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authorBaruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>2015-04-24 10:08:46 +0300
committerPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>2015-04-24 12:20:34 +0200
commit31c031e7cf05a5991464bb08b314aab97ebdf507 (patch)
tree9930b6c14e749041c0711e68676049e703708df3 /package/wpa_supplicant
parenta3f0785396e64b5e2428f860d785f00bbc665d67 (diff)
wpa_supplicant: add fix for CVE-2015-1863
Add upstream patch fixing CVE-2015-1863: buffer overflow of SSID buffer within struct p2p_device that is allocated from heap. Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/wpa_supplicant')
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch45
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..989bc4f78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
+ (CVE-2015-1863)
+
+Upstream commit 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd.
+
+This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
+p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
+was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
+arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
+dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
+heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
+peer discovery purposes.
+
+This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
+behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
+due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
+and potentially arbitrary code execution.
+
+Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
+hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
+---
+ src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
+--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
+ if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
+ os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ if (msg.ssid &&
++ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
+ (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
+ os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
+ != 0)) {
+--
+1.9.1
+