diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-07-23 12:27:27 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-07-23 12:27:27 -0700 |
commit | a66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3 (patch) | |
tree | 08cf68bcef3559b370843cab8191e5cc0f740bde /fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c | |
parent | a6be1fcbc57f95bb47ef3c8e4ee3d83731b8f21e (diff) | |
parent | 8cae6f7158ec1fa44c8a04a43db7d8020ec60437 (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull the big VFS changes from Al Viro:
"This one is *big* and changes quite a few things around VFS. What's in there:
- the first of two really major architecture changes - death to open
intents.
The former is finally there; it was very long in making, but with
Miklos getting through really hard and messy final push in
fs/namei.c, we finally have it. Unlike his variant, this one
doesn't introduce struct opendata; what we have instead is
->atomic_open() taking preallocated struct file * and passing
everything via its fields.
Instead of returning struct file *, it returns -E... on error, 0
on success and 1 in "deal with it yourself" case (e.g. symlink
found on server, etc.).
See comments before fs/namei.c:atomic_open(). That made a lot of
goodies finally possible and quite a few are in that pile:
->lookup(), ->d_revalidate() and ->create() do not get struct
nameidata * anymore; ->lookup() and ->d_revalidate() get lookup
flags instead, ->create() gets "do we want it exclusive" flag.
With the introduction of new helper (kern_path_locked()) we are rid
of all struct nameidata instances outside of fs/namei.c; it's still
visible in namei.h, but not for long. Come the next cycle,
declaration will move either to fs/internal.h or to fs/namei.c
itself. [me, miklos, hch]
- The second major change: behaviour of final fput(). Now we have
__fput() done without any locks held by caller *and* not from deep
in call stack.
That obviously lifts a lot of constraints on the locking in there.
Moreover, it's legal now to call fput() from atomic contexts (which
has immediately simplified life for aio.c). We also don't need
anti-recursion logics in __scm_destroy() anymore.
There is a price, though - the damn thing has become partially
asynchronous. For fput() from normal process we are guaranteed
that pending __fput() will be done before the caller returns to
userland, exits or gets stopped for ptrace.
For kernel threads and atomic contexts it's done via
schedule_work(), so theoretically we might need a way to make sure
it's finished; so far only one such place had been found, but there
might be more.
There's flush_delayed_fput() (do all pending __fput()) and there's
__fput_sync() (fput() analog doing __fput() immediately). I hope
we won't need them often; see warnings in fs/file_table.c for
details. [me, based on task_work series from Oleg merged last
cycle]
- sync series from Jan
- large part of "death to sync_supers()" work from Artem; the only
bits missing here are exofs and ext4 ones. As far as I understand,
those are going via the exofs and ext4 trees resp.; once they are
in, we can put ->write_super() to the rest, along with the thread
calling it.
- preparatory bits from unionmount series (from dhowells).
- assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place, as usual.
This is not the last pile for this cycle; there's at least jlayton's
ESTALE work and fsfreeze series (the latter - in dire need of fixes,
so I'm not sure it'll make the cut this cycle). I'll probably throw
symlink/hardlink restrictions stuff from Kees into the next pile, too.
Plus there's a lot of misc patches I hadn't thrown into that one -
it's large enough as it is..."
