
+	return;
+
+discard_new:
+	new->nkeys = keep;
+	keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
+just_return:
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" [no]");
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 769f9bdfd2b..9d01021ca0c 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -91,59 +91,94 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
 
-static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+	n = rb_next(n);
 	while (n) {
 		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
-		if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+		if (key->user->user_ns == user_ns)
 			break;
 		n = rb_next(n);
 	}
 	return n;
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n));
+	return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r)
+static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
-	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
-	return __key_serial_next(n);
-}
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+	struct key *minkey = NULL;
 
-static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
+	while (n) {
+		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (id < key->serial) {
+			if (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)
+				minkey = key;
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		} else if (id > key->serial) {
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		} else {
+			minkey = key;
+			break;
+		}
+		key = NULL;
+	}
 
+	if (!minkey)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (minkey->user->user_ns == user_ns)
+			return minkey;
+		n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
+		if (!n)
+			return NULL;
+		minkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+	}
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+	__acquires(key_serial_lock)
 {
-	struct rb_node *_p;
-	loff_t pos = *_pos;
+	key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
+	struct key *key;
 
 	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
 
-	_p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree);
-	while (pos > 0 && _p) {
-		pos--;
-		_p = key_serial_next(_p);
-	}
-
-	return _p;
+	if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	key = find_ge_key(pos);
+	if (!key)
+		return NULL;
+	*_pos = key->serial;
+	return &key->serial_node;
+}
 
+static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+	return key->serial;
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
-	(*_pos)++;
-	return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+	struct rb_node *n;
 
+	n = key_serial_next(v);
+	if (n)
+		*_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+	return n;
 }
 
 static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+	__releases(key_serial_lock)
 {
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
 }
@@ -174,11 +209,9 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
 	if (key->expiry == 0) {
 		memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
-	}
-	else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+	} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
 		memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
-	}
-	else {
+	} else {
 		timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
 
 		if (timo < 60)
@@ -218,9 +251,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-
 	return 0;
-
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
@@ -246,6 +277,7 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
 	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
 	return __key_user_next(n);
 }
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users
@@ -253,10 +285,10 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
 static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	return seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+	__acquires(key_user_lock)
 {
 	struct rb_node *_p;
 	loff_t pos = *_pos;
@@ -270,17 +302,16 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 	}
 
 	return _p;
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
 	(*_pos)++;
 	return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
-
 }
 
 static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+	__releases(key_user_lock)
 {
 	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 276d27882ce..5c23afb31ec 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
  * - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
  * - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
  */
-key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			  key_perm_t perm)
 {
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ try_again:
 	switch (id) {
 	case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
 		if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
-			if (!create)
+			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
 				goto error;
 
 			ret = install_thread_keyring();
@@ -521,7 +522,7 @@ try_again:
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
 		if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
-			if (!create)
+			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
 				goto error;
 
 			ret = install_process_keyring();
@@ -642,7 +643,14 @@ try_again:
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (!partial) {
+	/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
+	 * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
+	if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
 		ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
 		switch (ret) {
 		case -ERESTARTSYS:
@@ -660,7 +668,8 @@ try_again:
 	}
 
 	ret = -EIO;
-	if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+	if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
+	    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
 		goto invalid_key;
 
 	/* check the permissions */
@@ -702,7 +711,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
 	/* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
 	 * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
 	 * ENOMEM */
-	if (!is_single_threaded(current))
+	if (!current_is_single_threaded())
 		return -EMLINK;
 
 	new = prepare_creds();
@@ -760,3 +769,51 @@ error:
 	abort_creds(new);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Replace a process's session keyring when that process resumes userspace on
+ * behalf of one of its children
+ */
+void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+{
+	const struct cred *old;
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
+		return;
+
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
+	current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	if (!new)
+		return;
+
+	old = current_cred();
+	new->  uid	= old->  uid;
+	new-> euid	= old-> euid;
+	new-> suid	= old-> suid;
+	new->fsuid	= old->fsuid;
+	new->  gid	= old->  gid;
+	new-> egid	= old-> egid;
+	new-> sgid	= old-> sgid;
+	new->fsgid	= old->fsgid;
+	new->user	= get_uid(old->user);
+	new->group_info	= get_group_info(old->group_info);
+
+	new->securebits	= old->securebits;
+	new->cap_inheritable	= old->cap_inheritable;
+	new->cap_permitted	= old->cap_permitted;
+	new->cap_effective	= old->cap_effective;
+	new->cap_bset		= old->cap_bset;
+
+	new->jit_keyring	= old->jit_keyring;
+	new->thread_keyring	= key_get(old->thread_keyring);
+	new->tgcred->tgid	= old->tgcred->tgid;
+	new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
+
+	security_transfer_creds(new, old);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index b611d493c2d..5e05dc09e2d 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
+
 ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -20,7 +22,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -28,7 +32,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_maxbytes,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -36,7 +42,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_root_maxkeys,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -44,7 +52,19 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_root_maxbytes,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
+	},
+	{
+		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+		.procname = "gc_delay",
+		.data = &key_gc_delay,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &zero,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
 };
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 94b868494b3..500aad0ebd6 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 	}
 
 	switch (a->type) {
+	case LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT:
+		return;
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
 		audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
 		break;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674fbfc7..c4c673240c1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -684,6 +684,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -699,6 +704,11 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
 }
 
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+}
+
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
@@ -709,6 +719,11 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
+}
+
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
 	return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
@@ -959,6 +974,24 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
+
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
+
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
@@ -1112,6 +1145,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 	security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
 }
 
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1218,6 +1269,13 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
 }
 
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+				   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				   struct key *key)
+{
+	return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
+}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b2ab6085983..e3d19014259 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @av: access vector
  */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 {
 	const char **common_pts = NULL;
 	u32 common_base = 0;
@@ -492,23 +492,35 @@ out:
 	return node;
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
-				       struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
-				       char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-	if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
-	if (port)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
+			 ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
+			ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
-				       __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-	if (addr)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
-	if (port)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -532,13 +544,10 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
  */
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	u32 denied, audited;
-	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
 	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
 	if (denied) {
 		audited = denied;
@@ -551,144 +560,20 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
 			return;
 	}
-
-	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
-	if (!ab)
-		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
-	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-	avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
-	if (a && a->tsk)
-		tsk = a->tsk;
-	if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+	if (!a) {
+		a = &stack_data;
+		memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
 	}
-	if (a) {
-		switch (a->type) {
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
-			audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id);
-			break;
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
-			audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
-			break;
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
-			if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
-				struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
-				if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
-					audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-							 &a->u.fs.path);
-				} else {
-					audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-					audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-				}
-				inode = dentry->d_inode;
-			} else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
-				struct dentry *dentry;
-				inode = a->u.fs.inode;
-				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
-				if (dentry) {
-					audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-					audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-					dput(dentry);
-				}
-			}
-			if (inode)
-				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
-						 inode->i_sb->s_id,
-						 inode->i_ino);
-			break;
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
-			if (a->u.net.sk) {
-				struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
-				struct unix_sock *u;
-				int len = 0;
-				char *p = NULL;
-
-				switch (sk->sk_family) {
-				case AF_INET: {
-					struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-
-					avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
-							    inet->sport,
-							    "laddr", "lport");
-					avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
-							    inet->dport,
-							    "faddr", "fport");
-					break;
-				}
-				case AF_INET6: {
-					struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-					struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
-
-					avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
-							    inet->sport,
-							    "laddr", "lport");
-					avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
-							    inet->dport,
-							    "faddr", "fport");
-					break;
-				}
-				case AF_UNIX:
-					u = unix_sk(sk);
-					if (u->dentry) {
-						struct path path = {
-							.dentry = u->dentry,
-							.mnt = u->mnt
-						};
-						audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-								 &path);
-						break;
-					}
-					if (!u->addr)
-						break;
-					len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
-					p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
-					audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
-					if (*p)
-						audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
-					else
-						audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
-					break;
-				}
-			}
-
-			switch (a->u.net.family) {
-			case AF_INET:
-				avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
-						    a->u.net.sport,
-						    "saddr", "src");
-				avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
-						    a->u.net.dport,
-						    "daddr", "dest");
-				break;
-			case AF_INET6:
-				avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
-						    a->u.net.sport,
-						    "saddr", "src");
-				avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
-						    a->u.net.dport,
-						    "daddr", "dest");
-				break;
-			}
-			if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
-				struct net_device *dev;
-
-				/* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
-				dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
-						       a->u.net.netif);
-				if (dev) {
-					audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
-							 dev->name);
-					dev_put(dev);
-				}
-			}
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-	avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	audit_log_end(ab);
+	a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+	a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
+	a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
+	common_lsm_audit(a);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -956,7 +841,7 @@ out:
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		 u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc;
@@ -970,3 +855,9 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
 {
 	return avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
+
+void avc_disable(void)
+{
+	if (avc_node_cachep)
+		kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8d8b69c5664..417f7c99452 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
  *					   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *			    <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- *		Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *	Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  *		       Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  *
@@ -448,6 +448,10 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 	    sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 		sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 
+	/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
 	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -1479,14 +1483,14 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       int cap, int audit)
 {
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	u16 sclass;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
 	int rc;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
 	ad.tsk = tsk;
 	ad.u.cap = cap;
 
