From 0432013eb1fbddf51f43d3dfb7553db011c81707 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chia-chi Yeh Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2009 07:15:05 +0800 Subject: security: Add AID_NET_RAW and AID_NET_ADMIN capability check in cap_capable(). Signed-off-by: Chia-chi Yeh --- include/linux/android_aid.h | 1 + security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/android_aid.h b/include/linux/android_aid.h index d22723afbca..7f16a14c0fe 100644 --- a/include/linux/android_aid.h +++ b/include/linux/android_aid.h @@ -21,5 +21,6 @@ #define AID_NET_BT 3002 #define AID_INET 3003 #define AID_NET_RAW 3004 +#define AID_NET_ADMIN 3005 #endif diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 0cf4b53480a..5cbb55ec6e4 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK +#include +#endif + /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. @@ -75,6 +79,11 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit) { + if (cap == CAP_NET_RAW && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_RAW)) + return 0; + if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_ADMIN)) + return 0; + for (;;) { /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user) -- cgit v1.2.3