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-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy12
-rw-r--r--fs/befs/linuxvfs.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/block_dev.c7
-rw-r--r--fs/file_table.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/vfs.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h4
-rw-r--r--init/main.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c239
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c9
-rw-r--r--security/security.c2
14 files changed, 123 insertions, 178 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6434f0df012..6cd6daefaae 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description:
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
- base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+ base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK]
mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
uid:= decimal value
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description:
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
- measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+ measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
- open for read by root in inode_permission.
+ open for read by root in do_filp_open.
Examples of LSM specific definitions:
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description:
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
- measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
- measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
Smack:
- measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
index 33baf27fac7..34ddda888e6 100644
--- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
+++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
@@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ befs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
brelse(bh);
unacquire_priv_sbp:
+ kfree(befs_sb->mount_opts.iocharset);
kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
unacquire_none:
diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c
index 73d6a735b8f..d11d0289f3d 100644
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ struct super_block *freeze_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
if (!sb)
goto out;
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
- deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+ sb->s_frozen = SB_FREEZE_TRANS;
+ up_write(&sb->s_umount);
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return sb;
}
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
BUG_ON(sb->s_bdev != bdev);
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
- goto out_deactivate;
+ goto out_unfrozen;
if (sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs) {
error = sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs(sb);
@@ -321,11 +322,11 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
}
}
+out_unfrozen:
sb->s_frozen = SB_UNFROZEN;
smp_wmb();
wake_up(&sb->s_wait_unfrozen);
-out_deactivate:
if (sb)
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
out_unlock:
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 69652c5bd5f..b98404b5438 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file)
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
+ ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
fops_put(file->f_op);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 94a5e60779f..d62fdc875f2 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1736,8 +1736,7 @@ do_last:
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
- error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
- (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+ error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
@@ -1797,8 +1796,7 @@ ok:
}
filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
- error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
- (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+ error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index c194793b642..97d79eff6b7 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
flags, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(*filp))
host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
+ host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, access);
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
out:
@@ -2127,7 +2128,6 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
*/
path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt;
path.dentry = dentry;
- err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
nfsd_out:
return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 99dc6d5cf7e..975837e7d6c 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
-extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
+extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file);
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
return;
}
-static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index dac44a9356a..4cb47a159f0 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -657,9 +657,9 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void)
proc_caches_init();
buffer_init();
key_init();
+ radix_tree_init();
security_init();
vfs_caches_init(totalram_pages);
- radix_tree_init();
signals_init();
/* rootfs populating might need page-writeback */
page_writeback_init();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c41afe6639a..47fb65d1fcb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
-void ima_iintcache_init(void);
int ima_init(void);
void ima_cleanup(void);
int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 3cd58b60afd..2a5e0bcf388 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out:
* ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index fa592ff1ac1..0d83edcfc40 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
int rc = 0;
- if (!ima_initialized)
- return 0;
-
iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!iint)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
- if (!ima_initialized)
- return;
spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
@@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
}
-void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
{
iint_cache =
kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+ return 0;
}
+security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a89f44d5e03..294b005d652 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
*
* File: ima_main.c
* implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- * and ima_path_check.
+ * and ima_file_check.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
@@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ out:
return found;
}
+/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
+ *
+ * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
+ * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
+ * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *
+ * In either case invalidate the PCR.
+ */
+enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
+static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case TOMTOU:
+ if (iint->readcount > 0)
+ ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+ "ToMToU");
+ break;
+ case OPEN_WRITERS:
+ if (iint->writecount > 0)
+ ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+ "open_writers");
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Update the counts given an fmode_t
*/
@@ -99,6 +129,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
}
/*
+ * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
+ * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ * could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+ iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+out:
+ ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+ kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/*
* Decrement ima counts
*/
static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
@@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
}
-/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
- *
- * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
- * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
- * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *
- * In either case invalidate the PCR.
- */
-enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
-static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
- struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *filename)
-{
- switch (error) {
- case TOMTOU:
- if (iint->readcount > 0)
- ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
- "ToMToU");
- break;
- case OPEN_WRITERS:
- if (iint->writecount > 0)
- ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
- "open_writers");
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename)
-{
- int rc = 0;
-
- ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
- if (!rc)
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
- * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
- *
- * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
- * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
- *
- * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
- * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * could result in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
- */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
-{
- struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
- struct file *file = NULL;
- int rc;
-
- if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return 0;
- iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
- if (!iint)
- return 0;
-
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-
- rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
- ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
- path->dentry->d_name.name);
-
- if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
- goto out;
-
- ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
- path->dentry->d_name.name);
- if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
- struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
- struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
-
- file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
- current_cred());
- if (IS_ERR(file)) {
- int audit_info = 0;
-
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
- dentry->d_name.name,
- "add_measurement",
- "dentry_open failed",
- 1, audit_info);
- file = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
- }
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
- if (file)
- fput(file);
- kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
-
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
int mask, int function)
{
@@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-/*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
- *
- * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
- * - for nfsd exported files.
- *
- * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
-{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-
- if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return;
- iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
- if (!iint)
- return;
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-
- kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
-
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
@@ -369,11 +296,31 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
+ */
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+ mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+ FILE_CHECK);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
- ima_iintcache_init();
error = ima_init();
ima_initialized = 1;
return error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e1278399b34..4759d0f9933 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+ {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_func:
audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
- if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
- entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+ if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+ /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 24e060be9fa..122b748d0f4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{
security_ops->file_free_security(file);
- if (file->f_dentry)
- ima_file_free(file);
}
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-09 04:05:54 +0000