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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c21
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c17
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c177
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c42
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c62
11 files changed, 220 insertions, 127 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 9636e17c9f5d..0356e1d437ca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 80374842fe0b..c38bbce8c6a6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -22,6 +22,19 @@
#include "ima.h"
/*
+ * ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry
+ */
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++)
+ kfree(entry->template_data[i].data);
+
+ kfree(entry);
+}
+
+/*
* ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
*/
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -37,6 +50,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if (!*entry)
return -ENOMEM;
+ (*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
u32 len;
@@ -51,10 +65,9 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
}
- (*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
return 0;
out:
- kfree(*entry);
+ ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
*entry = NULL;
return result;
}
@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
}
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
if (result < 0)
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_template_entry(entry);
err_out:
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
op, cause, result, 0);
@@ -269,7 +282,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
if (result < 0)
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_template_entry(entry);
}
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 15f34bd40abe..37122768554a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
if (result < 0) {
audit_cause = "hashing_error";
- kfree(entry);
goto err_out;
}
}
@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
boot_aggregate_name);
if (result < 0)
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_template_entry(entry);
return;
err_out:
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 913e1927f916..635695f6a185 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields)
{
- char *c, *template_fmt_copy;
+ char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr;
int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
int i, result = 0;
@@ -127,7 +127,9 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
result = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_copy, "|")) != NULL &&
+
+ template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy;
+ for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
i < template_num_fields; i++) {
struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 7f44c3207a9b..8137b27d641d 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*
* TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
*/
- file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
+ file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto err_quota;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 55d110f0aced..6e21c11e48bc 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
}
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
- key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto no_memory_2;
@@ -293,18 +293,12 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
- key->flags = 0;
- key->expiry = 0;
- key->payload.data = NULL;
- key->security = NULL;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
- memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
-
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 69f0cb7bab7e..d46cbc5e335e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y)
static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
{
const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
- const unsigned long level_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
+ const unsigned long fan_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
const char *description = index_key->description;
unsigned long hash, type;
u32 piece;
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *inde
* ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is
* zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise.
*/
- if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) == 0)
+ if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) == 0)
return hash | (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1;
- if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) != 0)
- return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~level_mask;
+ if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) != 0)
+ return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~fan_mask;
return hash;
}
@@ -279,12 +279,11 @@ static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data)
* Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position
* at which they differ - if they differ.
*/
-static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *_a, const void *_b)
+static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *object, const void *data)
{
- const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(_a);
- const struct key *key_b = keyring_ptr_to_key(_b);
+ const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key;
- const struct keyring_index_key *b = &key_b->index_key;
+ const struct keyring_index_key *b = data;
unsigned long seg_a, seg_b;
int level, i;
@@ -691,8 +690,8 @@ descend_to_node:
smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
- node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
}
+ node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
begin_node:
kdebug("begin_node");
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 794c3ca49eac..419491d8e7d2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -95,10 +96,6 @@
#include "audit.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
-#define SB_TYPE_FMT "%s%s%s"
-#define SB_SUBTYPE(sb) (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0])
-#define SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb) sb->s_type->name, SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? "." : "", SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? sb->s_subtype : ""
-
extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
/* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -413,8 +410,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") has no "
- "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+ "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
@@ -422,22 +419,22 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
- SB_TYPE_FMT") has no security xattr handler\n",
- sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
- SB_TYPE_FMT") getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
- SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), -rc);
+ "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name, -rc);
goto out;
}
}
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), unknown behavior\n",
- sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), %s\n",
- sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb),
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
@@ -600,6 +597,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc = 0, i;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
@@ -658,8 +656,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
- mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
goto out;
}
switch (flags[i]) {
@@ -806,8 +804,7 @@ out:
out_double_mount:
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
- "security settings for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
- SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
goto out;
}
@@ -2480,8 +2477,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
- mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
goto out_free_opts;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -2519,8 +2516,8 @@ out_free_secdata:
return rc;
out_bad_option:
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
- "during remount (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
- SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+ "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name);
goto out_free_opts;
}
@@ -3828,7 +3825,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
