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authorBaruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>2015-09-29 10:24:57 +0300
committerPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>2015-09-30 00:28:52 +0200
commitbac20afec5d5e53fb359ff67187f62b2efbd5547 (patch)
tree3a1517d491db9ec08cfd4db6f94d44807c72c912 /package/wpa_supplicant
parent1639a7ebfa99f5b52dc7d2d8db94d826f4bac35f (diff)
wpa_supplicant: bump to version 2.5
Remove upstream patches. Renumber the remaining patch. Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/wpa_supplicant')
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch45
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch (renamed from package/wpa_supplicant/0005-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch)0
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch50
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch42
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch154
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash2
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk2
7 files changed, 2 insertions, 293 deletions
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 989bc4f78..000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
- (CVE-2015-1863)
-
-Upstream commit 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd.
-
-This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
-p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
-was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
-arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
-dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
-heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
-peer discovery purposes.
-
-This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
-behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
-due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
-and potentially arbitrary code execution.
-
-Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
-hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
----
- src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
-+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
- if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
- os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- if (msg.ssid &&
-+ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
- (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
- os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
- != 0)) {
---
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0005-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch
index 2a9b83279..2a9b83279 100644
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0005-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d9dccf911..000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37275c0..d2855e32fd0f 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
- if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
- goto bad;
- h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+ h->chunk_size);
-+ goto bad;
-+ }
- /* throw away chunk header
- * so we have only real data
- */
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 307297b9e..000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
-
-The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
-length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
-negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
-buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
-so, resulting in segmentation fault.
-
-This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
-attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
-hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
-drivers).
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
----
- src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
-index 6d4177c2a847..314e244bc956 100644
---- a/src/ap/wmm.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- return;
- }
-
-+ if (left < 0)
-+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
-+
- /* extract the tspec info element */
- if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
- hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 16a1f5398..000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-This patch combines the following upstream security fixes:
-
-28a069a545b0 EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
-3035cc2894e0 EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
-477c74395acd EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
-e28a58be2618 EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
-dd2f043c9c43 EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
-
-Details at
-http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt
-
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
----
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b092669a42..e58b13a42f73 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- u16 offset;
- u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
-+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-
- if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- int offset;
-
-+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
- /*
- * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
- * prf
-@@ -837,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
- */
- if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+ if (len < 2) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
- tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
- "total length = %d", tot_len);
- if (tot_len > 15000)
- return NULL;
-+ if (data->inbuf) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
- data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
-@@ -927,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- /*
- * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
- */
-+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
- len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
- if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
- resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2e9179..2bfc3c27647d 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- int res = 0;
-+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
-
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
-
-+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
- if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- int offset;
-
-+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+ goto fin;
-+ }
-+
- /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
- grp = htons(data->group_num);
- ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
-@@ -923,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- * the first fragment has a total length
- */
- if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+ if (len < 2) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+ return;
-+ }
- tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
- "length = %d", tot_len);
- if (tot_len > 15000)
- return;
-+ if (data->inbuf) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+ return;
-+ }
- data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash
index 1ec336723..19e43598f 100644
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
# Locally calculated
-sha256 058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122 wpa_supplicant-2.4.tar.gz
+sha256 cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316 wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
index eb4278a66..1a3e0dbb4 100644
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
################################################################################
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_VERSION = 2.4
+WPA_SUPPLICANT_VERSION = 2.5
WPA_SUPPLICANT_SITE = http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases
WPA_SUPPLICANT_LICENSE = GPLv2/BSD-3c
WPA_SUPPLICANT_LICENSE_FILES = README