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path: root/drivers/char/random.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/random.c39
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index b691b9d59503..655e327d425e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -650,7 +650,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
- execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ if (static_key_initialized)
+ execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
pr_notice("crng init done\n");
@@ -724,9 +725,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
*
**********************************************************************/
-static bool used_arch_random;
-static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
-static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
+static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
{
return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = random_pm_notifica
int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
{
ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
- unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
+ unsigned int i, arch_bits;
unsigned long entropy;
#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
@@ -784,12 +784,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
_mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
#endif
- for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
!arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
entropy = random_get_entropy();
- arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
+ arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
}
_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
}
@@ -798,11 +798,18 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
_mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
add_latent_entropy();
+ /*
+ * If we were initialized by the bootloader before jump labels are
+ * initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
+ * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
+ */
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
+ crng_set_ready(NULL);
+
if (crng_ready())
crng_reseed();
else if (trust_cpu)
- credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
- used_arch_random = arch_bytes * 8 >= POOL_READY_BITS;
+ _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
WARN_ON(register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier));
@@ -812,17 +819,6 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
}
/*
- * Returns whether arch randomness has been mixed into the initial
- * state of the RNG, regardless of whether or not that randomness
- * was credited. Knowing this is only good for a very limited set
- * of uses, such as early init printk pointer obfuscation.
- */
-bool rng_has_arch_random(void)
-{
- return used_arch_random;
-}
-
-/*
* Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
* initialize it.
*
@@ -865,13 +861,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
* Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
* CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*/
-void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
if (trust_bootloader)
credit_init_bits(len * 8);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID)
static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain);