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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2019-07-30 22:21:41 -0500 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-08-02 17:30:36 -0700 |
commit | ea443e5e98b5b74e317ef3d26bcaea54931ccdee (patch) | |
tree | bec48b840e6e8aca80e399e9cde1db571b7ba9b1 /tools/perf/scripts/python | |
parent | 685703b497bacea8765bb409d6b73455b73c540e (diff) |
atm: iphase: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
board is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2765 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2774 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2782 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2816 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2823 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2830 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue '_ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2845 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2856 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half. 'iadev'
Fix this by sanitizing board before using it to index ia_dev and _ia_dev
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions