diff options
| author | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-09-15 22:11:13 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-09-29 16:08:15 +0100 |
| commit | 6e5f0927846adf39aebee450f13871e3cb4ab012 (patch) | |
| tree | 261a6871c7b1a509831ad48b9ec2ea0fe9204675 /arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | |
| parent | 39533e12063be7f55e3d6ae21ffe067799d542a4 (diff) | |
arm64: Remove Spectre-related CONFIG_* options
The spectre mitigations are too configurable for their own good, leading
to confusing logic trying to figure out when we should mitigate and when
we shouldn't. Although the plethora of command-line options need to stick
around for backwards compatibility, the default-on CONFIG options that
depend on EXPERT can be dropped, as the mitigations only do anything if
the system is vulnerable, a mitigation is available and the command-line
hasn't disabled it.
Remove CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR and CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD in favour of
enabling this code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 9 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index a7a5ecaa2e83..f5e3efeb5b97 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ struct bp_hardening_data { bp_hardening_cb_t fn; }; -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) @@ -64,14 +63,6 @@ static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) if (d->fn) d->fn(); } -#else -static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) -{ - return NULL; -} - -static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { } -#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ extern void arm64_memblock_init(void); extern void paging_init(void); |