@@ -1525,12 +1529,14 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			  struct inode *inode,
 			  u32 perms,
-			  struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid;
 
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1539,7 +1545,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	if (!adp) {
 		adp = &ad;
-		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 	}
 
@@ -1555,9 +1561,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 				  u32 av)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
@@ -1577,11 +1583,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -1612,7 +1618,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1621,7 +1627,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1665,7 +1671,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int rc;
@@ -1673,7 +1679,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
@@ -1708,7 +1714,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1719,7 +1725,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1761,7 +1767,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			       struct super_block *sb,
 			       u32 perms,
-			       struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+			       struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1855,12 +1861,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 				     unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -2139,7 +2145,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
 	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2232,7 +2238,7 @@ extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 					    struct files_struct *files)
 {
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2266,7 +2272,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -2515,7 +2521,7 @@ out:
 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2526,7 +2532,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
 		return 0;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
@@ -2534,9 +2540,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
@@ -2711,12 +2717,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+
+	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+		ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+			      ATTR_FORCE);
+		if (!ia_valid)
+			return 0;
+	}
 
-	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
-			       ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
@@ -2756,7 +2768,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -2770,7 +2782,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2915,6 +2927,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		return rc;
 
 	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2939,11 +2952,6 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
-	if (!mask) {
-		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
 		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
@@ -2954,10 +2962,20 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
 	if (!mask)
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
 		return 0;
 
+	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+		/* No change since dentry_open check. */
+		return 0;
+
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -3220,12 +3238,29 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 }
 
 /*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-	cred->security = NULL;
+
+	BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+	cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
 	kfree(tsec);
 }
 
@@ -3249,6 +3284,17 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+	*tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3292,6 +3338,11 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3409,7 +3460,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
 	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
 	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -3490,7 +3541,7 @@ out:
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
 	u8 nexthdr;
 	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -3561,7 +3612,7 @@ out:
 
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
-static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
 			     char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
 	char *addrp;
@@ -3643,7 +3694,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
 			   u32 perms)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid;
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -3653,7 +3704,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
 		goto out;
 	sid = task_sid(task);
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
 	err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 
@@ -3740,7 +3791,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		char *addrp;
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
@@ -3769,7 +3820,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
-				AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+				COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 				ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net.family = family;
 				err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
@@ -3802,7 +3853,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
-		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 		ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = family;
 
@@ -3836,7 +3887,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
 	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
-		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
@@ -3861,7 +3912,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
 		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
-		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -3951,13 +4002,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int err;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3983,13 +4034,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int err;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -4002,7 +4053,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 
 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
 				    u32 peer_sid,
-				    struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+				    struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int err;
 	u32 if_sid;
@@ -4030,10 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4071,7 +4122,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4095,7 +4146,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return 0;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4309,6 +4360,59 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 	fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	/* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+	 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+	 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+	 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+	 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+	 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+	 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+	 * protocols were being used */
+
+	/* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
+	 * the sockcreate SID here */
+
+	sksec->sid = current_sid();
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	sksec->sid = sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = 0;
@@ -4353,7 +4457,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	int err;
 	char *addrp;
 	u32 peer_sid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 netlbl_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4370,7 +4474,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
 		return NF_DROP;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4458,7 +4562,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 proto;
 
@@ -4466,7 +4570,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4490,7 +4594,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	u32 secmark_perm;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct sock *sk;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4549,7 +4653,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4619,13 +4723,13 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
 	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
 	ad.u.cap = capability;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
@@ -4684,12 +4788,12 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 			u32 perms)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4709,7 +4813,7 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4719,7 +4823,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4739,12 +4843,12 @@ static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4783,7 +4887,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4804,7 +4908,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4828,14 +4932,14 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = task_sid(target);
 	int rc;
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 	msec = msg->security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4850,7 +4954,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4860,7 +4964,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4880,12 +4984,12 @@ static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4942,7 +5046,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4952,7 +5056,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -4972,12 +5076,12 @@ static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5195,7 +5299,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 
 		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
 		error = -EPERM;
-		if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
 			error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
@@ -5252,6 +5356,32 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 	kfree(secdata);
 }
 
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+						ctx, true);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
@@ -5323,7 +5453,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.name =				"selinux",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset =			selinux_capset,
@@ -5396,10 +5526,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.dentry_open =			selinux_dentry_open,
 
 	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer =		selinux_cred_transfer,
 	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
+	.kernel_module_request =	selinux_kernel_module_request,
 	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
 	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
 	.task_getsid =			selinux_task_getsid,
@@ -5448,6 +5581,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
+	.inode_notifysecctx =		selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
+	.inode_setsecctx =		selinux_inode_setsecctx,
+	.inode_getsecctx =		selinux_inode_getsecctx,
 
 	.unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
 	.unix_may_send =		selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
@@ -5477,6 +5613,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.tun_dev_create =		selinux_tun_dev_create,
+	.tun_dev_post_create = 		selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
+	.tun_dev_attach =		selinux_tun_dev_attach,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
@@ -5691,6 +5830,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
+	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+	avc_disable();
+
 	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
 	security_ops = secondary_ops;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index 8377a4ba3b9..abedcd704da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7c1ae..2b683ad83d2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192ee95..0546d616cca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,6 +423,28 @@
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
 #define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
 #define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
 #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
@@ -508,6 +530,7 @@
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ                       0x00000002UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD                        0x00000004UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE                    0x00000008UL
+#define SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST                    0x00000010UL
 #define CAPABILITY__CHOWN                         0x00000001UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE                  0x00000002UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH               0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index d12ff1a9c0a..e94e82f7381 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
 #include <asm/system.h>
@@ -36,48 +37,6 @@ struct inode;
 struct sock;
 struct sk_buff;
 
-/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
-struct avc_audit_data {
-	char    type;
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS   1
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET  2
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP  3
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC  4
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
-	union 	{
-		struct {
-			struct path path;
-			struct inode *inode;
-		} fs;
-		struct {
-			int netif;
-			struct sock *sk;
-			u16 family;
-			__be16 dport;
-			__be16 sport;
-			union {
-				struct {
-					__be32 daddr;
-					__be32 saddr;
-				} v4;
-				struct {
-					struct in6_addr daddr;
-					struct in6_addr saddr;
-				} v6;
-			} fam;
-		} net;
-		int cap;
-		int ipc_id;
-	} u;
-};
-
-#define v4info fam.v4
-#define v6info fam.v6
-
-/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-	{ memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
-
 /*
  * AVC statistics
  */
@@ -98,7 +57,9 @@ void __init avc_init(void);
 
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+	       struct av_decision *avd,
+	       int result,
+	       struct common_audit_data *a);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -108,7 +69,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
@@ -127,13 +88,13 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		     u16 tclass, u32 perms);
 
-/* Shows permission in human readable form */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av);
-
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
 int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
 extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
 
+/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
+void avc_disable(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 21ec786611d..7ab9299bfb6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -77,3 +77,4 @@
     S_(NULL)
     S_(NULL)
     S_("kernel_service")
+    S_("tun_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 882f27d66fa..f248500a1e3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_PEER                                    68
 #define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             69
 #define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          74
+#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              75
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index b4b5b9b2f0b..8d7384280a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				u16 family,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+				struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int level,
 				     int optname);
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      u16 family,
-					      struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 289e24b39e3..13128f9a3e5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+			struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2e984413c7b..e68823741ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				u16 family,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int rc;
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 500e6f78e11..ff17820d35e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
  *
  *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
  *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
  * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
@@ -279,6 +284,95 @@ mls_ops:
 }
 
 /*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+	char **permission_names = args;
+
+	BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+				    struct context *tcontext,
+				    u16 tclass,
+				    u32 permissions,
+				    const char *reason)
+{
+	struct common_datum *common_dat;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *tclass_name;
+	char *scontext_name = NULL;
+	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+	char *permission_names[32];
+	int index, length;
+	bool need_comma = false;
+
+	if (!permissions)
+		return;
+
+	tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+	/* init permission_names */
+	if (common_dat &&
+	    hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* audit a message */
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+			     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+		u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+				 need_comma ? "," : "",
+				 permission_names[index]
+				 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+		need_comma = true;
+	}
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+	/* release scontext/tcontext */
+	kfree(tcontext_name);
+	kfree(scontext_name);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
@@ -347,28 +441,12 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 	}
 
 	if (masked) {
-		struct audit_buffer *ab;
-		char *stype_name
-			= policydb.p_type_val_to_name[source->value - 1];
-		char *ttype_name
-			= policydb.p_type_val_to_name[target->value - 1];
-		char *tclass_name
-			= policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
-
 		/* mask violated permissions */
 		avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
-		/* notice to userspace via audit message */
-		ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
-				     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
-		if (!ab)
-			return;
-
-		audit_log_format(ab, "av boundary violation: "
-				 "source=%s target=%s tclass=%s",
-				 stype_name, ttype_name, tclass_name);
-		avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, masked);
-		audit_log_end(ab);
+		/* audit masked permissions */
+		security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+					tclass, masked, "bounds");
 	}
 }
 
@@ -480,7 +558,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
 		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
 					  constraint->expr)) {
-			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
 		}
 		constraint = constraint->next;
 	}
@@ -499,8 +577,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!ra)
-			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
-							PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+			avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+					  PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -687,6 +765,26 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 		}
 		index = type->bounds;
 	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char *old_name = NULL;
+		char *new_name = NULL;
+		int length;
+
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+					      &old_name, &length) &&
+		    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+					      &new_name, &length)) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context,
+				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+				  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+				  "result=denied "
+				  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+				  old_name, new_name);
+		}
+		kfree(new_name);
+		kfree(old_name);
+	}
 out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 72b18452e1a..f3cb9ed731a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int i, rc = 0;
 	struct sec_path *sp;
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-					struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+					struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 243bec175be..c6e9acae72e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
 {
 	memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
 	a->a.type = type;
-	a->a.function = func;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func;
 }
 
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 513dc1aa16d..0f9ac814690 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -240,8 +240,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
-	struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
-	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", ad->function,
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+			 ad->smack_audit_data.function,
 			 sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
@@ -274,11 +275,11 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
 		return;
 
-	if (a->function == NULL)
-		a->function = "unknown";
+	if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL)
+		a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown";
 
 	/* end preparing the audit data */
-	sad = &a->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+	sad = &a->smack_audit_data;
 	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
 	sad->subject = subject_label;
 	sad->object  = object_label;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182078c..acae7ef4092 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	char *sp, *tsp;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1080,6 +1080,22 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	cred->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
@@ -1117,6 +1133,18 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	new->security = old->security;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
  * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
@@ -1638,6 +1666,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
 		nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -2464,7 +2493,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	/*
 	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
 	 */
-	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
 	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
@@ -3029,10 +3058,31 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.name =				"smack",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		smack_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
 	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
 
@@ -3073,9 +3123,11 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
 
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		smack_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
 	.cred_commit =			smack_cred_commit,
+	.cred_transfer =		smack_cred_transfer,
 	.kernel_act_as =		smack_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	smack_kernel_create_files_as,
 	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
@@ -3155,6 +3207,9 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
+	.inode_notifysecctx =		smack_inode_notifysecctx,
+	.inode_setsecctx =		smack_inode_setsecctx,
+	.inode_getsecctx =		smack_inode_getsecctx,
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index fdd1f4b8c44..3c8bd8ee0b9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1285,6 +1285,36 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 }
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	/* Is there an active domain? */
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+		if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+			continue;
+		if (domain->is_deleted ||
+		    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		domain->is_deleted = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
  *
  * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 6d6ba09af45..31df541911f 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -339,8 +339,6 @@ const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
 const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
 /* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
 const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
-/* Delete a domain. */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data);
 /* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
 int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 /*
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 1d8b1696057..fcf52accce2 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -717,38 +717,6 @@ int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
 	return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
 }
 
-/* Domain create/delete handler. */
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
- *
- * @domainname: The name of domain.
- *
- * Returns 0.
- */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
-{
-	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
-	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
-
-	name.name = domainname;
-	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
-	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-	/* Is there an active domain? */
-	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
-		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
-		if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
-			continue;
-		if (domain->is_deleted ||
-		    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
-			continue;
-		domain->is_deleted = true;
-		break;
-	}
-	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
  *
@@ -818,13 +786,11 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
  *
- * @bprm:           Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
- * @next_domain:    Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
  */
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-			    struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain)
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	/*
 	 * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
@@ -946,9 +912,11 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 		tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
 				       TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
  out:
+	if (!domain)
+		domain = old_domain;
+	bprm->cred->security = domain;
 	tomoyo_free(real_program_name);
 	tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name);
-	*next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
 	tomoyo_free(tmp);
 	return retval;
 }
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 3194d09fe0f..9548a0984cc 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 #include "tomoyo.h"
 #include "realpath.h"
 
+static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	new->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -25,6 +31,15 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+	 * we don't need to duplicate.
+	 */
+	new->security = old->security;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -61,14 +76,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
 	 * using current domain.
 	 */
-	if (!domain) {
-		struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
-		int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
-
-		if (!retval)
-			bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
-		return retval;
-	}
+	if (!domain)
+		return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
 	/*
 	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
 	 * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
@@ -268,7 +277,9 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
  */
 static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
 	.name                = "tomoyo",
+	.cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer	     = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
 	.bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
 	.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
index 0fd588a629c..cd6ba0bf706 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 			    struct path *path2);
 int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 				    struct file *filp);
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-			    struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
 /* Index numbers for Access Controls. */