u32 nlbl_sid;
u32 nlbl_type;
- err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
if (unlikely(err))
return -EACCES;
err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
@@ -3846,6 +3843,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+ else
+ *conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
/* socket security operations */
static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
@@ -4452,7 +4473,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
int err;
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- u32 newsid;
+ u32 connsid;
u32 peersid;
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
@@ -4462,16 +4483,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
if (err)
return err;
- if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
- req->secid = sksec->sid;
- req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
- } else {
- err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- req->secid = newsid;
- req->peer_secid = peersid;
- }
+ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ req->secid = connsid;
+ req->peer_secid = peersid;
return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
}
@@ -4731,6 +4747,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
+ struct sock *sk;
u32 sid;
if (!netlbl_enabled())
@@ -4739,8 +4756,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
/* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
* because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
* before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
- if (skb->sk) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (sk) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
+ /* if the socket is the listening state then this
+ * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+ * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+ * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
+ * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+ * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+ * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+ * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+ * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+ * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+ * security label in the packet itself this is the
+ * best we can do. */
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+ sksec = sk->sk_security;
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -4810,27 +4846,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+
+ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ sk = skb->sk;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
* packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
* since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
* when the packet is on it's final way out.
* NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
- * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
- if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
+ * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+ * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+ * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+ * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+ * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+ * connection. */
+ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+ !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
- secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
- peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
- if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
- return NF_ACCEPT;
- /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
- * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
- * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
- * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
- sk = skb->sk;
if (sk == NULL) {
+ /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+ * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+ * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+ * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
if (skb->skb_iif) {
secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
@@ -4839,7 +4884,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
+ } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
+ /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+ * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
+ * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+ * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+ * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+ * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+ * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+ * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
+ * for similar problems. */
+ u32 skb_sid;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+ * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+ * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+ * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+ * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+ * pass the packet. */
+ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ default:
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ }
+ }
+ if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
} else {
+ /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+ * associated socket. */
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 0dec76c64cf5..48c3cc94c168 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
@@ -79,11 +80,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
}
-#endif
-static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
{
- return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
}
+#endif
#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ee470a0b5c27..d106733ad987 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2334,50 +2334,16 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
struct ocontext *c;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
- const char *subtype = (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) ? sb->s_subtype : NULL;
- struct ocontext *base = NULL;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
- for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; c; c = c->next) {
- char *sub;
- int baselen;
-
- baselen = strlen(fstype);
-
- /* if base does not match, this is not the one */
- if (strncmp(fstype, c->u.name, baselen))
- continue;
-
- /* if there is no subtype, this is the one! */
- if (!subtype)
- break;
-
- /* skip past the base in this entry */
- sub = c->u.name + baselen;
-
- /* entry is only a base. save it. keep looking for subtype */
- if (sub[0] == '\0') {
- base = c;
- continue;
- }
-
- /* entry is not followed by a subtype, so it is not a match */
- if (sub[0] != '.')
- continue;
-
- /* whew, we found a subtype of this fstype */
- sub++; /* move past '.' */
-
- /* exact match of fstype AND subtype */
- if (!strcmp(subtype, sub))
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
break;
+ c = c->next;
}
- /* in case we had found an fstype match but no subtype match */
- if (!c)
- c = base;
-
if (c) {
sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index a91d205ec0c6..0462cb3ff0a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -209,19 +209,26 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
- * incoming packet.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
- struct sec_path *sp;
+ struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
- if (skb == NULL)
- goto out;
+ if (dst == NULL)
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+ x = dst->xfrm;
+ if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+
+ return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+ u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
- sp = skb->sp;
if (sp) {
int i;
@@ -248,6 +255,30 @@ out:
}
/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+ if (skb == NULL) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+ if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
@@ -327,19 +358,22 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
return rc;
ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!ctx) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
- kfree(ctx_str);
x->security = ctx;
atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
- return 0;
+out:
+ kfree(ctx_str);
+ return rc;
}
/*
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-14 07:01:31 +0000