* 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (127 commits)
ext4: switch EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS to mnt_want_write_file()
btrfs: switch btrfs_ioctl_balance() to mnt_want_write_file()
switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself
spufs: shift dget/mntget towards dentry_open()
zoran: don't bother with struct file * in zoran_map
ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion
don't expose I_NEW inodes via dentry->d_inode
tidy up namei.c a bit
unobfuscate follow_up() a bit
ext3: pass custom EOF to generic_file_llseek_size()
ext4: use core vfs llseek code for dir seeks
vfs: allow custom EOF in generic_file_llseek code
vfs: Avoid unnecessary WB_SYNC_NONE writeback during sys_sync and reorder sync passes
vfs: Remove unnecessary flushing of block devices
vfs: Make sys_sync writeout also block device inodes
vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices
vfs: Reorder operations during sys_sync
quota: Move quota syncing to ->sync_fs method
quota: Split dquot_quota_sync() to writeback and cache flushing part
vfs: Move noop_backing_dev_info check from sync into writeback
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c | 73 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c index 0dbe58a8b172..809e67d05ca3 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c @@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include "ecryptfs_kernel.h" -struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_open_req_cache; +struct ecryptfs_open_req { + struct file **lower_file; + struct path path; + struct completion done; + struct list_head kthread_ctl_list; +}; static struct ecryptfs_kthread_ctl { #define ECRYPTFS_KTHREAD_ZOMBIE 0x00000001 @@ -67,18 +72,10 @@ static int ecryptfs_threadfn(void *ignored) req = list_first_entry(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.req_list, struct ecryptfs_open_req, kthread_ctl_list); - mutex_lock(&req->mux); list_del(&req->kthread_ctl_list); - if (!(req->flags & ECRYPTFS_REQ_ZOMBIE)) { - dget(req->lower_dentry); - mntget(req->lower_mnt); - (*req->lower_file) = dentry_open( - req->lower_dentry, req->lower_mnt, - (O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE), current_cred()); - req->flags |= ECRYPTFS_REQ_PROCESSED; - } - wake_up(&req->wait); - mutex_unlock(&req->mux); + *req->lower_file = dentry_open(&req->path, + (O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE), current_cred()); + complete(&req->done); } mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux); } @@ -111,10 +108,9 @@ void ecryptfs_destroy_kthread(void) ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.flags |= ECRYPTFS_KTHREAD_ZOMBIE; list_for_each_entry(req, &ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.req_list, kthread_ctl_list) { - mutex_lock(&req->mux); - req->flags |= ECRYPTFS_REQ_ZOMBIE; - wake_up(&req->wait); - mutex_unlock(&req->mux); + list_del(&req->kthread_ctl_list); + *req->lower_file = ERR_PTR(-EIO); + complete(&req->done); } mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux); kthread_stop(ecryptfs_kthread); @@ -136,34 +132,26 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file, struct vfsmount *lower_mnt, const struct cred *cred) { - struct ecryptfs_open_req *req; + struct ecryptfs_open_req req; int flags = O_LARGEFILE; int rc = 0; + init_completion(&req.done); + req.lower_file = lower_file; + req.path.dentry = lower_dentry; + req.path.mnt = lower_mnt; + /* Corresponding dput() and mntput() are done when the * lower file is fput() when all eCryptfs files for the inode are * released. */ - dget(lower_dentry); - mntget(lower_mnt); flags |= IS_RDONLY(lower_dentry->d_inode) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR; - (*lower_file) = dentry_open(lower_dentry, lower_mnt, flags, cred); + (*lower_file) = dentry_open(&req.path, flags, cred); if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file)) goto out; if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) { rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file)); goto out; } - req = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_open_req_cache, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - mutex_init(&req->mux); - req->lower_file = lower_file; - req->lower_dentry = lower_dentry; - req->lower_mnt = lower_mnt; - init_waitqueue_head(&req->wait); - req->flags = 0; mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux); if (ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.flags & ECRYPTFS_KTHREAD_ZOMBIE) { rc = -EIO; @@ -171,27 +159,14 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file, printk(KERN_ERR "%s: We are in the middle of shutting down; " "aborting privileged request to open lower file\n", __func__); - goto out_free; + goto out; } - list_add_tail(&req->kthread_ctl_list, &ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.req_list); + list_add_tail(&req.kthread_ctl_list, &ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.req_list); mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux); wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait); - wait_event(req->wait, (req->flags != 0)); - mutex_lock(&req->mux); - BUG_ON(req->flags == 0); - if (req->flags & ECRYPTFS_REQ_DROPPED - || req->flags & ECRYPTFS_REQ_ZOMBIE) { - rc = -EIO; - printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Privileged open request dropped\n", - __func__); - goto out_unlock; - } - if (IS_ERR(*req->lower_file)) - rc = PTR_ERR(*req->lower_file); -out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&req->mux); -out_free: - kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_open_req_cache, req); + wait_for_completion(&req.done); + if (IS_ERR(*lower_file)) + rc = PTR_ERR(*lower_file); out: return rc; } |